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LECTUKES ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
LECTURES
ON THE
PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
TOGETHER WITH A WORK ON THE PROOFS
OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
BY GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL
TRANSLATED FROM THE SECOND GERMAN EDITION
BY THE REV. E, B. SPEIRS, B.D., AND
J. BURDON SANDERSON
THK TRANSLATION EDITED
BY THE REV. E. B. SPEIRS, B.D.
IN THREE VOLUMES
VOL. III.
LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH, TRUBNER, & CO. I£?
PATERNOSTER HOUSE, CHARING CROSS ROAD
1895
The right* of translation and of reproduction are reserved.
Printed by BALLANTVNE, HANSON & Co.
At the Ballnntyne Press
3k vff-ff '• £
v,3
CONTENTS
PART III
PAOK
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION — continued .... 1-151
C. The division of the subject 1-6
I. God in His eternal Idea in-and-for-self ; the king-
dom of the Father 7-33
1 . Determination in the element of thought . . 7
2. Absolute diremption . . . . . . 8
3. Trinity 9
II. The eternal Idea of God in the element of conscious-
ness and ordinary thought, or difference ; the
kingdom of the Son 33-100
1 . The positing of the difference . . . -35
2. The world 36
3. The essential nature of Man . .... 45
III. The Idea in the element of the-Church or Spiritual
Community ; the kingdom of the Spirit . 100-15 1
a. The conception of the Spiritual Community . . 108
b. The realisation of the Spiritual Community . . 123
c. The realisation of the spiritual in universal reality 134
LECTURES ON THE PROOFS OF THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
FIRST LECTURE
SECOND LECTURE .......
THIRD LECTURE . . . .
FOURTH LECTURK •
FIFTH LECTURK
SIXTH LECTURE .
SEVENTH LECTURK .
110796
vi CONTENTS
PAGK
EIGHTH LECTURE 2I2
NINTH LECTURE
TENTH LECTURE . . . • • • • • • 22^
ELEVENTH LECTURE . • • 266
TWELFTH LECTURE • 275
THIRTEENTH LECTURE 2°'
FOURTEENTH LECTURE . . ... • • • 293
FIFTEENTH LECTURE ' • 3°5
SIXTEENTH LECTURE . . . • • • • • 3J3
AMPLIFICATION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL PROOF . . - 32&
AMPLIFICATION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL
PROOFS 347
AMPLIFICATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PROOF 36°
INDEX • • • -368
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EELIGION
PAET III
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION— (Continued)
C.
THE DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
I. The absolute, eternal Idea is, in its essential existence,
in and for itself, God in His eternity before the creation
of the world, and outside of the world.
II. The Creation of the World. — What is thus created,
this otherness or other-Being, divides up within itself into
two sides, physical Nature and finite Spirit. What is
thus created is therefore an Other, and is placed at first
outside of God. It belongs to God's essential nature,
however, to reconcile to Himself this something which
is foreign to Him, this special or particular element which
comes into existence as something separated from Him,
just as it is the nature of the Idea which has separated
itself from itself and fallen away from itself, to bring
itself back from this lapse to its truth or true state.
III. It is the way or process of reconciliation whereby
Spirit unites and brings into harmony with itself what it
distinguished from itself in the state of diremption and
differentiation, and thus Spirit is the Holy Spirit, the
Spirit is present in its Church.
Thus the distinctions we make are not made in an
VOL. III. A
2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
external fashion ; but, on the contrary, the action, the
developed life-force of the Absolute Spirit, is itself an
eternal life ; it is a development and a carrying back of
this development into itself.
Put more definitely, what is involved in this idea is
that the universal Spirit, the Whole which this Spirit is,
posits itself together with its three characteristics or
determinations, develops itself, realises itself, and that
only at the end we have in a completed form what
constitutes at the same time its presupposition. It
exists at first as a Whole, it pre-posits or presupposes
itself, and exists likewise only at the end. Spirit has
thus to be considered in the three forms or elements in
which it posits itself.
The three forms indicated are : eternal Being in and
with itself, the form of Universality ; the form of mani-
festation or appearance, that of Particularisation, Being
for another ; the form of the return from appearance into
itself, absolute Singleness or individuality.
The divine Idea unfolds itself in these three forms.
Spirit is divine history, the process of self-differentiation,
of separation or diremption, and of the resumption of
this ; it is divine history, and this history is to be con-
sidered in each of these three forms.
Considered in relation to the subjective consciousness,
they may further be denned as follows. The first form
is the element of thought. In pure thought God is as
He is in-and-for-Himself, is revealed, but He has not yet
reached the stage of manifestation or appearance, He is
God in His eternal essence, God abiding with Himself
and yet revealed. According to the second form He
exists in the element of the popular or figurative idea,
in the element of particularisation. Consciousness here
takes up an attitude of reserve in reference to the
" Other," and this represents the stage of appearance or
manifestation. The third element is that of subjectivity
•as such. This subjectivity is partly immediate, and takes
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 3
the form of feeling, idea, sentiment ; but it is also partly
subjectivity which represents the Notion, thinking reason,
the thought of free Spirit, which is free only when it
returns into itself.
As regards place or space, the three forms, since they
appear as development and history in different places,
so to speak, are to be explained as follows. The divine
history in its first form takes place outside of the world,
outside of finitude where there is no space, representing
God as He is in His essential being or in-and-for-Himself.
The second form is represented by the divine history in
a real shape in the world, God in definite completed ex-
istence. The third stage is represented by the inner
place, the Spiritual Community, existing at first in the
world, but at the same time raising itself up to heaven,
and which as a Church already has Him in itself here on
earth, full of grace, active and present in the world.
It is also possible to characterise the three elements,
and to distinguish them in accordance with the note
of Time. In the first element God is beyond time, as the
eternal Idea, existing in the element, of eternity in so far
as eternity is contrasted with time. Thus time in this com-
plete and independent form, time in-and-for-self, unfolds
itself and breaks up into past, present, and future. Thus
the divine history in its second stage as appearance is re-
garded as the past, it is, it has Being, but it is Being which
is degraded to a mere semblance. In taking on the form
of appearance it is immediate existence, which is at the
same time negated, and this is the past. The divine
history is thus regarded as something past, as represent-
ing the Historical properly so called. The third element
is the present, yet it is only the limited present, not the
eternal present, but rather the present which distinguishes
itself from the past and future, and represents the element
of feeling, of the immediate subjectivity of spiritual Being
which is now. The present must, however, also represent
the third element ; the Church raises itself to Heaven too,
4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and thus this Present is one which raises itself as well
and is essentially reconciled, and is brought by means of
the negation of its immediacy to a perfected form as
universality, a perfection or completion which, however,
does not yet exist, and which is therefore to be conceived
of as future. It is a Now of the present whose perfect
stage is before it, but this perfect stage is distinguished
from the particular Now which is still immediacy, and it
is thought of as future.
We have, speaking generally, to consider the Idea as
divine self-revelation, and this revelation is to be taken
in the sense indicated by the three categories just men-
tioned.
According to the first of these, God exists in a pure
form for the finite spirit only as thought. This is the
theoretical consciousness in which the thinking subject
exists in a condition of absolute composure, and is not
yet posited in this relation, not yet posited in the form of
a process, but exists in the absolutely unmoved calm of
the thinking spirit. Here God is for it thought of, exists
for thought, and Spirit thus rests in the simple conclusion
that He brings Himself into harmony with Himself by
means of His difference — which, however, here exists only
in the form of pure ideality, and has not yet reached the
form of externality — and is in immediate unity with
Himself. This is the first of these relations, and it exists
solely for the thinking subject which is occupied with
the pure content only. This is the Kingdom of the
Father.
The second characteristic is the Kingdom of the
Son, in which God exists, in a general way, for idea or
figurative thought in the element of mental pictures or
representation by ideas. This is the moment of separa-
tion or particularisation in general. Looked at from this
second standpoint, what in the first stage represented
God's Other or object, without, however, being defined as
such, now receives the character or determination of an
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 5
Other. Considered from the first standpoint, God as the
Son is not distinguished from the Father, but what is
stated of Him is expressed merely in terms of feeling.
In connection with the second element, however, the Son
is characterised as an Other or object, and thus we pass
out of the pure ideality of Thought into the region of
ordinary thought or idea. If, according to the first
characterisation, God begets only one Son, here He pro-
duces Nature. Here the Other is Nature, and the
element of difference thus receives its justification. What
is thus differentiated is Nature, the world in general, and
Spirit which is related to it, the natural Spirit. Here
the element which we have already designated Subject
comes in, and itself constitutes the content. Man is
here involved in the content. Since Man is here related
to Nature, and is himself natural, he has this character
only within the sphere of religion, and consequently we
have here to consider Nature and Man from the point of
view of religion. The Son comes into the world, and
this is the beginning of faith. When we speak of the
coming of the Son into the world we are already using
the language of faith. God cannot really exist for the
finite spirit as such, for in the very fact that God exists
for it it is directly involved that the finite spirit does not
maintain its finitude as something having Being, but that
it stands in a certain relation to Spirit and is reconciled to
God. In its character as the finite spirit it is represented
as in a state of revolt and separation with regard to God.
It is thus in contradiction with what is its own object
and content, and in this contradiction lies the necessity
for its abolition and elevation to a higher form. The
necessity for this supplies the starting-point, and the
next step in advance is that God exists for Spirit, that
the divine content presents itself in a pictorial form to
Spirit. Here, however, Spirit exists at the same time
in an empirical and finite form, and thus what God is
appears to Spirit in an empirical way. Since, however,
6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the Divine comes into view, and exists for Spirit in
history of this kind, this history has no longer the
character of outward history ; it becomes divine history,
the history of the manifestation of God Himself. This
constitutes the transition to the Kingdom of the Spirit,
in which we have the consciousness that Man is im-
plicitly reconciled to God, and that this reconciliation
exists for Man. The process of reconciliation itself is
contained in Worship.
It has to he noted further that we do not, as we did
previously, draw a distinction between Notion, Form, and
Worship. It will become evident, as we go on to treat
of the subject, that worship enters in directly everywhere.
The following general remarks may here be made on this
point. The element with which we have got to do is
Spirit, and Spirit is what manifests itself, what essen-
tially exists for self, or has actual existence, and as thus
conceived of it never exists alone, but always possesses
the character of something revealed, something which
exists for an Other, for its own Other, i.e., for that side of
Being which is represented by the finite spirit. Worship
thus is the relation of the finite spirit to the absolute
Spirit, and for this reason we find that this idea of wor-
ship is present in each of these elements.
In this connection a distinction has to be drawn be-
tween the Idea as it exists in the various elements for
the Notion, and the Idea as it appears in the form of
ordinary conception. Religion is universal, not only for
thought which is marked by culture and intellectual
grasp, for the philosophical consciousness ; but the truth
of the Idea of God is manifest also to the ordinary con-
sciousness which represents things pictorially by ideas,
and is marked by those necessary characteristics which
are inseparable from the ordinary or popular ideas of
things.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION
GOD IN HIS ETERNAL IDEA IN-AND-FOR-SELF.
Thus, regarded in the element of thought, God is, so
to speak, outside of or before the creation of the world.
In so far as He is thus in Himself, He represents the
eternal Idea which is not yet posited in its reality, but
is itself as yet merely the abstract Idea.
Thus God in His eternal Idea still exists in the
abstract element of thought, and not in that of notional
comprehension. It is this pure Idea with which we are
already acquainted. This is the element of thought, the
Idea in its eternal presence, as it exists for free thought,
whose fundamental characteristic is the untroubled light,
self-identity, an element which is as yet unaffected by
the presence of Being other than itself.
Within this sphere or element (i.) Determination is
necessary, inasmuch as thought in general is different
from thought which comprehends or grasps the process
of Spirit. The eternal Idea in its essential existence,
in-and-for-self, is present in thought, the Idea in its
absolute truth. Eeligion has thus a content, and the
content is an object ; religion is the religion of men, and
Man, besides his other qualities, is a thinking conscious-
ness, and therefore the Idea must exist for thinking
consciousness. But this is not all that Man is, for it
is in the sphere of thought that he first finds his true
nature, and it is only for thought that a universal object
exists, only to thought can the essence of the object
show itself; and since in religion God is the object, He
is essentially an object for thought. He is object inas-
much as Spirit is consciousness, and He exists for thought
because it is God who is the object.
For sensuous or reflective consciousness God cannot
exist as God, i.e., in His eternal and absolute essentiality.
His manifestation of Himself is something different from
8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
this, and is made to sensuous consciousness. If God
were present only in feeling, then men would be no higher
than the beasts. It is true that He does exist for feel-
ing too, but only in the region of appearance or mani-
festation. Nor does He exist for consciousness of the
rationalistic type. Eeflection is certainly thought too ;
but it has at the same time an accidental character, and
because of this its content is something chosen at random,
and is limited. God is certainly not a content of this
kind. He thus exists essentially for thought. It is
necessary to put the matter thus when we start from
what is subjective, from Man. But this is the very truth
we reach, too, when we start from God. Spirit exists
for the spirit for which it does exist, only in so far as it
reveals and differentiates itself, and this is the eternal
Idea, thinking Spirit, Spirit in the element of its freedom.
In this region God is the self-revealer, just because He is
Spirit ; but He is not yet present as outward manifestation.
That God exists for Spirit is thus an essential principle. '
Spirit is what thinks. Within this pure thought the
relation is of an immediate kind, and there exists no
difference between the two elements to differentiate them.
Nothing comes between them. Thought is pure unity
with itself, from which all that is obscure and dark has
disappeared. This kind of thought may also be called
pure intuition, as being the simple form of the activity
of thought, so that there is nothing between the subject
and the object, as these two do not yet really exist. This
kind of thought has no limitation, it is universal activity,
and its content is no other than the Universal itself ; it
is pure pulsation within itself.
2. It, however, passes further into the stage of abso-
lute Diremption. How does this differentiation come
about ? Thought is actu, unlimited. The element of
difference in its most immediate form consists in this
that the two sides which we have seen to be the two sorts
of modes in which the principle appears, show their dif-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 9
ference in their differing starting-points. The one side,
subjective thought, is the movement of thought in so far
as it starts from immediate individual Being, and, while
within this, raises itself to what is Universal and Infinite,
as is the case with the first proof of the existence of God.
In so far as it has arrived at the stage of the Universal,
thought is unlimited ; its end is infinitely pure thought,
so that all the mist of fmitude has disappeared, and it
here thinks God ; every trace of separation has vanished,
and thus religion, thinking upon God, begins. The second
side is that which has for its starting-point the Universal,
the result of that first movement, thought, the Notion.
The Universal is, however, in its turn again an inner
movement, and its nature is to differentiate itself within
itself, and thus to preserve within itself the element of dif-
ference, but yet to do this in such a way as not to disturb
the universality which is also there. Here universality
is something which has this element of difference within it-
self, and is in harmony with itself. This represents the
abstract content of thought, and this abstract thought is
the result which has followed from what has taken place.
The two sides are thus mutually opposed or contrasted.
Subjective Thought, the thought of the finite spirit, is a
Process too, inner mediation ; but this process goes on
outside of it, or behind it. It is only in so far as sub-
jective thought has raised itself to something higher that
religion begins, and thus what we have in religion is
pure motionless abstract thought. The concrete, on the
other hand, is found in its Object, for this is the kind of
thought which starts from the Universal, which differen-
tiates itself, and consequently is in harmony with itself.
It is this concrete element which is the object for thought,
taking thought in a general sense. This kind of thought
is thus abstract thought, and consequently the finite,
for the abstract is finite ; the concrete is the truth, the
infinite object.
3. God is Spirit; in His abstract character He is
io THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
characterised as universal Spirit which particularises
itself. This represents the absolute truth, and that
religion is the true one which possesses this content.
Spirit is the process referred to ; it is movement, life ;
its nature is to differentiate itself, to give itself a definite
character, to determine itself ; and the first form of the
differentiation consists in this, that Spirit appears as the
universal Idea itself. This Universal contains the entire
Idea, but it only contains it, it is the Idea potentially only.
In the act of judgment or separation, the Other, what
is put in contrast with the Universal, the Particular, is
God as that which is distinguished from the Universal,
but as implying that what is thus distinguished repre-
sents His entire Idea in-and-for-itself. Thus these two
characteristics mean the same thing in reference to each
other — mean that there is an identity between them,
that they are one, that this difference is not merely done
away with implicitly and that we are merely aware of
this, but that the fact of their being the same has been
brought forward into actuality or posited, and that these
differences are done away with in so far as this differen-
tiation just means that the difference is actually shown
to be no difference, and thus the One is at home with
itself in the Other.
The fact that this is so is just what is meant by
Spirit, or, expressed in terms of feeling, by eternal Love.
The Holy Spirit is eternal love. When we say God is
love, we are expressing a very great and true thought ;
but it would be unreasonable merely to take this in such
a simple way as a simple characterisation of God without
analysing the meaning of love.
For love implies a distinguishing between two, and
yet these two are, as a matter of fact, not distinguished
from one another. Love, this sense of being outside of
myself, is the feeling and consciousness of this identity.
My self-consciousness is not in myself, but in another ; but
this Other in whom alone I find satisfaction and am at
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION II
peace with myself — and I exist only in so far as I am
at peace with myself, for if I had not this inner peace I
would be the contradiction which breaks itself up into
parts— this Other, just because it is outside of me, has its
self-consciousness only in me. Thus the two are repre-
sented simply by this consciousness of their being outside
of themselves and of their identity, and this perception,
this feeling, this knowledge of the unity, is love.
God is love ; i.e., He represents the distinction referred
to, and the nullity of this distinction, the sort of play of
this act of distinction which is not to be taken seriously,
and which is therefore posited as something abolished,
i.e., as the eternal, simple Idea.
This eternal Idea, accordingly, finds expression in the
Christian religion under the name of the Holy Trinity,
and this is God Himself, the eternal Triune God.
Here God exists only for the man who thinks, who
keeps within the quiet of his own mind. The ancients
called this enthusiasm ; it is pure theoretic contempla-
tion, the supreme repose of thought, but at the same
time its highest activity manifested in grasping the pure
Idea of God and becoming conscious of this Idea. The
mystery of the dogma of God's nature is disclosed to
men ; they believe in it, and have already vouchsafed
to them the highest truth, although they apprehend it
only iu the form of a popular or figurative idea, without
being conscious of the necessary nature of this truth, and
without grasping it in its entirety or comprehending it.
Truth is the unveiling of what Spirit is in-and-for-itself.
Man is himself Spirit, and therefore the truth exists for
him. To begin with, however, the truth which comes
to him does not yet possess for him the form of freedom ;
it is for him merely something given and received, which,
however, he can receive only because he is Spirit. This
truth, this Idea, has been called the dogma of the Trinity.
God is Spirit, the activity of pure thought, the activity
which is not outside of itself, which is within the sphere
12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
of its own being. * It was Aristotle chiefly who conceived
of God under the abstract determination of activity.
Pure activity is knowledge (in the scholastic period actus
purus) ; but in order that it may actually appear as
activity, it has to be posited iii its moments or stages.
Knowledge implies the existence of an Other or object
which is consciously known, and since it is knowledge
which knows it, it is reckoned as belonging to it. * This
explains how God, who represents Being in-and-for-self,
eternally produces Himself in the form of His Son, dis-
tinguishes Himself from Himself, and is the absolute act
of judgment or differentiation. What He thus distin-
guishes from Himself does not take on the form of some-
thing which is other than Himself; but, on the contrary,
what is thus distinguished is nothing more nor less than
that from which it has been distinguished. God is
Spirit ; and no darkness, no colouring or mixture enters
into this pure light. The relation between Father and
Son is expressed in terms of organic life, and is used in
the popular or figurative sense. This natural relation is
merely pictorial, and, accordingly, never entirely corre-
sponds to the truth that is sought to be expressed. We
say that God eternally begets His Son, that God dis-
tinguishes Himself from Himself, and thus we begin to
say of God that He does this, and that in being in the
Other whom He has brought into definite existence, or
posited, He is simply with Himself, has not gone outside
of Himself, and this is the form of love ; but, at the same
time, we ought to know that God is Himself just this
entire act. God is the beginning ; He does this definite
thing; but He is equally the end only, the totality, and
it is as totality that God is Spirit. God thought of
simply as the Father is not yet the True. (Thus in the
Jewish religion He is conceived of without the Son.)
He is, on the contrary, Beginning and End ; He is His
own presupposition, He constitutes Himself His pre-
supposition— this is simply another form of the fact of
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 13
differentiation — He is the eternal Process. The fact that
this is the truth, and the absolute truth, appears rather
in the form of something given or taken for granted.
That this should be consciously known as the entire and
absolute truth, the truth in-and-for-itself, is, however,
just the work of philosophy, and is the entire content of
philosophy. In it it is seen how all that constitutes Nature
and Spirit presses forward in a dialectic form to this
central point as to its absolute truth. Here we are not
concerned to prove that the dogma, this silent mystery,
is the eternal Truth. That is done, as has been said,
in the whole of philosophy.
By way of giving a more definite explanation of these
characteristics, we may further call attention to the
following points : —
(a.) When the intention is to express what God is,
the attributes are what is first thought of. These attri-
butes are God ; He is defined by means of predicates,
and this is a mode of expressing the truth which is char-
acteristic of the ordinary thought, of the understanding.
Predicates are definite characteristics, particularisations,
such as goodness, almighty power, &c.
The predicates certainly do not represent natural
immediacy, but have got a permanence by means of
reflection, and in this way the definite content which
they represent has become immovably fixed in itself,
exactly as is the natural content by means of which
God is represented in the religion of Nature. Natural
objects, such as the sun, the sea, &c., are, they exist ; but
the determinations of reflection are as much self-identical
as is natural immediacy.
As Orientals have a feeling that this is not the true
mode of expressing the nature of God, they say that He
is TroAiww/xos, that His nature cannot be exhausted by
predicates, for names are in this connection the same
as predicates.
What is really defective in this way of defining God
•14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
by means of predicates is that these predicates are only
particular characterisations, and that there are many such
particular characterisations, and that it is the subject as
essentially undifferentiated to which they are attached ;
and this explains, too, how there comes to be such an
infinite number of predicates. Since there are particu-
lar determinations, and since these particularisations are
viewed in accordance with their determinateness, and ave
made the subject of thought, they come to be in opposition
or contradiction with each other, and these contradictions
accordingly are not harmonised.
This is further seen when these predicates are taken
as expressing the relation of God to the world, and when
the world is thought of as something different from God.
Being particularisatious, they cannot adequately express
His nature, and this explains that other way of consider-
ing them as expressing certain relations between God and
the world, such as the omnipresence, the infinite wisdom
of God in the world.
They do not contain the true relation of God to Him- /
self, but to an Other, the world namely, and thus they
are limited, and in this way get to be contradictory. We
have the feeling that God is not represented in this way
as living when so many particular features are counted
up one after the other. Nor is the contradiction which
they involve truly harmonised by taking away their deter-
minateness when the Understanding demands that they
should be taken merely sensu eminentiori. The true
harmony or solution of the contradiction is contained in
the Idea, which is the self-determination of God to the
act of distinguishing Himself from Himself, but is at the
same time the eternal abolition of the distinction.
If the element of difference were left remaining, there
would be contradiction, and if this difference were perma-
nent, then finitude would arise. Both are independent
in reference to each other, and they are in relation to each
other as well. It is not the nature of the Idea to allow
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 15
the difference to remain ; but, on the contrary, its nature
is just to resolve or cancel the difference. God posits
Himself in this element of difference, but He also
abolishes it as well.
When accordingly we attach predicates to God in
such a way as to make them particular, our first concern
is to harmonise this contradiction. This is an external
act, the act of our reflection, and consequently, owing to
the fact that it is external and takes place in us, and is
not the content of the Divine Idea, it follows that the
contradictions cannot be harmonised. The Idea in its
very nature implies the abolition of the contradiction.
Its essential content and nature consists in the very fact
that it posits this difference and cancels it absolutely,
and this represents the living nature of the Idea itself.
(6.) In the metaphysical proofs of the existence of
God, we can see that, in passing from Notion to Being,
the Notion is not thought of merely as Notion, but as
existing also, as having reality. It is in connection with
the standpoint with which we are now dealing, that the
necessity arises of making the transition' from the Notion
to Being.
The divine Notion is the pure Notion, the Notion
without any limitation whatsoever. The Idea implies
that the Notion determines itself, and consequently posits
itself as something different from itself. This is a mo-
ment or stage of the divine Idea itself, and just because
the thinking, reflecting spirit has this content before it,
there arises the necessity for this transition, this forward
movement.
The logical element of this transition is contained in
those so-called proofs. It is within the Notion itself,
and with the Notion as the starting-point, and, in fact, by
means of the Notion, that the transition must be made to
objectivity, to Being, and this in the element of thought.
This which appears in the form of a subjective necessity
is content, is the one moment of the divine Idea itself.
1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
When we say, God has created a world, we imply
that there has been a transition from the Notion to
objectivity, only the world is here characterised as
essentially God's Other, and as being the negation of
God, outside of God, without God, godless. In so far as
the world is denned as this Other, the difference does
not present itself to us as being in the Notion itself or
as contained in the Notion ; i.e., Being, Objectivity must
be shown to be in the Notion, must be shown to exist
in the form of activity, consequence, determination of
the Notion itself.
It is thus shown, at the same time, that this is im-
plicitly the same content, that the necessity for transi-
tion is seen in the form of the proof of the existence of
God referred to. In the absolute Idea, in the element of
thought, God is this purely concrete Universal, i.e., He
is thought of as positing Himself as an Other, but in
such a way that this Other is immediately and directly
characterised as God Himself, and the difference as being
merely ideal is directly done away with, and does not
attain to the form of externality, and this just means
that what has thus been posited as difference has been
shown to exist in and to be involved in the Notion.
It is characteristic of the logical sphere in which this
shows itself that it is the nature of every definite concep-
tion or notion to annul itself, to be its own contradiction,
and consequently to appear as its own difference, and
to posit itself as such. Thus the Notion itself is still
affected by this element of one-sidedness and finitude,
and is something subjective ; and the characteristics of the
Notion, its differences, are posited as ideal merely, and
do not actually appear in a definite form as differences.
Such is the Notion which gives itself an objective form.
When we say God, we speak of Him merely as
abstract ; or when we say God the Father, the Universal,
we speak of Him in terms of finite existence merely.
His infinitude consists just in this, that He does away
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 17
•with this form of abstract universality, of immediacy,
and in this way difference is posited ; but it is just
His very nature to abolish this difference. It is con-
sequently then only that He is truly reality, truth,
infinitude.
This Idea is the speculative or philosophical Idea,
i.e., the rational element, and inasmuch as it is reached by
thinking, it is the act of thinking upon what is rational.
Thought which is not speculative, thought which is the
product of the Understanding, is the thought which does
not get beyond difference as difference, nor beyond the
finite and the infinite. Both have an absoluteness attri-
buted to them, and yet they are thought of as being in
relation to each other, and as so far constituting a unity,
and consequently as having in them the element of con-
tradiction.
(c.) This speculative Idea stands opposed to the sense
element in thought and also to the Understanding. It is
consequently a secret or mystery to the senses and their
way of looking at things, and to the Understanding also.
For both it is a /uLixmipiov, i.e., so far as regards what
is rational in it. The nature of God is indeed not a
mystery in the ordinary sense of the term, and least
of all in the Christian religion, for in it God has com-
municated the knowledge of Himself, He has shown
what He is, He has revealed Himself; but it is a mys-
tery for sense-perception, for idea or ordinary thought,
for the senses and their way of looking at things, and
for the Understanding.
Speaking generally, the fundamental characteristic of
the sensuous is externality, the idea of things as being
outside of one another. In space the differences are
contiguous, in time they are successive. Space and
Time represent the externality in which they exist.
Thus it is characteristic of the mode of regarding things
which belongs to the senses, that differences should pre-
sent themselves as lying outside of one another,
VOL. III. B
18 TRIE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Thus, -sense-knowledge is based on the idea that the
•differences have an independent existence and remain
external to one another.
Thus, for the senses, w-hat is in the Idea is a mystery,
for in the region of the Idea, the way in which things
-are looked at, the relations ascribed to things, and the
categories employed, are entirely different from what we
have in the region of sense. The Idea is just this act
•of distinguishing or differentiation which at the same time
-gives no difference and does not hold to this difference
as permanent. God beholds Himself in what is differen-
tiated ; and when in His Other He is united merely with
Himself, He is there with no other but Himself, He is
in close union only with Himself, He beholds Himself in
His Other.
In connection with the senses we have something
•quite the reverse of this. In sense- knowledge one thing
is here and another there, each passes for something in-
dependent, it does not pass for being something which is
what it is because it finds itself in an Other. In the region
of sense-knowledge two things cannot be in one and the
••same place ; they are mutually exclusive.
In the Idea the differences are posited, not as exclusive,
but as existing only in this mutual inclusion of the one
by the other. This is the true superseusuous, not the
ordinary supersensuous, which is regarded as something
above ; fdr this latter equally belongs to the region of
the sensuous, in which things are outside of one another
and indifferent to one another. In so far as God is
•characterised as Spirit, externality is done away with
and absorbed, and therefore this is a mystery for
sense.
This Idea is equally something beyond the grasp of
the Understanding and is for it a secret, for it is the very
nature of the Understanding to hold fast by and keep
unchangeably to the idea that the categories of thought
are absolutely exclusive and different, and that they
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 19
remain unalterably independent in relation to each other.
The Positive is not the same as the Negative, as, for
example, cause-effect.
But, so far as the Notion is concerned, it is equally
true that these differences cancel themselves. It is just
because they are differences that they remain finite, and
it is the nature of the Understanding to stick to the
finite, and even when it is dealing with the Infinite
itself it has the Infinite on the one side and the finite
on the other.
The real truth is that the finite, and the Infinite which
is put in contrast with the finite, have no true existence,
but are themselves merely transitory. So far this is a
secret for the sensuous way of conceiving of things and for
the Understanding, and they struggle against the element
of rationality in the Idea. Those who oppose the doc-
trine of the Trinity are men who are guided merely by
their senses and understanding.
The Understanding is equally powerless to grasp the
meaning of anything else whatever, or to get at the truth
regarding anything. Animal life also exists as Idea, as
a unity of the notion or conception of the soul and bodily
form. For the Understanding each of these exists for
itself. They are undoubtedly different, but it is equally
their nature to abolish this difference. Life is simply
this perennial process. What has life exists ; it has
impulses, needs, and consequently it has within itself
difference, and this originates within it. There thus
comes to be a contradiction, and the Understanding takes
these differences as implying that the contradiction does
not cancel itself; when they are brought into relation
with each other nothing exists but just the contradiction,
which cannot be cancelled.
The contradiction is there; it cannot cease to exist if
the elements of difference are held to be perennial elements
of difference, just because it is the fact of this difference
that is insisted upon. "What has life has certain needs,
20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and thus involves a contradiction, but the satisfaction of
these is the removal of the contradiction.
In the case of impulse, in the presence of any need, I
am distinguished from myself, and this within myself.
But life just means the harmonising of the contradiction,
the satisfying of the need, the attainment of peace, in
such a way, however, that a contradiction springs up
again. What we have is the alternation of the act of
differentiation or contradiction, and of the removal of the
contradiction.
The two are different in point of time, the element of
succession is present in connection with them, and they
are on that account finite. Here, too, the Understanding,
in considering impulse and the satisfaction of impulse by
themselves, fails to grasp the truth that in the very act
of affirmation, in the very feeling of self, there is at the
same time contained the negation of the feeling of self,
limitation, defect, and yet I as having this feeling of self
at once pass beyond this element of defect.
This is the ordinary definite idea of a pva-ri'ipiov. A
mystery is also described as the incomprehensible ; but
it is just the Notion itself, the speculative element in
thought, which is described as incomprehensible, the
fact that what is rational is stated in terms of thought.
It is just by means of thought that the element of dif-
ference is definitely developed.
The thinking of the impulse is merely the analysis of
what the impulse is ; the affirmation and the negation
involved in it, the feeling of self, the satisfaction of the
impulse and the impulse. To think it is just to recog-
nise the element of difference which is in it. When,
accordingly, the Understanding gets so far, it says : this is
a contradiction, and it remains at this point, it holds by
the contradiction in face of experience, which teaches that
life itself just means the removal of the contradiction.
Thus, when the impulse is analysed, the contradiction
comes to light, and then it can be said : impulse is some-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 21
thing incomprehensible. The nature of God is equally
something incomprehensible. This Incomprehensible is
really nothing but the Notion itself, which involves the
power of differentiation, and the Understanding does not
get beyond the fact of the existence of the difference.
Thus it says : this cannot be comprehended ; for the
principle of the Understanding is abstract self-identity,
and not concrete identity, according to which these dif-
ferences exist in something which is one. For the Under-
standing God is the One, the Essence of Essences. This
empty identity without difference is the false representa-
tion of God given by the Understanding and by modern
theology. God is Spirit, what gives itself an objective
form and knows itself in that. This is concrete identity,
and thus the Idea is also an essential moment. According
to the idea of abstract identity, on the other hand, the
One and the Other exist independently, each for itself,
and are at the same time related to each other, and
therefore we get a contradiction.
This, then, is what is called the incomprehensible.
The cancelling or resolution of the contradiction is the
Notion; the Understanding does not get the length of
the cancelling of the contradiction, because it starts with
the presupposition of its existence ; for it the two sides
which form the contradiction are and remain in a state
of mutual independence.
One reason why it is said that the Divine Idea is
incomprehensible is that, since religion, the truth, exists
for all men, the content of the Idea appears in a sen-
suous form, or in the form of something which can be
grasped by the Understanding. It appears, we repeat,
in a sensuous form, and so we have the expressions
Father and Son descriptive of a relation which exists in
the sphere of life, a designation which has been adopted
from what is seen in the sense-life.
In religion the truth is revealed in accordance with
the content ; but it is something different for it to appear
22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
in the form of the Notion, of thought, or as the Notion
in a speculative form. However happily expressed those
nai've forms, such as begetting, son, &c., given to faith,
may be, whenever the Understanding takes them in hand
and applies its categories to them, they are at once per-
verted, and whenever it is in the mood it does not cease
to point out the contradictions involved in them. It
gets the power and the right to do this from the differen-
tiation and reflection into themselves which exist in these
forms. But it is just God or Spirit who Himself abolishes
these contradictions. He does not require to wait for
the Understanding to remove those characteristics which
contain contradiction. It is just the very nature of
Spirit to remove them ; and so, too, it belongs essen-
tially to Spirit to posit these characteristics, to make dis-
tinctions within itself, to bring about this separation or
diremption.
When, again, we say that the idea of God in His
eternal universality implies that He differentiates Him-
self, determines Himself, posits something that is His
Other or object, and at the same time abolishes the dif-
ference, is not outside of Himself in the difference, and
is Spirit only through what He thus accomplishes, then
we get another example of how the Understanding treats
the question. It takes up this thought, brings its cate-
gories of finitude to bear upon it, counts one, two, three,
and introduces into it the unfortunate category of number.
Here, however, we have nothing to do with number ;
numeration is something which implies utter absence of
thought, and if we introduce this category here we intro-
duce the element of incomprehensibility.
It is possible in the exercise of Reason to make use
of all the categories of the Understanding which imply
relation. Reason, however, does not only use them, it
destroys them, and so, too, here. This is indeed hard for
the Understanding, since it imagines that because they
have been made use of they have won some kind of right
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 23
to exist. They are, however, misused when, as here, they
are used in connection with the expression, three are
one. It is accordingly easy to point out that there are
contradictions in such ideas, differences which get the
length of being opposites, and the sterile Understanding
prides itself on amassing these. In all that is concrete,
in all that has life, this contradiction is involved, as has
been already shown. It is only the dead Understanding
that is self-identical. In the Idea, on the other hand, we
see the contradiction cancelled as well, and it is just this
cancelling or harmonising which is spiritual unity.
To enumerate the moments of the Idea as three units
appears to be- something quite ingenuous and natural,
and which does not require to be explained. Only, in
accordance with the nature of number, which is here
introduced into the matter, each characteristic gets a
fixed form as one, and we are required to conceive of three
units as only one unit, a demand which it is extremely
hard to entertain, and which is, as is sometimes said, an
utterly irrational demand.
It is the Understanding alone that is always haunted
by this idea of the absolute independence of the unit or
One, this idea of absolute separation and rupture. If, on
the contrary, we regard the matter from the point of view
of logic, we see that the One has an inner dialectic move-
ment, and is not truly independent. It is only necessary
to think of matter which is the true One or unity that
offers resistance, but which is subject to the law of gravi-
tation, i.e., it makes an effort not to be one, and rather
to do away with its state of independence, and thus con-
fesses that this is a nullity. In fact, just because it is
only matter, and continues to be the most external exter-
nality, it remains in the condition merely of something
which ought to be. Matter as such is the poorest, most
external, most unspiritual mode of existence ; but it is
gravitation, or the abolition of the oneness, which consti-
tutes the fundamental characteristic of matter.
24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The idea of a unit or a One is, to begin with, something
wholly abstract ; these units get a still deeper meaning
when they are expressed in terms of Spirit since they are
characterised as persons. Personality is something which
is essentially based on freedom, freedom in its first, deepest,
most inward form, but also in its most abstract form as
the freedom which proclaims its presence in the subject
by saying, I am a person, I exist for myself. This is
isolation pure and simple, a condition of pure reserve.
When, therefore, these differences are defined thus, and
each is taken as a unit, or in fact as a person, owing
to the infinite form according to which each moment is
regarded as a subject, the difficulty of satisfying the
demand of the Idea that these differences should be
regarded as differences which are not different, but are
purely one, and that this difference should be abolished,
appears to be still more insurmountable.
Two cannot be one ; each person has a rigid, reserved,
independent, self-centred existence. Logic shows that
the category of the unit is a poor category, a wholly
abstract unit. But when we are dealing with personality,
the contradiction seems to be pushed so far as to be
incapable of any solution ; still the solution is contained
in the fact that there is only one person, and this three-
fold personality, this personality which is consequently
posited merely as a vanishing moment, expresses the
truth that the antithesis is an absolute one, and is not
to be taken as an inferior antithesis, and that it is just
exactly when it has got to this point it abolishes itself.
It is, in short, the nature or character of what we mean by
person or subject to abolish its isolation, its separateness.
Morality, love, just mean the giving up of particularity
or of the particular personality and its extension to uni-
versality, and so, too, is it with the family and friend-
ship, for there you have the identity of the one with
the other. Inasmuch as I act rightly towards another, I
consider him as identical with myself. In friendship and
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 25
love I give up my abstract personality, and in this way ~
win it back as concrete personality.
It is just this winning back of personality by the act
of absorption, by the being absorbed into the other, which
constitutes the true nature of personality. Such forms
of the Understanding directly prove themselves in experi-
ence to be of those which annul themselves.
In love, in friendship, it is the person or individual
who maintains himself, and by means of love gets the
subjectivity which is his personality. If here, in con-
nection with religion, the idea of personality is clung to
in an abstract way, then we get three Gods, and the
infinite form, absolute negativity is forgotten, or if per-
sonality is regarded as not cancelled, then we have evil,
for personality which does not yield itself up to the
absolute Idea is evil. In the divine unity personality is ^
held to be cancelled, and it is only in appearance that
the negativity of personality is distinguished from that
whereby it is done away with.
The Trinity has been reduced to a relation of Father,
Son, and Spirit, and this is a childlike relation, a child-
like natural form. The Understanding has no category,
no relation which in point of suitability for expressing the
truth can be compared with this. At the same time it
must be understood that it is merely pictorial, and that
Spirit does not actually enter into a relation of this kind.
Love would be a still more suitable expression, but Spirit
is the really true one.
The abstract God, the Father, is the Universal, the
eternal, all - embracing, total particularity. We have
reached the stage of Spirit ; here the Universal includes
everything within itself; the Other, the Son, is infinite
particularity, manifestation ; the third, the Spirit, is indi-
viduality as such. The Universal, however, as totality is
itself Spirit ; all three are Spirit. In the third, God is
Spirit, we say, but He is presupposed to be this as well,
and the third is also the first. This is a truth which
26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
must be held to as essential. When, for instance, W3
say that God, in accordance with His conception or
notion, is potentially the immediate Power which differ-
entiates itself and returns to itself, it is implied that He
is this only as being negativity which is immediately
related to itself, i.e., as absolute reflection into self, which
is just the characteristic of Spirit. Should we, accord-
ingly, wish to speak of God as presented in His first
determination, in accordance with His Notion, and should
we wish to go on from this to the other determinations,
we are already speaking of the third ; the last is the first.
When, in order to avoid this, and if we begin in an
abstract way, we speak of the first only in accordance
with its own determination, or when the imperfection
of the notion renders it necessary to do this, then the
first is the Universal, and that activity, that begetting or
creating, is already a principle distinct from the abstract-
Universal, which thus appears and can appear as a second
principle, as something which manifests itself, externalises
itself {Logos, Sophia), just as the first exists as the abyss
of Being. This is made clear by the nature of the
Notion itself. It comes to the front in connection with
every end and with every manifestation of life. Life
maintains itself; to maintain or preserve means to pass
into difference, into the struggle with particularity, means
that something finds itself to be distinct from inorganic
nature. Life is thus only a resultant inasmuch as it
has brought itself into being, is a product which in turn
produces ; what is thus produced is itself living, i.e., it is
its own presupposition, it passes through its process, and
nothing new comes out of this ; what is produced was
already there from the beginning. The same holds true
of love and reciprocal love. In so far as love exists, it is
the beginning, and all action is merely its confirmation by
which it is at once produced and nourished. But what is
produced already exists, it is confirmation of the presence
of love, since nothing comes out of it but what is already
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 27
there. In the same way Spirit presupposes itself, it is
what begins.
The differentiation through which the Divine Life
passes is not of an external kind, but must be defined
as an inward differentiation in such a way that the First,
or the Father, is to be conceived of as the Last. The
process is thus nothing but the play of self-preservation
or self-confirmation. This characteristic is of importance
in this respect that it constitutes the criterion by which
to estimate the value of many of the popular conceptions
of God, and by which what is defective in them can be
detected and criticised, and it is specially owing to the
presence of that defective element that this characteristic
is often overlooked or misunderstood.
We are considering the Idea in its universality, as it
exists in pure thought, and as defined by means of pure
thought. This Idea is all truth and the one truth, and
consequently everything particular which is to be con-
ceived of as true must be conceived of in accordance with
the Form of this Idea.
Nature and the finite spirit are a product of God, and
therefore possess rationality. The fact that they have
been made by God involves their having truth in them-
selves, divine truth in general, i.e., the characteristic of
this Idea considered generally.
The Form of this Idea exists in God only as Spirit ; if
the Divine Idea exists in those forms which belong to
finitude, it is not in that case posited in its true and
entire nature, in-and-for-self ; it is only in Spirit that it
is so posited. In these finite forms it exists in a finite
way ; but the world is something which has been produced
by God, and therefore the Divine Idea always constitutes
its basis if we consider it in a general aspect. To kuow
the truth regarding anything just means to know it and
define it in accordance with the form of this Idea.
In the earlier religions, particularly in the religion of
India, we have ideas which are in accord with that of the
28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Trinity as the true determination. This idea of threefold-
ness was actually consciously reached, the idea that the
One cannot continue to exist as One and has not the
true form it ought to have, that the One does not repre-
sent the truth except as it appears in the form of move-
ment, of difference in general, and as standing in relation
to some other. Trimurti is the rudest form in which
this determination appears.
The third is not, however, Spirit, is not true reconcilia-
tion, but origination and decay, change in fact, a category
which is a unity of these differences, but represents a
union of a very subordinate kind.
It is not in immediate Appearance or manifestation,
but only when Spirit has taken up its abode in the
Church, when it is immediate, believing Spirit, and raises
itself to the stage of thought, that the Idea reaches per-
fection. We are interested in considering the workings
or ferment of this Idea, and in learning to recognise what
lies at the basis of the marvellous manifestations which
occur. The definition of God as the Three-in-One is one
which, so far as philosophy is concerned, has quite ceased
to be used, and in theology it is no longer seriously
adopted. In fact, in certain quarters an attempt has
been made to belittle the Christian religion by maintain-
ing that this definition which it employs is already older
than Christianity, and that it has got it from somewhere
or other. But, to begin with, any such historical state-
ment does not for that matter of it decide anything
whatsoever with regard to the inner truth. It must,
moreover, be understood, too, that those peoples and
individuals of former ages were not themselves conscious
of the truth which was in the idea, and did not perceive
that it contained the absolute consciousness of the truth ;
they regarded it as merely one amongst other character-
istics, and as different from the others. But it is a point
of the greatest importance to determine whether such a
characteristic is the first and absolute characteristic which
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 29
underlies all others, or whether it is just one form which
appears amongst others, as, for instance, in the case of
Brahma, who is the One, but is not at the same time
an object of worship. This form has certainly the least
chance of appearing in the Eeligion of Beauty and in that
of External Utility. In the multiplicity and particulari-
sation which are characteristic of these religions, it is not
possible to meet with the element of measure which
limits itself and returns to itself. Still they are not
devoid of traces of this unity. Aristotle, speaking of
the Pythagorean numbers, of the triad, says : We believe
that we have really called on the gods only when we
have called on them three times. Amongst the Pytha-
goreans and in Plato we come upon the abstract basis of
the Idea, but the characteristics do not in any way get
beyond this condition of abstraction, and partly continue
in the abstract state represented by one, two, three ;
though in Plato they get a rather more concrete form,
where we have described the nature of the One and the
Other, that which is different in itself, Oarepov, and the
third which is the unity of both.
The thought here is not of the fanciful kind which we
have in thelndian religions, but is rather a mere abstraction.
We have actual categories of thought which are better than
numbers, better than the category of number, but which,
all the same, are entirely abstract categories of thought.
It is, however, chiefly about the time of Christ's birth,
and during several centuries after, that we come upon a
philosophical representation of this truth in a figurative
form, and which has for its basis the popular idea ex-
pressed by the Trinity. It is found partly in philosophical
systems pure and simple, such as that of Philo, who had
carefully studied Pythagorean and Platonic philosophy,
and then in the later writers of the Alexandrian School,
but more especially in a blending of the Christian religion
with philosophical ideas of the kind referred to, and it
is this blending of the two which constitutes in a large
30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
measure the various heresies, particularly the Gnostic
heresy. Speaking generally, we see in these attempts to
grasp the Idea of the Three-in-One, the reality which
characterises Western thought refined away into an
intellectual world through the influence of Eastern
idealism. These are, to be sure, only first attempts
resulting in what were merely paltry and fantastic con-
ceptions. Still we can see in them at least the struggle
of Spirit to reach truth, and this deserves recognition.
An almost countless number of forms of stating the
truth may be observed here ; the First is, the Father, the
"Ov, terms which express something which is the abyss
or depths of Being, i.e., something, in fact, which is as yet
empty, which cannot be grasped by thought, but is in-
comprehensible and beyond the power of any conception
to express.
For what is empty, indeterminate, is undoubtedly the
Incomprehensible, the negative of the Notion, and it is
the nature of its notion to be this negative since it is
merely one-sided abstraction, and constitutes what is
merely a moment of the Notion. The One for itself, is
not yet the Notion, the True.
If the First is defined as the merely Universal, and if
the definitions or determinations are simply referred to
the Universal, to the ov, then we certainly get the incom-
prehensible, for it is without content ; anything compre-
hensible is concrete, and can >be comprehended only in
so far as it is determined as a moment. And it is in
this that tlte defect lies, namely, that the First is not
conceived of as being by its very nature totality.
Another idea of the same kind is expressed when it is
said that the First is the fivOds, the Abyss, the depths,
aia>v, the Eternal, whose dwelling is in the inexpressible
heights, who is raised above all contact with finite things,
out of whom 'nothing is evolved, the First Principle, the
Father of all existence, the Propator, who is a Father
only mediately, the Trpoap^, He who was before the be-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 31
ginning. The revelation of this abyss of Being, of this
hidden God, is defined as self-contemplation, reflection
into self, concrete determination in general ; self-contem-
plation begets, it is, in fact, the begetting of the Only-
begotten ; this represents the fact that the Eternal is in
process of being comprehended, because here we get the
length of determination.
This Second, Other-Being or object, determination,
action in short as shown in self-determination, is the
most general determination, as it appears in the form of
the Xo'yo?, the activity which determines itself after the
manner of reason, known also as the Word. The Word
is this simple self-expression which does not make any
hard and fast distinction, and does not become a hard
and fast distinction, but is taken in an immediate sense,
and which being thus immediate is taken up into the
inner life of the Eternal, and returns to its original source.
It is further expressed by the word o-otpia, Wisdom, the
original Man in the absolute purity of his Being, some-
thing which actually exists, and is other than that first
universality — in short, a particular something with a de-
finite character. God is the 'Creator, and He is this in
His specific character as the Logos, as the self-externalis-
ing, self-expressing Word, as the opatrt?, the vision of God.
This Second came to be further defined as the arche-
type of Man, Adam Kadmon, the Only-begotten. This
does not describe some accidental 'characteristic, but, on
the contrary, eternal action, which is not confined simply
to one time. In God there is only one birth, activity in
the form of eternal activity, a characteristic which essen-
tially belongs to the Universal itself.
Here we have the true differentiation or distinction
which has reference to the quality of both, but this
quality is only one and the same Substance, and the
difference is accordingly merely superficial as yet even
when defined as a person.
The essential point is that this (ro<p[a, the Only-
32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
begotten, remains likewise in the bosom of God, and the
distinction is no real distinction.
It was in forms such as these that the Idea showed its
workings. The most important point of view from which
to regard the matter is that which will enable us to see
that, however rude were the shapes taken by these
thoughts, they are to be considered as rational, and from
which we shall perceive that they are based on reason,
and discover what amount of reason is in them. Still it
is necessary at the same time to be able to distinguish
the form of rationality which is present, and which is not
yet adequate to express content.
This Idea is usually put somewhere beyond Man,
beyond thought and reason, and forms an antithesis to
these, so that this characteristic, which is all truth, and
alone is truth, comes to be regarded as something peculiar
to God only, something which remains in a region beyond
human life, and does not reflect itself into its Other,
which appears in the form of the world, Nature, Man.
So far this fundamental idea is not regarded as the Uni-
versal Idea.
To Jacob Bohme this mystery of the threefold nature
became clear in another fashion. His way of conceiving
of the truth, and his style of thought, are certainly of a
rather wild and fantastic sort. He did not attain to the
use of the pure forms of thought, but the ruling and fun-
damental principle of all the ideas which fermented in his
mind, and of all his struggles to reach the truth, was the
recognition of the presence of Trinity everywhere and
in everything, as, e.g., when he says, " It must be born
in the heart of Man."
It forms the universal basis of everything which is
looked at in a true way, it may indeed be as finite,
but still as something which even in its finitude has the
truth in it. Thus Jacob Bohme attempted to represent
under this category Nature and the heart or spirit of Man.
In more recent times the conception of Trinity has,
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 33
through the influence of the Kantian philosophy, been
brought into notice again in an outward way as a type,
and, as it were, as a ground-plan of thought, and this
in very definite forms of thought. "When this Idea is
thus known to represent what is the one and essential
nature of God, the next step is to cease to regard it as
something belonging to a region above human thought
and beyond this world, and to feel that the goal of know-
ledge is the recognition of the truth in the Particular as
well, and if it is thus recognised as present in it, then all
that is true in the Particular involves this determination.
To know in the philosophical sense, means to know
anything in its determinateness. Its nature, however,
is just the nature of the determinateness itself, and it
is unfolded in the Idea. Logical exposition and logical
necessity mean that this Idea represents truth in general,
and that all thought-determinations can be reduced to
this movement of determination.
II.
THE ETERNAL IDEA OF GOD IN THE ELEMENT OF CON-
SCIOUSNESS AND ORDINARY THOUGHT ( VORSTELLEN),
OR, DIFFERENCE ; THE KINGDOM OF THE SON.
We have here to consider how this Idea passes out of
its condition of universality and infinity into the deter-
mination or specific form of finitude. God is everywhere
present, and the presence of God is just the element of
truth which is in everything.
To begin with, the Idea was found in the element of
thought. This forms the basis, and we started with it.
The Universal, and what is consequently the more
abstract, must precede all else in scientific knowledge.
Looking at the matter from a scientific point of view, it
is what comes first, though actually it is what comes
later, so far as its existence in a definite form is con-
VOL. in. c
34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
cerned. It is what is potential and essential, but it is
what appears later in knowledge, and reaches the stage
of consciousness and knowledge later.
The Form of the Idea actually appears as a result
which, however, is essentially potentiality ; and just as
the content of the Idea means that the last is the first
and the first is the last, so what appears as a result is
the presupposition, potentiality, basis. This Idea is now
to be considered as it appears in the second element, in
the element of manifestation in general. In its form as
objectivity, or as potential, the absolute Idea is complete;
but this is not the case with the Idea in its subjective
aspect, either in itself as such, or when subjectivity
actually appears in the Divine Idea. The progress of
the Idea here referred to may be looked at from two
sides.
Looking at it from the first of these, we see that the
subject for which this Idea exists is the thinking subject.
Even the forms used by ordinary conception do not take
anything from the nature of the fundamental form, nor
hinder this fundamental form from being for man a form
characterised by thought. The subject, speaking generally,
exists as something which thinks, it thinks this Idea, and
yet it is concrete self-consciousness. This Idea must
exist for the subject as concrete self-consciousness, as an
actual subject.
Or it may be put thus — the Idea in its first form is
the absolute truth, while in its subjective form it exists
for thought ; but not only must the Idea be truth for the
subject, the subject on its part must have the certainty
of the Idea, i.e., the certainty which belongs to this sub-
ject as such, as finite, as a subject which is empirical,
concrete, and belonging to the sphere of sense.
The Idea possesses certainty for the subject, and the
subject has this certainty only in so far as the Idea is
actually perceived, in so far as it exists for the subject.
If I can say of anything, " that is," then it possesses
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 35
certainty for me, this is immediate knowledge, this is
certainty. The next form of mediation consists in
proving that what is is likewise necessary, that it is
true, that it is something certain. This accordingly is
the transition to the Universal.
By starting from the form of truth, we have reached
the definite thought that this form possesses certainty,
that it exists for me.
The other mode of viewing the advance of the Idea to
manifestation is to regard it from the side of the Idea
itself.
i. Eternal Being, in-and-for-itself, is something which
unfolds itself, determines itself, differentiates itself, posits
itself as its own difference, but the difference, again, is at
the same time eternally done away with and absorbed ;
what has essential Being, Being in-and-for-itself, eternally
returns to itself in this, and only in so far as it does this
is it Spirit.
What is differentiated is determined in such a way that
the difference directly disappears, and so, that this is seen
to be a relation of God merely to Himself, of the Idea
merely to itself. This act of differentiation is merely a
movement, a playing of love with itself, in which it does
not get to be otherness or Other-Being in any serious sense,
nor actually reach a condition of separation and division.
The Other is defined as the Son, as love regarded from
the side of feeling, or, defined from a higher point of
view, as Spirit which is not outside of itself, which is
with itself, which is free. In this determination, the
determination of difference is not yet complete so far as
the Idea is concerned. What we have here is merely
abstract difference in general, we have not yet got to
difference in the form which peculiarly belongs to it ;
difference here is only one characteristic or determina-
tion amongst others.
In this respect we can say that we have not yet got
the length of difference. The things differentiated are
36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
considered to be the same ; we have not yet reached that
determination according to which the things differentiated
should have a different determination. Eegarded from
this side, we have to think of the judgment or differen-
tiating act of the Idea as implying that the Son gets the
determination of the Other as such, that He exists as a
free personality, independently or for Himself, that He
appears as something real outside of and apart from God,
as something, in fact, which actually is.
His ideality, His eternal return into essential Being, is
posited in the Idea in its first form as immediate and
identical. In order that there may be difference, and in
order that it may be properly recognised, it is necessary
to have the element of Otherness, necessary that what is
thus distinguished should appear as Otherness which is
possessed of Being.
It is only the absolute Idea which determines itself,
and which, in determining itself, is inwardly certain that
it is absolutely free in itself ; and in thus determining
itself it implies that what is thus determined is allowed
to exist as something which is free, as something in-
dependent, as an independent object. The Free exists
only for the Free, and it is only for free men that an
other is free too.
The absolute freedom of the Idea means that in deter-
mining itself, in the act of judgment, or differentiation, it
grants the free independent existence of the Other. This
Other, as something thus allowed to have an independent
existence, is represented by the World taken in a general
sense. The absolute act of judgment which gives inde-
pendence to that aspect of Being called Other-Being
might also be called Goodness, which bestows upon this
side of Being in its state of estrangement the whole Idea,
in so far as and in the way in which it is able to receive
and represent the Idea.
2. The truth of the world is its ideality only, and does
not imply that it possesses true reality ; it is involved in its
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 37
nature that it should be, but only in an ideal sense ; it is
not something implicitly eternal, but, on the contrary, it
is something created, its Being is something which has
been merely posited, or is dependent on something else.
The Being of the world means that it has a moment
of Being, but that it annuls this separation and estrange-
ment from God, and that it is its true nature to return
to its source, to get into a relationship of Spirit or Love.
We thus get the Process of the world which implies
a passing from the state of revolt and separation to that
of reconciliation. What first appears in the Idea is
merely the relation of Father and Son ; but the Other also
comes to have the characteristic of Other-Being or other-
ness, of something which is.
It is in the Sou, in the determination or specifying
of the difference, that an advance is made to further
specification in the form of more differences, and that
difference gets its rights, the right of being different.
Jacob Bohme described this transition in the stage repre-
sented by the Son as follows : The first and Only-begotten
was Lucifer, the light-bearer, clearness, brightness, but
he imaged himself in himself, i.e., posited au indepen-
dent existence for himself, advanced to a condition of
Being, and so to a state of revolt, and that then the
eternal and Only-begotten was immediately put in his
place.
Eegarded from the first of the two standpoints, the
relation is that God exists in His eternal truth, and this
is thought of as the state of things which existed before
time was, as the state in which God was when the
blessed spirits and the morning stars, the angels, His
children, sang His praises. The relation thus existing is
described as a state, but it is an eternal relation of
thought to its object. Later on a revolt occurred, as it is
expressed, and this is the positing of the second stand-
point, the one side of the truth represented by the
analysis of the Son, the keeping apart of the two
38 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
moments which are contained in Him." The other side,
again, is represented by subjective consciousness, the finite
spirit, and this as pure thought is regarded as implicitly
the Process which found its starting-point in the Imme-
diate, and raised itself to the condition of truth. This is
the second form.
We thus enter the sphere of determination, enter space
and the world of finite Spirit. This may be more de-
finitely expressed as a positing or bringing into view of
the determinations or specific qualities, as a difference
which is momentarily maintained ; it is an act of going
out on the part of God into finitude, an act of manifesta-
tion in finitude, for finitude taken in its proper meaning,
implies simply the separation of what is implicitly
identical, but which maintains itself in the act of
separation. Regarded from the other side, that of sub-
jective Spirit, this is posited as pure thought, though it
is implicitly a result, and this has to be posited as it is
potentially in its character as the movement of thought,
or, to put it otherwise, pure thought has to go into itself,
and it is in this way that it first posits itself as finite.
Regarding the matter from this standpoint, this Other
is not represented by the Son, but by the external world,
the finite world, which is outside of truth, the world of
finitude, in which the Other has the form of Being, and
is yet in its nature merely the erepov, the definite, the
differentiated, the limited, the negative.
The relation of these two spheres to the first may thus
be defined by saying that it is the same Idea potentially
which is present, though with this different specific form.
The absolute act involved in that first judgment or act of
differentiation is implicitly the same as the second here
referred to ; it is only in ordinary thought that the two
are regarded as separate, as two absolutely distinct spheres
and acts.
And,as a matter of fact, they have to be distinguished and
kept separate ; and when it is said that they are implicitly
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 39
the same, we must carefully define the sense in which
this is to be understood, else we may get a false meaning
and an incorrect conception, implying that the eternal
Son of the Father, the Godhead who exists objectively
for Himself, is the same as the world, and that we are
to understand by the former nothing more than what we
mean by the latter.
It has been already remarked, and is, indeed, self-
evident, that it is only the Idea of God as previously
unfolded in what was called the first sphere which is the
true and eternal God, while His higher realisation and
manifestation in the detailed process of Spirit is what
is treated of in the third sphere.
When the world in its immediate form is taken as
something which has an essential existence of its own,
and when the sensuous and the temporal are regarded as
having Being, then either the false meaning before re-
ferred to is attached to what is thus predicated of them, or
else we are, at the very outset, forced to think of there
being two eternal acts on the part of God. God's active
working, however, is emphatically one and the same, and
does not show itself in manifold forms of varying ac-
tivity, such as is expressed by the terms now, after,
separate, &c.
Thus this differentiation when it takes the form of
independence is merely the negative moment of Other-
Being in an independent form or for itself, or of Being
external to itself, which as such has no truth, but is
merely a stage, and regarded from the point of time is
merely a moment, and not even a moment, but some-
thing which possesses this kind of independence only as
contrasted with finite Spirit, inasmuch as it itself as
actually existing represents this kind and mode of in-
dependence. In God Himself this Now, this independent
existence or Being-for-self, is the vanishing moment of
manifestation.
This moment certainly now has the extension, breadth,
40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and depth which belong to a world ; it is heaven and
earth, with all their infinite organisation, internal and
external. When, accordingly, we say that the Other is
a vanishing moment ; that it is merely the gleam of the
lightning-flash, which, in appearing, directly disappears ;
that it is the sound of a word, which, in being spoken
and heard, disappears so far as its outward existence is
concerned — we are very apt, when we think of things
of this transitory sort, to have always before our minds
the idea of the momentary in time, with its before and
after, and yet it is in neither of the two. "What we have
really got to do is to get rid of that time-determination,
whether it be of duration or of the present, and merely
to keep to the simple thought of the Other, the simple
thought, for the Other is an abstraction. That this
abstraction has actually taken an extended form in the
world of space and time is explained by the fact that it
is the simple moment of the Idea itself, and accordingly
receives the Idea wholly into itself; but because it is the
moment of otherness or Other- Being it takes the form
of immediate, material extension.
Questions as to whether the world or matter is eternal,
and has existed from all eternity, or has begun in time,
belong to the empty metaphysics of the Understanding.
In the phrase " from all eternity," eternity itself is repre-
sented in a figurative way as infinite time, in accordance
with a false kind of infinitude, the infinitude and the
determination being those of Reflection merely. It is
the world which is really the region of contradiction ;
in it the Idea appears in a specialised form which is
inadequate to express it. As soon as the world enters
into the region of ordinary thought or figurative idea,
the element of time comes in, and next, by means of re-
flection, the infinitude or eternity referred to. We must,
however, understand that this characteristic in no way
applies to the Notion itself.
Another question, or what is partly the same question
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 41
with a broader meaning, is raised when it is said that
the world or matter, inasmuch as it is regarded as having
existed from all eternity, is uncreated and exists imme-
diately for itself. The separation made by the Under-
standing between form and matter lies at the basis
of this statement ; while the real truth is that matter
and the world, regarded according to their fundamental
characteristics, are this Other, the negative, which is
itself simply a moment or element of posited Being.
This is the opposite of something independent, and the
meaning of its existence is simply that it annuls itself
and is a moment in the Process. The natural world
is relative, it is Appearance, i.e., it is this not only for us,
but implicitly, and it belongs to its quality or character
to pass over and return into the ultimate Idea. It is in
the determination of the independence of Other-Being
that all the various metaphysical determinations given
to the v\n amongst the ancients, and also amongst those
Christians who indulged in philosophical speculations,
the Gnostics particularly, have their root.
It is owing to the otherness or Other-Being of the
world that this latter is simply something created and
has not a complete and independent Being, Being in-and-
for-itself, and when a distinction is drawn between the
beginning as creation and the preservation of what
actually exists, this is done in accordance with the
ordinary conception which implies that such a material
world is actually present and is possessed of real Being.
It has always been correctly held that since the world
does not possess Being, an independence belonging to it
in virtue of its own nature, preservation is a kind of
creation. But if we can say that creation is also
preservation, we would express ourselves thus merely in
virtue of the fact that the moment of Other-Being is
itself a moment of the Idea, or else it would be
presupposed, as was done previously, that something
possessed of Being preceded the act of creation.
42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Thus inasmuch as Other-Being has been characterised
as the totality of appearance or manifestation, it expresses
in itself the Idea, and it is this which is really designated
by the term, the wisdom of God. Wisdom is, however,
so far a general expression, and it is the business of
philosophical knowledge to understand this conception
in Nature, to conceive of it as a system in which the
Divine Idea is mirrored. This Idea is manifested, but
its content is just the manifestation, and consists in its
distinguishing itself as an Other, and then taking back
this Other into itself, so that the expression taking
back applies equally to what is done outside and inside.
In Nature these stages break up into a system of king-
doms of Nature, of which that of living things is the
highest.
Life, however, the highest form in which the Idea
exhibits itself in Nature, is simply something which
sacrifices itself and whose essence is to become Spirit,
and this act of sacrifice is the negativity of the Idea
as against its existence in this form. Spirit is just
this act of advance into reality by means of Nature,
i.e., Spirit finds its antithesis, or opposite, in Nature,
and it is by the annulling of this opposition that it
exists for itself and is Spirit.
The finite world is the side of the difference which is
put in contrast with the side which remains in its unity ;
and thus it breaks up into the natural world and into
the world of finite Spirit. Nature enters into a relation
with Man only, and not on its own account into a re-
lation with God, for Nature is not knowledge ; God is
Spirit, but Nature knows nothing of Spirit.
Nature has been created by God, but she does not
of herself enter into a relation with God, by which is
meant that she is not possessed of knowledge. She
stands in a relation to Man only, and in this relation
to Man she represents what is called the side of his
dependence.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 43
Tn so far as she is known by thought to have been
created by God, and to have understanding and reason
in her, she is consciously known by Man as a thinking
being ; and she is put in relation with the Divine to the
extent to which her truth or true nature is recognised.
The discussion of the manifold forms expressive of the
relation of the finite spirit to Nature does not belong to
the philosophy of religion. Their scientific treatment
forms part of the Phenomenology of Spirit, or the
Doctrine of Spirit. Here this relation has to be con-
sidered in so far as it comes within the sphere of religion,
and in such a way as to show that Nature is for Man
not only the actual immediate external world, but a
world in which Man knows God ; Nature is thus for
Man a revelation of God. We have already seen how
this relation of Spirit to Nature is present in the ethnic
religions in which we encountered those forms which
belong to the advance of Spirit from what is immediate
to what is necessary and to the thought of something
which acts wisely and in accordance with an end, Nature
meanwhile being regarded as contingent. Thus the con-
sciousness of God on the part of the finite spirit is
reached through Nature, mediated by it. Man sees God
by means of Nature ; Nature is so far merely a veiling
and imperfect embodiment of God.
What is distinguished from God is here really an
Other, and has the form of an Other or object; it is
Nature which exists for Spirit and for Man. It is
through this that the unity of the two is to be brought
about, and the consciousness attained that the end and
the essential character of religion is reconciliation. The
first thing is the abstract act of becoming conscious of
God, that Man raises himself in Nature to God. This
stage we saw represented in the proofs of the existence
of God, and connected with it, too, are those pious reflec-
tions as to how gloriously God has made everything
how wisely He has arranged all things. This elevation
44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
of the soul takes it straight to God, and may start from
any set of facts. The pious mind makes edifying re-
flections upon what it sees, and beginning with what
is most insignificant and most special, recognises in it
something which is essentially higher. Very often you
find mixed up with these reflections the perverted
notion that what goes on in the world of Nature is to
be regarded as belonging to a higher order of things
than what is found in the human sphere. This way of
looking at things, however, is inadequate, from the very
fact that it starts from what is individual or particular.
"We may look at things in another way which will be
the opposite of this. The cause, it may be argued, must
correspond to the phenomenon, and must itself con-
tain the element of limitation which belongs to the
phenomenon ; we desire a particular ground or basis
upon which this particular phenomenon is based. This
element of inadequacy always attaches to the considera-
tion of any particular phenomenon. Further, these par-
ticular phenomena belong to the realm of the natural ;
God, however, must be conceived of as Spirit, and the
element in which we recognise His presence must also
be spiritual. " God thunders with His thunder," it is
said, "and is yet not known." The spiritual man, how-
ever, demands something higher than what is merely
natural. If God is to be known as Spirit, He must do
more than thunder.
The truth is that we reach a higher mode of viewing
Nature, and perceive the deeper relation in which it must
be placed in regard to God, when it is itself conceived of
as spiritual, i.e., as something which is the natural side
of Man's nature. It is only when the subject ceases to
be classed as belonging to the immediate Being of the
Natural, and is made to appear what it implicitly is,
namely, movement, and when it has gone into itself, that
we get finitude as such, and finitude, in fact, as shown
in the process of the relation in which the need of the
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 45
absolute Idea and its manifestation come to exist for it.
"What comes first here is the necessity or need of truth,
while the kind and manner of the manifestation of the
truth is what is second.
As regards the first point, the necessity for truth, it
is presupposed that there exists in subjective Spirit a
demand to know the absolute truth. This necessity
directly involves the supposition that the subject exists
in a state of untruth ; as Spirit, however, the subject is
at the same time implicitly raised above this state of
untruth, and for this reason its condition of untruth is
one which has to be surmounted.
Untruth more strictly defined means that the subject
is in a state of alienation from itself, and the need for
truth so far expresses itself in the fact that this division
or alienation is in the subject, and is just because of
this also annulled by truth, that it is thus changed into
reconciliation, and that this reconciliation which is within
itself can only be a reconciliation with the truth.
This is the necessity or need of truth in its more
strictly defined form. Its essential character implies that
the alienation is really in the subject, that the subject
is evil, that it is inner division or alienation, inherent con-
tradiction, not, however, contradiction of the mutually ex-
clusive kind, but is something which at the same time
keeps itself together, and that the alienation takes place
only when it is an inner contradiction in the subject.
3. This reminds us that we are called on to define the
nature or essential character of Man, and to show how
it is to be regarded, how Man ought to regard it, and
what he has got to know of it.
And here we (i) at once meet with characteristics
which are mutually opposed : Man is by nature good,
he is not divided against himself, but, on the contrary,
his essence, his Notion, consists in this, that he is by
nature good, that he represents what is harmony with
itself, inner peace ; and — Man is ly nature evil.
46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The first of these characteristics thus means that Man
is by nature good, that his universal substantial essence
is good ; the second characteristic is the opposite of this.
This, then, to begin with, is the nature of these contrary
propositions, so far as we are concerned, and so far as the
outward way of looking at things is concerned. The next
step is to perceive that we do not merely thus reflect
upon things, but that Man has an independent knowledge
of himself, and knows how he is constituted and what is
his essential character.
We have, to start with, the one proposition: Man is by
nature good, what has no element of division ; thus he
has no need of reconciliation, and if reconciliation is not
at all necessary, then the course of development we are
considering here and this whole part of the subject are
superfluous.
To say that Man is by nature good amounts substanti-
ally to saying that he is potentially Spirit, rationality, that
he has been created in the image of God ; God is the Good,
and Man as Spirit is the reflection of God, he is the Good
potentially. It is just on this very proposition and on it
alone that the possibility of his reconciliation rests ; the
difficulty, the ambiguity is, however, in the potentiality.
Man is potentially good — but when that is said every-
thing is not said ; it is just in this potentiality that the
element of one-sidedness lies. Man is good potentially,
i.e., he is good only in an inward way, good so far as
his notion or conception is concerned, and for this very
reason not good so far as his actual nature is concerned.
Man, inasmuch as he is Spirit, must actually be, be
for himself, what he truly is ; physical Nature remains in
the condition of potentiality, it is potentially the Notion,
but the Notion does not in it attain to independent
Being, to Being-for-self. It is just in the very fact that
Man is only potentially good that the defect of his nature
lies.
The potentiality of Nature is represented by the laws
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 47
of Nature ; Nature remains true to its laws, and does not
go beyond them ; it is this which constitutes its substan-
tiality, and just in consequence of this it is in the sphere
of necessity. But in contrast to this, Man must be
actually, for himself, what he potentially is, his potential
being must come to be for him actual.
What is good by nature is good in an immediate way,
and it is just the very nature of Spirit not to be some-
thing natural and immediate ; rather, it is involved in the
very idea of Man as Spirit that he should pass out of
this natural state into a state in which there is a separa-
tion between his notion or conception and his immediate
existence. In the case of physical Nature this separation
of an individual thing from its law, from its substantial
essence, does not occur, just because it is not free.
What is meant by Man is, a being who sets himself
in opposition to his immediate nature, to his state of
being in himself, and reaches a state of separation.
The other assertion made regarding Man springs directly
from the statement that Man must not remain what he
is immediately ; he must pass beyond the state of imme-
diacy ; that is the notion or conception of Spirit. It
is this passing beyond his natural state, his potential
Being, which first of all forms the basis of the division
or disunion, and in connection with which the disunion
directly arises.
This disunion is a passing out of this natural condition
or immediacy ; but we must not take this to mean that it
is the act of passing out of this condition which first
constitutes evil, for, on the contrary, this passing out of
immediacy is already involved in the state of nature.
Potentiality and the natural state constitute the Imme-
diate ; but because it is Spirit it is in its immediacy the
passing out of its immediacy, the revolt or falling away
from its immediacy, from its potential Being.
This involves the second proposition : Man is by nature
evil ; his potential Being, his natural Being, is evil. It
48 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
is just in this his condition as one of natural Being that
his defect is found ; because he is Spirit he is separated
from this natural Being, and is disunion. One-sidedness
is directly involved in this natural condition. When
Man is only as he is according to Nature, he is evil.
The natural man is Man as potentially good, good
according to his conception or notion ; but in the concrete
sense that man is natural who follows his passions and
impulses, and remains within the circle of his desires, and
whose natural immediacy is his law.
He is natural, but in this his natural state he is at the
same time a being possessed of will, and since the con-
tent of his will is merely impulse and inclination, he is
evil. So far as form is concerned, the fact that he is
will implies that he is no longer an animal, but the
content, the ends towards which his acts of will are
directed, are still natural. This is the standpoint we
are concerned with here, the higher standpoint according
to which Man is by nature evil, and is evil just because
he is something natural.
The primary condition of Man, which is superficially
represented as a state of innocence, is the state of nature,
the animal state: Man must be culpable ; in so far as
he is good, he must not be good as any natural thing is
good, but his guilt, his will, must come into play, it must
be possible to impute moral acts to him. Guilt really
means the possibility of imputation.
The good man is good along with and by means of his
will, and to that extent because of his guilt. Innocence
implies the absence of will, the absence of evil, and con-
sequently the absence of goodness. Natural things and
the animals are all good, but this is a kind of goodness
which cannot be attributed to Man ; in so far as he is
good, it must be by the action and consent of his will.
What is absolutely required is that Man should not
continue to be a natural being, to be natural will. Man,
it is -true, is possessed of consciousness, but he can still
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 49
be a natural being although he is Man, in so far as
what is natural constitutes the end, the content, and the
essential character of his acts of will.
It is necessary to view this characteristic in a stricter
way. Man is Man as being a subject or person, and as
a natural subject he is a definite single subject, and his
will is a definite single will ; particularity constitutes the
content of his will, i.e., the natural man is selfish.
We demand of the man who is called good that he
should at least regulate his conduct in accordance with
general principles and laws. The naturalness of will is,
strictly speaking, the selfishness of will as distinguished
from the universality of will, and as contrasted with the
rationality of the will which has been trained to guide
itself by universality. This Evil personified in a general
way is the Devil. This latter, as representing the Nega-
tive which wills itself, is because of this, self-identity,
and must accordingly have the element of affirmation
also in him, as he has in Milton, where his energy, which
is full of character, makes him better than many an
angel.
But the fact that Man in so far as he represents the
natural will is evil, does not imply that we can no longer
regard him from the other point of view, according to
which he is potentially good. He always remains good,
viewed in accordance with his notion or conception ; but
Man is consciousness, and is consequently essentially
differentiation, and therefore a real, definite subject as
distinguished from his notion ; and since this subject is,
to begin with, merely distinguished from its notion, and
has not yet returned into the unity of its subjectivity
with the notion, into the rational state, this reality which
it has is natural reality, and that is selfishness.
The fact of evil directly presupposes a relation between
reality and the Notion, and consequently we thus get
simply the contradiction which is in potential Being, the
contradiction of the Notion and particularity, of Good and
VOL. in. D
50 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Evil. It is to put a false question to ask, Is Man good
by nature, or is he not ? That is a false position, and so,
too, it is superficial to say, He is as much good as evil.
In reference particularly to the statement that the
will is caprice or arbitrary will, and can will good or
evil, it may be remarked that, as a matter of fact, this
arbitrary will is not will. It is will only in so far as it
comes to a resolution, for in so far as it wills this or
' thaUit is not will. The natural will is the will of the
desires, of inclination which wills the immediate, and
does not as yet will anything definite, for in order to do
that it would have to be rational will and be able to per-
ceive that law is rational. What is demanded of Man
is that he should not be natural will, that he should
not be as he is merely by nature. The conception of
volition is something different from this ; so long as Man
continues to exist ideally as will, he is only potentially
will, he is not yet actual will, he does not yet exist as
Spirit. This is the truth in its universal aspect ; the
special aspect of it must here be left out of considera-
tion. We can speak of what belongs to the definite
sphere of morality only when we are dealing with some
particular condition in which Man is placed ; it has
nothing to do with the nature of Spirit.
As opposed to the view that the will is evil, we have
the fact that when we regard Man in a concrete way we
speak of volition, and this concrete, this actual element
cannot be simply something negative ; the evil will, how-
ever, is thought of as purely negative volition, and this
is a mere abstraction. If Man is not by nature what he
should be, then he is implicitly rational, implicitly Spirit.
This represents the affirmative element in him, and the
fact that in the state of nature he is not what he ought
to be, has reference accordingly only to the form of voli-
tion, the essential point being that Man is potentially
Spirit. This potentiality persists when the natural will
is being yielded up ; it is the Notion, the persistent
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 51
element, the self -producing element. When, on the
other hand, we speak of the will being evil by nature,
we are thinking of the will in its negative aspect merely.
We thus have in our minds at the same time this parti-
cular concrete element with which the abstraction referred
to is in contradiction. We carry this so far that when
we set up a Devil we have to show that there is some-
thing affirmative in him, strength of character, energy,
consistency. When we come to the concrete we at once
find that affirmative characteristics must show themselves
present in it. In all this it is forgotten that when we
speak of men they are thought of as men who have been
educated and trained by customs, laws, &c. People say,
Men are, after all, not so bad — just look round you ; but
then the men round about us are men who are already
educated ethically and morally, men already reconstructed
and brought into a certain state of reconciliation.
The main thing is, that in connection with religion we
should not think of a moral condition, such as that of
the child ; on the contrary, in any description of the
truth, what is essentially presented to us is the logical
unfolding of the history of what Man is. It is the specu-
lative way of regarding things which rules here ; the
abstract differences of the Notion are presented in suc-
cessive order. If it is the trained and cultured man who
has to be studied, then the change and reconstruction and
discipline through which he has passed must necessarily
appear in him as representing the transition from natural
volition to true volition, and his immediate natural will
must necessarily appear in this case as something which
has been absorbed in what is higher.
(2.) If, therefore, the first characteristic means that Man
in his immediate state is not what he is intended to be, then
we have to remember that Man has also to reflect upon
himself as he thus is ; the fact of his being evil is thus
brought into relation with reflection. This is readily taken
to mean that it is only in accordance with this knowledge
52 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
he comes to be regarded as evil, so that this reflection is
a sort of external demand or condition implying that if
he were not to reflect upon himself in this way the other
characteristic, namely, that he is evil, would drop away.
When this act of reflection is made a duty, then it
may be so represented as to suggest that it only is what
is essential, and that there can be no content without it.
Further, the relation of reflection is stated also in such a
way as to imply that it is reflection or knowledge which
makes man evil, so that it is evil, and it is this knowledge
which ought not to exist, and which is the source of evil.
In this way of representing it, we have the connection
which exists between the fact of being evil and know-
ledge. This is a point of essential importance.
In its more definite form this idea of evil implies that
Man becomes evil through knowledge, or, as the Bible
represents it, that he ate of the tree of knowledge. In
this way, knowledge, intelligence, the theoretic element,
and will enter into a more definite relation, and the
nature of evil gets to be discussed in a more definite way.
In this connection it may accordingly be remarked that
as a matter of fact it is knowledge which is the source of
all evil, for knowledge or consciousness is just the act
by which separation, the negative element, judgment,
division in the more definite specific form of independent
existence or Being-for-self in general, comes into exist-
ence. Man's nature is not as it ought to be ; it is
knowledge which reveals this to him, and brings to light
that condition of Being in which he ought not to be.
This obligation which lies on him is his Notion, and the
fact that he is not what he should be originates first of
all in the sense of separation or alienation, and from a
comparison between what he is and what he is in his
essential nature, in -and -for -himself. It is knowledge
which first brings out the contrast or antithesis in
which evil is found. The animal, the stone, the plant
is not evil; evil is first present within the sphere of
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 53
knowledge ; it is the consciousness of independent Being,
or Being-for-self relatively to an Other, but also rela-
tively to an Object which is inherently universal in the
sense that it is the Notion, or rational will. It is only
by means of this separation that I exist independently,
for myself, and it is in this that evil lies. To be evil
means in an abstract sense to isolate myself ; the isola-
tion which separates me from the Universal represents
the element of rationality, the laws, the essential char-
acteristics of Spirit. But it is along with this separa-
tion that Being-for-self originates, and it is only when
it appears that we have the Spiritual as something uni-
versal, as Law, what ought to be.
It is therefore not the case that reflection stands in
an external relation to evil, but, on the contrary, reflection
itself is evil. This is the condition of contrast to which
Man, because he is Spirit, must advance ; he has, in fact,
to be independent or for himself in such a way that he
has as his object something which is his own object
confronting him, which exists for him, the Good, the
Universal, his essential or ideal character. Spirit is
free, and freedom has within itself the essential element
of the disunion referred to. It is in this disunion that
independent Being or Being-for-self originates, and it is
in it that evil has its seat ; here is the source of the evil,
but here also the point which is the ultimate source of
reconciliation. It is at once what produces the disease,
and the source of health. We cannot, however, better
illustrate the character and mode of this movement of
Spirit than by referring to the form it takes in the story
of the Fall.
Sin is described by saying that Man ate of the tree of
knowledge, &c. This implies the presence of knowledge,
division, disunion in which good as existing for Man
first shows itself, but, as a consequence, evil too. Ac-
cording to the story it is forbidden to eat of the tree, and
thus evil is represented in a formal way as the trans-
54 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
gression of a divine command, which might have had any-
kind of content. Here, however, it is just the knowledge
referred to which essentially constitutes the command.
It is upon this that the rise of consciousness depends,
but it is at the same time to be thought of as a standpoint
at which consciousness cannot rest, but which is to be
absorbed in something higher, for consciousness must
not remain at that point at which Being-for-self is in a
state of disunion. The serpent further says that Man
by the act of eating would become equal to God, and by
speaking thus he made an appeal to Man's pride. God
says to Himself, Adam is become as one of us. The
serpent had thus not lied, for God confirms what it said.
A great deal of trouble has been taken with the explana-
tion of this passage, and some have gone the length of
explaining it as irony. The truer explanation, how-
ever, is that the Adam referred to is to be understood as
representing the second Adam, namely, Christ. Know-
ledge is the principle of spiritual life, but it is also, as
was remarked, the principle of the healing of the injury
caused by disunion. It is in fact this principle of
knowledge which supplies also the principle of man's
divineness, a principle which by a process of self-
adjustment or elimination of difference must reach a
condition of reconciliation or truth ; or, in other words,
it involves the promise and certainty of attaining once
more the state in which Man is the image of God.
We find such a prophecy expressed pictorially in what
God says to the serpent, " I will put enmity, &c."
Since the serpent represents the principle of knowledge
as something existing independently outside of Adam,
it is clearly perfectly logical that Man, as representing
concrete knowledge, should have in himself the other side
of the truth, that of conversion and reflection, and that
this other side should bruise the head of the serpent as
representing the opposite side.
This is what the first man is represented as having
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 55
actually done, but here again we are using the language
of sense ; the first man, considered from the point of
view of thought, signifies Man as Man, not any individual
accidental single man out of many, but the first man
absolutely, Man regarded in accordance with his con-
ception or notion. Man as such is consciousness, and
consequently he enters into this state of disunion — con-
sciousness, namely, which when it gets a more specific
character is knowledge.
In so far as the universal man is represented as the
first man, he is distinguished from other men, and so the
question arises : It is only this particular individual who
has done the evil deed, how, then, has it affected others ?
Here accordingly we have the popular conception of in-
heritance, and by means of it the defect which attaches
to the representation of Man as such, as an individual
first man, is corrected.
Division or disunion is essentially implied in the
conception of Man ; the one-sided view involved in the
representation of his act as the act of one individual is
thus changed into a complete view by the introduction
of the idea of communicated or inherited evil.
Work, &c., is declared to be the punishment of sin,
and this from a general point of view is a necessary
consequence.
The animal does not work, it works only when com-
pelled, it does not work by nature, it does not eat its
bread in the sweat of its brow, it does not produce its
own bread; it directly finds in Nature satisfaction for all
the needs it has. Man, too, finds the material for doing
this ; but the material, we may say, is for Man the least
important part ; the infinite means whereby he satisfies
his needs come to him through work.
"Work done in the sweat of his brow, both bodily
work, and the work of the spirit, which is the harder
of the two, is immediately connected with the knowledge
of good and evil. That Man must make himself what
56 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
he is, that he must eat his bread in the sweat of his
brow, that he must produce the nature which is his,
belongs to what is essential to and most distinctive of
Man, and is necessarily connected with the knowledge of
good and evil.
The story further describes how the tree of life also
stood in the garden ; and the representation of this fact
is of a simple and childlike character. The Good to-
wards which men direct their wishes is of two kinds.
Man wishes, on the one hand, to live in undisturbed hap-
piness, in harmony with himself and outward Nature ;
the animal continues in this condition of unity, but Man
has to pass beyond it ; his other wish practically is to
live eternally — and it is in accordance with these wishes
that this pictorial conception has been constructed.
When we consider this representation of primitive
man more closely, it is at once seen to be of a merely
childlike sort. Man as an individual living thing, his
individual life, his natural life, must die. But when we
look more narrowly at the narrative, this is seen to be
the wonderful part of it, the self-contradictory element
in it.
In this contradiction Man is characterised as having
an existence of his own, as being for himself. Being-
for-self, in its character as consciousness, self-conscious-
ness, is infinite self -consciousness, abstractly infinite.
The fact that lie is conscious of his freedom, of his
absolutely abstract freedom, constitutes his infinite Being-
for-self, which did not thus come into consciousness in
the earlier religions in which the contrast or opposition
did not get to this absolute stage, nor attain to this
depth. Owing to the fact that this has happened here,
the worth or dignity of Man is directly put on a much
higher level. The subject has hereby attained absolute
importance ; it is essentially an object of interest to
God, since it is self-consciousness which exists on its
own account. It appears as the pure certainty of itself
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 57
within itself, there exists in it a centre or point of
infinite subjectivity; it is certainly abstract, but it is
abstract essential Being, Being in-and-for-self. This
takes the form of the assertion that Man as Spirit is
immortal, is an object of God's interest, is raised above
finitude and dependence, above external circumstances,
that he has freedom to abstract himself from everything,
and this implies that he can escape mortality. It is in
religion that the immortality of the soul is the element
of supreme importance, because the antithesis involved
in religion is of an infinite kind.
What is mortal is what can die ; what is immortal
is what can reach a state in which death cannot enter.
Combustible and incombustible are terms implying that
combustion is a possibility merely, which attaches to the
object in an external way. The essential character of
Being is not, however, a possibility after this fashion,
but, on the contrary, is an affirmative determinate quality
which it already now possesses in itself.
Thus the immortality of the soul must not be repre-
sented as first entering the sphere of reality only at a
later stage ; it is the actual present quality of Spirit ;
Spirit is eternal, and for this reason is already present.
Spirit, as possessed of freedom, does not belong to the
sphere of things limited ; it, as being what thinks and
knows in an absolute way, has the Universal for its
object ; this is eternity, which is not simply duration, as
duration can be predicated of mountains, but knowledge.
The eternity of Spirit is here brought into consciousness,
and is found in this reasoned knowledge, in this very
separation, which has reached the infinitude ofBeing-for-
self, and which is no longer entangled in what is natural,
contingent, and external. This eternity of Spirit in itself
means that Spirit is, to begin with, potential ; but the
next standpoint implies that Spirit ought not to continue
to be merely natural Spirit, but that it ought to be what
it is in its essential and complete nature, in-and-for-self.
58 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Spirit must reflect upon itself, and in this way disunion
arises, it must not remain at the point at which it is
seen not to be what it is potentially, but must become
adequate to its conception or notion, it must become
universal Spirit. Kegarded from the standpoint of divi-
sion or disunion, its potential Being is for it an Other,
and it itself is natural will ; it is divided within itself,
and this division is so far its feeling or consciousness of
a contradiction, and there is thus given along with it the
necessity for the abolition of the contradiction.
On the one hand, it is said that Man in Paradise
without sin would have been immortal — immortality on
earth and the immortality of the soul are not separated
in this statement — and would have lived for ever. If
this outward death is to be regarded as merely a con-
sequence of sin, then he would be implicitly immortal ;
on the other hand, we have it also stated in the story
that it was not till Man should eat of the tree of life
that he was to become immortal.
The matter, in fact, stands thus. Man is immortal in
consequence of knowledge, for it is only as a thinking
being that he is not a mortal animal soul, and is a free,
pure soul Eeasoned knowledge, thought, is the root of
his life, of his immortality as a totality in himself. The
animal soul is sunk in the life of the body, while Spirit,
on the other hand, is a totality in itself.
The next thing is, that this idea which we have reached
in the region of thought should take an actual shape
in Man, i.e., that Man should come to see the infinite
nature of the opposition, of the opposition, that is, be-
tween good and evil, that he should know himself to
be evil in so far as he is something natural, and thus
become conscious of the antithesis, not merely in general,
but as actually existing in himself, and see that it is
he who is evil, and realise that the demand that the
Good should be attained, and consequently the con-
sciousness of disunion and the feeling of pain because
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 59
of the contradiction and opposition, have been awakened
in him.
We have found the form of the opposition in all
religions ; but the opposition between Man and the power
of Nature, between Man and the moral law, the moral
will, morality, fate, is an opposition of a subordinate
kind, involving opposition merely in reference to some
particular thing.
The man who transgresses a commandment is evil,
but he is evil only in this particular case, he is in a
condition of opposition only in reference to this special
commandment. We saw that in the Persian religion
good and evil stood to each other in a relation of general
opposition ; there the opposition is outside of Man, who
is himself outside of it. This abstract opposition is not
present within himself.
It is accordingly required that Man should have this
abstract opposition within himself and overcome it, not
merely that he should not obey this or the other command,
since the truth rather really is that he is implicitly evil,
evil in his universal character, in his most inward nature,
purely evil, evil in his inner being, and that this quality
of evil represents the essential quality of his conception,
and that he has to become conscious of this.
(3.) It is with this depth of Spirit that we are con-
cerned. Depth means the abstraction of the opposition,
the pure universalisatiou of the opposition, so that its
two sides acquire this absolutely universal character in
reference to each other.
This opposition has, speaking generally, two forms :
on the one hand, it is the opposition of evil as such,
implying that it is the opposition itself which is evil —
this is the opposition viewed in reference to God ; on the
other hand, it is opposition as against the world, im-
plying that it is out of harmony with the world — this
is misery, the condition of division or disunion viewed
from the other side.
60 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
In order that the need of universal reconciliation, and
as a part of this divine reconciliation, absolute recon-
ciliation in Man, should arise, it is necessary that the
opposition should get this infinite character, and that it
should be seen that this universality comprises Man's
most inward nature, that there is nothing which is out-
side of this opposition, that the opposition is not of a
particular kind. This is the deepest depth.
(a.) We have first to consider the relation in which the
disunion stands to one of the extremes, namely, to God.
Man is inwardly conscious that in the depths of his being
he is a contradiction, and thus there arises an infinite feel-
ing of sorrow in reference to himself. Sorrow is present
only where there is opposition to what ought to be, to
an affirmative. What is no longer in itself an affirma-
tive has no contradiction, no sorrow in it either ; sorrow
is just negativity in the Affirmative, it means that the
Affirmative is something self-contradictory, that it is
wounded by its own act.
This sorrow is the one element of evil. Evil existing
simply by itself is an abstraction, it exists only in op-
position to good ; and since it is present in the unity
of the subject, the feeling of opposition in reference to
this disunion constitutes infinite sorrow. If the con-
sciousness of good did not thus exist in the subject
itself, and if the infinite demand made by good was not
present in the inmost being of the subject, then there
would be no sorrow there, evil itself would be an
empty nothing ; it is present only in this antithesis or
opposition.
Both evil and this sorrow can be infinite only when
good, God, is known as one God, as a pure spiritual
God, and it is only when good is this pure unity, when
we have belief in one God, and only in connection with
such a belief, that the negative can and must advance
to this determination of evil, and that the negation also
can advance to this condition of universalitv.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 61
The one side of this disunion thus becomes apparent by
the elevation of Man to the pure spiritual unity of God.
This sorrow and this consciousness represent Man's descent
into himself, and consequently into the negative moment
of disunion or evil.
This is the negative, or inward, descent or absorption
into evil ; inward absorption of an affirmative kind is
absorption into the pure unity of God. When this
stage is reached, it is seen that I as a natural man do not
correspond to what represents the truth, and that I am
entangled in the multiplicity of natural particular thing?,
and just as the truth of the one Good is present in me
with an infinite certainty, so this want of correspondence
gets a determinate character as something which ought
not to be.
The problem, the demand, is of an infinite kind.
It may be said that since I am a natural man I have
from one point of view a consciousness of myself; but
to be in a state of nature means that I am without con-
sciousness in reference to myself, means the absence of
will ; I am a being of the kind which acts in accordance
with Nature, and so far regarded from this side I am,
as is often said, innocent, I have, so far, no conscious-
ness of what I do, I am without any will of my own,
what I do I do without definite inclination, and allow
myself to be surprised into doing it by impulse.
Here, however, in this state of opposition this inno-
cence disappears. For it is just this natural, unconscious,
and will-less Being of Man which ought not to be, and it
is consequently determined to evil in presence of the
pure unity, the perfect purity which I know as repre-
senting the True and the Absolute. In putting it thus
we imply that when this point has been reached it is
essentially this very unconsciousness and absence of will
which is to be considered as evil.
The contradiction, however, still remains, turn it how
you will. Since this so-called innocence characterises
62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
itself as evil, the want of correspondence between myself
and the Absolute, my inadequacy to express my essence,
remain, and thus, from whichever side I regard myself,
I always know myself to be something which ought not
to be.
This expresses the relation in reference to the one
extreme, and the result, this sorrow in a more definite
form, is my humility, the feeling of contrition, the fact
that I experience sorrow because I as a natural being
do not correspond to what I at the same time know
myself to be in my knowledge and will.
(5.) As regards the relation to the other extreme, the
separation appears in this case in the form of misery
arising from the fact that Man does not find satisfac-
tion in the world. His desire for satisfaction, his natural
wants have no longer any rights, any claims to be satisfied.
As a natural being, Man stands related to an Other, and
that Other is related to him in the form of forces, and his
existence is to this extent contingent, just as that of other
things is.
The demands of his nature, however, in reference to
morality, the higher moral claims of his nature, are
demands and determinations of freedom. In so far as
these demands, which are implicitly legitimate, and are
grounded in his notion or conception — for he knows
about the Good, and the Good is in him — do not find
their satisfaction in the existing order of things, in the
external world, he is in a state of misery.
It is misery which drives Man into himself, forces
him back into himself, and because this fixed demand
that the world should be rational exists in him, he gives
up the world, and seeks happiness, satisfaction, in him-
self, as the harmony of the affirmative side of his nature
with himself. Because he seeks after this, he gives up
the external world, transfers his happiness into himself,
and finds satisfaction in himself.
"We had this demand and this unhappiness in the
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 63
two following forms. We saw how the sorrow which
comes from universality, from above, was found amongst
the Jewish people ; in connection with it there is ever
present the infinite demand for absolute purity in my
natural existence, in my empirical willing and knowing.
The other form they took, the retreat from misery into
self, represents the standpoint at which the Roman world
arrived and where it ended, namely, the universal misery
of the world.
We saw how this formal inwardness which finds
satisfaction in the world, this dominion as being the aim
or end of God, was represented, and known, and thought
of as worldly dominion. Both of these aspects of the
truth are one-sided ; the first may be defined as the feel-
ing of humiliation, the other is the abstract elevation of
Man in himself, of Man as self-centred. Thus it is
Stoicism or Scepticism.
According to the Stoical or Sceptical view, Man is
driven back upon himself, he has to find satisfaction in
himself, in this state of independence ; in remaining
inflexibly self-centred he has to find happiness, inner
harmony of soul, he is to rest in this abstract, present,
self-conscious inwardness of his.
It is in this separation or disunion, as we have said,
that the subject thus takes on a definite character, and
conceives of itself as the extreme of abstract Being-for-
self, of abstract freedom ; the soul plunges into its depths,
into its absolute abyss. This soul is the undeveloped
monad, the naked monad, the empty soul devoid of con-
tent ; but since it is potentially the Notion, the concrete,
this emptiness or abstraction stands in a relation of
contradiction to its essential character, which is, to be
concrete.
Thus the universal element is represented by the fact
that in this separation which develops into an infinite
antithesis, the abstraction is to be done away with and
absorbed. This abstract " I " is also in itself, a will, it is
64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
concrete, but the immediate element which is present in
it and gives it substance is the natural will. The soul
linds nothing in itself except desires, selfishness, &c. ; and
this is one of the forms of the opposition, that " I," as
representing the soul in the depth of its nature, and the
real side, are distinct from one another, and in such a way
that the real side is not something which has been made
adequate to express the Notion and is accordingly carried
back to it, but, on the contrary, finds in itself only the
natural will.
The sphere of opposition in which the real side is
further developed, is the world, and thus the unity of
the Notion has opposed to it the natural will as a whole,
the principle of which is selfishness, and the realisation
of which appears in the form of depravity, cruelty, &c.
The objectivity which this pure " I " has, and which
exists for it as something adequate to express it, is not
found in the natural will, nor in the world either ; on the
contrary, the objectivity which adequately corresponds
to it is the universal Essence only, that One which does
not find its realisation or fulness in it, and which has ail
that supplies realisation, or the world, confronting it.
Accordingly the consciousness of this opposition, of
this division between the " I " and the natural will, is that
of an infinite contradiction. This "I" exists in an im-
mediate relation to the natural will and to the world,
and at the same time it is repelled by them. This is
infinite sorrow, the world's Passion. The reconciliation
which we have hitherto found to be connected with this
standpoint is only partial, and for that reason unsatis-
factory. The harmony of the " I " within itself, which
it attains in the Stoic philosophy, is of a merely ab-
stract kind ; it here knows itself as what thinks, and its
object is what is thought, the Universal, and this is for it
simply everything, the true essentiality, and thus this has
for it the value of something thought, and has value for the
subject as being what it itself has posited. This recon-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 65
ciliation is merely abstract, for all determination lies
outside of what is thus thought, and we have merely
formal self-identity. Such an abstract kind of recon-
ciliation cannot find, and ought not to find, a place in
connection with this absolute standpoint, nor can the
natural will find satisfaction within itself either, for
neither it nor the world as it is can satisfy him who has
become conscious of his infinity. The abstract depth of
the opposition demands an infinite suffering on the part
of the soul, and consequently a reconciliation which will
be correspondingly complete.
These are the highest, most abstract moments, and the
opposition or antithesis is the highest of all. The two
sides represent the opposition in its most complete uni-
versality, in what is most inward, in the Universal itself,
the two sides of the antithesis in the case in which
the opposition goes deepest. Both sides are, however,
one-sided ; the first side contains the sorrow, the abstract
humiliation referred to ; what is highest here is simply
this inadequacy of the subject to express the Universal,
this division or disruption, which is not healed nor ad-
justed, representing the opposition between an infinite
on the one side, and a fixed finitude on the other side.
This finitude is abstract finitude ; anything in this con-
nection reckoned as belonging to me is, according to this
way of looking at it, simply evil.
This abstraction finds its completion in the Other j
this is thought in itself, it implies that I am adequate
to myself, that I find satisfaction in myself and can be
satisfied in myself. This second side is, however, actually
just as one-sided, for it is merely the Affirmative, my self-
affirmation in myself. The first side, the brokenness of
heart, is merely negative, without affirmation in itself;
the second is meant to represent this affirmation, this
satisfaction of self within self. This satisfaction of my-
self in myself, however, is a merely abstract satisfaction
reached by fleeing from the world, from reality, by pas-
VOL. III. E
66 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
sivity. Since this is a fleeing from reality, it is also a
fleeing from my reality, not a fleeing from external reality,
but from the reality of my own volition.
The reality of my volition, I as a definite subject, the
will in a realised form, are no longer mine ; but what is
left to me is the immediacy of my salf-consciousness, the
individual self -consciousness. This is certainly com-
pletely abstract, still this final point of the spirit's depth
is contained in it, and I have preserved myself in it.
This abstraction from my abstract reality is not in me
or in my immediate self-consciousness, in the immediacy
of my self-consciousness. On this side, therefore, it is
affirmation which is the predominant factor, affirmation
without the negation of the one-sidedness of immediate
Being. In the other case it is the negation which is
one-sided.
These are the two moments which contain the neces-
sity for transition. The conception or notion of the
preceding religions has purified itself and thus reached
this antithesis, and the fact that this antithesis or oppo-
sition has shown itself to be, and has taken the form of,
an actually existing necessity, is expressed by the words,
" When the time was fulfilled," i.e., Spirit, the demand of
Spirit, is actually present, Spirit which points the way to
reconciliation.
(c.) Reconciliation. — The deepest need of Spirit con-
sists in the fact that the opposition in the subject itself
has attained its universal, i.e., its most abstract extreme.
This is the division, the sorrow referred to. That these
two sides are not mutually exclusive, but constitute this
contradiction in one, is what directly proves the subject
to be an infinite force of unity ; it can bear this contra-
diction. This is the formal, abstract, but also infinite
energy of the unity which it possesses.
What satisfies this need, we call the consciousness of
reconcilement, the consciousness of the abolition, of the
nullity of the opposition, the consciousness that this
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 67
opposition is not the truth, but that, on the contrary,
the truth consists in reaching unity by the negation of
this opposition, i.e., the peace, the reconciliation which
this need demands. Reconciliation is the demand of the
subject's sense of need, and is inherent in it as being
what is infinitely one, what is self-identical.
This abolition of the opposition has two sides. The
subject must come to be conscious that this opposition is
not something implicit or essential, but that the truth, the
inner nature of Spirit, implies the abolition and absorp-
tion of this opposition. Accordingly, just because it is
implicitly, and, from the point of view of truth, done
away with in something higher, the subject as such in
its Being-for-self can reach and arrive at the abolition
of this opposition, that is to say, can attain to peace or
reconciliation.
i. The very fact that the opposition is implicitly done
away with constitutes the condition, the presupposition,
the possibility of the subject's ability to do away with it
actually. In this respect it may be said that the subject
does not attain reconciliation on its own account, that is,
as a particular subject, and in virtue of its own activity,
and what it itself does ; reconciliation is not brought
about, nor can it be brought about, by the subject in its
character as subject.
This is the nature of the need when the question is,
By what means can it be satisfied ? Eeconciliation can
be brought about only when the annulling of the division
has been arrived at ; when what seems to shun recon-
ciliation, this opposition, namely, is non-existent ; when
the divine truth is seen to be for this, the resolved or
cancelled contradiction, in which the two opposites lay
aside their mutually abstract relation.
Here again, accordingly, the question above referred to
once more arises. Can the subject not bring about this
reconciliation by itself by means of its own action, by
bringing its inner life to correspond with the divine Idea
68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
through its own piety and devoutness, and by giving
expression to this in actions ? And, further, can the
individual subject not do this, or, at least, may not all
men do it who rightly will to adopt the divine Law as
theirs, so that heaven might exist on earth, and the Spirit
in its graciousness actually live here and have a real
existence ? The question is as to whether the subject
can or cannot effect this in virtue of its own powers as
subject. The ordinary idea is that it can do this. What
we have to notice here, and what must be carefully kept
in mind, is that we are dealing with the subject thought
of as standing at one of the two extremes, as existing for
itself. To subjectivity belongs, as a characteristic feature,
the power of positing, and this means that some parti-
cular thing exists owing to me. This positing or making
actual, this doing of actions, &c., takes place through
me, it matters not what the content is ; the act of pro-
ducing is consequently a one-sided characteristic, and the
product is merely something posited, or dependent for its
existence on something else ; it remains as such merely
in a condition of abstract freedom. The question referred
to consequently comes to be a question as to whether it
can by its act of positing produce this. This positing
must essentially be a pre-positing, a presupposition, so that
what is posited is also something implicit. The unity of
subjectivity and objectivity, this divine unity, must be a
presupposition so far as my act of positing is concerned,
and it is only then that it has a content, a substantial
element in it, and the content is Spirit, otherwise it is
subjective and formal ; it is only then that it gets a true,
substantial content. When this presupposition thus gets
a definite character it loses its one-sidedness, and when a
definite signification is given to a presupposition of this
kind the one-sidedness is in this way removed and lost.
Kant and Fichte tell us that man can sow, can do good
only on the presupposition that there is a moral order in
the world ; he does not know whether what he does will
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 69
prosper and succeed ; he can only act on the presupposi-
tion that the Good by its very nature involves growth
and success, that it is not merely something posited, but,
on the contrary, is in its own nature objective. Presup-
position involves essential determination.
The harmony of this contradiction must accordingly
be represented as something which is a presupposition
for the subject. The Notion, in getting to know the
divine unity, knows that God essentially exists in-and-
for-Himself, and consequently what the subject thinks,
and its activity, have no meaning in themselves, but are
and exist only in virtue of that presupposition. The
truth must therefore appear to the subject as a presup-
position, and the question is as to how and in what form
the truth can appear in connection with the standpoint
we now occupy ; it is infinite sorrow, the pure depth
of the soul, and it is for this sorrow that the cancelling
or solution of the contradiction has to exist. This can-
celling has, to begin with, necessarily the form of a pre-
supposition, because what we have here is a one-sided
extreme.
What belongs to the subject, therefore, is simply this
act of positing, action as representing merely one side ;
the other side is the substantial and fundamental one,
which contains in it the possibility of reconciliation. This
means that this opposition does not really exist implicitly.
To put it more correctly, it means that the opposition
springs up eternally, and at the same time eternally
abolishes itself, is at the same time eternal reconciliation.
That this is the truth, we saw when dealing with the
eternal divine Idea, which implies that God as living
Spirit distinguishes Himself from Himself, posits an
Other, and in this Other remains identical with Himself,
and has in this other His self-identity with Himself.
This is the truth ; it is this truth which must consti-
tute the one side of what Man has to become conscious
of, the potentially existing, substantial side.
70 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
We may express it in a more definite form by saying
that the opposition is inadequacy in general. The oppo-
sition, Evil, represents the natural aspect of human exist-
ence and volition, or immediacy. This is just the mode
of existence characteristic of the natural life ; it is just
when we have immediacy that we have finitude, and
this finitude or natural life is inadequate to express the
universality »of God, of the absolutely free, self -existent,
infinite, eternal Idea.
This inadequacy is the starting-point which constitutes
the need of reconciliation. The stricter definition of it
would not consist in saying that the inadequacy attach-
ing to both sides disappears for consciousness. The
v inadequacy exists; it is involved in what is spiritual.
• Spirit means self-differentiation, the positing or making
explicit of differences.
If these are different, then, by the very fact that ac-
cording to this moment they are differences, they are not
alike; they are distinguished from each ether, they do
not correspond to each other. The inadequacy or want of
correspondence cannot disappear ; if it were to disappear
then Spirit's power of judgment or differentiation, its
life, would disappear, in which case it would cease to be
Spirit.
2. A further determination is reached when we say
that, spite of this want of correspondence, the identity of
the two exists ; that otherness or Other-Being, finitude,
weakness, the frailty of human nature, cannot in any
way impair the value of that unity which forms the
substantial element in reconciliation.
This, too, we recognised as present in the divine Idea ;
for the Son is other than the Father, and this Other-
Being is difference, for if it were not, it would not be
Spirit.! But the Other is God, and has the entire ful-
ness of the Divine nature in Himself. The characteristic
of Other-Being in no way detracts from the value of the
fact that this Other is the Son of God, and is conse-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 71
quently God ; and so, too, it does not detract from the
divine character of the Other as it appears in human
nature.
This otherness or Other-Being is Being which eternally
annuls itself, which eternally posits itself and eternally
annuls itself, and this self-positing and annulling of
Other-Being is love or Spirit. Evil, as representing
one side of Being, has been defined simply as the Other,
the finite, the negative, and God has been placed on the
other side as the Good, the True. But this Other, this
negative, contains within itself affirmation as well, and
in finite Being it must come to be consciously known
that the principle of affirmation is contained in this
Other, and that there lies in this principle of affirmation
the principle of identity with the other side, just as God
is not only the True, abstract self-identity, but has in
the Other, in negation, in the self-positing of the Other,
His peculiarly essential characteristic, which is indeed the
peculiar characteristic of Spirit.
The possibility of reconciliation rests only on the
conscious recognition of the implicit unity of divine and
human nature ; this is the necessary basis. Thus Man
can know that he has been received into union with God
in so far as God is not for him something foreign to his
nature, in so far as he does not stand related to God as
an external accident, but when he has been taken up
into God in his essential character, in a way which is in
accordance with his freedom and subjectivity ; this, how-
ever, is possible only in so far as this subjectivity which
belongs to human nature exists in God Himself.
Infinite sorrow must come to be conscious of this im-
plicit Being as the implicit unity of divine and human
nature, but only in its character as implicit Being or
substantiality, and in such a way that this finitude, this
weakness, this Other-Being, in no way impairs the sub-
stantial unity of the two.
The unity of divine and human nature, Man in his
72 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
universality, is the Thought of Man, and the Idea of
absolute Spirit in -and -for -itself. In the process also
in which Other-Being annuls itself, this Idea and the
objectivity of God are implicitly real, and they are in
fact immediately present in all men ; out of the cup of
the entire spirit-realm there foams for him infinitude.
The sorrow which the finite experiences in being thus
annulled and absorbed, does not give pain, since it is
by this means raised to the rank of a moment in the
process of the Divine.
"Why should that trouble trouble us, since it makes our
pleasure more ?"
Here, however, at the standpoint at which we now
are, it is not with the Thought of Man that we have
got to do. Nor can we stop short at the characteristic of
individuality in general, which is itself again universal,
and is present in abstract thinking as such.
3. On the contrary, if Man is to get a consciousness
of the unity of divine and human nature, and of this
characteristic of Man as belonging to Man in general ;
or if this knowledge is to force its way wholly into the
consciousness of his finitude as the beam of eternal
light which reveals itself to him in the finite, then it
must reach him in his character as Man in general,
i.e., apart from any particular conditions of culture or
training ; it must come to him as representing Man in
his immediate state, and it must be universal for imme-
diate consciousness.
The consciousness of the absolute Idea, which we have
in thought, must therefore not be put forward as belong-
ing to the standpoint of philosophical speculation, of
speculative thought, but must, on the contrary, appear
in the form, of certainty for men in general. This does
not mean that they think this consciousness, or perceive
and recognise the necessity of this Idea ; but what we are
concerned to show is rather that the Idea becomes for
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 73
them certain, i.e., this Idea, namely, the unity of divine
and human nature, attains the stage of certainty, that, so
far as they are concerned, it receives the form of imme-
diate sense-perception, of outward existence — in short,
that this Idea appears as seen and experienced in the
world. This unity must accordingly show itself to con-
sciousness in a purely temporal, absolutely ordinary
manifestation of reality, in one particular man, in a
definite individual who is at the same time known to
be the Divine Idea, not merely a Being of a higher kind
in general, but rather the highest, the absolute Idea, the
Son of God.
The expression, " the divine and human natures in
One," is a harsh and awkward one ; but we must forget
the pictorial idea associated with it. What we have
got to think of in connection with it is the spiritual
substantiality which it suggests ; in the unity of the
divine and human natures everything belonging to
outward particularisation has disappeared ; the finite, in
fact, has disappeared.
It is the substantial element in the unity of the
divine and human natures of which Man attains the con-
sciousness, and in such a way that to him Man appears
as God and God as Man. This substantial unity is
Man's potential nature ; but while this implicit nature
exists for Man, it is above and beyond immediate con-
sciousness, ordinary consciousness and knowledge ; con-
sequently it must be regarded as existing in a region
above that subjective consciousness which takes the form
of ordinary consciousness and is characterised as such.
This explains why this unity must appear for others
in the form of an individual man marked off from or
excluding the rest of men, not as representing all indi-
vidual men, but as One from whom they are shut off,
though he no longer appears as representing the poten-
tiality or true essence which is above, but as individuality
in the region of certaintv.
74 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
It is with this certainty and sensuous view that we
are concerned, and not merely with a divine teacher,
nor indeed simply with morality, nor even in any way
simply with a teacher of this Idea either. It is not
with ordinary thought or with conviction that we have
got to do, but with this immediate presence and cer-
tainty of the Divine ; for the immediate certainty of
what is present represents the infinite form and mode
which the "Is" takes for the natural consciousness.
This Is destroys all trace of mediation ; it is the final
point, the last touch of light which is laid on. This
Is is wanting in mediation of any kind such as is
given through feeling, pictorial ideas, reasons ; and it
is only in philosophical knowledge, by means of the
Notion only in the element of universality, that it re-
turns again.
The Divine is not to be conceived of merely as a
universal thought, or as something inward and having
potential existence only ; the objectifying of the Divine
is not to be conceived of simply as the objective form it
takes in all men, for in that case it would be conceived
of simply as representing the manifold forms of the
Spiritual in general, and the development which the
Absolute Spirit has in itself and which has to advance
till it reaches the form of what is the form of imme-
diacy, would not be contained in it.
The One we find in the Jewish religion exists in
thought, not in the form of sense-perception, and conse-
quently has not reached the perfect form of Spirit. It
is just this attaining of a complete and perfect form
in Spirit which we call subjectivity, which endlessly
alienates or estranges itself, and then from this abso-
lute opposition, from the furthest point of manifestation,
returns to itself.
The principle of individuality, it is true, was already
present in the Greek ideal, but there it was wanting just
in that universal essentially existing infinitude ; the Uni-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 75
versal as Universal is posited only in tlie subjectivity
of consciousness ; it is this subjectivity only which is
infinite inner movement, in which all the determinate-
ness of definite existence is cancelled, and which at
the same time is present in existence in its most finite
form.
This individual, accordingly, who represents for others
the manifestation of the Idea, is a particular Only One,
not some ones, for the Divine in some would become an
abstraction. The idea of some is a miserable superfluity
of reflection, a superfluity because opposed to the con-
ception or notion of individual subjectivity. In the
Notion once is always, and the subject must turn exclu-
sively to one subjectivity. In the eternal Idea there is
only one Son, and thus there is only One in whom the
absolute Idea appears, and this One excludes the others.
It is this perfect development of reality thus embodied '
in immediate individuality or separateness which is the
finest feature of the Christian religion, and the absolute
transfiguration of the finite gets in it a form in which it
can be outwardly perceived.
This characteristic, namely, that God becomes Man,
and consequently that the finite spirit has the conscious-
ness of God in the finite itself, represents what is the
most difficult moment of religion. According to a
common idea, which we find amongst the ancients
particularly, the spirit or soul has been forced into this
world as into an element which is foreign to it ; this
indwelling of the soul in the body, and this particu-
larisation in the form of individuality, are held to be a
degradation of Spirit. In this is involved the idea of
the untruth of the purely material side, of immediate
existence. On the other hand, however, the charac-
teristic of immediate existence is at the same time an
essential characteristic, it is the final tapering point of
Spirit in its subjectivity. Man has spiritual interests
and is spiritually active ; he can feel that he is hindered
76 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
in connection with these interests and activities ; in so
far as he feels himself to be in a condition of physical
dependence, and has to provide for his own support,
&c., his thoughts are taken away from his spiritual in-
terests through his being bound to Nature. The stage
of immediate existence is, however, contained in Spirit
itself. The essential characteristic of Spirit is that it
should advance to this stage. The natural life is not
simply an external necessity ; on the contrary, Spirit, as
subject in its infinite reference to itself, has the charac-
teristic of immediacy in it. In so far, accordingly, as the
nature of Spirit happens to be revealed to Man, the
nature of God in the entire development of the Idea
must be revealed, and thus this form must also be
present here, and that is just the form of finitude. The
Divine must appear in the form of immediacy. This
immediate presence is merely a presence of the Spiritual
in that spiritual form which is the human form. This
manifestation is not true when it takes any other form,
certainly not when it is a manifestation of God in the
burning bush, and the like. God appears as an indivi-
dual person to whose immediacy all kinds of physical
necessities are attached. In Indian pantheism a count-
less number of incarnations occur ; there subjectivity,
human existence, is only an accidental form ; in God it
is simply a mask which Substance adopts and changes in
an accidental way. God as Spirit, however, contains in
Himself the moment of subjectivity, of singleness ; His
manifestation, accordingly, can only be a single one, can
take place only once.
In the Church Christ has been called the God-Man.
This is the extraordinary combination which directly con-
tradicts the Understanding ; but the unity of the divine
and human natures has here been brought into human
consciousness and has become a certainty for it, implying
that the otherness, or, as it is also expressed, the fini-
tude, the weakness, the frailty of human nature is not
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 77
incompatible with this unity, just as in the eternal
Idea otherness in no way detracts from the unity which
God is.
This is the extraordinary combination the necessity of
which we have seen. It involves the truth that the
divine and human natures are not implicitly different.
God in human form. The truth is that there is only
one reason, one Spirit, that Spirit as finite has no true
existence.
The substantiality of the form of manifestation is un-
folded or made explicit. Because it is the manifestation
of God, it is essentially for the community of believers.
Manifestation means Being for an Other, and this other
is the community of believers.
This historical manifestation may, however, be looked at
in two different ways. On the one hand, it may be held
to be Man as he is in his outward condition in the sense
of ordinary Man, the sense in which Man is taken in the
irreligious way of regarding this manifestation. Then,
on the other hand, it may be looked at in spirit or in
a spiritual way, and with the spirit, which presses on
to reach its truth, and which, just because it has this
infinite division, this sorrow within itself, wills the truth,
wills to have, and must have, the need of truth and the
certainty of truth. This is the true way of regarding
the manifestation so far as religion is concerned. We
must distinguish between these two standpoints — the
immediate way of looking at the question, and the way
followed by faith.
By ^aitji this individual is known to possess divine
nature, whereby God ceases to be a Being beyond this
world. When Christ is looked at in the same way as
Socrates is, He is looked at as an ordinary man, just as
the Mohammedans consider Christ as God's ambassador
in the general sense in which all great men are God's
ambassadors or messengers. If we say nothing more of
Christ than that He was a teacher of humanity, a martyr
78 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
for the truth, we do not occupy the Christian standpoint,
the standpoint of the true religion.
The one side is this human side, this appearance of
one who was a living man. As an immediate or natural
man he is subject to the contingency which belongs to
outward things, to all temporal relations and conditions ;
he is born, as Man he has the needs which all other men
have except that he does not share in the corruption,
the passions, the particular inclinations of men, in the
special interests of the worldly life in connection with
which uprightness and moral teaching may also find a
place ; on the contrary, he lives only for the truth and
the proclamation of the truth, his activity consists simply
in fulfilling the higher consciousness of men.
It is to this human side, therefore, that the doctrine
of Christ chiefly belongs. The question is, How can such
doctrine exist, and in what way is it formed ? The
doctrine in its first form cannot have been composed
of the same elements as afterwards appeared in the doc-
trine of the Church. It must have certain peculiarities
which in the Church of necessity partly receive another
signification and are partly dropped. Christ's teaching
in its immediate form cannot be Christian Dogmatics,
cannot be Church-doctrine. When the Christian com-
munity has been set up, when the Kingdom of God has
attained reality and a definite existence, this teaching
can no longer have the same signification as before.
The principal contents of this teaching can only be
general and abstract. If something new, a new world,
a new religion, a new conception of God, is to be given
to the world of ordinary thought, then the first thing
needed is the general sphere of ideas in which this
can show itself, and the second thing is the particular,
the determinate, the concrete. The world of ordinary
thought, in so far as it thinks, thinks merely abstractly,
it thinks only what is general ; it is reserved for Spirit,
which comprehends things through the Notion, to recognise
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 79
the particular in the general, and to see how this particular
proceeds out of the Notion by its own power. For the
world of ordinary or popular thought, the basis on which
universal Thought rests, and particularisation, develop-
ment, are separated. This general or universal basis
may therefore be made use of for the true notion of God,
by means of doctrine.
Since what we have got to do with is a new conscious-
ness on the part of men, a new religion, it is for that
reason the consciousness of absolute reconciliation ; this
involves a new world, a new religion, a new reality, a
world in a different condition, for it is religion which is
the substantial element in external determinate Being
or existence.
This is the negative or polemical side, as against
continuance in this externality on the part of the con-
sciousness or faith of Man. The new religion declares
itself to be a new consciousness, a consciousness of the
reconciliation of Man with God; this reconciliation as
expressing a condition is the Kingdom of God, the
Eternal as the home of Spirit, a real world in which
God reigns ; the spirits, the hearts here are reconciled
with Him, and thus it is God who has attained to
authority over them. This so far represents the general
sphere or basis.
This Kingdom of God, the new religion, thus contains
within itself the characteristic of negation in reference
to all that is actual. This is the revolutionary side of
its teaching which partly throws aside all that actually
exists, and partly destroys and overthrows it. All earthly
and worldly things drop away as being without value,
and are expressly declared to be valueless. What has
hitherto existed is altered, the hitherto existing relations,
the condition of religion and of the world, cannot remain
as they have hitherto been. What, therefore, has to be
done is to get Man — who must reach a consciousness
of reconciliation — drawn out of his present condition,
So THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and to get him to seek after this abstraction or with-
drawal from actual reality.
This new religion as yet concentrates itself, and does
not actually exist as a church or community of believers,
but shows itself rather in that energy which constitutes
the sole interest of the man who has to fight and struggle
in order to obtain this new condition, because it is not yet
in harmony with the actual state of the world, and is not
yet brought into connection with his world-consciousness.
This new religion, therefore, on its first appearance pre-
sents a polemical aspect, involves a demand that finite things
should be abandoned ; it demands that Man should rise to
the exercise of an infinite energy in which the Universal
demands that it should be laid hold of for its own sake,
and in which all other ties have to be treated as matters
of indifferencej and all that had hitherto been regarded
as moral and right, all other ties, have to be put aside.
" Who is my mother and my brother ?" &c. " Let the
dead bury their dead," &c. " Whoever puts his hand to
the plough and looks back is not fit for the Kingdom
of God." " I am come to bring a sword," &c. In these
words we see how a polemic is directed against all
ordinary moral relations — " Take no thought for the
morrow," " Give your goods to the poor."
All those relations which have reference to property,
disappear ; meanwhile they in turn cancel themselves, for
if everything is given to the poor then there are no poor.
All this represents doctrines and special characteristics
which belong to the first appearance of the new religion
when it constitutes man's sole interest, which he must
believe he is as yet in danger of losing, and when its
teaching is addressed to men with whom the world is
done and who are done with the world. The one side
is represented by this renunciation ; this giving up,
this slighting of every substantial interest and of moral
ties, is an essential characteristic of the concentrated
manifestation of truth, a characteristic which subse-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 81
quently, when truth has attained a sure existence, loses
some of its importance. In fact, if this religion at its
start as suffering, appears in relation to what is outside
of it as willing to endure, to yield, to submit to death,
in course of time, when it has grown strong, its inner
energy will act towards what is outside of it with a cor-
respondingly violent display of force.
The next thing in the affirmative part of this religion
is the proclamation of the Kingdom of God ; into this
Kingdom, as representing the Kingdom of love to God,
Man has to transport himself, and he does this by directly
devoting himself to the truth it embodies. This is ex-
pressed with the most absolute and startling frankness,
as, for instance, at the beginning of the so-called Sermon
on the Mount : " Blessed are the pure in heart, for they
shall see God." Words like these are amongst the grandest
that have ever been uttered. They represent a final central
point in which all superstition and all want of freedom on
Man's part are done away with. It is of infinite import-
ance that, by Luther's translation of the Bible, a popular
book has been put into the hands of the people, in which
the heart, the spirit can find itself at home in the very
highest, in fact in an infinite way ; in Catholic countries
there is in this respect a grave want. For Protestant
peoples the Bible supplies a means of deliverance from
all spiritual slavery.
There is no mention of any mediation in connection
with this elevating of the spirit whereby it may become
an accomplished fact in Man ; but, on the contrary, the
mere statement of what is required implies this imme-
diate Being, this immediate self-transference into Truth,
into the Kingdom of God. It is to the intellectual and
spiritual world, to the Kingdom of God, that Man ought
to belong, and in it it is feeling or moral disposition
alone which has value, but not abstract feeling, not mere
chance opinion, but that absolute feeling or disposition
which has its basis in the Kingdom of God. It is in
VOL. III. F
82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
connection with this Kingdom of God that the infinite
worth of inwardness first comes into view. This is
proclaimed in the language of enthusiasm, in tones so
penetrating as to thrill the soul, and, as Hermes the
psychagogue did, to draw it out of the body and bear it
away beyond the temporal into its eternal home. " Seek
first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness."
Along with this elevation above, and complete abstrac-
tion from all that the world counts great, we everywhere
find in Christ's teaching a lament over the degradation of
His nation, and of men in general. Jesus appeared at a
time when the Jewish nation, owing to the dangers to
which its worship had been exposed and was still exposed,
was more obstinately absorbed in its observance than ever,
and was at the same time compelled to despair of seeing
its hopes actually realised since it had come in contact
with a universal humanity, the existence of which it could
no longer deny, and which nevertheless was completely
devoid of any spiritual element — He appeared, in short,
when the common people were in perplexity and helpless.
" I thank Thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth,
that Thou hast hid these things from the wise and
prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes."
Accordingly, this substantial element, this universal
divine heaven of the inner life, leads, under the influence
of reflection of a more definite kind, to moral commands
which are the application of that universal element to
particular circumstances and situations. These commands,
however, themselves partly apply only to limited spheres
of action, and are partly intended for those stages in
which we are occupied with absolute truth ; they contain
nothing striking, or else they are already contained in
other religions and in the Jewish religion. These com-
mands are comprised in the command of Love as their
central point, love which has for its aim, not the rights,
but the well-being of the other, and thus expresses a
relation to its particular object. " Love thy neighbour
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 83
as thyself." This command, thought of in the abstract
and more extended sense as embracing the love of men
in general, is a command to love all men. Taken in this
sense, however, it is turned into an abstraction. The
people whom one can love, and for whom our love is
real, are a few particular individuals ; the heart which
seeks to embrace the whole of humanity within itself
indulges in a vain attempt to spread out its love until
it becomes a mere idea, the opposite of real love.
Love, in the sense in which Christ understood it, is
primarily moral love of our neighbour in those particular
relations in which we stand to him ; but, above all, it is
meant to express the relation existing between His dis-
ciples and followers, the bond which makes them one.
And here it is not to be understood as meaning that each
is to have his particular occupation, interests, and rela-
tions in life, and is further to love in addition to all this,
but that this love, as something apart which abstracts
from all else, is to be the central point in which they live,
and is to constitute their business.
They are to love one another, nothing more or less, and
consequently are not to have any particular end in view
whatever, ends connected with the family, political ends,
nor are they to love because of these particular ends.
Love, on the contrary, is abstract personality, and the
identity of this in one consciousness in which it is not
any longer possible for special ends to exist. Here,
therefore, no other objective end exists unless this love.
This love, which is independent, and which is thus made
a centre, finally becomes the higher divine love itself.
At first, however, this love, as a love which as yet has
no objective end, also takes up a polemical attitude to the
existing order of things, especially to the Jewish existing
order. All those actions commanded by the Law by the
doing of which apart from love, men formerly estimated
their moral worth, are declared to be dead works, and
Christ Himself heals on the Sabbath.
84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The following moment or determinate element accord-
ingly enters into these doctrines. While this command
of love is directly expressed in the words, " Seek the
Kingdom of God," abandon yourself to the truth; and
while the demand is made in this immediate way, it
appears as if in the form of a subjective statement, and
so far the person speaking comes into view.
In accordance with this reference to a person, Christ
does not speak as a teacher merely who states his own
subjective view, and who is conscious of what he pro-
duces in the way of truth and of his own action in the
matter, but as a prophet ; He is one who, since this
demand is direct, utters the command directly from God,
and as one out of whom God thus speaks.
The fact that this possession of this life of the spirit
in truth is attained without intermediate helps, is ex-
pressed in the prophetic manner, namely, that it is God
who thus speaks. Here it is with absolute, divine truth,
truth in-and-for-itself, that we are concerned ; this utter-
ance and willing of the truth in-and-for-itself, and the
carrying out of what is thus expressed, is described as an
act of God, it is the consciousness of the real unity of the
divine will, of its harmony with the truth. It is as
conscious of this elevation of His spirit, and in the assur-
ance of His identity with God that Christ says, " Woman,
thy sins are forgiven thee." Here there speaks in Him
that overwhelming majesty which can undo everything,
and actually declares that this has been done.
So far as the form of this utterance is concerned, what
has mainly to be emphasised is that He who thus speaks
is at the same time essentially Man, it is the Son of Man
who thus speaks, in whom this utterance of the truth, this
carrying into practice of what is absolute and essential,
this activity on God's part, is essentially seen to exist as
in one who is a man and not something superhuman,
not something which appears in the form of an outward
revelation — in short, the main stress is to be laid on the
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 8$
fact that this divine presence is essentially identical with
what is human.
Christ calls Himself the Son of God and the Son of
Man ; these titles are to be taken in their strict meaning.
The Arabs mutually describe themselves as the son of a
certain tribe ; Christ belongs to the human race ; that is
His tribe. Christ is also the Son of God ; it is possible
to explain away by exegesis the true sense of this expres-
sion, the truth of the Idea, what Christ has been for His
Church, and the higher Idea of the truth which has been
found in Him in His Church, and to say that all the
children of men are children of God, or are meant to
make themselves children of God, and so on.
Since, however, the teaching of Christ taken by itself
belongs to the world of ordinary figurative ideas only, and
takes to do with inner feeling and disposition, it is sup-
plemented by the representation of the Divine Idea in
His life and fate. That Kingdom of God, as constituting
the content of Christ's teaching, is at first the Idea in a
general form, represented as yet in a general conception ;
it is by means of this individual man that it enters into
the region of reality, so that those who are to reach that
Kingdom can do it through that one individual.
The primary point is, to start with, the abstract cor-
respondence between the acts, deeds, and sufferings of this
teacher, and His own teaching, the fact that His life was
wholly devoted to carrying it out, that He did not shun
death, and that He sealed His faith by His death. The
fact that Christ became a martyr for the truth has an
intimate connection with His appearing thus on the earth.
Since the founding of the Kingdom of God is in direct
contradiction with the actually existing State, which is
based on a different view of religion, and which ascribes a
different character to it, the fate of Christ, whereby — to
put it in human language — He became a martyr for the
truth, is in close connection with the manner of His
appearing above referred to.
86 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
These are the principal elements in the manifestation
of Christ in a human form. This teacher gathered friends
around Him. Inasmuch as His doctrines were revolution-
ary Christ was accused and condemned, and so He sealed
the truth of His teaching by His death. Even unbelief goes
this length in the view it takes of His history ; it is exactly
similar to that of Socrates, only in different surroundings.
Socrates, too, made men conscious of the inwardness
of their nature. His Saijmovtov is nothing else than this
inner life. He, too, taught that Man must not stop
short with obedience to ordinary authority, but form
convictions for himself, and act in accordance with these
convictions. These two individualities are similar, and
their fates are also similar. The inwardness of Socrates
was in direct opposition to the religious belief of his
nation, and to the form of government, and consequently
he was condemned ; he, too, died for the truth.
Christ lived merely amongst a different people, and
His teaching has so far a different complexion. But the
Kingdom of God and the idea of purity of heart contain
an infinitely greater depth of truth than the inwardness of
Socrates. This is the outward history of Christ, which is
for unbelief just what the history of Socrates is for us.
^ With the death of Christ, however, there begins the
conversion of consciousness. The death of Christ is the
central point round which all else turns, and in the con-
ception formed of it lies the difference between the out-
ward way of conceiving of it and Faith, i.e., regarding it
with the spirit, taking our start from the spirit of truth,
from the Holy Spirit. According to the comparison above
referred to, Christ is a man just like Socrates, a teacher
who lived virtuously, and made men conscious of what
is essentially true, of what must constitute the basis of
human consciousness. According to the higher way of
regarding the matter, however, the divine nature was
revealed in Christ. This consciousness is reflected in those
passages which state that the Son knows the Father, &c.,
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 87
expressions which, to begin with, have in themselves a
certain generality, and which exegesis can transfer to the
region of general views, but which Faith by its explana-
tion of the death of Christ lays hold of in their true
meaning ; for Faith is essentially the consciousness of
absolute truth, of what God is in His true nature. But
we have already seen what God is in His true essential
nature ; He is the life-process, the Trinity, in which the
Universal puts itself into antithesis with itself, and is in
this antithesis identical with itself. God in this element
of eternity represents what encloses itself in union with
itself, the enclosing of Himself with Himself. Faith
simply lays hold of the thought and has the consciousness
that in Christ this absolute essential truth is perceived
in the process of its development, and that it is through
Him that this truth has first been revealed.
This view represents, to begin with, the religious
attitude as such, in which the Divine is itself an es-
sential moment. This anticipation, this imagining, this
willing of a new Kingdom, " a new heaven and a new
earth," of a new world, is found amongst those friends
and acquaintances who have been taught the truth ; this
hope, this certainty has made its way into the real part
of their hearts, has sunk into their inmost hearts as a
reality.
Accordingly the Passion, the death of Christ does away
with the human side of Christ's nature, and it is just in
connection with this death that the transition is made
into the religious sphere ; and here the question comes to
be as to how this death is to be conceived of. On the
one hand, it is a natural death brought about by injustice,
hate, and violence ; on the other hand, however, believers
are already firmly convinced in their hearts and feelings
that they are not here specially concerned with morality,
with the thinking and willing of the subject in itself or as
starting from itself, but that the real point of importance
is an infinite relation to God, to God as actually present,
88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the certainty of the Kingdom of God, a sense of satisfac-
tion not in morality, nor even in anything ethical, nor in
the conscience, but a sense of satisfaction beyond which
there can be nothing higher, an absolute relation to God
Himself.
All other modes of satisfaction imply that in some
aspect or other they are of a subordinate sort, and thus
the relation of Man to God does not get beyond being
a relation to something above, and distant, to some-
thing, in fact, which is not actually present at all. The
fundamental characteristic of this Kingdom of God is
the presence of God, meaning that the members of this
Kingdom are not only expected to have love to men, but
to have the consciousness that God is Love.
This implies, in fact, that God is present, and that this as
personal feeling must be the feeling of the individual Self.
This aspect of the truth is represented by the Kingdom
of God, or the presence of God, and it is to it that the
certainty of the presence of God belongs. Since it is, on
the one hand, a need, a feeling, the subject must, on the
other hand, distinguish itself from it, must make a dis-
tinction between this presence of God and itself, but in
such a way that this presence of God will be something
certain, and this certainty can actually exist here only in
the form of sensuous manifestation.
The eternal Idea itself means that the characteristic of
subjectivity as real, as distinguished from what are simply
thoughts, is permitted to appear in an immediate form.
On the other hand, it is faith begotten by the sorrow of
the world, and resting on the testimony of the Spirit,
which explains the life of Christ. The teaching of Christ
and His miracles are conceived of and understood in
connection with this witness of the Spirit. The history
of Christ is related, too, by those upon whom the Spirit
has been already poured out. The miracles are conceived
of and related under the influence of this Spirit, and the
death of Christ is truly understood by this Spirit to mean
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 89
that in Christ God is revealed together with the unity of
the Divine and human natures. Christ's death is ac-
cordingly the touchstone, so to speak, by means of which
Faith verifies its belief, since it is essentially here that its
way of understanding the appearance of Christ makes
itself manifest. Christ's death primarily means that
Christ was the God-Man, the God who had at the same
time human nature, even unto death. It is the lot of
finite humanity to die ; death is the most complete proof
of humanity, of absolute finitude, and Christ in fact died
the aggravated death of the evil-doer ; He did not only die
a natural death, but a death even of shame and dishonour
on the cross ; in Him humanity was carried to its furthest
point.
In connection with this death \ve have to notice first of
all what is one of its special characteristics, namely, its
polemical attitude towards outward things. Not only is
the act whereby the natural will yields itself up here
represented in a sensible form, but all that is peculiar to
the individual, all those interests and personal ends with
which the natural will can occupy itself, all that is great
and counted as of value in the world, is at the same time
buried in the grave of the Spirit. This is the revolu-
tionary element by means of which the world is given
a totally new form. And yet in this yielding up of the
natural will, the finite, the Other-Being or otherness, is at
the same time transfigured. Other-Being or otherness
has in fact besides its immediate natural being a more
extended sphere of existence and a further determination.
It belongs essentially to the definite existence of the sub-
ject that it should exist for others ; the subject exists not
only on its own account or for itself, but exists also in
the idea formed of it by others, it exists, has value, and
is objective to the extent to which it is able to assert its
claim to exist amongst others and has a valid existence.
Its validity is the idea formed of it by others, and is based
on a comparison with what they hold to be of value
90 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and what is regarded by them as possessing the worth of
something potential or essential.
Since, accordingly, the death of Christ, in addition to
the fact that it is natural death, is, further, the death of
an evil-doer, the most degrading of all deaths, death upon
the cross, it involves not only what is natural, but also
civil degradation, worldly dishonour; the cross is trans-
figured, what according to the common idea is lowest,
what the State characterises as degrading, is transformed
into what is highest. Death is natural, every man must
die. But since degradation is made the highest honour,
all those ties that bind human society together are attacked
in their foundations, are shaken and dissolved. When the
cross has been elevated to the place of a banner, and is
made a banner in fact, the positive content of which is
at the same time the Kingdom of God, inner feeling is in
the very heart of its nature detached from civil and state
life, and the substantial basis of this latter is taken
away, so that the whole structure has no longer any
reality, but is an empty appearance, which must soon
come crashing down, and make manifest in actual exist-
ence that it is no longer anything having inherent
existence. Imperial power, on its part, degraded all that
was esteemed and valued by men. The life of every
individual depended on the caprice of the Emperor, and
this caprice was not limited by anything either without
or within. But, besides life, all virtue, worth, age, rank,
race, everything, in short, was utterly degraded. The
slave of the Emperor was next to him the highest power
in the State, or had even more power than the Emperor
himself ; the Senate debased itself in proportion as it
was debased by the Emperor. Thus the majesty of
world-empire, together with all virtue, justice, veneration
for institutions and constituted things, the majesty of
everything, in short, held by the world as of value was
pitched into the gutter. Thus the temporal ruler of the
earth, on his part, changed what was highest into what
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 91
was most despised, and fundamentally perverted feeling,
so that in man's inner life there no longer remained
anything to set against the new religion, which in its
turn raised what had been most despised to the place of
what was highest, and made it a banner. Everything
established, everything moral, everything considered by
ordinary opinion as of value and possessed of authority,
was destroyed, and all that was left to the existing order
of things, towards which the new religion took up a
position of antagonism, was the purely external, cold
power, namely, death, which life, ennobled by feeling that
in its inner nature it was infinite now, no longer in any
way dreaded.
Now, however, a further determination comes into
play — God has died, God is dead, — this is the most
frightful of all thoughts, that all that is eternal, all that
is true is not, that negation itself is found in God ; the
deepest sorrow, the feeling of something completely irre-
trievable, the renunciation of everything of a higher kind,
are connected with this. The course of thought does
not, however, stop short here ; on the contrary, thought
begins to retrace its steps : God, that is to say, maintains
Himself in this process, and the latter is only the death t_
of death. God comes to life again, and thus things are
reversed.1 The Eesurrection is something which thus
1 This is the meaning of the resurrection and the ascension of Christ.
Like all that goes before, this elevation of Christ to heaven outwardly
appears for the immediate or natural consciousness in the mode of reality.
" Thou wilt not leave Thy righteous one in the grave ; Thou wilt not suffer
Thine Holy One to see corruption." This is the form, too, in which this
death of death, the overcoming of the grave, the triumph over the negative,
and this elevation to heaven appear to sense-perception. This triumphing
over the negative is not, however, a putting off of human nature, but, on
the contrary, is its most complete preservation in death itself and in the
highest love. Spirit is Spirit only in so far as it is this negative of the
negative which thus contains the negative in itself. When, accordingly,
the Son of Man sits on the right hand of the Father, we see that in this
exaltation of human nature its glory consists, and its identity with the
divine nature appears to the spiritual eye in the highest possible way. —
(From the sheets in Hegel's own handwriting belonging to the year 1821.)
92 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
essentially belongs to faith. After His resurrection
Christ appeared only to His friends ; this is not outward
history for unbelief, but, on the contrary, this appearing
of Christ is for faith only. The resurrection is followed
by the glorification of Christ ; and the triumph of His
exaltation to the right hand of God closes this part of
His history, which, as thus understood by believing con-
sciousness, is the unfolding of the Divine nature itself.
If in the first division of the subject we conceived of
God as He is in pure thought, in this second division we
start from immediacy as it exists for sense - perception
and for ideas based on sense. The process is accordingly
this, that immediate particularity is done away with and
absorbed ; and just as in the first region of thought,
God's state of seclusion came to an end, and His primary
immediacy as abstract universality, according to which
He is the Essence of Essences, was annulled, so here the
abstraction of humanity, the immediacy of existing parti-
cularity, is annulled, and this is brought about by death ;
the death of Christ, however, is the death of death, the
negation of the negation. We have had in the Kingdom of
the Father the same course and process in the unfolding of
God's nature ; here, however, the process is explained in
so far as it is an object for consciousness. For here there
existed the impulse to form a mental picture of the divine
nature. In connection with the death of Christ we have
finally to emphasise the moment according to which it is
God who has killed death, since He comes out of the
state of death : this means that finitude, human nature,
and humiliation are attributed to Christ as something
foreign to His nature, which is that of one who is God
pure and simple ; it is shown that fiuitude is something
foreign to His nature, and has been adopted by Him
from an Other; this Other is represented by men who
stand over against the divine process. It is their fini-
4 tude which Christ has taken upon Himself, this finitude
in all its forms, and which at its furthest extreme is
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 93
represented by Evil ; this humanity, which is itself a
moment in the divine life, is now characterised as some-
thing foreign to God, as something which does not belong
to His nature ; this finitude, however, in its condition
of Being-for-self, or as existing independently in relation
to God, is evil, something foreign to God's nature ; He
has, however, taken our finite nature in order to slay it
by His death. His shameful death, as representing the
marvellous union of these absolute extremes, is at the
same time infinite love.
It is a proof of infinite love that God identified Him-
self with what was foreign to His nature in order to slay
it. This is the signification of the death of Christ.
Christ has borne the sins of the world, He has recon-
ciled God to us, as it is said.
This death is thus at once finitude in its most extreme
form, and at the same time the abolition and absorption of
natural finitude, of immediate existence and estrangement,
the cancelling of limits. This abolition and absorption
of the natural is to be conceived of in a spiritual sense
as essentially meaning that the movement of Spirit con-
sists in comprehending itself in itself, in dying to the
natural, that it is therefore abstraction from immediate
volition and immediate consciousness, an act of sinking
into itself, and then an act whereby it itself draws out of
this depth into which it has plunged what is merely its
own specific character, its true essence, and its absolute
universality. What has for it worth, and all that con-
stitutes its value, it finds only in this abolition of its
natural Being and will. The suffering and the sorrow
connected with this death which contains this element of
the reconciliation of Spirit with itself and with what it
potentially is, this negative moment which belongs to
Spirit only as Spirit, is inner conversion and change.
Here, however, death is not brought before us with this
concrete meaning, but is represented as natural death, for
in the Divine Idea that negation cannot be exhibited
94 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
under any other form. When the eternal history of Spirit
exhibits itself in an outward way, in the sphere of the
natural, Evil which realises itself in the Divine Idea can
appear only in the form of the Natural, and thus the
reversion which takes place can have only the form of
natural death. The Divine Idea cannot proceed beyond
this characteristic of the natural. This death, however,
although it is natural, is the death of God, and thus
sufficient as an atonement for us, since it exhibits the
absolute history of the Divine Idea, what has implicitly
taken place and takes place eternally.
That the individual man does something, attains to
something, and accomplishes it, is owing to the fact that
this is how the matter stands regarding the true reality
looked at from the point of view of its Notion. The
fact, for example, that any particular criminal can b3
punished by the judge, and that this punishment is the
carrying out and expiation of the law, does not imply
that it is the judge who does this, or that the criminal
does it by undergoing the punishment as a particular
outward event ; but, on the contrary, what takes place is
in accordance with the nature of the thing or true fact,
with the necessity of the Notion. We thus have this
process before us in a double form : on the one hand, we
have it in thought, in the idea embodied in law, and in
the Notion ; and, on the other, in one particular instance,
and in this particular instance the process is what it is
because this belongs to the nature of the thing, and apart
from this neither the action of the judge nor the suffering
undergone by the criminal would represent the punish-
ment inflicted by the law and the expiation it demands.
The fundamental reason, the substantial element, belongs
to the nature of the thing.
Accordingly this is how it stands, too, with that satis-
faction or atonement for us above referred to, i.e., what
lies at the basis of that idea is that this atonement has
actually and completely taken place, has taken place
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 95
in-and-for-itself ; it is not a strange sacrifice, a sacrifice
of what is foreign to man which has been offered, it is
not an Other who has been punished in order that there
might be punishment. Each one must for himself, start-
ing from his own subjectivity and responsibility, do and
be what he ought to be. But what he thus is for him-
self must not be anything accidental, or be his own
caprice ; it must, on the contrary, be something true.
When he thus accomplishes within himself this con-
version and the yielding up of the natural will, and lives
in love, this represents the essential fact, the thing in-
and-for-itself. His subjective certainty, his feeling, is
truth, it is the truth and the nature of the Spirit. The
basis of redemption is thus contained in the history
spoken of, for it represents the essential thing or fact,
the thing as it is in-and-for-itself ; it is not an accidental
special act and occurrence, but is true and complete.
This proof of its truth is the pictorial view given of it in
the history referred to, and according to that representa-
tion the individual lays hold of, appropriates the merit
of Christ. It is not, however, the history of one indivi-
dual ; on the contrary, it is God who accomplishes what
is told in it ; i.e., the view which it gives is that this
history is the universal and absolute history, the history
which is for itself.
Other forms, for example, of the sacrificial offering,
with which is connected the false idea that God is a
tyrant who desires sacrifice, reduce themselves to that
conception of sacrifice which has been stated, and are to
be corrected by it. Sacrifice means the abolition and
absorption of naturalness, of Otherness. It is further
said that Christ died for all, and this does not represent
an individual act, but the divine eternal history. It is
said in the same way that in Him all have died. This
is itself a moment in the nature of God ; it has taken
place in God Himself. God cannot find satisfaction
through anything other than Himself, but only through
Himself. This death is love itself, expressed as a moment
of God, and it is this death which brings about recon-
ciliation. In it we have a picture of absolute love. It
is the identity of the Divine and the human, it implies
that in the finite God is at home with Himself, and this
finite as seen in death is itself a determination belonging
to God. God has through death reconciled the world,
and reconciled it eternally with Himself. This coming-
back from the state of estrangement is His return to
Himself, and it is because of it that He is Spirit, and
the third point accordingly is that Christ has risen.
Negation is consequently surmounted, and the negation
of the negation is thus a moment of the Divine nature.
Suffering and dying taken in this sense are ideas
opposed to the doctrine of moral imputation according
to which each individual has to stand for himself only,
and each is the doer of his own deeds. The fate of
Christ seems to contradict this imputation ; this imputa-
tion, however, has a place only in the sphere of finitude,
where the subject is regarded as a single person, and not
in the sphere of free Spirit. The characteristic idea in
the region of finitude is that each remains what he is ; if
he has done evil, he is evil ; evil is in him as represent-
ing his quality. But already in the sphere of morality,
and still more in that of religion, Spirit is known to be
free, to be affirmative in itself, so that the element of
limit in it which gets the length of evil is a nullity for the
infinitude of Spirit ; Spirit can make what has happened
as if it had not happened ; the action certainly remains
in the memory, but Spirit puts it away. Imputation,
therefore, does not reach to this sphere. For the true
consciousness of Spirit the finitude of Man is slain in
the death of Christ. This death of the natural gets in
this way a universal signification, the finite, evil, in fact,
is destroyed. The world is thus reconciled, and through
this death the world is implicitly freed from its evil. It
is in connection with a true understanding of the death of
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 97
Christ that the relation of the subject as such in this
way comes into view. Here any mere outward con-
sideration of the history ceases ; the subject is itself
drawn into the process ; it feels the pain of evil and of
its own alienation, which Christ has taken upon Himself
by putting on humanity, while at the same time destroying
it by His death.
Since the content, too, just consists in this, we have
here the religious side of the subject, and it is in it that
the Spiritual Community, or the Church, first originates.
This content is the same thing as what is termed the
outpouring of the Holy Spirit. It is Spirit which has
revealed this ; the relation to men simply as men is
changed into a relation which is altered and transformed
into a relation which is entirely one of Spirit, and is
of such a kind that the nature of God unfolds itself in
it, and this truth comes to have immediate certainty in
accordance with the form of outward manifestation.
Here, accordingly, he who at first was regarded as a
teacher, a friend, a martyr, comes to have a totally dif-
ferent position. Up to this point we have had simply
the beginning, which is now carried forward by the Spirit
so as to form a result, an end, truth. The death of
Christ is in one aspect the death of a man, of a friend
who met his death by violence, &c. ; but then it is just
this death which, when conceived of in a spiritual way,
becomes the means of salvation and the central point of
reconciliation.
The perception of the nature of Spirit, that is, the
presentation of the satisfaction of the need of Spirit, in
a sensuous way, was accordingly what was disclosed to the
friends of Christ only after His death. Thus the con-
viction concerning Him which it was possible for them.
to get from a study of His life was not yet the real
truth ; but, on the contrary, it was the Spirit which first
showed them the truth.
Before His death He appeared to them as an individual
VOL. in. G
98 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
under the limitations of sense ; the real disclosure of
what He was was given to them by the Spirit, of whom
Christ said, " He will lead you into all truth." " That will
first be the truth into which the Spirit will lead you."
Regarded in this aspect this death consequently assumes
the character of a death which is the transition to glory, to
a glorified state, which, however, is merely a restoration
of the original glorified state. The death, the negative,
is the mediating element implying that the original state
of majesty is thought of as having been reached. The
history of the resurrection and exaltation of Christ to
the right hand of God forms part of the history of His
death when this comes to have a spiritual signification.
Thus it came about that this little community of
believers attained the sure conviction : God has appeared
in the form of Man ; this humanity in God, and this
humanity in its most abstract form, the most complete
dependence, weakness in its most extreme form, the final
stage of frailty, is just what we have in natural death.
" God Himself is dead," as it is said in a Lutheran
hymn ; the consciousness of this fact expresses the truth
that the human, the finite, frailty, weakness, the nega-
tive, is itself a divine moment, is in God Himself ; that
otherness or Other-Being, the finite, the negative, is not
outside of God, and that in its character as otherness it
does not hinder unity with God ; otherness, the nega-
tion, is consciously known to be a moment of the Divine
nature. The highest knowledge of the nature of the
Idea of Spirit is contained in this thought.
This outward negative changes round in this way into
the inner negative. Eegarded in one aspect the mean-
ing, the signification attached to death is that in it the
human element has been stripped ofi', and the divine
glory comes again into view. But death is itself at the
same time also the negative, the furthest point of that
experience to which man as a natural being and con-
sequently God Himself are exposed.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 99
111 this whole history men have attained to the con-
sciousness of a truth, and this is the truth which they
have reached, namely, that^the Idea of God has come to
be a certainty for them, that the human is God as imme-
diate and present, and this indeed means that we have
in this history, as understood by Spirit, the actual repre-
sentation of the process of what constitutes Man or Spirit.^
Man as potentially God and deac[— that is the mediation
whereby the human element is discarded ; or, regarded from
another point of view, what has potential or essential Being
returns to itself and by this act first comes to be Spirit.
i Itvis with the consciousness of the Spiritual Com-
munity, which thus makes the transition from man pure
and simple to a God-man, and to a perception, a conscious-
ness; a certainty of the unity and union of the Divine
and human natures, that the Church or Spiritual Com-
munity begins, and it is this consciousness which consti-
tutes the truth upon which the Spiritual Community is
founded. *
This then is the explication of the meaning of recon-
ciliation, that God is reconciled with the world, or rather
that God has shown Himself to be by His very nature
reconciled with the world, that what is human is not
something alien to His nature, but that this otherness,
this self-differentiation, finitude, as it is sometimes ex-
pressed, is a moment in God Himself, though, to be sure,
it is a vanishing moment ; still He has in this moment
revealed and shown Himself to the Church.
This is the form which the history of God's manifesta-
tion takes for the Church ; this history is a divine history
whereby it reaches a consciousness of the truth. It is
this which creates the consciousness, the knowledge, that
God is a Trinity.
The reconciliation believed in as being in Christ has
no meaning if God is not known as Trinity, if it is not
recognised that He is but is at the same time the Other,
the self-differentiating, the Other in the sense that this
ioo THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Other is God Himself and has potentially the divine
nature in it, and that the abolishing of this difference,
of this otherness, this return, this love, is Spirit.
This consciousness involves the truth that faith does
not express relation to anything which is an Other, but
relation to God Himself. These are the moments with
which we are here concerned, and which express the
truth that Man has come to a consciousness of that
eternal history, that eternal movement which God Him-
self is.
This is the description of the second Idea as Idea in
outward manifestation, and of how the eternal Idea has
come to exist for the immediate certainty of Man, i.e.,
of how it has appeared in history. The fact that it is a
certainty for men necessarily implies that it is material
or sensuous certainty, but one which at the same time
passes over into spiritual consciousness, and for the same
reason is converted into immediate sensuousness, but in
such a way that we recognise in it the movement, the
history of God, the life which God Himself is.
III.
THE IDEA IN THE ELEMENT OF THE CHURCH OR
SPIRITUAL COMMUNITY, OR, THE KINGDOM OF
SPIRIT.
What was first dealt with was the notion or conception
of this standpoint for consciousness ; what came second
was what was supplied to this standpoint, what actually
exists for the Spiritual Community ; the third point is
the transition into this Community itself.
This third sphere represents the Idea in its specific
character as individuality ; but, to begin with, it exhibits
only the one individuality, the divine, universal individu-
ality as it is in-and-for-itself. One is thus all ; once is
always, potentially, from the point of view of the Notion,
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 101
it is simple determiuateness. But individuality in its
character as independent Being, Being-for-self, is this act
of allowing the differentiated moments to reach free im-
mediacy and independence, it shuts them off from each
other ; individuality just means that it has at the same
time to be empirical individuality.
Individuality as exclusive is for others immediacy, and
is the return from the Other into self. The individuality
of the Divine Idea, the Divine Idea as a person, first
attains to completeness in reality, since at first it has the
many individuals confronting it, and brings these back
into the unity of Spirit, into the Church or Spiritual
Community, and exists here as real, universal self-con-
sciousness.
It is just in connection with the act whereby the
definite transition of the Idea to the sensuous present is
accomplished that we have what is most distinctive in
the religion of Spirit, namely, that all the moments are
developed till they have reached definiteness and com-
pleteness in their most external forms. But even in this
condition of extreme opposition Spirit is certain of itself
as being absolute truth, and consequently it is afraid of
nothing, not even of the sensuous present. It is part of
the cowardice of abstract thought that it shuns the sen-
suous present in a monkish fashion ; modern abstraction
takes up this attitude of fastidious gentility towards the
moment of the sensuous present.
It is next required of the individuals in the Community
or Church that they should revere the Divine Idea in the
form of individuality, and appropriate it to themselves.
For the tender, loving disposition, that of woman, this is
easy ; but then, on the other side, we are confronted with
the fact that the subject on which this demand is made is
in a condition of infinite freedom, and has come to under-
stand the substantiality of its self -consciousness ; for the
independent Notion, the man, this demand is accordingly
infinitely hard. The freedom of the subject rebels against
102 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the thought of reverencing a single sensuous individual
as God, and against the combination which this implies.
The Oriental does not hesitate to comply with this demand,
but then he is nothing, he is implicitly thrown aside as of
no value, without, however, having thrown himself aside,
i.e., without having the consciousness of infinite freedom
in himself. Here, however, this love, this recognition of
the Divine in an individual is the direct opposite of this,
and is just what constitutes the supreme miracle, that
miracle which Spirit itself just is.
This region is accordingly the Kingdom of Spirit, im-
plying that the individual is of infinite value in himself,
knows himself to be absolute freedom, possesses in himself
the most rigid fixedness, and at the same time yields up
this fixedness and maintains himself in what is absolutely
an Other. Love harmonises all things, even absolute
opposition.
The pictorial conception of this religion demands the
despising of all that presently exists, of everything which
is otherwise regarded as possessed of value, it is that
perfect ideality which takes up a polemical attitude to-
wards all the glory of the world; in this single person,
in this present immediate individual in whom the Divine
Idea appears, everything that belongs to the world has
met together, so that it is the individual sensuous present
which has value. This individuality or particularity is
consequently to be regarded as absolutely universal. Even
in ordinary love we find this infinite abstraction from all
worldly things, and the loving person centres all his satis-
faction in one particular individual ; but this satisfaction
still belongs essentially to particularity; it is particular
contingency and feeling which opposes itself to the Uni-
versal, and desires in this way to become objective.
In contrast to this, that individuality in which I will
the Divine Idea, is purely universal, it is for this reason
directly removed from the sphere of the senses, it passes
away of itself, becomes part of a history that is past, this
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 103
sensuous mode must disappear and mount into the region
of idea or mental representation. One of the constituent
parts of the formation of the Church is that this sensuous
form passes over into a spiritual element. The mode in
which this purification from immediate Being takes place
implies that the sensuous element in it is preserved ; the
fact that it passes away is negation, as this is posited in
and appears in one particular sensuous individual as such.
It is only in a single individual that this sensuous repre-
sentation is found, it is not something which can be
inherited, and is not capable of renewal as the manifesta-
tion of substance in the Lama is, it cannot appear in such
a way because the sensuous manifestation as a definite
individual manifestation is in its nature momentary ;
it has to be spiritualised, and is therefore essentially a
manifestation that has already been, and so is raised to
the region of idea or mental representation.
It is possible also to occupy a standpoint at which we
do not get beyond the Son and His appearance in time.
This is the case in Catholicism, in which the intercession
of Mary arid the Saints is added to the reconciling power
of the Son, and where the Spirit is present, rather in the
Church as a hierarchy merely, and not in the Community
of believers. Here, however, the second element in the
specification of the Idea is not so much spiritualised, but
rather remains in the region of ordinary thought. Or to
put it otherwise, Spirit is not so much known as objective,
but merely as the particular subjective form in which it
appears in the sensuous present as the Church and lives
in tradition. Spirit in this outward form of reality is,
as it were, the Third Person.
For the spirit which stands in need of it, the sensuous
present can be given a permanent existence in pictures,
though these are not indeed works of art, but are rather
miracle-working pictures, regarded, that is to say, as
existing in a definite material form. It follows from this
that it is not merely the corporeal form and the body of
104 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Christ which is able to satisfy the sensuous need, but
rather the sensuous aspect of His bodily presence in
general, the cross, the places in which He moved about,
and so on. To this, relics, &c., come to be added.
There is no lack of such mediate means of satisfying the
craving felt. For the Spiritual Community, however, the
immediate Present, the Now, is past and gone. The sen-
suous idea accordingly, above all, integrates the Past,
views it from the point of view of the whole, for it the
Past is a one-sided moment ; the Present contains the
Past and the Future in it as moments. Thus the sen-
suous idea finds the completion of its representation in
the Second Advent, but the essentially absolute return
is the act of exchanging externality for what is inward :
this is the Comforter who can come only when sensuous
history as immediate is past.
This, therefore, is the point represented by the forma-
tion of the Spiritual Community, or the third point ; it
is the Spirit. It represents the transition from what is
outward, from outward manifestation to what is inward.
It occupies itself with the certainty felt by the subject
of its own infinite non-sensuous substantiality, and of
the fact that it knows itself to be infinite and eternal,
knows itself to be immortal.
The retreat into inner self-consciousness which is
involved in this conversion is not of the Stoical kind,
the value of which consists in the fact that it accom-
plishes this through the strength of the individual spirit
as exercising thought, and seeks for the reality of
thought in Nature, in natural things and in compre-
hending these, and which consequently is devoid of
infinite sorrow and stands at the same time in a
thoroughly positive relation to the world. On the con-
trary, it takes the form of the self -consciousness which
endlessly yields up its particularity and individuality,
and finds its infinite value only in that love which is
contained in infinite sorrow and arises out of it. All
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 105
immediacy in which Man might find some worth is
thrown away ; it is in mediation alone that he finds
such value, but of an infinite kind, and in which sub-
jectivity becomes truly infinite and has an essential
existence, is in-and-for-itself. It is only through this
mediation that Man is not immediate, and thus at first
he is capable merely of having such value ; but this
capacity and possibility is his positive, absolute, essential
nature or characteristic.
This characteristic contains the reason why the im-
mortality of the soul becomes a definite doctrine in the
Christian religion. The soul, the individual soul, has
an infinite, an eternal quality, namely, that of being a
citizen in the Kingdom of God. This is a quality and
a life which is removed beyond time and the Past ;
and since it is at the same time opposed to the present
limited sphere, this eternal quality or determination
eternally determines itself at the same time as a future.
The infinite demand to see God, i.e., to become conscious
in spirit of His truth as present truth, is in this tem-
poral Present not yet satisfied so far as consciousness in
its character as ordinary consciousness is concerned.
The subjectivity which has come to understand its
infinite worth has thereby abandoned all distinctions of
authority, power, position, and even of race ; before God
all men are equal. It is in the negation of infinite
sorrow that love is found, and there, too, are first found
the possibility and the root of truly universal Right, of
the realisation of freedom. The Roman formal life of
right or justice starts from the positive standpoint and
from the Understanding, and has no principle whereby
to maintain absolutely the standpoint of Right, but is
thoroughly worldly.
This purity of subjectivity which passes out of infinite
sorrow by mediating itself in love, is reached simply by
that mediation which has its objective form and pictorial
representation in the sufferings, death, and exaltation of
io5 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Christ. Regarded from another point of view, this sub-
jectivity likewise possesses this mode of its reality in
itself, inasmuch as it is a multiplicity of subjects and
individuals; but since it is implicitly universal and is
not exclusive, the multiplicity of individuals has to be
absolutely posited as having merely the appearance or
show of reality, and the very fact that it posits itself as
this show of reality is what constitutes the unity of
faith, according to the ordinary idea formed by faith,
and therefore in this third thing. This is the love of
the Spiritual Community, which seems to consist of
many individuals, while this multiplicity is merely a
semblance or illusion.
This love is neither human love, love of persons, the
love of the sexes, nor friendship. Surprise has often
been expressed that such a noble relationship as friend-
ship is does not find a place amongst the duties enjoined
by Christ. Friendship is a relationship which is tinged
with particularity, and men are friends not so much
directly as objectively rather through some substantial
bond of union, in a third thing, in fundamental prin-
ciples, studies, knowledge ; the bond, in short, is consti-
tuted by something objective ; it is not attachment as
such, like that of the man to the woman as a definite
particular personality. The love of the Spiritual Com-
munity, on the other hand, is directly mediated by the
worthlessness of all particularity. The love of the man
for the woman, or friendship, can certainly exist, but
they are essentially characterised as subordinate ; they
are characterised not indeed as something evil, but as
something imperfect ; not as something indifferent, but
as representing a state in which we are not to remain
permanently, since they are themselves to be sacrificed,
and must not in any way injuriously affect that absolute
tendency and unity which belong to Spirit.
The unity in this infinite love springing out of infinite
sorrow is consequently in no way a sensuous, worldly
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 107
connection of things, not a connection of the particu-
larity and naturalness which may still remain over and
be held to have value, but unity in the Spirit simply,
the love, in fact, which is just the notion or conception
of Spirit itself. It is an object for itself in Christ
as representing the central point of faith, in which it
appears to itself in an infinite, far-off loftiness. But this
loftiness is at the same time an infinite nearness to the
subject, something peculiar to it and belonging to it,
and thus what at first comprised individuals as a Third
is also what constitutes their true self-consciousness,
their most inner and individual character. Thus this
love is Spirit as such, the Holy Spirit. It is in them,
and they are and constitute the universal Christian
Church, the Communion of saints. Spirit is infinite
return into self, infinite subjectivity, not Godhead con-
ceived of in ideas, but the real present Godhead, and
thus it is not the substantial potentiality of the Father,
not the True in the objective or antithetical form of the
Son, but the subjective Present and Eeal, which, just
because it is subjective, is present, as estrangement into
that objective, sensuous representation of love and of its
infinite sorrow, and as return, in that mediation. This
is the Spirit of God, or God as present, real Spirit, God
dwelling in His Church. Thus Christ said, "Where
two or three are gathered together in My name, there
am I in the midst of you." " I am with you always,
even to the end of the world."
It is as containing this absolute signification of Spirit,
and in this deep sense of being absolute truth, that the
Christian religion is the Religion of Spirit, though not
in the trivial sense of being a spiritual religion. On
the contrary, the true element in the determination of
the nature of Spirit, the union of the two sides of the
infinite antithesis — God and the world, I, this particu-
lar homuncio — is what constitutes the content of the
Christian religion, and makes it into a religion of Spirit,
io8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and this content is also found in it by the ordinary
uncultured consciousness.
All men are called to salvation ; that is what is
highest in the Christian religion and highest in a unique
degree. Therefore Christ also says, "All sins can be
forgiven to men except the sin against the Spirit." The
violation of absolute truth, of the Idea of that union of
the two sides of the infinite antithesis, is in these words
declared to be the supreme transgression. People have
from time to time given themselves a deal of trouble and
racked their brains trying to find out what is the sin
against the Holy Spirit, and have smoothed down this
significant expression in all kinds of ways in order to get
entirely rid of it. Everything can be destroyed in the
infinite sorrow of love, but this destroying process itself
appears only as inner present Spirit. What is devoid of
Spirit appears at first to have no sin in it, but to be inno-
cent ; but this is just the innocence which is by its very
nature judged and condemned.
The sphere of the Spiritual Community is accordingly
the region which belongs peculiarly to Spirit. The Holy
Spirit was poured out on the disciples, it was their im-
manent life, from that time onward they joyfully went
out into the world as a Spiritual Community, in order to
raise it to the condition of a universal Community of
believers, and to extend far and wide the Kingdom of God.
We have thus to consider (a) the origin of the Spiritual
Community, or, in other words, its conception or notion ;
(b) its existence in a definite form and its continued exist-
ence, this is the realisation of its conception ; and (c) the
transition from faith to knowledge, the alteration, the
transfiguration of faith in philosophy.
(a.) The Conception of the Spiritual Community.
The Spiritual Community consists of the subjects or
persons, the individual, empirical subjects who live in the
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 109
Spirit of God, though at the same time it is necessary to
distinguish between them and the definite content, the
history, the truth which confronts them. Faith in this
history, in reconciliation, is, on the one hand, immediate
knowledge, an act of faith ; on the other hand, the nature
of Spirit is in itself this process which has been con-
sidered in the universal Idea, and in the Idea in the form
of manifestation, and this means that the subject itself is
nothing but Spirit, and consequently becomes a citizen of
the Kingdom of God owing to the fact that it passes
through this process in virtue of what it is. The Other,
which exists for the subjects, exists for them objectively
in this divine drama in the sense in which the spectator
beheld himself objectively in the Chorus.
To begin with, it is undoubtedly the subject, the
human subject, Man, in whom is revealed what comes by
the aid of Spirit to have for Man the certainty of re-
conciliation, and comes to be characterised as individual,
exclusive, different from others. Thus the representation
of the divine history is an objective one so far as the
other subjects are concerned ; they have accordingly still
to pass through this history and this process in their own
selves also.
In order to this, however, they must first presuppose
that reconciliation is possible, or, to put it more accurately,
that this reconciliation has actually and completely taken
place and is a certainty.
This is the universal Idea of God in-and-for-itself ; the
other presupposition is that this reconciliation is some-
thing certain for Man, and that this truth does not
exist for him by means of speculative thought,, but is,
on the contrary, something certain. This presupposition
implies that it is certain that the reconciliation has been
accomplished, i.e., it must be represented as something
historical, as something which has been accomplished on
the earth, in a manifested form. For there is no other
mode of representing what is called certainty. This is
no THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the presupposition iii which we must believe, to begin
with.
I. The rise of the Spiritual Community appears in the
form of an outpouring of the Holy Spirit. Faith takes
its rise first of all in a man, a human, material mani-
festation ; and next conies spiritual comprehension, con-
sciousness of the Spiritual. We get spiritual content, a
changing of what is immediate into what has a spiritual
character. The verification here is spiritual, it is not
found in what is sensuous or material ; and it cannot
be brought about in an immediate, material way ; some
objection can always be brought against the material
facts.
As regards the empirical mode of verifying the truth,
the Church is so far right when it refuses to countenance
investigations such as those concerned with the appear-
ances of Christ after His death ; for investigations of
this sort start from a point of view which implies that
the real question is as to the sensuous element in the
appearance of Christ, as to what is historical in it, as if
the verification of Spirit and of its truth was contained
in such narratives regarding one who was represented as
an historical person and in an historical fashion. This
truth, however, is sure and certain by itself, although it
has an historical starting-point.
This transition is the outpouring of the Spirit, which
could make its appearance only after Christ had been
taken away out of the flesh, and the sensuous, immediate
present had ceased. It is then the Spirit appears, for
then the entire history is completed, and the entire
picture of Spirit is present to perception. What Spirit
now produces is something different and has a different
form.
The question as to the truth of the Christian religion
directly divides itself into two questions : I . Is it really
true that God does not exist apart from the Son, and that
He has sent Him into the world? And 2. Was this par-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION in
ticular individual, Jesus of Nazareth, the carpenter's son,
the Son of God, the Christ ?
These two questions are commonly mixed up together,
•with the result that if this particular person was not
God's Son sent by Him, and if this cannot be proved to
be true of Him, then there is no meaning at all in His
mission. If this were not true of Him, we would either
have to look for another, if indeed one is to come, if
there is a promise to that effect, i.e., if it is absolutely
and essentially necessary, necessary from the point of
view of the Notion, of the Idea ; or, since the correctness
of the Idea is made to depend on the demonstration of
the divine mission referred to, we should have to conclude
that there can really be no longer any thought of such a
mission, and that we cannot further think about it
But it is essential that we ask first of all, Is such a
manifestation true in-aud-for-itself? It is, because God
as Spirit is the triune God. He is this act of mani-
festation, this self-objectifying, and it is His nature to
be identical with Himself while thus making Himself
objective ; He is eternal love. This objectifying as seen
in its completely developed form in which it reaches the
two extremes of the universality of God and finitude or
death, and this return into self in the act of abolishing
the rigidity of the antithesis is — love in the infinite sorrow,
which is at the same time assuaged in it.
This absolute truth, this truth iu-and-for-itself that
God is not an abstraction, but something concrete, is un-
folded by philosophy, and it is only modern philosophy
which has reached the profound thought thus contained
in the Notion. It is not possible at all to discuss this
truth in unphilosophical platitudes which suggest an
idea of contradiction that is so entirely valueless and is
so absolutely wanting in what is spiritual.
But this notion or conception must not be thought of
as one which gets a complete form in philosophy only, it
is not only potentially true ; on the contrary, it belongs
ii2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
essentially to philosophy to get a grasp of what is, of
what is actually real in itself. All that is true starts
from the form of immediacy as it appears in its mani-
festation, i.e., in its Being. The notion or conception
must therefore be implicitly present in the self-con-
sciousness of men, in the Spirit ; the World-Spirit must
have conceived of itself after this fashion. This concep-
tion of itself, however, is necessity in the form of the
process of Spirit, which was exhibited in the preceding
stages of religion, and chiefly in the Jewish, the Greek,
and the Roman religions, and had for its result the notion
or conception of the absolute unity of the divine and
human natures, the reality of God, i.e., God's objectifying
of Himself as representing His truth. Thus the history
of the world is the setting forth of this truth as a result
in the immediate consciousness of Spirit.
We have seen God as a God of free men, though at
first as yet in the subjective, limited, national spirit of the
various peoples, and in the accidental shape which belongs
to imagination ; next we had the sorrow of the world
following on the crushing out of the national Spirit. This
sorrow was the birthplace of the impulse felt by Spirit to
know God as spiritual in a universal form and stripped
of finitude. This need was created by the progress of
history, by the gradual advance of the World-Spirit.
This immediate impulse, this longing which wishes and
craves for something definite, the instinct, as it were, of
Spirit which is impelled to seek for this, demanded such
an appearance in time, the manifestation of God as the
infinite Spirit in the form of a real man.
" When the fulness of time was come, God sent His
Son," i.e., when Spirit had entered so deeply into itself as
to know its infinitude, and to comprehend the Substantial
in the subjectivity of immediate self-consciousness, in a
subjectivity, however, which is at the same time infinite
negativity, and is just, in consequence of this, absolutely
universal.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 113
The proof, however, that this particular individual is
the Christ, is of another kind, and has reference only to
the specific statement that this particular individual is
the Christ, and not any other individual, and has not to
do with the question as to whether in this case the Idea
does not exist at all. Christ said, "Run not hither and
thither ; the Kingdom of God is within you." Many
others amongst Jews and heathen were revered as divine
messengers or as gods. John the Baptist went before
Christ ; amongst the Greeks, statues were erected, for
instance, to Demetrius Poliorcetes as if he were a god ;
and the Roman Emperor was revered as God. Apol-
lonius of Tyana and many others passed for being
workers of miracles ; and for the Greeks, Hercules was
the man who by his deeds, which were at the same time
deeds of obedience merely, took his place amongst the
gods, and became God ; without mentioning that great
number of incarnations, and the deification implied in
being raised to Brahma, which we meet with amongst the
Hindus. But it was to Christ only that the Idea, when
it was ripe and the time was fulfilled, could attach itself,
and in Him only could it see itself realised. In the
heroic deeds of Hercules the nature of Spirit is still
imperfectly expressed. But the history of Christ is a
history for the Spiritual Community, since it is absolutely
adequate to the Idea ; while it is only the effort of
Spirit to reach the determination implied in the implicit
unity of the Divine and the Human, which lies at the
basis of those earlier forms, and can be recognised as
present in them. This is what must be regarded as the
essential thing, this is the verification, the absolute proof ;
this is what is to be understood by the witness of the
Spirit ; it is the Spirit, the indwelling Idea which attests-
Christ's mission, and for those who believed, and for us
who are in possession of the Notion in its developed
form, this is verification. This is also the kind of veri-
fication whose, force is of a spiritual kind, and is not
VOL. III. H
Ii4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
outward force such as that used by the Church against
heretics.
This then is (2.) Knowledge or Faith, for faith is also
knowledge only in a peculiar form. We have now to
consider this point.
Thus what we see is that the divine content appears
as self-conscious knowledge of the Divine in the element
of consciousness, of inwardness. On the one hand, it is
seen that the content is the truth, and that it is the truth
of infinite Spirit in general, i.e., is its knowledge, in such
a way that it finds its freedom in this knowledge, is itself
the Process by which it casts aside its particular individu-
ality, and gets freedom for itself in this content.
To begin with, however, the content exists for the
immediate consciousness, and the truth might appear for
consciousness in a variety of material forms, for the Idea
is one in all things, it is universal necessity ; reality can
be only the mirror of the Idea, and for consciousness the
Idea can accordingly issue forth from everything, for it is
always the Idea that is in these infinitely many drops
which reflect back the Idea. The Idea is represented
figuratively, known and foreshadowed in the seed which
is the fruit ; the fruit in its final character dies away in
the earth, and it is through this negation that the plant
first comes into being. A history, a pictorial representa-
tion, a description, a phenomenon of this sort can be
elevated by Spirit to the rank of something universal,
and thus the history of the seed or of the sun becomes a
symbol of the Idea, but only a symbol, for they are forms
which, so far as their peculiar content and specific quality
are concerned, are inadequate to express the Idea ; what
is consciously known through them lies outside of them,
the signification they suggest does not exist in them as
signification. The object which exists in itself as the
Notion is spiritual subjectivity, Man ; it is signification
in virtue of what it itself is, and this signification does not
lie outside of it. It is what thinks everything, knows
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 115
everything, it is not a symbol, but, on the contrary, its
subjectivity, its inner form, its self is essentially this very
history itself, and the history of the Spiritual is not found
in some form of existence, which is inadequate to express
the Idea, but rather in its own element. It is therefore
necessary for the Spiritual Community that Thought, the
Idea, should become objective. At first, however, the
Idea appears in a single individual in a material, pic-
torial form ; this must be discarded, and the real signi- £_
fication, the eternally true essence must be brought into
view. Tliis is the faith of the Spiritual Community when
it is coming into existence. It starts from faith in the
individual, this individual man is changed by the Spiritual
Community, He is recognised to be God and is characterised
as the Son of God and as comprising all of the finite which
attaches to subjectivity as such in its development, but as
being subjectivity He is separated from substantiality.
The material or sensuous manifestation is accordingly
changed into knowledge of the Spiritual. We thus see
the Spiritual Community starting from faith, but regarded
in another aspect it appears in the form of Spirit. The
different significations of faith and of verification or proof
have now to be brought out.
Since faith starts from the sensuous way of viewing
things, it has before it a history in time ; what it holds
as true is an outward ordinary event, and the verification
of the truth of this is conducted according to the histori-
cal and juridical mode of verifying a fact, which gives
sensuous certainty ; the idea formed of the basis upon
which truth rests takes as a foundation the material cer-
tainty of other persons regarding certain material facts,
and brings other facts into connection with these.
The history of the life of Christ is thus the outward
form of verification ; but faith alters its meaning, that is
to say, we have not merely got to do with faith as faith
in a certain external history, but with the fact that this
particular man was the Son of God.
n6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The sensuous content thus becomes something wholly
different, it becomes altered into another kind of content,
and what is demanded is that this should be proved to
be true. The object has undergone a complete altera-
tion, and from being a material, empirically existing
element, it has become a divine moment, an essentially
supreme moment in God Himself. This content is no
longer anything material, and therefore when the demand
is made that it should be verified in the material fashion
just referred to, this method is at once seen to be insuffi-
cient, because the object is of a wholly different nature.
If miracles are supposed to contain the immediate
verification of the truth, still in-and-for-themselves they
supply a merely relative, verification or a proof of a sub-
ordinate sort. Christ says, by way of reproof, " Unless
ye see miracles, ye will not believe." " Many will come
and say to Me : Have we not done many signs in Thy
name ? And I will say to them : I have not known you ;
depart from Me." What is the kind of interest that can
here any longer attach to this working of miracles ? The
relative element could have an interest or importance
only for those who stood outside, for the instruction of
Jews and heathen. But the Spiritual Community, which
has taken a definite form, no longer stands in need of this
relative kind of proof, it has the Spirit in itself, which
leads into all truth, and which, by means of its truth as
Spirit, exercises upon Spirit the true kind of force, a
power in which Spirit has left to it its absolute freedom.
The miracle represents a force which influences the natural
connections of things, and is consequently a force which
is exercised only upon Spirit when it is confined within
the consciousness of this limited connection between
things. How is it possible that the eternal Idea itself
could reach consciousness through the conception of a
force of this kind ?
When the content is defined to mean that the
miracles of Christ are themselves material phenomena
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 117
winch can be attested historically, and when His resur-
rection and ascension are in the same way considered
as occurrences perceived by the senses, so far as the Sen-
suous is concerned we are not dealing with the sensuous
attestation of these phenomena, and it is not suggested
that the miracles of Christ, His resurrection and ascension,
in their character as themselves outward phenomena and
sensuous occurrences, have not sufficient evidence of their
truth ; but, on the contrary, what we are concerned with
is the relation of the sensuous verification and the
sensuous occurrences taken together, to Spirit, to the
spiritual content. The verification of the Sensuous,
whatever be its content, and whether it is based on evi-
dence or direct perception, is always open to an infinite
number of objections, because it is based on what is
sensuous and external, and this is an Other so far as
Spirit or consciousness is concerned ; here consciousness
and its object are separated, and what holds sway is
this underlying separation, which carries with it the
possibility of error, deception, and a want of the culture
necessary to form a correct conception of a fact, so that
one may have doubts, and look on the Holy Scriptures,
as regards what in them has reference to what is merely
external and historical, as profane writings, without mis-
trusting the goodwill of those who give the personal
evidence. The sensuous or material content is not
certain in itself, because it does not originate with Spirit
as such, because it belongs to another sphere and does not
come into existence by means of the Notion. It may be
thought that we ought to come to our conclusions by a
comparison of all the evidence and the circumstances,
or that there must be reasons why we should decide
for the one or for the other, only, this entire method of
proof and the sensuous content as such ought to be
given a subordinate place in comparison with the need
of Spirit. What is to be true for Spirit, what it is
necessary for it to believe must have no connection with
ii8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
sensuous faith ; what is true for Spirit is something for
which sensuous manifestation has only a secondary value.
Since Spirit starts from what is sensuous, and attains
to this lofty estimate of itself, its relation to the Sensuous
is a directly negative relation. This is a fundamental
principle.
Still, spite of this, there always remains a certain
curiosity in this matter, and a desire to know how in
this case we are to understand miracles, how we are to
explain them and conceive of them — to conceive of them,
that is to say, in the sense that they are not miracles at
all, but, on the contrary, are natural effects. A curiosity
of this kind, however, presupposes doubt and unbelief,
and would like to find some plausible grounds where-
by the persons concerned might still be held to be
morally virtuous and preserve their character for truth-
fulness ; so next it is maintained that there was no
intention to deceive, i.e., that no deception actually was
practised, and that in any case it was so moderate and
vwell meant that Christ and His friends ought still to be
considered as honourable persons. The shortest way of
settling the matter would be entirely to reject miracles ;
if we do not believe in any miracles at all, and find
that they are opposed to reason, the fact of their being
proved will do no good ; the evidence for them must
rest on sense-perception, but there is in the human mind
an insurmountable objection to regard as truth what is
attested solely after this fashion — for here the proofs
are nothing but possibilities and probabilities, i.e., they
are merely subjective and finite reasons.
Or we must give the advice : simply don't have doubts
and then they are solved ! But I must have them, I
cannot rid myself of them, and the necessity there is for
answering them rests on the necessity of having them.
Reflection advances these claims as absolute, it fixes on
these finite reasons ; but by piety, by true faith, these
finite reasons, these methods of the finite understanding
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 119
have long since been set aside. Curiosity of this sort
really has its origin in unbelief; faith, however, rests
on the witness of the Spirit — not on miracles, but on
the absolute truth, on the eternal Idea. Thus so far as
the true content is concerned, and regarding them from
this standpoint, miracles are of small importance, they
may with equal propriety either be used as subjective
reasons with the minor purpose of edification, or else be
let alone. There is the further fact that miracles, if they
are to attest the truth of anything, must first be attested
themselves. But what has to be attested by them is the
Idea which has no need of them, and because cf this has
no need to attest them.
It has further to be observed that miracles are, speak-
ing generally, effects produced by the power exercised by
Spirit upon the natural connection'of things, are an inter-
ference with the course and the eternal laws of Nature.
But the truth is that it is Spirit which is this miracle,
this absolute interference. Life is already an interference
with these so-called eternal laws of Nature ; it destroys,
for instance, the eternal laws of mechanism and chemistry.
The power of Spirit, and also its weakness, have still
more effect on life. Terror can produce death, anxiety,
illness, and so in all ages infinite faith and trust have
enabled the lame to walk and the deaf to hear, &c.
Modern unbelief in occurrences of this sort is based on
a superstitious belief in the so-called force of Nature
and its independence relatively to Spirit.
This, however, is merely the first and accidental method
of attesting truth employed by faith. The real kind of
faith rests on the Spirit of truth. The former kind of
verification still involves a relation to the sensuous im-
mediate present ; faith proper is spiritual, and in Spirit
truth has the Idea for its basis, and, since the Idea is at
the same time represented in a temporal and finite way
existing in a single definite individual, it can appear as
realised in this individual only after his death and after
120 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
he has been removed from the temporal sphere when the
process through which the manifestation passes has itself
reached the form of spiritual totality, i.e., the very fact of
believing in Jesus implies that this faith has no longer
before it the sensuous manifestation as such, the sensuous
perception of which would in that case have constituted
the proof of the truth.
What happens here is what happens in connection
with all knowledge in so far as it has reference to a
Universal. Kepler, as is well known, discovered the laws
of the Heavens. They are valid for us in a double way,
they are the Universal. A start was made from single
instances ; certain movements were referred back to laws.
But these are only single instances, and we would be free
to think that there may be millions more of instances, that
there may be bodies which don't move like those we know
of, and thus this is not a universal law even in the case
of the heavenly bodies themselves. We have certainly
become acquainted with these laws by means of induction ;
but for Spirit, the interest lies in the fact that such a law
is true in-and-for-itself, i.e., in its own nature, that reason
finds in it its counterpart, and then recognises it to be
true in-and-for-itself. In comparison with this absolute
knowledge, the sensuous knowledge referred to accord-
ingly takes a secondary place, it is indeed a starting-point,
a point of departure which has to be gratefully recognised,
but a law such as that just mentioned holds good for
itself — and thus accordingly the proof of its truth is of a
different kind from that supplied by the senses, it is the
Notion, and sensuous existence is now lowered to the
condition of a dream-like vision of the earthly-life, above
which exists a higher region with a fixed content of its
own.
The same kind of thing is seen in connection with the
proofs of the existence of God which start from the finite.
The defect in them is that the finite is conceived of in an
affirmative way only ; but the transition from the finite
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 121
to the Infinite is at the same time of such a character
that the region of the finite is left behind, and the finite
is reduced to the condition of something subordinate, to
being a far-away picture, which has its real existence
only in the past and in memory, and not in Spirit, which
is above all things present, and which has left that
starting-point behind, and belongs to a region the value
of which is of a totally different sort. The pious man
can thus take advantage of everything in order to edify
himself, and in that case this is the starting-point. It
lias been proved that several of the quotations made by
Christ from the Old Testament are incorrect, and that
the meaning extracted from them is not based on the
immediate sense of the words. The Word, according to
this view, is to be regarded as something fixed ; but Spirit
makes out of it something that is true. Thus the material
history is the starting-point for Spirit, for faith, and these
two characteristics must be distinguished from each other,
and what we are first of all concerned with is the return
of Spirit into itself, spiritual consciousness.
It thus becomes clear that it is the Church or Spiritual £/_
Community which of itself produces this faith, and that
it is not, so to speak, created by the words of the Bible,
but, on the contrary, by the Spiritual Community. So,
too, it is not the material Present but the Spirit which
teaches the Spiritual Community that Christ is the Son
of God, that He sits eternally at the right hand of the
Father in heaven. That is the interpretation, the witness,
the decree of Spirit. If grateful peoples have only placed
their benefactors amongst the stars, Spirit has recognised
subjectivity as an absolute moment of the divine nature.
The person of Christ has been decreed by the Church to
be the Son of God. We have nothing to do in this con-
nection with the empirical method of stating this, with
the ecclesiastical method of determining the truth, with
councils and such like. The real question is as to what
the content essentially is, is in-and-for-itself. The true
122 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Christian content of faith is to be justified by philosophy,
not by history. What Spirit does is no history ; it takes
to do only with what exists on its own account, is in-and-
for-itself, not with something past, but, on the contrary,
simply with what is present.
3. But this has appeared in time, too, it has a relation
to the subject, it exists for it, and it has a no less essen-
tial relation to the fact that the subject is intended to be
a citizen of the Kingdom of God.
This fact that the subject itself is to become a child of
God involves the truth that reconciliation has actually
been completely accomplished in the Divine Idea, and
that it has accordingly appeared in time, that the truth
has become a matter of certainty to men. It is just
this fact of certainty which is the manifestation, the
Idea, in the manifested form in which it comes to con-
sciousness.
The relation of the subject to this truth is that the
subject reaches this very consciousness of unity, thinks
itself worthy of it, produces it in itself, is filled with the
Divine Spirit.
This takes place by means of mediation in itself, and
this mediation means that the subject has this faith ; for
faith is the truth, the presupposition that reconciliation
is essentially and absolutely accomplished and is certain.
It is only by means of this belief that reconciliation has
been essentially and absolutely accomplished and is certain,
that the subject is capable of placing itself in this unity,
and is in a position to do this. This mediation is abso-
lutely necessary.
In the blissful feeling thus reached by means of this
act of apprehending the truth, the difficulty is removed
which is directly involved in the circumstance that the
relation of the Spiritual Community to this Idea is a
relation of individual particular subjects to the Idea ; this
difficulty is, however, done away with in this very truth
itself.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 123
Speaking more strictly, the difficulty is that the sub-
ject is different from the Divine Spirit, and appears as
something which is its finitude. This finite element is
taken away, and the reason of this is that God looks on
the heart of Man, on the substantial will, on the most
inward all-embracing subjectivity of Man, on the inner,
true, earnest act of will.
Besides this inner will, and as distinguished from this
inner substantial reality, there further exists in Man an
element of externality, of defectiveness, which shows it-
self in the fact that he commits mistakes, that he can
exist in a way which is not in conformity with this inner,
substantial, essential nature, this substantial, essential in-
wardness.
But externality, otherness — in short, finitude, or im-
perfection as it may further be defined, is degraded to the
condition of something unessential, and is known as such.
For in the Idea the otherness, or Other-Being of the Son,
is a passing, disappearing moment, and not at all a true,
essential, permanent, and absolute moment.
This is the notion or conception of the Spiritual Com-
munity in general ; the Idea, which so far is the process
of the subject within and in itself — this subject being
taken up into the Spirit — is spiritual, in the sense that
the Spirit of God dwells in it. This pure self-conscious-
ness which thus belongs to it is at the same time a
consciousness of the truth, and this pure self-conscious-
ness which knows and wills the truth is just the Divine
Spirit in it. Or, this self-consciousness taken as faith
which rests on the Spirit, i.e., on a mediation which does
away with all finite mediation, is the faith wrought in
Man by God.
(b.) The Realisation of the Spiritual Community.
The real Spiritual Community is what we in general
call the Church. This no longer represents the rise of
124 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the Spiritual Community, but the Spiritual Community
as actually existing and as maintaining itself.
The actual, permanent existence of the Spiritual Com-
munity is its continuous, eternal becoming, which is based
on the fact that it is the very nature of Spirit to know
itself as eternal, to liberate itself so as to form those finite
flashes of light which make the individual consciousness,
and then to collect itself again out of this finitude and com-
prehend itself, and in this way the knowledge of its essence
and consequently the divine self-consciousness appear in
finite consciousness. Out of the ferment of finitude, and
while it changes itself into foam, Spirit rises like a vapour.
In the Spiritual Community as actually existing, the
Church is emphatically the institution in virtue of which
the persons composing it reach the truth and appropriate
it for themselves, and through it the Holy Spirit comes to
be in them as real, actual, and present, and has its abode
in them ; it means that the truth is in them, and that
they are in a condition to enjoy and give active expres-
sion to the truth or Spirit, that they as individuals are
those who give active expression to the Spirit.
The Church viewed in its universal aspect means that
the truth is here presupposed as already existing — not as
if it were just originating, and the Holy Spirit were being
poured out for the first time, and was being brought into
existence for the first time, but rather that the truth
exists as actually present truth. For the subject this
means an alteration of the relation in which it stood to
the truth at the beginning.
i. This truth which is thus presupposed is actually
present ; it is the doctrine of the Church, the Faith, and
we know what the content of this doctrine is ; it is, in
one word, the doctrine of reconciliation. We have no
longer to do with the fact that this one man has been
elevated by the outpouring, the decree of the Spirit, so as
to have an absolute signification, but with the fact that
this signification is consciously known and recognised.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 125
This represents the absolute capacity possessed by the
subject for taking a share in the truth, both as it exists
in itself and as it exists in an objective form, the capa-
city for reaching the truth, for being in the truth, for
attaining to a consciousness of the truth. This con-
sciousness of doctrine is here presupposed and actually
exists.
It is clear from this, both that some kind of doctrine
is necessary, and that the doctrine is already formed when
the Spiritual Community definitely exists. It is this
doctrine which is represented in a pictorial way, and
constitutes a content in which we see and have shown in
an absolutely completed form, what ought to be accom-
plished in the individual as such.
This doctrine is thus regarded as something presup-
posed so far as its main elements are concerned, as
something already formed, while it is in the Spiritual
Community itself that it first gets a matured form. The
Spirit which is poured out is the beginning, what makes
the beginning, that in which the doctrine takes its rise.
The Spiritual Community is the consciousness of this
Spirit, the expression of what the Spirit has discovered,
and by which it has been laid hold of, namely, that
Christ is for the Spirit. The distinction involved in
the question as to whether the Spiritual Community
gives expression to its consciousness on the basis of al
written document, or attaches its own self-determinations
to tradition, is not at all an essential one ; the maiii
point is, that by means of the Spirit, which is present
in it, this Community is the infinite power and authority
whereby its doctrine is further developed and gets a more
specific form. This authority makes its presence felt in
both of those different cases. The exposition of a docu-
ment which lies at the basis of any doctrine is always in
its turn a form of knowledge, and develops into new
specific truths ; and even if, as in the case of tradition,
it attaches itself to something given or taken for granted,
126 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the tradition itself, in its historical development, is essen-
tially a positing or making explicit of some implicit truth.
Thus doctrine is essentially worked out and matured in
the Church. It exists, to begin with, as intuition, feeling,
as the felt, flash-like witness of the Spirit. But the
determination implied in the act of producing or bring-
ing into existence is itself merely a one-sided determina-
tion, for truth is at the same time implicitly present or
presupposed. The subject is already taken up into the
content.
The confession of faith or dogma accordingly is some-
thing which has been essentially formed in the Church
first of all, and* it is consequently Thought, developed
consciousness which asserts its rights in connection with
it, and it applies all that it has gained from trained
thinking and philosophy, to these thoughts and on behalf
of this truth thus consciously perceived ; doctrine is con-
structed out of foreign concrete elements which have still
an impure element mixed with them.
This actually existing doctrine must accordingly be
preserved in the Church, and all that is considered as
doctrine must be taught. In order to remove it out of
the region of caprice and of accidental opinions and views,
and to preserve it as absolute truth and as something
fixed, it is deposited or stated in creeds. It is, it exists,
it has value, it is recognised immediately yet not in a
material fashion that the apprehension of this doctrine
takes place through the senses, just as the world, too, is
something presupposed as existing, and to which we are
related as to something material.
Spiritual truth exists only as something consciously
known ; the mode in which it outwardly appears consists
in the fact that it is taught. The Church is essentially
the institution which implies the existence of a teaching
body to which is committed the duty of expounding this
doctrine.
The subject is born within the circle of this doctrine ;
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 127
he begins in this condition of established existing truth
and in the consciousness of it. That is his relation to
this truth, which actually exists, and is presupposed as
having an absolute and essential existence.
2. Since the individual is thus born in the Church, he
is forthwith destined, although, to be sure, unconsciously,
to share in this truth and to become a partaker of it ; he
is destined for this truth. The Church expresses this in
the Sacrament of Baptism, Man is in the fellowship of
the Church, in which Evil is essentially, in-and-for-itself,
overcome, and God is essentially, or in-and-for-Himself,
reconciled.
Baptism shows that the child has been born in the
fellowship of the Church, not in sin and misery ; that he
has not come into a hostile world, but that the Church
is his world, and that he has only to train himself in the
Spiritual Community which already actually exists as
representing his worldly condition.
Man must be born twice, once naturally, and then
again spiritually, like the Brahman. Spirit is not im-
mediate, it exists only in so far as it brings itself out of
itself; it exists only as the regenerate Spirit.
This regeneration is no longer that infinite sadness
which is in general the birth sorrow of the Spiritual
Community ; the subject is not indeed spared the in-
finitely real sorrow, but this is softened ; for there still
exists the opposing factor of particularity, of special
interests, passions, selfishness. The natural heart which
encompasses Man is the enemy that has to be fought ;
this is, however, no longer the real battle out of which
the Spiritual Community sprang.
The doctrine of the Church is related to this individual
as something external. The child is, to begin with, Spirit
implicitly only, it is not yet realised Spirit, does not
actually exist as Spirit, but has only the capability, the
faculty of being Spirit, of becoming Spirit actually ; thus
the truth comes to it at first as something taken for
128 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
granted, recognised, valid, i.e., truth necessarily presents
itself at first to men in the form of authority.
All truth, even material truth — this, however, is not
truth properly so-called — comes to men in this form, to
begin with. In our sense-perception the world presents
itself to us as authority, it is, we find it as it is, we take
it as something which has existence, and we are related
to it as something which exists. It exists in a certain
way, and its existence in this form is valid for us.
Doctrine, the spiritual element does not actually exist
in the form of material authority of this sort, but must
be taught as established truth. Custom is something
established or valid, a definitely formed conviction ; but
because it is something spiritual we do not say : it is ; but
rather, it is valid. Since it comes to us as something
which exists, it is, and since it thus comes to us as some-
thing having valid worth, we call the mode in which it
thus appears authority.
Just as man has to learn about material things on
authority and because they are there and exist, has to
be content with them — the sun is there, and because it
is there I must be content with it — so, too, is it with
doctrine or truth ; it does not, however, come to us by
means of sense-perception, by the active exercise of the
senses, but through teaching, as something which actually
exists, through authority. What is in the human spirit,
i.e., in its true spirit, is in this way brought into its con-
sciousness as something objective, or what is in it is
developed so that it knows it to be the truth in which
it exists. In such education, practice, training, and ap-
propriation, the whole interest centres merely in get-
ting accustomed to the Good and the True. So far we
are not concerned with overcoming Evil, for Evil has
implicitly and actually been overcome.
We are concerned merely with contingent subjectivity.
With the one characteristic of faith, namely, that the
subject is not what it is meant to be, there is joined the
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 129
absolute possibility that it may fulfil its destiny and be
received into favour by God. This belongs to faith. The
individual must lay hold of the truth of the implicit unity
of divine and human nature, and he lays hold of this
truth by faith in Christ ; God is thus no longer for the
individual something beyond this world, and the appre-
hension of this truth is in direct contrast to the first
fundamental characteristic, according to which the sub-
ject is not what it ought or is intended to be. The
child, inasmuch as it has been born in the Church, has
been born in freedom and to freedom ; there no longer
exists for it any absolute Other- Being, this Other-Being
is considered as something overcome and conquered.
This education in the truth is concerned only with
preventing evil from appearing, for there is in Man,
looked at from a general point of view, a possibility that
it will appear ; but in so far as evil appears when a man
does what is evil, it is at the same time something which
is implicitly a nullity over which Spirit has power, and
this power is of such a character that Spirit is able to
make evil to cease to exist, to undo it.
Repentance, Penitence signifies that the transgression
has come to be recognised owing to a man's elevation to
the truth, as something which has been virtually over-
come and has no longer power in itself. That what has
happened can be made as though it had not happened,
cannot take place in a sensuous or material way, but in
a spiritual and inward way. He is pardoned, he passes
for one who has been adopted by the Father amongst
men.
This is the business of the Church, this training whereby
the education of the spirit becomes ever more inward,
and this truth becomes identical with his Self, with the
will of Man, becomes his act of will, his Spirit. The
battle is past, and Man is conscious that it is not a case
of battle, as it is in the Persian religion or the Kantian
Philosophy, in which Evil is indeed to be overcome, but
VOL. III. I
130 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
in which it confronts the Good in virtue of its own
essential nature, and in which infinite progress is what
is highest of all.
If we get no further than the idea of what ought to
be, then effort becomes endless, and the solution of the
problem is removed infinitely far away.
Here, on the contrary, the contradiction is already
implicitly solved ; evil is known as something which in
the Spirit is virtually and absolutely overcome, and in
virtue of the fact of its being thus overcome the subject
has only to make its will good, and evil, the evil action,
disappears.
Here there is the consciousness that there is no sin
which cannot be forgiven if the natural will is surren-
dered, unless the sin against the Holy Spirit, the denial
of Spirit; for it alone is the power which can cancel
everything.
Very many difficulties arise in connection with this
point, and they all spring from the conception of Spirit
and of freedom. On the one hand, Spirit is regarded as
universal Spirit, and, on the other hand, as Man's inde-
pendent existence, as the independent existence of the
single individual. It is necessary to say that it is the
divine Spirit which effects regeneration ; this is divine
free grace, for all that is divine is free ; it is not fate, it
is not destiny. On the other hand, however, there is
the self of the soul existing in a positive way, and it is
sought accordingly to ascertain how much Man's share
in the matter is ; a Velleitas, a Nisus is left to him, but
persistence in firmly remaining in such a relation is itself
unspiritual. The first condition of Being, the Being of
the Self, is potentially the Notion, potentially Spirit, and
what has to be abolished is the form of its immediacy, of
its isolated, particular, independent Being or Being-for-
self. This cancelling of self and coming to self on the
part of the Notion is not, however, limited, universal
Spirit. The act implied in belief in implicit reconcilia-
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 131
tion, is, viewed in one aspect, the act of the subject, and,
viewed in another aspect, it is the act of the Divine
Spirit : faith is itself the Divine Spirit which works in
the individual ; but this latter is not in this case a passive
receptacle, but, on the contrary, the Holy Spirit is equally
the Spirit of the subject, since it has faith ; in the exer-
cise of this faith it acts against its natural life, discards
it, puts it away. The difference between the three ways
of representing this truth which have been employed may
also serve to throw light on the antinomy which is in-
volved in the course thus pursued by the soul.
(a.) There is first the moral view which finds its
antithesis in the absolutely external relation of self-
consciousness, in a relation which, taken by itself, might
appear either as first or as fourth, namely, in the oriental
despotic relation which involves the annihilation of indi-
vidual thought and will ; this moral view places the
absolute end, the essence of Spirit, in an end connected
with volition, and with volition, in fact, simply as its
volition, so that this subjective aspect is the main point.
Law, the Universal, the Rational is my rationality in me,
and so, too, the willing of the end and its realisation
which make it my own, my subjective end, are also mine ;
and inasmuch as the idea of something higher or highest,
of God and the Divine, enters into this view, this is itself
merely a postulate of my reason, something posited by
me. It ought, it is true, to be something which has not
been posited, something which is a purely independent
power ; still, although it is thus something not posited, I
do not forget that this very fact of its not being posited
is something which has been posited by me. It comes
to the same thing whether this be stated in the form
of a postulate, or whether we say, my feeling of depend-
ence or of the need of salvation is what comes first, for
in both cases the peculiar objectivity of truth has been
abolished.
(6.) In reference to the good resolve, and still more in
132 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
reference to the Universal or Law, the pious man further
adds that this is the divine will, and that the power of
making the good resolution is itself really something
divine, and he does not go beyond the universal relation
here implied.
Finally, (c.) The mystical and ecclesiastical view gives
greater definiteness to this connection between God and
the subjective act of will and Being, and brings it into
the relation which is based on the nature of the Idea, The
various ways in which this truth has been conceived of
in the Church are simply attempts to solve the antinomy.
The Lutheran conception of it is, without doubt, the most
brilliant, even if it has not perfectly reached the form of
the Idea.
3. What comes last in this sphere of thought is the
enjoyment of what is thus appropriated, the enjoyment
of the presence of God. What we have here is the
consciously felt presence of God, unity with God, the
unio mystica, the feeling of God in the heart.
This is the Sacrament of the Supper, in which Man
has given him in a sensible immediate way the con-
sciousness of his reconciliation with God, the abiding and
indwelling of the Spirit in him.
Since this is a feeling in the individual heart, it is
also a movement, it presupposes the abolition of differ-
ences whereby this negative unity comes into existence
as the result. If the permanent preservation of the
Spiritual Community, which is at the same time its
unbroken creation, is itself the eternal repetition of the
life, passion, and resurrection of Christ, then this repeti-
tion gets a complete expression in the Sacrament of the
Supper. The eternal sacrifice here just is, that the
absolute substantial element, the unity of the subject
and of the absolute object is offered to the individual to
enjoy in an immediate way, and since the individual is
reconciled, it follows that this complete reconciliation is
the resurrection of Christ. Consequently the Supper is
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 133
the central point of Christian doctrine, and it is from
ic that all the differences in Christian doctrine get their
colour and peculiar character. The conceptions formed
of it are of three kinds : —
(i.) According to one conception the host, this out-
ward, material, unspiritual thing is, owing to the act of
consecration, the actually present God — God as a thing,
and in the form of an empirical thing, and thus, too,
as empirically enjoyed by Man. Since God is thus
known as something outward in the Supper which is the
central point of doctrine, this externality is the basis of
the whole Catholic religion. There arises from this a
slavishness of knowledge and action ; this externality
runs through all further definitions of the truth owing
to the fact that the True is represented as something
fixed and external. Being thus something which has a
definite existence outside of the subject, it can come to
be in the power of others ; the Church is in possession
of it as it is of all the means of grace ; the subject is in
this respect something passive and receptive which does
not know what is true, right, and good, but has to accept
it merely from others.
(2.) According to the Lutheran conception the move-
ment starts from something external which is an ordinary
common thing, but the act of communion takes place and
the inner feeling of the presence of God arises to the
extent to which, and in so far as, the externality is eaten
not simply in a corporal fashion, but in spirit and faith.
It is only in spirit and in faith that we have the present
God. The sensible presence is in itself nothing, nor does
consecration make the host into an object worthy of
adoration ; but, on the contrary, the object exists in faith
only, and thus it is in the consuming and destroying of
the sensuous that we have union with God and the con-
sciousness of this union of the subject with God. Here
the grand thought has arisen that, apart from the act
of communion and faith, the host is a common, material
134 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
thing ; the process truly takes place only in the spirit of
the subject.
In this case there is no transubstantiation — transub-
stantiation there certainly is, but it is of the kind by
which what is external is absorbed and abolished; while
the presence of God is of a purely spiritual sort, and is
directly connected with the faith of the subject.
(3.) According to this third conception God is present
only in the conception we form of Him, only in memory,
and thus His presence is so far merely immediate and
subjective. This is the conception of the Eeformed
Church, an unspiritual and merely lively remembrance
of the Past, not a divine Presence, not a really spiritual
existence. Here the Divine, the Truth has got lowered
to the prose of the Enlightenment and of the mere
Understanding, and expresses a merely moral relation.
(c.) The Realisation of the Spiritual culminating in
Universal Reality.
This directly involves the transformation and remodel-
ling of the Spiritual Community.
Religion is here the spiritual religion, and the Spiritual
Community exists primarily in what is inward, in Spirit
as such. This inner element, this subjectivity which is
present to itself as inward, not developed in itself, is
feeling or sensation ; the Spiritual Community has also
as an essential part of its character, consciousness, ordi-
nary thought or mental representation, needs, impulses,
a worldly existence in fact, but this brings with it dis-
union, differentiation ; the divine objective Idea presents
itself to consciousness as an Other outside of it which is
given partly through authority and is partly appropriated
in acts of devotion — to put it otherwise, the moment of
communion is merely a single moment, or the divine
Idea, the divine content is not actually seen, but is only
represented in the mind. The Now or actuality of
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 135
communion as thus represented is transferred partly to
a region beyond, to a heaven beyond the present, partly
to the past and partly to the future. Spirit, however,
is above all things present, and demands a real and
complete presence ; it demands more than love merely,
than sad ideas or mental pictures, it demands that the
content should itself be present, or that the feeling, the
sensation experienced should be developed and expanded.
Thus the Spiritual Community, in its character as the
Kingdom of God, has standing over against it, objectivity
in general. Objectivity in the shape of an external
immediate world is represented by the heart with its
interests ; another form of objectivity is the objectivity
of Eeflection, of abstract Thought, of the Understanding ;
and the third and true form of objectivity is that of the
Notion ; and we have now to consider how Spirit realises
itself in these three elements.
i. In religion the heart is implicitly reconciled; this
reconciliation has thus its place in the heart, it is spiritual
— is the pure heart which attains this enjoyment of the
presence of God in it, and consequently reconciliation,
the enjoyment of being reconciled. This reconciliation
is, however, abstract ; the self, the subject, that is to say,
represents at the same time that aspect of this spiritual
presence according to which a worldly element in a de-
veloped form is actually found in the self, and thus the
Kingdom of God, the Spiritual Community, has a relation
to the worldly element.
In order that the reconciliation be real, it is neces-
sary that in this development, in this totality, the recon-
ciliation should also be consciously known, be present,
and be brought forward into actuality. The principles
which apply to this worldly element actually exist in this
spiritual element.
The truth of the worldly element is the Spiritual, or,
to put it more definitely, it means that the subject as an
object of divine grace, as a being who is reconciled with
136 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
God, has an infinite value by the very character which is
essentially his, and which is further developed in the Spiri-
tual Community. In accordance with this its essential
character, the subject is accordingly recognised as being the
infinite certainty of Spirit itself, as the eternity of Spirit.
So far as this subject which is thus inherently infinite
is concerned, the fact of its being determined or destined
to infinitude is its freedom, and just means that it is a
free person, and thus is also related to this world, to
reality as subjectivity which is at home with itself,
reconciled within itself, and is absolutely fixed and
infinite subjectivity. This is the substantial element ;
this specific character which thus belongs to it must
form the basis in so far as it brings itself into relation
with this world.
The rationality, the freedom of the subject means
that the subject is this something which has been freed
and has attained to this condition of freedom through
religion, that it is essentially free in virtue of its reli-
gious character. What we are concerned with is to see
how this reconciliation takes place within the worldly
sphere itself.
(l.) The first form of reconciliation is the immediate
one, and just because of its being immediate it is not
yet the true mode of reconciliation. This reconciliation
shows itself as follows. At first the Spiritual Community,
as representing the fact of reconciliation, the Spiritual,
the fact of reconciliation with God in itself, stands aloof
from the worldly sphere in an abstract way ; the Spiri-
tual renounces the worldly sphere by its own act, takes
up a negative relation to the world, and consequently to
itself; for the world in the subject shows itself as the
impulse to Nature, to social life, to art and science.
The concrete element in the self, namely, the passions,
is not able to justify itself in reference to the religious
element by the fact of its being natural ; while ascetic
withdrawal from the world implies that the heart does
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 137
not get a concrete expansion and is to remain undeveloped,
or, in other words, that the spiritual element, the state of
reconciliation, and the life in which this reconciliation is
to show itself, is to be, and is to continue to be, concen-
trated in itself and undeveloped. It is, however, the
very nature of Spirit to develop itself, to differentiate
itself until it reaches the worldly sphere.
(2.) The second form, of this reconciliation implies that
the interests of the world and religious interests continue
to be external to one another, and that still they ought
to come into relation to each other. Thus the relation
in which both stand is merely an external one, and it
means that the one prevails over the other, and thus
there is no reconciliation : the religious element, it is
felt, should be the ruling element ; what has been recon-
ciled, the Church namely, should rule the secular element,
which is unreconciled.
There is a union with the worldly element which is
unreconciled, the worldly element in its purely crude
state, and which in its purely crude state is merely brought
under the sway of the other ; but the element which thus
holds sway absorbs this worldly element into itself, all
tendencies, all passions, everything, in short, which repre-
sents worldly interests devoid of any spiritual element,
make their appearance in the Church owing to the posi-
tion of sovereignty thus attained, because the secular
element is not reconciled in itself.
Thus a sovereignty is reached by means of what is
unspiritual, in which what is external is the ruling prin-
ciple, and in which Man is in his general relationships
directly outside of himself ; it is, in fact, the relation or
condition of want of freedom. The element of disunion
enters into everything that can be called human, into all
kinds of impulses, and into all those relationships which
have reference to the family, to active life, and life in the
State ; and the ruling principle is that Man is not at home
with himself, is in a region foreign to his nature.
138 ' THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Man, in fact, in all these forms is in a condition of
servitude, and all those forms which his life takes are
held to be worthless, unholy, and he himself, by the very
fact of his connection with them, is essentially something
finite, disunited, and thus has no valid worth, since what
possesses validity is an Other.
This reconciliation is connected with worldly interests
and with Man's own heart in such a way that it becomes
the direct opposite of reconciliation. The further de-
velopment of this condition of rupture in reconciliation
itself, is accordingly what takes the form of the corruption
of the Church — the absolute contradiction of the Spiritual
within itself.
(3.) The third characteristic is that this contradiction
cancels itself in Morality, that the principle of freedom
has forced its way into secular life ; and since secular life
so constructed is itself in conformity with the Notion,
reason, truth, eternal truth, it is a freedom which has
become concrete, the rational will.
It is in the organisation of the State that the Divine
has passed into the sphere of reality ; the latter is pene-
trated by the former, and the existence of the secular
element is justified in-and-for-itself, for its basis is the
Divine Will, the law of right and freedom. The true
reconciliation whereby the Divine realises itself in the
region of reality is found in moral and legal life in the
State ; this is the true disciplining of the secular life.
The institutions of morality are divine, are holy, not
in the sense in which what is holy is opposed to what is
moral, as when it is held that celibacy represents what
is holy as opposed to family life, or voluntary poverty
as opposed to active acquisition by one's own efforts, to
what is lawful. In the same way blind obedience passes
for being something holy ; while, on the contrary, what
makes morality is obedience in freedom, free, rational
will, the obedience of the subject in respect of what is
moral. In morality the reconciliation of religion with
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 139
reality, with the secular life, is an actual and accom-
plished fact.
2. The second point is that the ideal side now emerges
here on its own account. In this state in which Spirit
is reconciled with itself, what is inward knows itself as
being within the sphere of its own nature, knows that
it is together with itself, and this knowledge that it is
together with itself, not outside of itself, is just Thought,
which is the state of reconciliation, the being together
with self, the being at peace with self, but in a wholly
abstract undeveloped condition of peace with itself. There
thus arises the infinite demand that the content of reli-
gion should verify its truth for Thought as well, and this
is a necessary requirement which cannot be set aside.
Thought is the Universal, the active expression of
the Universal, and stands in contrast to the concrete in
general, which represents the external.
It is the Freedom of Eeason which has been won in
religion, and which knows itself in Spirit as existing for
itself. This freedom accordingly opposes itself to the
purely unspiritual externality, to servitude ; for servi-
tude is directly opposed to the conception of reconciliation
and liberation, and thus thought enters in and destroys
and bids defiance to externality in whatever form it may
appear.
This represents the negative and formal act which in
its concrete form has been called the " Enlightenment,"
and which implies that thought sets itself to oppose ex-
ternality, and that the freedom of Spirit, which is involved
in reconciliation, is asserted. This thought, when it first
appears, appears in the form of this abstract Universal,
and sets itself against the concrete in general, and con-
sequently against the Idea of God, against the theory
that God is the Triune God and not a dead abstraction,
but a Being related to Himself, who is at home with
Himself and returns to Himself. Abstract thought
attacks this doctrinal content, as held by the Church,
140 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
with its principle of identity ; for this concrete content
is in contradiction with this law of identity. In the
concrete there are determinations, differences ; since ab-
stract thought turns against externality in general, it is
also opposed to difference as such, the relation of God
to Man, the unity of the two, divine grace and human
freedom ; for all this is the union of opposed determina-
tions. The rule, however, for the Understanding, for this
abstract thought, is abstract identity ; this kind of thought
thus aims at dissolving all that is concrete, all determina-
tions, all content in God, and accordingly reflection has
as its final resultant merely the objectivity of identity
itself, this, namely, that God is nothing but the Supreme
Essence, without definite character or determination,
empty ; for every determination makes what is deter-
mined concrete. He is for cognition something beyond
the present, for cognition or reasoned knowledge is know-
ledge of a concrete content. Reflection in this its com-
plete form is the antithesis of the Christian Church ; and
as everything concrete in God is destroyed, this fact is
expressed somewhat in this fashion — Man cannot know
God ; for to know God is to know Him in accordance
with His attributes or determinations, but according to
this view He remains a pure abstraction. This formula
certainly contains the principle of freedom, of inward-
ness, of religion even ; but it is, to begin with, conceived
of in a merely abstract way.
The Other, by means of which determination enters
into this universality which exists alongside of this ab-
straction, is nothing but what is contained in the natural
inclinations, the impulses of the subject. Regarding the
matter from this standpoint, it is accordingly said that
Man is by nature good. Inasmuch as this pure sub-
jectivity, this ideality, is pure freedom, it is certainly
brought into connection with the essential character of
the Good, but the Good itself must in this case equally
remain an abstraction.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 141
The determination of the Good here is the arbitrari-
ness, the accidental nature of the subject in general, and
this latter is thus the extreme or culminating point of
this subjectivity, the freedom which renounces its claim
to truth and to the development of truth, which thus
moves within itself and knows that what it considers as
having validity is simply its own determinations, and that
it has the mastery over all that is called good and evil.
This is an inner self-enclosed life which may indeed
coexist with calm, lofty, and pious aspirations, but may
as readily appear as hypocrisy or as vanity in its most
extreme form. It is what is called the pious life of
feeling, to which Pietism also restricts itself. Pietism
recognises no objective truth, sets itself in opposition to
dogmas, to the content of religion, and though it does
indeed preserve the element of mediation, and still main-
tains a certain relation to Christ, yet this relation is sup-
posed to remain in the sphere of feeling, in the sphere of
inner sentiment. Each person has thus his own God,
Christ, &c. The element of particularity in which each
has his own individual religion, his own theory of the
Universe, &c., does undoubtedly exist in Man ; but in
religion it is absorbed by life in the Spiritual Community,
and for the truly pious man it has no longer any real
worth and is laid aside.
On this side of the empty essence of God there thus
stands a finitude which is free on its own account and
has become independent, which has an absolute value in
itself, e.g., in the shape of the righteousness of individuals.
The further consequence is, that not only is the objec-
tivity of God thus put in a sphere beyond the present
and negated, but all other objective characteristics which
have validity in -and -for- themselves, and which have
appeared in the world as Right, as what is moral, &c.,
absolutely disappear. Since the subject thus retreats to
the extreme point of its infinity, the Good, all that is
right, &c., are contained only in it, it takes all this as
142 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
constituting its own subjective character, it is only its
thought. What gives body to this Good is accordingly
taken from natural caprice, from what is accidental, from
passion, &c. This subject is further the consciousness
that objectivity is shut up within it itself, and that this
objectivity has no permanent existence ; it is only the
principle of identity which has for it validity ; this
subject is something abstract, it can be filled up with
any kind of content, since it has the power to subsume
every content which is thus planted in the heart of Man.
Subjectivity is thus caprice itself, and is, in short, the
knowledge of that power belonging to it whereby it pro-
duces objectivity or the Good and gives it a content.
The other development of this point of view, accord-
ingly, is that the subject has no independent existence,
is not for itself in reference to the unity which it has
reached by emptying itself, it does not preserve its
particularity as against it, but has for its specific aim
self-absorption in the unity of God. The subject has
thus no particular end, nor any objective end beyond
simply the glory of the one God. What we have here
is religion ; there is in it an affirmative relation to its
Essence which is constituted by this One, in it the
subject yields itself up. This religion has the same
objective content as the Jewish religion, but the relation
in which men stand to one another is broadened ; there
is no particularity left in it, the Jewish idea of national
value which establishes the relation in which Man stands
to the One, is wanting here. Here there is no limitation,
Man is related to this One as a purely abstract self-con-
sciousness. This is the characteristic of the Moham-
medan religion. It forms the antithesis of Christianity,
because it occupies a like sphere with the Christian
religion. It is, as it were, the Jewish spiritual religion,
but this God exists for self-consciousness in Spirit which
has merely abstract knowledge, and occupies a stage
which is one with that occupied by the Christian religion,
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 143
inasmuch as in it no kind of particularity is retained.
The man who fears God is acceptable to Him, and Man
has value only in so far as he finds his truth in the
knowledge that this God is the One, the Essence. There
is no recognition of the existence of any wall of partition
between believers themselves or between them and God.
Before God all specific distinction of the subject according
to his standing or rank is done away with ; rank may
exist, there may be slaves, but this is to be regarded as
merely accidental.
The contrast between the Christian and Mohammedan
religions consists in the fact that in Christ the spiritual
element is developed in a concrete way, and is known as
Trinity, i.e., as Spirit, and that the history of Man, the
relation in which he stands to the One, is a concrete
history. It takes its start from the natural will, which
is not as it ought to be, and the yielding up of this will
is the act whereby it reaches this its essence by means
of this negation of itself. The Mohammedan hates and f
proscribes everything concrete, God is the absolute One,
and as against Him Man retains for himself no end, no
particularity, no interests of his own. Man as actually
existing does undoubtedly particularise himself in his
natural inclinations and interests, and these are here all
the more savage and unrestrained that reflection is want-
ing in connection with them ; but this again involves
something which is the complete opposite, namely, the
tendency to let everything take its course, an indifference
in respect of every kind of end, absolute fatalism, in-
difference in respect of life, while no practical end is
regarded as having any essential worth. Since, how-
ever, Man is as a matter of fact practical and active, the
end to be pursued can only be to bring about the wor-
ship of the One amongst all men, and accordingly the
Mohammedan religion is essentially fanatical.
Reflection, as we have seen, occupies the same stand-
point as Mohammedanism in so far as it maintains that
144 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
God has no content, is not concrete. Thus the manifes-
tation of God in the flesh, the exaltation of Christ to the
position of Son of the God, the transfiguration of the
finitude of the world and of self-consciousness until they
appear as the infinite self-determination of God, have no
place here. Christianity is held to be a system of teach-
ing or set of doctrines, and Christ an ambassador from
God, a divine teacher, and so a teacher like Socrates, only
a still more distinguished teacher, since he was without
sin. This, however, is to go only half way, it is a com-
promise. Christ was either merely a man, or he was the
" Son of Man." There would thus be nothing left of the
divine history, and Christ would be spoken of as he is in
the Koran. The difference between this standpoint and
Mohammedanism consists merely in the fact that the
latter, the conceptions of which are bathed in the ether
of illimitableness, and which represents this infinite inde-
pendence, directly gives up all particular interests, enjoy-
ment, position, individual knowledge, all "vanity" in short.
On the other hand, rationalistic Enlightenment gives Man
an abstract standing on his own account, since for it God
is beyond this world and has no affirmative relation to the
subject, so that Man recognises the affirmative Universal
only in so far as it is in him, and yet has it in him in a
merely abstract wa}', and accordingly what gives it body
or substance is taken only from what is accidental and
arbitrary.
Still we must recognise the presence of reconciliation
in this last form too, and thus this final manifestation is
also a realisation of Faith. Since, in fact, all content, all
truth perishes in this particular subjectivity which knows
itself infinitely in itself, the principle of subjective free-
dom has as a consequence come to be consciously known.
What is called in the Spiritual Community the inner life,
is now developed in itself ; it is not only something
inward, conscience, but it is subjectivity which differen-
tiates itself makes distinctions within itself, is concrete ;
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 145
it appears as its own objectivity, it knows the Universal
as being in itself, as something which it produces out
of itself, it is the subjectivity which is independent, for
itself, self-conscious, determines itself within itself, and
is thus the complete development of the subjective
extreme until it has reached the Idea in itself. The
defect here is that this is merely formal, that it misses
having true objectivity, it represents the extreme point
of formal spiritual development without inner necessity.
If the Idea is to get a truly complete form, it is neces-
sary that the objectivity should be set free, should be
the totality of objectivity in itself.
The result of this objectivity, therefore, is, that every-
thing in the subject is refined away, without objectivity,
without fixed character, without development in God.
This final and culminating point thus reached by the
formal culture of our day is at the same time the most
extreme crudeness, because it possesses merely the form
of culture.
We have so far recognised the presence of these two
mutually opposing extremes in the development of the
Spiritual Community. The one was that unfreedom, that
servitude of the Spirit in the absolute region of freedom ;
the other was abstract subjectivity, subjective freedom
without content.
3. What we have finally still to consider is, that
subjectivity develops the content out of itself, but does
this in accordance with necessity — knows and recognises
the content to be necessary and that it is objective, that it
has an essential existence of its own, is in-and-for-itself.
This is the standpoint of philosophy, according to which
the content takes refuge in the Notion and by means of
thought gets its restoration and justification.
This thought is not merely the process of abstraction and
determination which is governed by the law of identity ;
this thought is itself essentially concrete, and thus it is
comprehension, grasping in the Notion, it means that
VOL. III. K
146 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the Notion so determines itself as to take on the form
of totality, of the Idea.
It is free reason which has an essential existence,
is in-and-f or- itself, which develops the content of truth
and justifies it in knowledge, recognises and cognises one
truth. The purely subjective standpoint, the volatilisation
of all content, the Enlightenment of the Understanding,
together with Pietism, do not recognise any content, and
consequently no truth.
The Notion, however, prod-uves the truth — this is sub-
jective freedom — but at the same time recognises this con-
tent to be something not produced, to be something which
is inherent and essentially true, true in -and -for -itself.
This objective standpoint is alone capable of expressing
and attesting the witness of the Spirit in a way which
betokens intellectual training and thought, and it is in-
volved in the position taken up by the better kind of
dogmatic theology of our day.
This standpoint consequently supplies us with the
justification of religion, and in particular of the Christian
or true religion ; it knows the content in accordance
with its necessity, in accordance with its reason, and so,
too, it knows the forms also in the development of this
content.
What these forms are we have already seen, namely,
the manifestation of God, that representation for the sen-
suous, spiritual consciousness which has arrived at uni-
versality, at thought, that complete development which
exists for Spirit.
In the act of justifying the content and the forms,
in getting a rational knowledge of the specific character
of the manifestation, thought at the same time also
knows the limits of the forms. Enlightenment knows
only of negation, of limit, of determinateness as such,
and because of this is unjust to the content.
Form or determinateness is not merely finitude, or
limit, but rather the form, as totality of the form is
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 147
itself the Notion, and these forms are necessary and
essential.
Owing to the fact that reflection has invaded the domain
of religion, thought or reflection takes up a hostile atti-
tude to the ordinary or popular idea in religion and to
its concrete content. Thought, when it has thus begun,
never pauses again, but goes on its way, empties feeling,
heaven, and the knowing mind, and the religious content
accordingly takes refuge in the Notion. Here it must
get its justification, here thought must conceive of itself
as concrete and free, preserving the differences not as
if they were only posited or dependent on something,
but allowing them to appear as free, and consequently
recognising the content as objective.
It is the business of philosophy to establish the
relation in which thought stands to the two preceding
stages. Religion, the need felt by the pious mind, can
take refuge in " experience," in feeling, as well as in
the Notion, and limit itself to this, and thus give up the
search after truth, renounce the possibility of knowing any
content, so that the Holy Church has no longer any com-
munion in it, but splits up into atoms. For what com-
munion there is is in doctrine ; but here each individual
has a feeling of his own, has his own sensations or experi-
ences, and his particular theory of the universe. This form
does not answer to Spirit which also wishes to know
what its relation is to doctrine. Philosophy thus stands
opposed to two points of view. On the one hand, it
appears to be opposed to the Church, and has this
in common with culture and reflection, that in compre-
hending the popular religious idea it does not keep to
the forms of the popular idea> but has to comprehend
it in thought, though in doing this it recognises that
the form of the popular idea is also necessary. But
the Notion is that higher element which also embraces
within it different forms and allows their right to exist.
The second way in which it takes up an attitude of oppo-
148 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
sition is when it appears in antagonism to Enlightenment,
to the theory which holds that the content is of no con-
sequence, to opinion, to the despair which renounces the
truth. The aim of philosophy is to know the truth,
to know God, for He is the absolute truth, inasmuch
as nothing else is worth troubling about save God and
the unfolding of God's nature. Philosophy knows God as
essentially concrete, as spiritual, real universality which
is not jealous but imparts itself. Light by its very
nature imparts itself. Whoever says that God cannot
be known, says He is jealous, and so makes no earnest
effort to believe iu Him, however much he may speak
of God. Enlightenment, that conceit, that vanity of the
Understanding is the most violent opponent of philosophy,
and is displeased when the latter points to the element
of reason in the Christian religion, when it shows that
the witness of the Spirit, of truth, is lodged in religion.
Philosophy, which is theology, is solely concerned with
showing the rationality of religion.
In philosophy, religion gets its justification from think-
ing consciousness. Piety of the naive kind stands iu no
need of this, it receives the truth as authority, and expe-
riences satisfaction, reconciliation by means of this truth.
In faith the true content is certainly already found,
but there is still wanting to it the form of thought. All
forms such as we have already dealt with, feeling, popu-
lar ideas, and such like, may certainly have the form of
truth, but they themselves are not the true form which
makes the true content necessary. Thought is the ab-
solute judge before which the content must verify and
attest its claims.
Philosophy has been reproached with setting itself
above religion ; this, however, is false as an actual matter
of fact, for it possesses this particular content only and
no other, though it presents it in the form of thought ;
it sets itself merely above the form of faith, the content
is the same in both cases.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 149
The form of the subject as an individual who feels, &c.,
concerns the subject as a single individual ; but feeling
as such is not rejected by philosophy. The question
merely is as to whether the content of feeling is the truth,
whether it can prove itself to be true in thought. Philo-
sophy thinks what the subject as such feels, and leaves it
to the latter to settle with its feeling. Feeling is thus
not rejected by philosophy ; on the contrary, it simply
gets through philosophy its true content.
But, in so far as thought begins to place itself in op-
position to the concrete, the process of thought then con-
sists in carrying through this opposition until it reaches
reconciliation. This reconciliation is philosophy ; so far
philosophy is theology, it sets forth the reconciliation
of God with Himself and with Nature, and shows that
Nature, Other-Being is divine, that it partly belongs to
the very nature of finite Spirit to rise into the state of
reconciliation, and that it partly reaches this state of
reconciliation in the history of the world.
This religious knowledge thus reached through the
Notion is not universal in its nature, and it is further
only knowledge in the Spiritual Community, and thus we
get in reference to the Kingdom of God three stages or
positions : the first position is that of immediate naive
religion and faith ; the second, the position of the
Understanding, of the so-called cultured, of reflection
and Enlightenment ; and finally, the third position, the
stage of philosophy.
But if now, after having considered the origin and
permanent existence of the Spiritual Community, we see
that in attaining realisation in its spiritual reality it falls
into this condition of inner disruption, then this realisa-
tion appears to be at the same time its disappearance.
But ought we to speak here of destruction when the
Kingdom of God is founded eternally, when the Holy
Spirit as such lives eternally in its Spiritual Community,
and when the gates of Hell are not to prevail against the
I5o THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Church ? • To speak of the Spiritual Community passing
away is to end with a discordant note.
Only, how can it be helped ? This discordant note is
actually present in reality. Just as in the time of the
Roman Empire, because universal unity in religion had
disappeared, arid the Divine was profaned, and because,
further, political life was universally devoid of principle,
of action, and of confidence, reason took refuge only in
the form of private right, or, to put it otherwise, because
what was by its very nature essential, what existed in-
and-for-itself was given up, individual well-being was
elevated to the rank of an end, so, too, is it now. Moral
views, individual opinion and conviction without objective
truth, have attained authority, and the pursuit of private
rights and enjoyment is the order of the day. When the
time is fulfilled in which speculative justification, justi-
fication by means of the Notion, is what is needed, then
the unity of the outer and inner no longer exists in
immediate consciousness, in the world of reality, and in
the sphere of Faith nothing is justified. The rigidity of
an objective command, an external direction, the power
of the State can effect nothing here ; the process of decay
has gone too deep for that. When the Gospel is no
longer preached to the poor, when the salt has lost its
savour, and all the foundations have been tacitly removed,
then the people, for whose ever solid reason truth can
exist only in a pictorial conception, no longer know how
to assist the impulses and emotions they feel within
them. They are nearest to the condition of infinite
sorrow ; but since love has been perverted to a love and
enjoyment from which all sorrow is absent, they seem to
themselves to be deserted by their teachers. These latter
have, it is true, brought help to themselves by means of
reflection, and have found their satisfaction in finitude, in
subjectivity and its virtuosity, and consequently in what
is empty and vain, but the substantial kernel of the
people cannot find its satisfaction there.
THE ABSOLUTE RELIGION 151
« For us philosophical knowledge has harmonised this
discord, and the aim of these lectures has just been to
reconcile reason and religion, to show how we know this
latter to be in all its manifold forms necessary, and to
rediscover in revealed religion the truth and the Idea.
But this reconciliation is itself merely a partial one
without outward universality. Philosophy forms in this
connection a sanctuary apart, and those who serve in it
constitute an isolated order of priests, who must not mix
with the world, and whose work is to protect the posses-
sions of Truth. How the actual present-day world is
to find its way out of this state of disruption, and what
form it is to take, are questions which must be left to
itself to settle, and to deal with them is not the immediate
practical business and concern of philosophy. *
LECTURES ON THE PROOFS OF THE
EXISTENCE OF GOD
FIRST LECTURE
THESE Lectures are devoted to the consideration of the
proofs of the existence of God. The occasion for them
is this. I had at first to make up my mind to give
only one set of lectures in this summer session on philo-
sophical knowledge as a whole, and then afterwards I
felt I would like to add a second set on at least one
separate subject of knowledge. I have therefore chosen
a subject which is connected with the other set of lectures
which I gave on logic, and constitutes, not in substance,
but in form, a kind of supplement to that set, inasmuch
as it is concerned with only a particular aspect of the
fundamental conceptions of logic. These lectures are
therefore chiefly meant for those of my hearers who
•were present at the others, and to them they will be
most easily intelligible.
But inasmuch as the task we have set ourselves is to
consider the proofs of the existence of God, it would
appear as if only one aspect of the matter belongs to the
subject of logic, namely, the nature of proof. The other,
again, the content, which is God Himself, belongs to a
different sphere, that of religion, and to the consideration
of it by thought, to the philosophy of religion. In point
of fact, it is a portion of this branch of knowledge which
has to be set apart and treated by itself in these lectures.
In what follows it will more clearly be seen what relation
this part bears to the entirety of the doctrine of religion ;
and further, that this doctrine in so far as it is scientific,
and what belongs to the sphere of logic, do not fall out-
side one another to the extent that would appear from the
first statement of our aim, and that what is logical does
»55
156 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
not constitute the merely formal side, but, in fact, occupies
the very centre point of the content.
The first thing we encounter when we seek to make a
beginning with the execution of our design is the general,
and, so far as this design is concerned, repugnant, point
of view of the prepossessions of present-day culture. If
the object, God, is in itself capable of producing exalta-
tion of mind by its very name, and of stirring our soul to
its innermost depths, our lofty expectation may just as
quickly die away when we reflect that it is the proofs of
the existence of God with which we are about to concern
ourselves. For the proofs of the existence of God are to
such an extent fallen into discredit that they pass for
something antiquated, belonging to the metaphysics of
days gone by ; a barren desert, out of which we have
escaped and brought ourselves back to a living faith ;
the region of arid Understanding, out of which we have
once more raised ourselves to the warm feeling of religion.
The attempt to renovate, by means of new applications
and artifices of an acute Understanding, those rotten props
of our belief that there is a God, which have passed for
proofs, or to improve the places which have become weak
through attacks and counter-proofs, could of itself gain
no favour merely by its good intention. For it is not
this or that proof, or this or that form and way of putting
it, that has lost its weight, but the very proving of reli-
gious truth has so much lost credit with the mode of
thought peculiar to our time that the impossibility of
such proof is already a generally accepted opinion. Nay
more, it has come to be regarded as irreligious to place
confidence in such reasoned knowledge, and to seek by
such a path to reach a sure conviction regarding God and
His nature, or even regarding His mere existence. This
business of proof, therefore, is so much out of date, that
the proofs themselves are barely even historically known
here and there ; and even to theologians, that is to say,
people who desire to have a scientific acquaintance with
religious truths, they are sometimes unknown.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 157
The proofs of the existence of God have originated in
the necessity of satisfying thought and reason. But
this necessity has assumed, in modern culture, quite a
different position from that which it had formerly, and
those points of view must first of all be considered which
have presented themselves in this reference. Yet since
they are known in their general aspects, and this is not
the place to follow them back to their foundations,
we need only recall them, and, in fact, limit ourselves
to the form which they assume within the sphere of
Christianity. It is in this region that the conflict be-
tween faith and reason in Man himself first finds a basis,
and that doubt enters his soul, and can reach the fearful
height of depriving him of all peace. Thought must
indeed touch the earlier religions of imagination, as we
may shortly call them ; it must turn itself with its oppo-
site principles directly against their sensuous pictures
and all else in them. The contradictions, the strife and
enmity which have thus arisen belong to the external
history of philosophy. But the collisions between philo-
sophy and religion here get the length of hostility merely,
and have not come to be that inner division of mind and
feeling, such as we see in Christianity, where the two
sides which come into contradiction get possession of the
depth of the Spirit as their single and consequently
common source, and in this position, bound together in
their contradiction, are able to disturb this spot itself,
the Spirit in its inmost nature. The expression " faith "
is reserved for Christianity ; we do not speak of Greek
or Egyptian faith, or of a faith in Zeus or Apis. Faith
expresses the inwardness of certainty, and certainty of
the deepest and most concentrated kind, as distinguished
from all other opinion, conception, persuasion, or volition.
This inwardness, at once as being what is deepest and
at the same time most abstract, comprises thought itself;
a contradiction of this faith by thought is therefore the
most painful of all divisions in the depths of the Spirit.
158 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Yet such misery is happily, if we may so express our-
selves, not the only form in which the relation of faith
and knowledge is to be found. On the contrary, this re-
lation presents itself in a peaceful form, in the conviction
that revelation, faith, positive religion, and, on the other
hand, reason and thought in general, must not be in con-
tradiction, and not only that they may be in harmony,
but also that God does not so contradict Himself in His
works, cannot so contradict Himself, as that the human
Spirit in its essence, in its thinking reason, in that which
it must have come from the very first to regard as divine
in itself, could get into conflict with what has come to it
through greater enlightenment about the nature of God
and Man's relation to that nature. During the whole of
the Middle Ages, theology was understood to mean no-
thing else than a scientific knowledge of Christian truths,
that is to say, a knowledge essentially connected with
philosophy. The Middle Ages were far enough away from
taking the historical knowledge of faith for scientific
knowledge ; in the Fathers and in what may be reckoned
generally as historical material, they sought only authori-
ties, edification, and information on the doctrines of the
Church. The opposite tendency is simply to search out
the human origin of the articles of faith by the historical
treatment of the older evidences and works of every kind,
and in this way to reduce them to the minimum of their
most primitive form. This form must be regarded as
wholly unfruitful in deeper knowledge and development,
'because it is in contradiction with that Spirit, which, after
the removal of that primitive form as something imme-
diately present, had been poured out on the adherents of
these doctrines, in order to lead them now, for the first
time, into all truth. The tendency here described was
unknown in these times. In the belief in the unity
of this Spirit with itself, the whole of these doctrines,
•even those which are most abstruse for reason, are re-
garded from the point of view of thinking, and the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 159
attempt is made, in the case of all of these which are
recognised as in themselves the content of belief, to
prove them on rational grounds. The great theologian
Anselm of Canterbury, whom we shall have to consider
elsewhere, declares in this sense that, if we are firm in
the faith, it is idleness, negligentice mihi esse videtur, not
to know what we believe. In the Protestant Church
it has in the same way come about that the rational
knowledge of religious truths is cherished and held in
honour in combination with theology or along with it.
The point of interest was to see how far the natural
light of reason, human reason by itself, could progress
in the knowledge of the truth, with the important reser-
vation that through religion Man can learn higher truths
than reason is in a position to discover of itself.
Here we come upon two distinct spheres, and, to begin
with, a peaceful relation between them is justified by
means of the distinction that the teachings of positive
religion are above but not against reason. This activity
of thinking knowledge found itself stimulated and sup-
ported from without through the example which lay be-
fore its eyes in the pre-Christian, or, speaking generally,
non-Christian religions. This showed that the human
spirit, even when left to itself, has attained to deep
insight into the nature of God, and with all its errors
has arrived at great truths, even at fundamental truths,
such as the existence of God and the purer idea, free from
sensuous ingredients, of that existence, the immortality
of the soul, providence, and such like. Thus positive
doctrine and the rational knowledge of religious truths
have been peacefully pursued alongside of one another.
This position of reason in relation to dogma was, how-
ever, different from that confidence of reason which was
first considered, which dared to approach the highest
mysteries of doctrine, such as the Trinity, and the
incarnation of Christ ; whereas, on the contrary, the
point of view referred to after the one just mentioned
I6o THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
timidly confined itself to the business of merely venturing
through the medium of thought to deal with what the
Christian religion possesses in common with heathen and
non-Christian religions in general, and what must there-
fore remain a part merely of what is abstract in religion.
But when once we have become conscious of the differ-
ence of these two spheres, we must pronounce the relation
of equality in which faith and reason are to be regarded
as standing each alongside of the other, to be unintelli-
gible, or else to be a misleading pretence. The tendency
of thought to seek unity leads of necessity to the com-
parison of these spheres first of all, and then when they
once pass for different, to the agreement of faith with
itself alone, and of thought with itself alone, so that each
sphere refuses to recognise the other and rejects it. It
is one of the commonest self-deceptions of the Under-
standing to regard the element of difference, which is
found in the one central point of Spirit, as though it
must not necessarily advance to opposition and so to
contradiction. The point at which the conflict on the
part of Spirit begins has been reached as soon as what
is concrete in Spirit has, by means of analysis, attained
to the consciousness of difference. All that partakes of
Spirit is concrete ; in this we have before us the Spiritual
in its most profound aspect, that of Spirit as the concrete
element of faith and thought. The two are not only
mixed up in the most manifold way, in immediate passing
over from one side to the other, but are so inwardly bound
up together that there is no faith which does not contain
within itself reflection, argumentation, or, in fact, thought,
and, on the other hand, no thinking which does not,
even if it be only for the moment, contain faith, — for
faith in general is the form of any presupposition, of any
assumption, come whence it may, which lies firmly at the
foundation — momentary faith. This means that even in
free thinking that which now exists as a presupposition, is
a comprehended result, thought out either before or after,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 161
but in this transformation of the presupposition into a
result, again has a side which is a presupposition, an
assumption or unconscious immediacy of the activity of
the Spirit.
Yet the explanation of the nature of free self-conscious
thought we must here leave on one side, and rather remark
that for the attainment of this essentially and actually
existent union of faith and thought a long time has been
necessary — more than fifteen hundred years — and that it
has cost the most severe toil to reach the point at which
thought has escaped from its absorption in faith, and
attained to the abstract consciousness of its freedom, and
thereby of its independence and its complete self-suffi-
ciency, in the light of which nothing can have validity for
thought which has not come before its judgment-seat, and
been then justified as admissible. Thought thus taking
its stand upon the extreme point of its freedom — and it is
only completely free in this extreme point — and rejecting
authority and faith in general, has driven faith in like
manner to take its stand in an abstract fashion upon
itself, and to attempt entirely to free itself from thought.
At all events, it has arrived at the point of declaring
itself to be freed from and not to require thought.
Wrapped up in unconsciousness of the at all events
small amount of thought which must remain to it, it goes
on to declare thought to be incapable of reaching truth
and destructive of it, so that thought is capable of compre-
hending one thing only, its incapacity to grasp the truth
and see into it, and of proving to itself its own nothing-
ness, with the result that suicide is its highest vocation.
So completely has the relation in the view of the time
been reversed, that faith has now become exalted as
immediate knowledge in opposition to thought, as the
only means of attaining to the truth, just as formerly,
on the other hand, only that could give peace to Man
of which he could become conscious as truth through
proof by thought.
VOL. III. L
i62 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
This standpoint of opposition cannot better show how
important and far-reaching it is than when it is con-
sidered in relation to the subject which we have set our-
selves to discuss, the knowledge of God. In the working
out into opposition of the difference between faith and
thought, it is immediately apparent that they have
reached formal extremes in which abstraction is made
from all content, so that in the first instance they are
no longer opposed as concretely defined religious faith
and thought about religious subjects, but abstractly, as
faith in general, and as thought in general, or knowledge,
in so far as this last does not yield merely forms of
thought, but gives us a content in and with its truth.
From this point of view the knowledge of God is made
dependent on the question as to the nature of knowledge
in general, and before we can pass to the investigation
of the concrete it seems necessary to ascertain whether
the consciousness of what is true can and must be think-
ing knowledge, or, faith. Our proposed consideration of
the knowledge of the existence of God thus changed into
this general consideration of knowledge, just as the new
philosophical epoch has made it the beginning and foun-
dation of all philosophical speculation that the nature of
knowledge itself is to be examined before the actual,
i.e., concrete knowledge of an object. "We thus incurred
the danger — a danger, however, necessary in the interests
of thoroughness — of having to trace the subject further
back than the time at our disposal for carrying out the
aim of these lectures would permit of our doing. If,
however, we look more closely at the demand which
appears to have met us, it becomes perfectly plain that
it is only the subject that has changed with it, not the
thing. In both cases, either if we admitted the demand
for that inquiry, or stuck directly to our theme, we
should have to know, and in that case we should have a
subject, too, in the shape of knowledge itself. And as in
doing so we should not have emerged from the activity
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 163
of knowledge, from real knowledge, there is nothing to
hinder our leaving the other subject which it is not our
aim to consider, alone, and thus stick to our own subject.
It will further appear, as we follow out our purpose, that
the knowledge of our subject will also in itself justify
itself as knowledge. That in true and real knowledge
the justification of knowledge will and must lie, might
admittedly be said in advance, for to say so is simply a
tautology, just as we may know in advance that the
desired way round, the desiring to know knowledge
before actual knowledge, is superfluous just because it
is inherently absurd. If under the process of knowledge
we figure to ourselves an external operation in which it
is brought into a merely mechanical relation with an
object, that is to say, remains outside it, and is only
externally applied to it, knowledge is presented in such
a relation as a particular thing for itself, so that it may
well be that its forms have nothing in common with
the qualities of the object ; and thus when it concerns
itself with an object, it remains only in its own forms,
and does not reach the essential qualities of the object,
that is to say, does not become real knowledge of it. In
such a relation knowledge is determined as finite, and as
of the finite ; in its object there remains something essen-
tially inner, whose notion is thus unattainable by and
foreign to knowledge, which finds here its limit and its
end, and is on that account limited and finite. But to
take such a relation as the only one, or as final or ab-
solute, is a purely made-up and unjustifiable assumption
of the Understanding. Eeal knowledge, inasmuch as it
does not remain outside the object, but in point of fact
occupies itself with it, must be immanent in the object,
the proper movement of its nature, only expressed in the
form of thought and taken up into consciousness.
We have now provisionally indicated those standpoints
of culture which in the case of such material as we have
before us ought in the present day to be taken into
1 64 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
account. It is pre-eminently, or, properly speaking, only
here that it is self-evident that the proposition already
laid down, according to which the consideration of know-
ledge is not different from the consideration of its object,
must hold good without limitation. I will therefore at
once indicate the general sense in which the proposed
theme, the proofs of the existence of God, is taken, and
which will be shown to be the true one. It is that they
ought to comprise the elevation of the human spirit to God,
and express it for thought, just as the elevation itself is an
elevation of thought and into the kingdom of thought.
And to begin with, as regards knowledge, Man is
essentially consciousness, and thus what is felt, the con-
tent, the determinateness which a feeling or sensation has,
is also in consciousness as something presented in the form
of an idea. That in virtue of which feeling is religious
feeling, is the divine content ; it is therefore essentially
something of which we have knowledge. But this con-
tent is in its essence no sensuous perception or sensuous
idea ; it does not exist for imagination, but only for
thought ; God is Spirit, only for Spirit, and only for pure
Spirit, that is, for thought. This is the root of such a
content, even though imagination and even sense-percep-
tion may afterwards accompany it, and this content itself
may enter into feeling. It is the elevation of the thinking
Spirit to that which is the highest thought, to God, that
we thus wish to consider.
This elevation is besides essentially rooted in the nature
of our mind. It is necessary to it, and it is this necessity
that we have before us in this elevation, and the setting
forth of this necessity itself is nothing else than what we
call proof. Therefore we have not to prove this elevation
from the outside ; it proves itself in itself, and this means
nothing else than that it is by its very nature necessary.
We have only to look to its own process, and we have
there, since it is necessary in itself, the necessity, insight
into the nature of which has to be vouched for by proof.
SECOND LECTURE
IF the undertaking which is commonly called proof of
the existence of God has been understood in the form
in which it was set forth in the first lecture, the chief
objection to it will have been got rid of. For the nature
of proof was held to consist in this, that it is only the con-
sciousness of the proper movement of the object in itself.
If this thought might be attended with difficulties in
its application to other objects, these difficulties would
necessarily disappear in the case of the object with
which we are concerned, for it is not a passive and
external object, but really a subjective movement, the
elevation of the Spirit to God, an activity, the following
of a certain course, a process, and thus has in it that
necessary procedure which constitutes proof, and which
has only to be taken up and studied in order that it
may be seen to involve proof. But the expression proof
carries with it too definitely the idea of a merely sub-
jective line of thought to be followed on our behoof, to
allow of the conception of it just stated being considered
sufficient in itself apart from any attempt to expressly
examine and get rid of this contrasted idea. In this
lecture, then, we must first come to an understanding
about the nature of proof in general, and with especial
definiteness as regards that aspect of it which we here
put aside and exclude. It is not our business to assert
that there is no proof of the kind indicated, but to assign
its limits, and to see that it is not, as is falsely thought,
the only form of proof. This is bound up with the con-
trast drawn between immediate and mediated knowledge,
in which in our time the chief interest centres in connec-
166 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
tion with religious knowledge, aud even the religious
frame of mind itself, which must accordingly be likewise
considered.
The distinction, which has already been touched upon
in connection with knowledge, implies that two kinds of
proof must be taken into account, of which the one is
clearly that which we use simply as an aid to knowledge,
as something subjective, whose activity and movement
have their place within ourselves, and are not the peculiar
movement of the thing considered. That this kind of
proof finds a place in the scientific knowledge of finite
things and their finite content, becomes apparent when
we examine the nature of the procedure more closely.
Let us take for this purpose an example from a science
in which this method of proof is admittedly applied in
its most complete form. If we prove a geometrical pro-
position every part of the proof must in part carry its
justification within itself, so also when we solve an equa-
tion in algebra. In part, however, the whole course of
procedure is defined and justified through the aim which
we have in connection with this, and because that end is
attained by such procedure. But we are very well aware
that that of which the quantitive value has been deve-
loped out of the equation, has not as an actual thing run
through these operations in order to reach the quantity
which it possesses, and that the magnitude of the geo-
metrical lines, angles, and so on, has not gone through
and been brought about by the series of propositions by
which we have arrived at it as representing a result. The
necessity which we see in such proof corresponds indeed
to the individual properties of the object itself, these
relations of quantity actually belong to it ; but the pro-
gress in connecting the one with the other is something
which goes on entirely within us ; it is a process for
realising the aim we have in view, namely, to see into
the meaning of the thing, not a course in which the
object arrives at its inherent relations and their connec-
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 167
tion. It does not thus create itself, and is not created, as
we create it and its relations in the process of attaining
insight into it.
Besides proof proper, of which the essential character-
istic— for this is all that is necessary for the purpose of
our investigation — has been brought out, we find further,
that in the region of finite knowledge the term proof is
also applied to what, when more closely examined, is only
the indicating of something, the pointing out of an idea, a
proposition, a law, and so on in experience. Historical
proof we do not require from the point of view from
which we here consider knowledge, to elaborate in detail ;
it depends for its material on experience, or rather per-
ception. Looked at in one light, it makes no difference
that it has reference to foreign perceptions and their
evidences ; argumentation, that is to say, the exercise of
understanding proper regarding the objective connection
of circumstances and actions, makes these data into pre-
suppositions and fundamental assumptions, just as its
criticism of evidences has done in drawing its conclusions.
But in so far as argument and criticism constitute the
other essential side of historical proof, such proof treats
its data as being the ideas of other people ; the subjective
element directly enters into the material, and the reason-
ing about and combination of that material is likewise
subjective activity ; so that the course and activity of
knowledge has quite different ingredients from the course
followed by the circumstances themselves. As regards
the pointing things out in everyday experience, this is
certainly concerned, in the first instance, with individual
perceptions, observations, and so on, that is to say, with
the kind of material which is only pointed out, but its
interest is by so doing to prove further that there are in
Nature and in Spirit such species and kinds, such laws,
forces, faculties, and activities as are mentioned in the
sciences. We pass by the metaphysical or common
psychological reflections about that subjective element of
1 68 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
sense, external and internal, which accompanies percep-
tion. But the material, however, in so far as it enters into
the sciences, is not so left to itself as it is in the senses
and in perception. On the contrary, the content of the
sciences — the species, kinds, laws, forces, and so on — is
built up out of that material, which is, perhaps, already
called by the name of phenomena, by putting together
through analysis what is common, the leaving aside of
what is not essential, the retention of what is called essen-
tial, without any certain test having been applied to dis-
tinguish between what is to be regarded as non-essential
and what as essential. It is admitted that what is per-
ceived does not itself make these abstractions, does not
compare its individuals (or individual positions, circum-
stances, and so on), or put what is common in them
together ; that therefore a great part of the activity of
knowledge is a subjective affair, just as in the content
which has been obtained a part of its definitions, as being
logical forms, are the product of this subjective activity.
The expression " predicate," or mark (MerJcmal), if people
will still use this stupid expression, directly indicates a
subjective purpose of isolating properties for our use in
marking distinctions, while others, which likewise exist
in the object, are put aside. This expression is to be
called stupid, because the definitions of species and kinds
directly pass for something essential and objective, and
not as existing merely for us who mark distinctions.
We may certainly also express ourselves by saying that
the species leaves aside, in one kind, properties which it
places in another, or that energy in one form of its
manifestation leaves aside circumstances which are pre-
sent in another, that these circumstances are thus shown
by it to be unessential, and it of itself gives up the form
of its manifestation, and withdraws itself into inactivity
or self- con tain edness ; that thus, for example, the law of
the motion of the heavenly bodies penetrates to every
single place and every moment in which the heavenly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 169
body occupies that place, and just by this continual ab-
straction shows itself to be a law. If we thus look on
abstraction as objective activity, which it so far is, it is
yet very different from subjective activity and its pro-
ducts. The former leaves the heavenly body to fall back
again after abstraction from this particular place and this
particular moment into the particular changing place and
moment of time, just as the species may appear in the
kind in other contingent or unessential forms and in the
external particularity of individuals. On the other hand,
subjective abstraction raises the law like the species into
its universality as such, and makes it exist and preserves
it in this form, in the mind.
In these forms of the knowledge which progresses
from mere indication to proof, from immediate objectivity
to special products, the necessity may be felt of consider-
ing explicitly the method, the nature, and fashion of the
subjective activity, in order to test its claims and pro-
cedure ; for this method has its own characteristics and
kind of progress which are quite different from the charac-
teristics and process of the object in itself. And without
entering more particularly into the nature of this method
of knowledge, it becomes immediately apparent, from a
single characteristic which 'we observe in it, that inas-
much as it is represented as being concerned with the
object in accordance with subjective forms, it is only
capable of apprehending relations of the object. It is
therefore idle to start the question whether these relations
are objective and real or only subjective and ideal, not to
mention the fact that such expressions as subjectivity and
objectivity, reality and ideality, are simply vague abstrac-
tions. The content, be it objective or merely subjective,
real or ideal, remains always the same, an aggregate of
relations, not something that is in- and- for- itself, the
notion of the thing, or the infinite, with which know-
ledge must have to do. If that content of knowledge
is taken by perverted sense as containing relations only,
170 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and these are understood to be phenomena or relations
to a faculty of subjective knowledge, it must, so far as
results are concerned, always be recognised as representing
the great intellectual advance which modern philosophy
has achieved, that the mode of thinking, proving, and
knowing the infinite, which has been described, is proved
incapable of reaching what is eternal and divine.
What has been brought out in the preceding exposition
regarding knowledge in general, and especially what re-
lates to thinking knowledge (which is what alone concerns
us), and to proof, the principal moment in that knowledge,
we have looked at from the point of view from which it
is seen to be a movement of the activity of thought which
is outside the object and different from the development
of the object itself. This definition may in part be taken
to be sufficient for our purpose, but partly, too, it is to be
taken as what is essential in opposition to the one-sided-
ness which lies in the reflections about the subjectivity
of knowledge.
In the opposition of the process of knowledge to the
object to be known lies the finiteness of knowledge.
But this opposition is not on that account to be regarded
as itself infinite and absolute, and its products are not
to be taken to be appearances only because of the mere
abstraction of subjectivity ; but in so far as they them-
selves are determined by that opposition, the content
as such is affected by the externality referred to. This
point of view has an effect upon the nature of the content,
and yields a definite insight into it ; while, on the con-
trary, the other way of looking at the question gives
us nothing but the abstract category of the subjective,
which is, moreover, taken to be absolute. What we thus
get as the result of the way in which we look at the
proof, for the otherwise quite general quality of the con-
tent, is, speaking generally, just this, that the content,
inasmuch as it bears an external relation to knowledge,
is itself determined as something external, or, to put it
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 171
more definitely, consists of abstractions from finite pro-
perties. Mathematical content as such is essentially
magnitude. Geometrical figures pertain to space, and
have thus in themselves externality as their principle,
since they are distinguished from real objects, and re-
present only the one-sided spatiality of these objects,
as distinguished from their concrete filling up, through
which they first became real. So number has the unit
for its principle, and is the putting together of a multi-
plicity of units which are independent, and is thus a
completely external combination. The knowledge which
we have here before us can only attain its greatest
perfection in this field, because that field contains only
simple and definite qualities, and the dependence of these
upon each other, the insight into the nature of which is
proof, is thus stable, and ensures for proof the logical
progress of necessity. This kind of knowledge is capable
of exhausting the nature of its objects. The logical
nature of the process of proof is not, however, confined
to mathematical content, but enters into all departments
of natural and spiritual material ; but we may sum up
what is logical in knowledge in connection with proof
by saying that it depends on the rules of inference ;
the proofs of the existence of God are therefore essen-
tially inferences. The express investigation of these
forms belongs, however, partly to logic, and for the rest
the nature of the fundamental defect must be ascertained
in the course of the examination of these proofs which is
about to be taken in hand. For the present it is enough
to remark further, in connection with what has been said,
that the rules of inference have a kind of foundation
which is of the nature of mathematical calculation.
The connection of propositions which are requisite to
constitute a syllogistic conclusion depends on the rela-
tions of the sphere which each of them occupies as
regards the other, and which is quite properly regarded
as greater or smaller. The definite extent of such
172 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
a sphere is what determines the correctness of the
subsuraption. The older logicians, such as Lambert and
Ploucquet, have been at the pains of inventing a nota-
tion by means of which the relation in inference may
be reduced to that of identity, that is, to the abstract
mathematical relation of equality, so that inference is
shown to be the mechanism of a kind of calculation.
As regards, however, the further nature of knowledge
in such an external connection of objects, which in their
very nature are external in themselves, we shall have to
speak of it presently under the name of mediate know-
ledge, and to consider the opposition in its more definite
form.
As regards these forms which are called species, laws,
forces, and so on, knowledge does not stand to them
in an external relation ; they are rather its products.
But the knowledge which produces them, as has been
shown, produces them only by abstraction from what is
objective ; they have their root in this, but are essentially
separated from what is actual ; they are more concrete than
mathematical figures, but their content differs essentially
from that from which the start was made, and which must
constitute their only foundation of proof.
The defective element in this mode of knowledge
has thus attention drawn to it in a different form from
that shown in the way of looking at it, which declares the
products of knowledge to be mere phenomena, because
knowledge itself is only a subjective activity. But the
general result, however, is the same, and we have now to
see what has been set over against this result. What is
determined as insufficient for the aim of the Spirit, which
is the absorption into its very nature of what is infinite,
eternal, divine, is the activity of the Spirit which in
thinking proceeds by means of abstraction, inference,
and proof. This view, itself the product of the mode of
thought characteristic of the period, has jumped straight
over to the other extreme in giving out a proofless,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 173
immediate knowledge, an unreasoning faith, a feeling
devoid of thought, as the only way of grasping and
having within oneself divine truth. It is asserted that
that kind of knowledge which is insufficient for the higher
kind of truth is the exclusive and sole kind of knowledge.
The two assumptions are most closely connected. On
the one side, we have, in the investigation of what we
have undertaken to consider, to free that knowledge from
its one-sidedness, and in doing so at the same time to
show hy facts that there exists another kind of know-
ledge than that which is given out as the only kind.
On the other side, the pretension which faith as such
sets up against knowledge is a prejudice which occupies
too firm and sure a position not to make a stricter inves-
tigation necessary. In view of this pretension it must
be borne in mind that the true, unsophisticated faith,
the more it in case of dire necessity might reasonably
make pretensions, the less it does make them, and that the
case of necessity exists only for the merely rationalising,
dry, and polemical assertion of faith.
But I have elsewhere already explained how the matter
stands as regards that faith or immediate knowledge. It
is not possible that in the forefront of any attempt to
deal at the present time with the proofs of the existence
of God, the position taken up by faith can be set aside
as done with; the chief points from which it is to be
criticised, and the place to be assigned to it, must at least
be called to mind.
THIRD LECTURE
IT has already been remarked that the assertion of faith,
of which we have to speak, is found outside of genuine
simple faith. This latter, in so far as it has advanced
to conscious knowledge, and has consequently acquired
a consciousness of knowledge, accedes to knowledge with
full confidence in it, because it is pre-eminently full of con-
fidence in itself, is sure of itself, and firmly established in
itself. We are rather concerned with faith in so far as it
takes up a polemical attitude towards rational knowledge,
and expresses itself in a polemical fashion even against
knowledge in general. It is thus not a faith which opposes
itself to another kind of faith. Faith (or belief) is what
is common to both ; it is therefore the content which
fights against the content. But this fact of having to
do with content at once brings knowledge with it. If it
were otherwise, the overthrow and defence of the truth of
religion would not be carried out with external weapons,
which are just as foreign to faith and religion as to
knowledge. The faith which rejects knowledge as such,
is just because of this devoid of content, and is, to begin
with, to be taken abstractly as faith in general, as it
opposes itself to concrete knowledge, to rational know-
ledge, without reference to content. As thus abstract,
it is removed back into the simplicity of self-conscious-
ness. This is in its simplicity, in so far as it has any
fulness at all, feeling, and what is content in knowledge
is definiteness of feeling. The assertion of abstract faith
thus leads immediately to the form of feeling, in which
the subjectivity of knowledge intrenches itself as in an
inaccessible place. The standpoints of both must there-
fore be briefly indicated, from which their one-sidedness,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 175
and consequently the untruth of the fashion in which they
are asserted to he ultimate and fundamental determina-
tions, becomes apparent. Faith, to begin with it, starts
from this, that the nullity of knowledge, so far as ab-
solute truth is concerned, has been demonstrated. We
wish so to proceed as to leave faith in possession of this
assumption, and to see accordingly what it is in itself.
To begin with, if the opposition is conceived of as being
of such an absolutely general kind as that between faith
and knowledge, as we often hear it put, this abstraction
must be directly found fault with. For faith belongs to
consciousness ; we know about what we believe ; nay, we
know about it with certainty. It is thus at once apparent
that it is absurd to wish to separate faith and knowledge
in such a general fashion.
But faith is now called immediate knowledge, and is
accordingly to be distinguished radically from mediate
and mediating knowledge. Since at this stage we leave
on one side the speculative examination of these concep-
tions, in order to keep within the proper sphere of this
kind of assertion, we will oppose to this separation, which
is asserted to be absolute, the fact that there is no act
of knowledge, any more than there is any act of sensa-
tion, conception, or vol.ition, no activity, property, or con-
dition pertaining to Spirit, which is not mediated and
mediating ; just as there is no other object in Nature or
Spirit, be it what it may, in heaven or the earth, or under
the earth, which does not include within itself the quality
of mediation as well as that of immediacy. It is thus
as a universal fact that logical philosophy presents it —
we might add, along with the exhibition of its necessity,
to which we need not here appeal — in the completed
circle of the forms of thought. As regards the matter of
sense, whether it belongs to outer or inner perception, it
is admitted that it is finite, that is, that it exists only as
mediated through what is other than sense. But of
this matter itself, and still more of the higher content of
176 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
Spirit, it will be admitted that it derives its essential
character from categories, and that the nature of this
character is shown in logic to be the possession of the
moment of mediation above indicated inseparably in itself.
But we pause here to call attention to the absolutely
universal fact, in whatever sense and with whatever
meaning the facts may be understood. Without digress-
ing into examples, we abide by the one object which here
lies nearest to us.
God is activity, free activity relating itself to itself,
and remaining with itself. The essential element in the
notion or conception of God, or, for that matter, in every
idea of God, is that He is Himself, the mediation of Him-
self with Himself. If God is defined merely as the
Creator, His activity is taken only as going out of itself,
as expanding itself out of itself, as sensible or material
producing, without any return into itself. The product is
something different from Him, it is the world ; the intro-
duction of the category of mediation would at once bring
with it the idea that God must be through the medium of
the world ; one might, at all events, say with truth that
He is Creator only by means of the world, or what He
creates. Only this would be mere empty tautology ; for
the category, " that which is created," is itself directly
involved in the first category, that of the Creator. On
the other hand, what is created remains, so far as the
ordinary idea of it is concerned, as a world outside God, as
an Other over against Him, so that He exists away beyond
that world, apart from it, in-and-for-Himself. But in
Christianity least of all is it true that we have to know God
only as creation, activity, not as Spirit. The fact rather
is that to this religion, the explicit consciousness that
God is Spirit is peculiar, the consciousness that He, even
as He is in-and-for-Himself, relates Himself, as it were,
to the Other of Himself (called the Son), to Himself, that
He is related to Himself in Himself as love, essentially
as this love is mediation with itself. God is indeed the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 177
Creator of the world, and is so sufficiently defined. But
God is more than this ; He is the true God in that He is
the mediation of Himself with Himself, and is this love.
Faith, then, inasmuch as it has God as the object of
its consciousness, has this mediation for its object ; just
as faith, as existing in the individual, only exists through
teaching and training, the teaching and training of men,
but still more through the teaching and training of the
Spirit of God, and exists only through this process of
mediation. But faith, like consciousness in general, this
relation of the subject to an object, is quite abstract,
whether God is its object, or whatever thing or content
may be the object, and so faith or knowledge only exists
through the medium of an object. Otherwise we have
empty identity, a faith in or knowledge of nothing.
But conversely there is to be found here the other fact
that, in like manner, there can be nothing which is only
and exclusively the product of mediation. If we examine
into what we understand by immediacy, it will be seen
that it must exist in itself without any difference, such
as that through which mediation is at once posited. It
is simple reference to self, and is thus in its immediate
form merely Being. Now all knowledge, mediate and
immediate, and indeed everything else, at all events is;
and that it is, is itself the least and most abstract thing that
one can say of anything. If it is even only subjective,
as faith or knowledge is, at all events it is, the predi-
cate of Being belongs to it, just as such Being appertains
to the object which exists only in faith or knowledge.
The insight involved in this view is of a very simple kind.
Yet we may be impatient with philosophy just because
of this simplicity, in so far as we pass from the fulness
and warmth which belong to faith, over to such abstrac-
tions as Being and immediacy. But, in point of fact, this
is not the fault of philosophy ; on the contrary, it is that
assertion of faith and immediate knowledge which takes
its stand on these abstractions. In this fact, that faith is
VOL. in. M
i;8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
not mediate knowledge, there lies the entire value of the
matter, and the verdict passed upon it. But we come
also to the content, or rather, we may likewise come only
to the relation of a content, to knowledge.
It is further to be remarked that immediacy in know-
ledge, which is faith, has this further quality, that faith
knows that in which it believes, not merely generally,
not merely in the sense of having an idea or knowledge
from without of it, but knows it with certainty. It is
in certainty that the nerve of faith lies. And here we
encounter a further distinction, we further distinguish
truth from certainty. We know very well that much has
been known, and is known for certain, which is never-
theless not true. Men have long enough known it to be
certain, and millions still know it to be certain, to take
a trivial example, that the sun goes round the earth.
And what is more, the Egyptians believed, and knew it
for certain, that Apis was a great or the greatest god ;
while the Greeks thought the same regarding Jupiter ; just
as the Hindus still know for certain that the cow, and other
inhabitants of India, the Mongols and many races, that
a man, the Dalai-Lama, is God. That this certainty is
expressed and asserted is admitted. A man may quite
well say, I know something for certain, I believe it, it is
true. But, at the same time, every one else must be
allowed the right to say the same thing, for every one is
" I," every one knows, every one knows for certain. But
this unavoidable admission expresses the truth that this
knowledge, knowledge for certain, this abstraction, may
have a content of the most diverse and opposite kind,
and the proof of the content must lie just in this assur-
ance of being certain, of faith. But what man will come
forward and say, Only that which I know and know as
certain is true ; what I know as certain is true just
because I know it as certain. Truth stands eternally
over against mere certainty, and neither certainty, nor
immediate knowledge, nor faith decides what is truth.
Christ directed the minds of the Apostles and His friends
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 179
away from the genuinely immediate visible certainty
which they derived from His immediate presence, from
His own sayings and spoken words heard with their ears
and apprehended through their senses and feelings, away
from such a faith and such a source of faith to the
truth, into which they were to be led only in the further
future and through the Spirit. For the attainment of
anything more in addition to this highest certainty, derived
from the source above indicated, there exists nothing ex-
cept just what is in the content itself.
Faith, in so far as it is defined to be immediate know-
ledge, as distinguished from what is mediate, reduces
itself to the abstract formalism above mentioned. This
abstraction makes it possible not only to rank as faith
the sensuous certainty which I have that I possess a body,
and that there are things outside me, but to deduce or
prove from it what the nature of faith is. But we should
do gross injustice to what in the sphere of religion is
termed faith if we were to see in it only this abstraction.
Faith must rather be full of substance ; it must be a
content, and this is to be a true content ; it must be far
removed from such a content as the sensuous certainty
that I have a body, that things perceived by the senses
surround me. It must contain the truth, and quite a
different truth from that last mentioned, the truth of
finite things of sense, and derived from quite a different
source. The tendency above indicated to formal subjec-
tivity must find faith as such even too objective, for this
latter has always to do with ideas of things, with a know-
ledge of them, with a state of conviction regarding some
content. This extreme form of the subjective, in which
the definite form of the content and the conception and
knowledge of it have vanished, is that of feeling. We
cannot, therefore, avoid speaking of it too ; it is this
form, moreover, which is asked for in our times, not
feeling of the simple or naive kind, but as a result of
culture, derived from grounds or reasons which are the
same as those already referred to.
FOURTH LECTURE
As has been shown in the preceding lecture, the form of
feeling is closely related to mere faith as such. It is
the yet more intensive forcing back of self-consciousness
into itself, the development of the content to mere definite-
ness of feeling.
Religion must be felt, must exist in feeling, otherwise
it is not religion; faith cannot exist without feeling,
otherwise it is not religion. This must be admitted to
be true, for feeling is nothing but my subjectivity in its
simplicity and immediacy — myself as this particular
existent personality. If I have religion ouly as idea,
faith takes the form of certainty about these ideas; its
content is before me, it is still an object over against
me; it is not yet identical with me as simple self; I
am not so penetrated through and through with it that
it constitutes my qualitative, determinate character. The
very inmost unity of the content of faith with me is
requisite in order that I may have quality or substance,
its substance. It thus becomes my feeling. As against
religion Man must hold nothing in reserve for himself,
for it is the innermost region of truth. Religion must
therefore possess not only this as yet abstract " I," which
even as faith is yet knowledge, but the concrete " I " in
its simple personality, comprehending the whole of it in
itself. Feeling is this inwardness which is not separated
in itself.
Feeling is, however, understood to have the property of
being something purely individual, lasting for a single
moment, just as one individual thing in the process of
alternation with another exists either after that other or
180
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 181
alongside of it. But the heart signifies the all-embracing
unity of the feelings, both in their quantity and also as
regards their duration in time. The heart is the ground
or basis which contains in itself and preserves the es-
sential nature of feelings, independent of the fleeting
nature of their succession in consciousness. In this
their unbroken unity — 'for the heart expresses the
simple pulse of the living spirit — religion is able to
penetrate the different kinds of feeling, and to become
for them the substance which holds, masters, and rules
them.
But this brings us at once to the reflection that feeling
and heart as such are only the one side, definite forms
of feeling and heart being the other. And, accordingly,
we must at once go further and say, that just as little is
religion true, because it exists in our feelings or hearts,
as because it is believed and known immediately and for
certain. All religions, even the most false and unworthy,
exist in our feelings and hearts just as much as those
that are true. There are feelings which are immoral,
unjust, and godless, just as much as there are feelings
which are moral, just, and pious. Out of the heart pro-
ceed evil thoughts, murder, adultery, backbiting, and so
forth ; that is to say, the fact that thoughts are not bad,
but good, does not depend on their being in the heart
and proceeding out of it. We have to do with the
definite form which is assumed by the feeling which is
in the heart. This is a truism so trivial that one hesi-
tates to give it expression, but it is part of philosophical
culture to carry the analysis of ideas even to the length
of questioning and denying what is most simple and
most commonly received. To that shallow type of
thought or Enlightenment which is vain of its boldness,
it appears unmeaning and unseemly to recall trivial
truths, such, for instance, as that which may be here
once more brought to mind, the truth that Man is dis-
tinguished from the brute by the faculty of thought, but
1 82 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
shares that of feeling with it. If feeling is religious
feeling, religion is its definite quality. If it is wicked,
bad feeling, what is bad and wicked is its definite quality.
It is this determinate quality which forms the content
for consciousness, what in the words already used is
called thought. Feeling is bad on account of its bad
content ; the heart, because of its sinful thoughts. Feel-
ing is the common form for the most different kinds of
content. It can on that account just as little serve as
a justification for any of its determinate qualities, for
its content, as can immediate certainty.
Feeling makes itself known as a subjective form, as
being something in me, while I am the subject of some-
thing. This form is that which is simple, which remains
equal to itself, and therefore potentially indeterminate in
every difference of content — the abstraction of my exist-
ence as a single individual. The determinateness or
special character of the feeling is, on the contrary, to
begin with, difference in general, the being unlike some
other, being manifold. It must therefore be explicitly
distinguished from the general form whose particular and
definite quality it is, and be regarded on its own account.
It has the form of the content which must be regarded
" on its own merits," and judged on its own account ; on
this value depends the value of the feeling. This con-
tent must be true, to begin with, and independently of
the feeling, just as religion is true on its own account —
it is what is in itself necessary and universal — the Thing
or true fact which develops itself to a kingdom of truths
and of laws, as well as to a kingdom of their knowledge
and their final ground, God.
I shall indicate only in outline the consequences which
ensue if immediate knowledge and feeling as such are
elevated into a principle. It is their very concentration
which carries with it for the content, simplification, ab-
straction, and iudefiniteness. Thus they both reduce the
divine content, be it religious as such, or legal and moral,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 183
to a minimum, to what is most abstract. With this the
determination of the content becomes arbitrary, for in
that minimum there exists nothing determinate. This
is a weighty consequence, from a theoretical as well as
a practical point of view. Chiefly from a practical, for
since, for the justification of disposition and action, reasons
are necessary, the faculty of argument must still be very
untrained, and very little skilled in its work, if it does not
know how to assign good reasons for what is arbitrary.
Another feature in the situation, which the withdrawal
into immediate knowledge and into feeling brings into
view, concerns the relation of men to other men, and
their spiritual fellowship. The objective, the true fact
or Thing, is what is in-and-for-itself universal, and is
so, therefore, for all. As what is most universal, it is
implicitly thought in general ; and thought is the com-
mon basis. The man who betakes himself to feeling,
to immediate knowledge, to his own ideas or his own
thoughts, shuts himself up, as I have already said, in his
own particularity, and breaks off any fellowship or com-
munity with others — the only way is to leave him alone.
But this kind of feeling and heart lets us see more closely
into the nature of feeling and heart. Restricting itself
in accordance with its first principle to its own feeling,
the consciousness of a content degrades it to the deter-
minate form belonging to itself ; it maintains itself
rigidly as self-consciousness, in which this determinate-
ness inheres ; the self is for consciousness the object
which it sets before itself, the substance which has the
content only as an attribute, as a predicate in it, so that
it is not the independent element in which the subject
is sublated, or loses itself. The subject is itself in this
way a fixed condition, which has been called the life of
feeling. In the so-called Irony, which is connected with
it, the " myself " is abstract only in relation to itself ; in
the distinction of itself from its content it stands as
pure consciousness of itself, and as separated from it.
1 84 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
In the life of feeling this subject exists rather in the
above-mentioned identity with the content, it is definite
consciousness in it, and remains as this individual " I,"
object and end to itself. As the religious individual " I,"
it is end to itself ; this individual "I" is object and end in
general ; in the expression, for instance, that I am blessed,
and in so far as this blessedness is brought about through
belief in the truth, the " I " is filled with truth and
penetrated by it. Filled in this way with yearning, it is
unsatisfied in itself ; but this yearning is the yearning of
religion ; it is, accordingly, satisfied in having this yearn-
ing in itself ; in it it has the subjective consciousness of
itself, and of itself as the religious self. Carried beyond
itself only in this yearning, it is just in it that it preserves
itself and the consciousness of being satisfied, and in close
connection with this the consciousness of its contentment
with itself. But this inwardness involves at the same
time the opposite condition which consists in that most
unhappy sense of division experienced by the pure hearted.
While I regard myself strictly as this particular and
abstract " I," and compare my particular impulses, in-
clinations, and thoughts, with what ought to fill my
nature, I am able to feel that this contrast is a painful
contradiction within myself, which becomes permanent,
owing to the fact that " I," as this particular subjective
" me," have it as my aim and object to concern myself
about myself as my individual self. It is just this fixed
reflection which prevents me from being filled by the sub-
stantial content, by the Thing or true fact, for in the true
fact I forget myself; in the very act of becoming absorbed
in it that reflection upon myself disappears of itself. I
am characterised as subjective only in that opposition
to the Thing which remains with me through reflection
on myself. In thus keeping myself outside of the Thing
or true fact, and since this Thing constitutes my end, the
real interest is transferred from the attentive observation
of the Thing back to myself. I thus go on unceasingly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 185
emptying myself, and continue in this condition of empti-
ness. The hollowness which thus attaches to the highest
end pursued by the individual, namely, pious effort and
anxiety about the weli'are of his own soul, has led to the
most inhuman manifestations of a feeble and spiritless
reality, ranging from the quiet anxiety of a loving dis-
position to the suffering caused to the soul by despair
and madness. This was still more the case in former
times than in these later days when the sense of satis-
faction in the yearning has gained the upper hand of the
sense of division, and has produced in the soul a feeling of
contentment and even a sense of irony itself. Unreality in
the heart, such as that referred to, is not only emptiness,
but is also iiarrow-heartedness. It is its own formal,
subjective life with which it is filled ; it always has this
particular "I" as its object and end. It is only the
truly Universal, the Universal in-and-for-itself, which is
broad, and the heart inwardly extends only by entering
into this, and expanding within this substantial element,
which is at once the religious, the moral, and the legal
element. Speaking generally, love is the abandonment
on the part of the heart of limitation to a particular point
of its own, and its reception of the love of God is the
reception of that development or unfolding of His Spirit
which comprehends in itself all true content, and swal-
lows up in this objectivity whatever is merely peculiar to
the heart. In this substantial element the subjectivity,
which is for the heart itself a one-sided form, is given up,
and this at the same time supplies the impulse to throw
off the subjectivity. This is the impulse to action in
general, or, more strictly speaking, it is the impulse to
take part in the action of the content which is divine
in-and-for-itself, and is therefore the content which has
absolute power and authority. It is this, accordingly,
which constitutes the reality or real existence of the heart,
and it is indivisibly both that inner reality and also outer
reality.
186 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
When we have thus distinguished between what, be-
cause it is buried in and absorbed into the Thing or true
object, is the unsophisticated heart, and the heart which
in reflection is consciously occupied with itself, we find
that the distinction constitutes the relation in which the
heart stands to the substantial element. So long as the
heart remains within itself, and consequently remains
outside of this element, it is by its own act in an ex-
ternal and contingent relation to this element. This
connection, which leads the heart to declare what is just,
and to lay down the law in accordance with its own feel-
ing, has been already mentioned. To the objectivity of
action, that is, to action which originates in the truly
substantial element, subjectivity opposes feeling, and to
this substantial element and to the thinking knowledge
of it it opposes immediate knowledge. Here, however,
we do not stay to consider the nature of action, but
simply remark that it is just this substantial element,
represented by the laws of justice and morality and the
commandments of God, which is by its very nature the
true Universal, and has consequently its root and basis
in the region of thought. If sometimes the laws of jus-
tice and morality are regarded merely as arbitrary com-
mands of God — which would mean, in fact, that they
were irrational — still it would take us too far to make
that our starting-point. But the putting on a permanent
basis and the investigation of the conviction, on the part
of the conscious subject, of the truth of the principles
which ought to constitute for him the basis of his action,
is thinking knowledge. While the unsophisticated heart
yields itself up to these principles, its insight is as yet so
undeveloped, and any pretension on its part to indepen-
dence is so foreign to it, that it reaches them rather by
the road of authority, and thus this part of the heart in
which they are implanted is alone the place of conscious
thought, for they are themselves the thoughts of action,
and are inherently universal principles. This heart
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 187
cannot, therefore, offer any opposition to the development
of what is its own objective basis, any more than it can
to that of those truths which belong to it, and which at
first appear in themselves rather as theoretical truths
pertaining to its religious faith. As, however, this pos-
session, and the intensity which characterises it, are al-
ready in the heart only through the mediation of education,
which has asserted its influence upon its thought and
knowledge just as it has upon its volition, so, in a still
greater degree, the further developed content, and the
alteration in the circle of its ideas which are implicitly
native to the place where they are found, also represent
mediating knowledge mediated into the conscious form of
thought.
FIFTH LECTURE
WE may sum up what has gone before as follows. The
heart ought not to have any dread of knowledge ; the
determinateness of feeling, the content of the heart, ought
to have a substantial form. Feeling or the heart must
be filled by the Thing or true object by what actually
exists, and consequently be broad and true in character.
But this Thing, this substantial element, is simply the
truth of the Divine Spirit, the Universal in-and-for-itself,
though just because of this it is not the abstract Universal,
but the Universal in the development which belongs
essentially to itself. The substantial element is thus
essentially implicit thought, and exists in thought. But
thought, what constitutes the really inner nature of faith
itself, if it is to be known as essential and true — in so
far as faith is no longer something implicit and merely
natural, but is regarded as having entered into the sphere
of knowledge with all its requirements and claims — must
at the same time be known as something necessary, and
must have gained a consciousness of itself and of the
connected nature of its development. It thus extends
and proves itself at the same time ; for, speaking gener-
ally, to prove simply means to become conscious of the
connection, and consequently of the necessity of things,
and in relation to our present design it means the recog-
nition of the particular content in the Universal in-and-for-
itself, and of how this absolute truth itself is the result,
and is consequently the final truth of all particular content.
This connection, which is thus present to consciousness,
must not be a subjective movement of thought outside
of reality, but must follow this latter, and must simply
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 189
unfold its meaning and necessity. Knowledge is just this
unfolding of the objective movement of the content, of
the inner necessity which essentially belongs to it, and
it is true knowledge since it is in unity with the object.
For us this object must be the elevation of our spirit to
God, and is thus what we have referred to as the neces-
sity of absolute truth in the form of that final result into
which everything returns in the Spirit.
But because it contains the name of God, the mention
of this end may easily have the effect of rendering worth-
less all that was urged against the false ideas of know-
ledge, cognition, and feeling, and all that was gained in
the way of a conception of true knowledge.
It has already been remarked that the question as to
whether our reason can know God, was made a formal
one ; that is to say, it was referred to the criticism of
knowledge, of rational knowledge in general, and con-
nected with the nature of faith and feeling in such a
way that what is included under these special heads is
to be understood apart altogether from any content.
This is the position taken up by immediate knowledge,
which itself speaks with the fruit of the tree of know-
ledge in its mouth, and transfers the problem to the
formal sphere since it bases the justification of such
knowledge, and of this exclusively, on the reflections
which it makes regarding proof and philosophical know-
ledge, and as a consequence it has to put the true and
infinite content outside of the range of its reflections,
because it does not get beyond the idea of finite know-
ledge and cognition. With this presupposition of a
knowledge and cognition which are merely finite, we
contrasted the knowledge which does not remain outside
of the Thing or true reality, but which, without intro-
ducing any of its own qualities, simply follows the course
of true reality, and we have directed attention, to the
substantial element in feeling and the heart, and have
shown that, speaking generally, it exists essentially for
igo THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
consciousness and for conscious thought, in so far as its
truth has to be worked out in what constitutes its most
inner nature. But owing to the mention of the name
of God, this object defined as knowledge in general, as
well as the study of it, have been forced into an inferior
position, and connected with that subjective way of
looking at things for which God is something above.
Since, in what has gone before, this aspect of the matter
has received sufficient elucidation, and can be here indi-
cated merely, rather than examined in detail, the only
other thing to do would be to explain the relation of God
in and to knowledge as deduced from the nature of God.
In connection with this it may be remarked, first of all,
that our subject, namely, the elevation of the subjective
spirit to God, directly implies that in this very act of
elevation the one-sidedness of knowledge, that is, its
subjectivity, is abolished, and that it is itself essentially
this process of abolition and absorption. Consequently,
the knowledge of the other side of the subject, namely,
the nature of God, and, together with this, His relation
in and to knowledge, comes in here of itself. But there
is one drawback connected with what is of an intro-
ductory and incidental character, and is yet necessary
here, and it is this, that any thorough treatment of the
subject renders it superfluous. Still we may so far
anticipate as to say that there can be no thought here
of carrying our treatment of the subject to the point
reached by the explanation so intimately connected with
it, of the self-consciousness of God, and of the relation
of His knowledge of Himself to the knowledge of Him-
self in and through the human spirit. Without referring
you here to the more abstract and systematic discussions
on this subject to be found in my other works, I may call
attention to a very remarkable book which has recently
appeared, entitled, " Aphorisms on Agnosticism and Abso-
lute Knowledge in Relation to the Science of Christian
Faith," by C. Fr. G 1 (Berlin: C. Franklin). It
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 191
makes reference to my statement of philosophical prin-
ciples, and contains quite as much thoroughly grounded
Christian belief as it does speculative and philosophical
depth. It throws light on all the points of view from
which the Understanding directs its attack on the Chris-
tianity of knowledge, and answers the objections and
counter - arguments which the theory of agnosticism
(Nichtwissen) has brought against philosophy. It shows
in particular the misunderstanding and the want of
understanding of which the pious consciousness is guilty
when it ranges itself on the side of the explaining
Understanding in connection with the principle of
agnosticism, and thus makes common cause with it in
its opposition to speculative philosophy. What is there
advanced regarding the self-consciousness of God, His
knowledge of Himself in men, and Man's knowledge of
himself in God, has direct reference to the point of view
just indicated, and it is marked by speculative thorough-
ness while casting light on the false opinions which have
been attributed alike to philosophy and to Christianity in
connection with these subjects.
But even in connection with the purely general ideas
to which we here confine ourselves, in order that, taking
God as the starting-point, we may discuss the relation in
which He stands to the human spirit, we are met more
than anywhere else by an assumption which is in con-
tradiction with any such design — namely, that we do not
know God ; that even in the act of believing in Him we
do not know what He is, and therefore cannot start from
Him. To take God as the starting-point would be to
presuppose that we were able to state, and had stated,
what God is in Himself as being the primary object.
That assumption, however, permits us to speak merely of
our relation to Him, to speak of religion and not of God
Himself. It does not permit of the establishment of a
theology, of a doctrine of God, though it certainly does
allow of a doctrine of religion.
192 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
If there is not exactly any such doctrine, we at least
hear much talk — an infinite amount of it, or rather, little
talk with infinite repetitions — about religion, and therefore
all the less about God Himself. This everlasting explana-
tion of religion, of its necessity, its usefulness, and so on,
together with the insignificant attempts to explain God,
or the prohibition even of any attempt at explaining His
nature, is a peculiar phenomenon of the culture of our
time. We get off most easily when we rest contented
with this standpoint, so that we have nothing before us
but the barren characterisation of a relation in which
our consciousness stands to God. As thus understood,
religion means at least that our spirit comes into contact
with this content, and our consciousness with this object,
and is not merely, so to speak, a drawing out of the lines
of longing into empty space, an act of perception which
perceives nothing and finds nothing actually confronting
it. Such a relation implies, at all events, this much, that
we not only stand in a certain connection with God, but
that God stands also in a certain connection with us.
This zeal for religion expresses, hypothetically at least,
something regarding our relation to God, if it does not
express exclusively what would be the really logical
outcome of the principle of the impossibility of knowing
God. A one-sided relation, however, is not a relation at
all. If, in fact, we are to understand by religion nothing
more than a relation between ourselves and God, then
God is left without any independent existence. God
would, on this theory, exist in religion only, He would
be something posited, something produced by us. The
expression that God exists in religion only, an expression
which is both frequently employed and found fault with,
has, however, the true and important meaning that it
belongs to the nature of God in His condition of complete
and perfect independence that He should exist for the
spirit of Man, and should communicate Himself to Man.
The meaning here expressed is totally different from that
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 193
previously referred to, according to which God is merely
a postulate, a belief. God is, and gives Himself to men
by coming into a relation with them. If this word is is
limited to the expression of the truth that we do indeed
know or recognise the fact that God is, but do not know
what He is, and is thus used with a constantly recurring
reflection on knowledge, then this would imply that no
substantial qualities can be attributed to Him. Thus we
should not have to say we know that God is, but could
merely speak of is ; for the word God introduces an idea,
and consequently a substantial element, a content with
definite characteristics, and apart from these God is an
empty word. If in the language of this agnosticism
(Nichtwissen) those characteristics to which we must
still find it possible to refer are limited to express some-
thing negative — and for this the expression the Infinite
is peculiarly appropriate, whether by it is meant the
Infinite in general or those so-called attributes extended
into infinity — then all that this gives us is merely in-
determinate Being, abstraction, a kind of supreme or
infinite Essence which is expressly our product, the pro-
duct of abstraction, of thought, and does not get beyond
being mere Understanding.
If, however, God is not thought of as existing in sub-
jective knowledge merely, or in faith, but if it is seriously
meant that He exists, that He exists for us, and has on
His part a relation to us, and if we do not get beyond
this merely formal characteristic, it is all the same implied
that He communicates Himself to men, and this is to
admit that God is not jealous. The Greeks of purely
ancient times attributed jealousy to God when they
represented Him as putting down all that was generally
regarded as great and lofty, and as wishing to have and
actually placing everything on a level. Plato and Aris-
totle were opposed to the idea of divine jealousy, and
the Christian religion is still more opposed to it since it
teaches that God humbled Himself even to taking on the
VOL. III. N
194 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
form of a servant amongst men, that He revealed Him-
self to them ; that, consequently, far from grudging men
what is high, nay even what is highest, He, on the con-
trary, along with that very revelation, laid on them the
command that they should know God, and at the same
time indicated that this was Man's highest duty. With-
out appealing to this part of the teaching of Christianity,
we may take our stand on the fact that God is not
jealous, and ask, Why should He not communicate Him-
self to Man ? It is recorded that in Athens there was a
law according to which any man who had a lighted
candle and refused to allow another to light his at it,
was to be punished with death. This kind of commu-
nication is illustrated even in connection with physical
light, since it spreads and imparts itself to some other
thing without itself diminishing or losing anything ; and
still more is it the nature of Spirit itself to remain in
entire possession of what belongs to it, while giving
another a share in what it possesses. We believe in
God's infinite goodness in Nature, since He gives up those
natural things which He has called into existence in in-
finite profusion, to one another, and to Man in particular.
And is He to bestow on Man what is thus merely ma-
terial and which is also His, and withhold from him what
is spiritual, and refuse to Man what alone can give him
true value ? It is as absurd to give such ideas a place
in our thoughts as it is absurd to say of the Christian
religion that by it God has been revealed to Man,
and to maintain at the same time that what has been
revealed is that He is not now revealed and has not
been revealed.
On God's part there can be no obstacle to a knowledge
of Him through men. The idea that they are not able to
know God must be abandoned when it is admitted that
God has a relation to us, and since our spirit has a rela-
tion to Him, God exists for us, or, as it has been expressed,
He communicates Himself and has revealed Himself.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 195
God reveals Himself, it is said, in Nature; but God cannot
reveal Himself to Nature, to the stone, to the plant, to
the animal, because God is Spirit ; He can reveal Him-
self to Man only, who thinks and is Spirit. If there is
no hindrance on God's side to the knowledge of Him,
then it is owing to human caprice, to an affectation of
humility, or whatever you like to call it, that the finitude
of knowledge, the human reason is put in contrast to the
divine knowledge and the divine reason, and that the
limits of human reason are asserted to be immovable and
absolutely fixed. For what is here suggested is just that
God is not jealous, but, on the contrary, has revealed and
is revealing Himself ; and we have here the more definite
thought that it is not the so-called human reason with its
limits which knows God, but the Spirit of God in Man, it
is, to use the speculative expression previously employed,
the self-consciousness of God which knows itself in the
knowledge of Man.
This may suffice by way of calling attention to the
main ideas which are floating about in the atmosphere of
the culture of our time as representing the results of the
" Enlightenment," and of an understanding which calls
itself reason. These are the ideas which directly meet
us, to begin with, when we undertake to deal with the
general subject of the knowledge of God. It was possible
only to point out the fundamental moments of the worth-
lessness of those categories which are opposed to this
knowledge, and not to justify this knowledge itself. This,
as being the real knowledge of its object, must receive its
justification along with the content.
Note. — The rendering of Nichtwissen in this Lecture by "Agnos-
ticism " involves something of an anachronism, and is not techni-
cally strictly accurate ; but we have no other English word which
seems so well to suggest the meaning. — E. B. S.
SIXTH LECTURE
ALL questions and investigations regarding the formal
element in knowledge we for the present consider as
settled or as put on one side. We at the same time
escape the necessity of putting in a merely negative form
the exposition of what is known as the metaphysical
proofs of the existence of God. Criticism which leads to
a negative result is not merely a sorry business, but, in
confining itself to the task of showing that a certain con-
tent is vain, it is itself a vain exercise, an exertion of
vanity. In defining those proofs as the grasping in
thought of what we have called the elevation of the soul
to God, we declared that in criticism we must directly
reach an affirmative content.
And so, too, our treatment of the subject is not to be
historical. Since time will not permit of rue doing
otherwise, I must partly refer you to histories of philo-
sophy for the literary portion of the subject, and, indeed,
the range of the historical element in these proofs may
be held to be of the greatest possible extent, to be univer-
sal in fact, since every philosophy has a close connection
with the primary question or with subjects which are most
intimately related to it. There have, however, been times
when this question was treated of in the express form of
these proofs, and the interest which was felt in refuting
atheism directed attention to them in a supreme degree
and secured for them thorough treatment — times when the
insight of thought was considered indispensable even in
theology in connection with those of its parts which were
capable of being known in a rational way. Besides, the
historical element in anything which is a substantial
196
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 197
content for itself, can and should have an interest for us
when we are clear about the thing itself, and that thing
which we have got to consider here deserves above
anything else to be taken up for itself, apart from any
interest which might otherwise attach to it by its being
connected with material lying outside of it. To occupy
ourselves too exclusively with the historical element in
subjects which are in themselves eternal truths for Spirit,
is a proceeding rather to be disapproved of, for it is only
too frequently an illusion which deceives us as to what
is of real interest. Historical study of this kind has the
appearance of dealing with the Thing or actual reality ;
while, on the contrary, we are as a matter of fact dealing
with the ideas and opinions of others, with external cir-
cumstances, with what, so far as the actual reality is
concerned, is past, transitory, and vain. We may certainly
meet with historically learned persons who are what is
called thoroughly conversant with all the details of what
has been advanced by celebrated men, Fathers of the
Church, philosophers, and such like, regarding the funda-
mental principles of religion, but who, on the other hand,
are strangers to the true object or Thing itself. If such
people were to be asked what they considered to be the
reality and the grounds of their conviction regarding the
truth they possessed, they would very likely be astonished
at such a question as something which did not concern
them here, their real concern being, on the contrary, with
others, with theories and opinions, and with the knowledge
not of something actual but of theories and opinions.
It is the metaphysical proofs which we are considering
here. I make this further remark inasmuch as it has
been the custom to deduce a proof of the existence of
God, ex consensu gentium, a popular category over which
Cicero long ago waxed eloquent. The knowledge that
all men have imagined, believed, known this, carries with
it a tremendous authority. How could any man resist
it and say, I alone contradict all that all men picture, to
i&8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
themselves as true, what many of them have perceived to
be the truth by means of thought, and what all feel and
believe to be the truth. If, to start with, we leave out of
account the force of such a proof, and look at the dry
substance of it which is supposed to rest on an empirical
and historical basis, it will be seen to be both uncertain
and vague. All that about all nations, all men who are
supposed to believe in God, is on a level with similar
appeals to all generally ; they are usually made in a very
thoughtless fashion. A statement, which is necessarily
an empirical statement, is made regarding all men, and
which covers all individuals, and consequently all times
and places ; future ones, too, if strictly taken, for we are
supposed to be dealing with all men. But it is not
possible to get historical evidence regarding all nations.
Such statements regarding all men are in themselves
absurd, and are to be explained only by the habit people
have of not treating seriously such meaningless and
trite ways of speaking. But apart from this, nations,
or if you choose to call them tribes, have been dis-
covered, whose dull minds, being limited to the few
objects connected with their outward needs, had not
risen to a consciousness of anything higher which might
be called God. What is supposed to be the historical
element in the religion of many peoples rests principally
on uncertain explanations of sensuous expressions, out-
ward actions, and the like. Of a great many nations,
even such as are otherwise highly civilised, and with
whose religion we have a more definite and thorough
acquaintance, it may be said that what they call God is
of such a character that we may well hesitate to recognise
it as God. A dispute of the most bitter kind has been
carried on between two Roman Catholic monastic orders
as to whether the names Thian and Chang-ti, which
occur in the Chinese State-religion, the former meaning
heaven, and the latter lord, might be used to designate
the Christian God, that is to say, as to whether these
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 199
names did not express ideas which are utterly opposed
to our ideas of God, so opposed that they contain nothing
in common with ours, not even the common abstract
idea of God. The Bible makes use of the expression,
" the heathen who know not God," although these heathen
were idolaters, i.e., as it is well put, although they had a
religion. Here, all the same, we draw a distinction be-
tween God and an idol, and spite of the broad mean-
ing attached in modern times to the name religion, we
would perhaps shrink from giving the name God to an
idol. Are we to call the Apis of the Egyptians, the
monkey, the cow, &c., of the Hindus and other nations,
God ? Even if we were to speak of the religion of these
peoples, and consequently allow that they had something
more than a superstition, still we might hesitate to
speak of their having belief in God. Otherwise God
would be represented by the purely indeterminate idea
of something higher of an entirely general character, and
not even of something invisible and above sense. One
may take up the position that even a bad or false religion
should still be called a religion, and that it is better that
the various nations should have a false religion rather
than none at all, which reminds us of the story of the
woman who, to the complaint that it was bad weather,
replied that such weather was at least better than no
weather at all. Closely connected with this position is
the thought that the value of religion is to be found only
in the subjective element, in the fact of having a religion,
it being a matter of indifference what idea of God is
contained in it. Thus belief in idols, just because such
a belief can be included under the abstract idea of God
in general, is regarded ae sufficient, just as the abstract
idea of God in general is considered satisfactory. This
is certainly the reason, too, why such names as idols and
heathen are regarded as something antiquated, and are
considered as objectionable because of their invidious
meaning. As a matter of fact, however, this abstract
200 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
antithesis of truth and falsehood demands a very different
solution from that given in the abstract idea of God in
general, or, what comes to the same thing, in the purely
subjective view of religion.
In any case the consensus gentium with regard to be-
lief in God turns out to be a perfectly vague idea, both
as regards the element of fact as such expressed in it,
and also as regards the substantial element composing it.
But neither is the force of this proof binding in itself,
even if the historical basis had been of a firmer and more
definite kind. A proof of this kind does not amount to
being an individual inner conviction, since it is a matter
of accident whether or not others agree with it. Con-
viction, whether in the form of faith or knowledge based on
thought, certainly takes its start from something outside,
from instruction, from what is learnt, from authority in
fact ; still it is essentially an inner act of self-remembrance
on the part of Spirit. The fact that the individual him-
self is satisfied is what constitutes Man's formal freedom,
and is the one moment in presence of which authority of
every kind entirely falls away ; and the fact that he finds
satisfaction in the Thing, in the actual reality, is what
makes real freedom, and is the other factor in presence
of which, in the very same manner, all authority sinks
out of sight. They are truly inseparable. Even in the
case of faith the one absolutely valid method of proof
referred to in the Scriptures does not consist of miracles,
credible accounts and the like, but of the witness of the
Spirit. With regard to other subjects we may yield to
authority, either from confidence or from fear ; but the
exercise of the right referred to is at the same time the
higher duty laid upon us. In connection with the kind
of conviction implied in religious belief in which the
innermost nature of Spirit is directly involved, both as
regards the certainty of itself (conscience) and because
of its content, the individual, in consequence of this, has
the absolute right to demand that his own witness and
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 201
not that of outside minds should be what decides and
gives confirmation.
The metaphysical method of proof which we are here
considering, constitutes the witness of thinking Spirit
in so far as this latter is thinking Spirit not merely
potentially, but actually. The object with which it takes
to do, exists essentially in thought, and even if, as was
previously remarked, it is taken in the sense of something
represented in feeling, still the substantial element in it
belongs to thought, which is its pure self, just as feeling
is the empirical self, the self which has become specialised
or separate. In reference to this object an advance was
made at an early period to the stage of thinking, witness-
ing, that is, proving, so soon, in fact, as thought emerged
from its condition of absorption in sensuous and material
conceptions and ideas of the sky, the sun, the stars, the
sea, and so on, and disengaged itself, so to speak, from
its wrapping of pictures of the imagination which were
still permeated by the sensuous element — so that Man
came to be conscious of God as essentially objectivity
which was to be thought of, and which had been reached
by thought. So, too, the subjective action of Spirit by a
process of recollection brought itself back from feeling,
picture-thought, and imagination, to its essence, namely,
thought, and sought to have before it what belongs
peculiarly to this sphere, and to have it in its pure form
as it exists in this sphere. The elevation of the soul
to God in feeling, intuition, imagination, and thought —
and as being subjective it is so concrete that it has in it
something of all these elements — is an inner experience.
In regard to it we have likewise an inner experience of
the fact that accidental and arbitrary elements enter into
it. Consequently there arises on external grounds the
necessity for analysing that elevation, and for bringing
into clear consciousness the acts and characteristic
qualities contained in it, in order that it may be purified
from other contingent elements, and from the contingency
202 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
which attaches to thought itself ; and in accordance with
the old belief that what is substantial and true can be
reached only by reflection, we effect the purification of
this act of elevation whereby it attains to substantiality
and necessity, by explaining it in terms of thought, and
give thought the satisfaction of realising that the absolute
right possessed by it has a right to satisfaction totally
different from that belonging to feeling and sense-percep-
tion or ordinary conception.
SEVENTH LECTURE
THE necessity we feel of understanding the elevation of
the spirit to God from the point of view of thought, is
suggested by a formal characteristic which meets us at
the very first glance when we consider what direction is
taken by the proof of the existence of God, and which
has to be taken notice of first of all. The study of a
subject from the point of view of thought is an exposition,
a differentiation of what in our very first experience we
arrive at by a single stroke. In connection with the
belief that God is, this analysis comes into direct contact
with a point which has already been incidentally touched
upon, and is to be dealt with more thoroughly here,
namely, the question as to the distinction to be drawn
between what God is and the fact that He is. God is ;
what then does this mean ? what is it supposed to be ?
God is, to begin with, a figurative idea, a name. So far
as the two determinations contained in the proposition,
namely, God and Being, are concerned, the most important
thing is to determine or define the subject for itself, all
the more that here the predicate of the proposition which
would otherwise be indicated by the peculiar determina-
tion of the subject, namely, what this subject is, contains
merely dry Being. But then God is for us more than
mere Being. And, conversely, just because He is an in-
finitely richer content than mere Being, and is infinitely
different from it, the important thing is to add to it this
determination as representing a determination which is
different from that of Being. This content which is thus
distinguished from Being is an idea, a thought, a concep-
tion which is to be explained for itself, and have its
204 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
meaning determined afterwards. Thus in the Metaphysic
of God, or what is known as natural theology, we start
by unfolding the meaning of the notion or conception of
God. This is in accordance with the ordinary mode
of dealing with the subject, since we consider what our
previously formed idea of God contains, and in so doing
further presuppose that we all have this idea which we
express by the term God. The notion, accordingly, for
itself, and apart altogether from the question of its reality,
brings with it the demand that it should be true in itself
as well, and consequently, as being the notion, that it
should be logically true. Since logical truth, in so far
as thought takes the form of Understanding merely, is
reduced to identity, to what does not contradict itself,
nothing more is demanded than that the notion should
not contradict itself, or, as it is otherwise expressed, that
it be possible, since possibility is itself nothing more than
the identity of an idea with itself. The second thing,
accordingly, is to show that this notion exists, and this
is the proof of the existence of God. But because that
possible notion is, in this very matter of identity, of bare
possibility, reduced to this the most abstract of categories,
and becomes no richer by means of existence, the product
thus reached does not answer to the fulness of the idea
of God, and we have accordingly a third division of the
subject, in which we treat still further of the attributes
of God and of His relations to the world.
These are the distinctions which meet us when we
begin to examine the proofs of the existence of God. It
is the work of the Understanding to analyse what is con-
crete, to distinguish and to define the elements belonging
to it, then to hold firmly to them and abide by them. If
at a later stage it once more frees them from their isola-
tion, and recognises that it is their union which constitutes
the truth, still they are from this standpoint to be regarded
as being true before their union as well, and consequently
when outside of this condition of unity. It is accordingly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 205
the interest of the Understanding to show that Being
essentially belongs to the notion or conception of God,
and that this notion must necessarily be thought of as
being or existing. If this is the case, then the notion
must not be thought of as separate from Being ; it has no
real truth apart from Being. The result thus reached is
opposed to the idea that the notion should be regarded as
true in itself, and as something the existence of which
must be assumed, to begin with, and then established. If
the Understanding here declares that this first separation
made by it and what arises from the separation have no
truth, then the comparison, the other separation which
further arises in connection with this, is proved to be with-
out any foundation. The notion, that is to say, is to
be first considered, and then afterwards the attributes of
God are to be dealt with. It is the notion or conception
of God which constitutes the content of Being ; it can be,
and ought also to be, nothing else than the " substance of
its realities." But how then should the attributes of God
be anything but realities and His realities. If the attri-
butes of God are supposed to express rather His relations
to the world, the mode of His action in and towards an
Other different from Himself, then the idea of God involves
this much at least, that God's absolute independence does
not permit Him to come out of Himself, and shows us
what happens to be the condition of the world, which is
supposed to be outside of Him and to be contrasted with
Him, and which we have no right to suppose is already
separate from Him. Thus His attributes, His action and
mode of existence, remain shut up within His notion, find
their determination in it alone, and are essentially nothing
more than its relation to itself ; the attributes are merely
the determinations of the notion itself. But, again, if we
start from the world looked at in itself as something which
is external so far as God is concerned, so that the attri-
butes of God describe His relations to it, then the world,
as a product of His creative power, gets a definite character
206 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
only through His notion, in which again, consequently,
we find, after having followed this unnecessary and round-
about road through the world to God, that the attributes
get their definite character, while the notion, if it is not
to be something empty, but, on the contrary, is to be some-
thing full of content, is made explicit only through them.
It results from this that the differences which we have
met with are so formal that they cannot be taken as the
basis of any substantial element, or of any particular
spheres of existence which, if regarded apart from each
other, could be considered as representing something true.
The elevation of the spirit to God is found in one thing,
in the determination of His notion, of His attributes, and
of His Being ; or God as notion or idea is the absolutely
Indeterminate, and it is only when there is a transition,
namely, to Being — and this is the transition in its very
first and most abstract form — that the notion and the idea
enter on the stage of determinateness. This determinate-
ness, to be sure, is poor enough, but the reason of this just
is that the Metaphysic referred to begins with possibility,
a possibility which, although it is meant to be that of the
notion of God, comes to be the mere possibility of the
Understanding, which is devoid of all content, simple
identity. Thus we find that in reality we are dealing
merely with the final abstractions of thought in general
and Being, and with their opposition as well as with their
inseparableness, such as we have seen these to be. Since
we have pointed out the nullity of the differences with
which the metaphysical principle in question starts, we
have to remember that only one result follows so far as the
process involved in them is concerned, this, namely, that
along with the differences we give up the process. One of
the proofs which we have to consider will have for its con-
tent the very contrast of thought and Being, which we
already see making its appearance here, and which will
therefore be examined in its proper place in accordance
with the value which it itself possesses. Here, however,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 207
we might give promineDce to the affirmative element which
it contains for the knowledge of the at first absolutely
general and formal nature of the notion. "We must pay
attention to this so far as it has reference to the speculative
basis and connection of our treatment of the subject in
general. This is an aspect of the question which we
merely indicate, whereas in itself it can indeed be .nothing
else but the truly leading one ; but it is not our intention
to follow it out in our treatment of the subject, or to
confine ourselves to it alone.
It may therefore be remarked by way of preliminary, that
what was previously called the notion or conception of God
for itself and its possibility, is now to be called thought
simply, and indeed abstract thought. A distinction was
drawn between the notion of God and the possible existence
of God. It was only such a notion which was in harmony
with possibility, with abstract identity; and so, too, of what
was intended to be taken not as the Notion in general but as
a particular notion, in fact as the notion of God, nothing re-
mained but simply this very abstract characterless identity.
It is already implied iu what has been said that we
cannot take any such abstract determination of the Under-
standing as applicable to the Notion, but rather that we
must simply regard it as concrete in itself, as a unity
which is not indeterminate but essentially determinate,
and thus only as a unity of determinations ; and this unity
itself, which is thus joined on to its determinations, is
therefore nothing but the unity of itself and its determina-
tions, so that apart from the determinations the unity is
nothing and disappears, or, more strictly speaking, it is
even degraded to the condition of what is merely an un-
true determinateness, and requires to get into relation in
order to be true and real. To what has just been said,
we may further add that such a unity of determinations
— and it is they which constitute the content — is there-
fore not to be taken as a subject to which they are
attached as representing several predicates which would
203 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
have their bond of union only in it as in a third thing,
but would be in themselves outside of this unity and
mutually opposed. On the contrary, their unity is to be
regarded as belonging essentially to them, that is to say,
as a unity which is constituted solely by the determina-
tions themselves, and, conversely, the separate determina-
tions as such are to be considered as in themselves
inseparable from each other, and able to pass over into
each other, and as having no meaning taken by them-
selves apart from one another, so that as they constitute
the unity this latter is their soul and substance.
It is this which constitutes the concrete element of
the Notion in general. We cannot engage in philoso-
phical speculation regarding any object whatever without
employing universal and abstract categories of thought,
least of all when God, the profoundest subject of thought,
the absolute Notion, is the object, so that it was not
possible to avoid pointing out what the speculative
notion or conception of the Notion itself is. Here it
will be possible to develop this notion only in the way
of an historical sketch ; that its content is true in-and-for-
itself is shown in the logical part of philosophy. Some
examples might make it plainer for ordinary thought, and
not to go too far — and Spirit, certainly, is always what
is nearest — it is sufficient to think of the life-force
which is the unity, the simple unit of the soul, and
which is at the same time so concrete in itself that it
appears only in the form of the process of its viscera, of
its members and organs, which are essentially different
from it and from each other, and which, yet, when sepa-
rated from it, perish, and cease to be what they are,
namely, life, that is, they no longer have the meaning
and signification which belong to them.
We have still to trace in detail the result of the notion
or conception of the speculative Notion in the same
fashion in which we have dealt with the conception
itself. That is to say, since the characteristics of the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 209
Notion exist only in its unity, and are therefore insepa-
rable— and in conformity with the character of our object
we shall call it the Notion of God — each of these char-
acteristics themselves, in so far as it is taken in itself,
and as distinct from any other, must be regarded not as
an abstract characteristic, but as a concrete notion or
conception of God. But God is at the same time one
only, and accordingly no other relation exists between
these notions except the relation which was previously
declared to exist among them as characteristics ; that is
to say, they are to be regarded as moments of one and
the same notion, as being necessarily related to each
other, as mutually mediating each other, as inseparable,
so that they exist only in virtue of their relationship to
each other, and this relation is the living unity which
comes into existence through them, and is regarded as
their hypothetical basis. It is with a view to their thus
appearing in different forms that they are implicitly
the same notion, only posited differently, and that, in
fact, this different way in which they are posited, or
different mode of appearance, is in necessary connection
with the other, so that tVie one comes out of the other,
and is posited by means of it.
The difference between the Notion in this form and
the Notion as such consists, accordingly, merely in this,
that the latter has in it abstract determinations represent-
ing the aspects it presents, while the Notion in its more
determinate form, the Idea namely, has itself concrete
aspects within itself for which those universal determina-
tions merely supply a basis. These concrete aspects or
sides are, or rather seem to be, a complete whole existing
for itself. When it is conceived of as differentiated in
them, within the sphere which constitutes their specific
determinateness, and likewise in itself, then we get the
further determination of the Notion, a- multiplicity not
only of determinations, but a wealth of definite forms
which are accordingly purely ideal, and are posited and
VOL. in. o
2TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
contained in the one Notion, in the one subject. And
the unity of the subject with itself becomes the more
intensive the greater the number of differences developed
in it. The further continuous determination or specifica-
tion which takes place is at the same time a going into
itself on the part of the subject, a going down into or
absorption of itself in itself.
When we say that it is one and the same Notion
which is merely further determined, we are employing
a, formal expression. Any further and continued deter-
mination of what is one and the same adds several de-
terminations to what is thus further defined. This
richness in increased determination or specification must
not, however, be thought of simply as a multiplicity of
•determinations, but rather as concrete. These concrete
aspects regarded in themselves even take on the form of a
•complete self-existing whole. But when posited in one
notion, in one subject, they are not independent and
separate from one another in it, but rather exist ideally,
and the unity of the subject accordingly becomes all the
more intensive. The greatest intensity of the subject in
the ideality of all concrete determinations, of the most
complete antitheses, is Spirit. By way of giving a
clearer conception of this, we shall refer to the relation
of Nature and Spirit. Nature is contained in Spirit, is
created by it, and spite of its apparently immediate Being,
of its apparently independent reality, it is in itself some-
thing merely posited or dependent, something created,
-something having an ideal existence in Spirit. When in
the course of knowledge we advance from Nature to
Spirit, and Nature is defined as simply a moment of
Spirit, we do not reach a true multiplicity, a substantial
two, the one of which would be Nature, and the other
Spirit; but, on the contrary, the Idea which is the
substance of Nature, having taken on the deeper form of
Spirit, retains in itself that content in this infinite in-
tensity of ideality, and is all the richer because of the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 21 1
determination of this ideality itself, which is in-and-for-
itself, self-conscious, or Spirit. In connection with this
mention of Nature regarded in reference to the several
characteristics which we have to treat of in the course of
our investigation, we may mention, by way of preface,
that it does indeed appear in this shape as the totality
of external existence, but at the same time as one of
those characteristics above which we are to raise ourselves.
Here we do not go on either to consider that specula-
tive ideality, nor to a study of the concrete shape in
which the thought-determination in which it has its root,
appears as Nature. The peculiar feature of the stage it
occupies certainly forms one of the characteristics of God,
a subordinate moment in the same notion. Since in
what follows we mean to confine ourselves to its develop-
ment, and to how the differences continue to be thoughts
as such, moments of the Notion, the stage referred to
will be regarded not as Nature but as necessity, and life
as a moment in the notion or conception of God, which,
however, may further be conceived of as Spirit, and pos-
sessed of the deeper quality of ifreedom, in order that it
may be a notion or conception of God which would be
worthy of Him and also of us.
What has just been said regarding the concrete form
of a moment of the notion reminds us of a peculiar
aspect of the matter, according to which the characteristics
or determinations increase in the course of their develop-
ment. The relation of the characteristics of God to one
another is a difficult subject in itself, and is all the more
difficult for those who are not acquainted with the nature
of the Notion. But without some acquaintance at least
with the notion of the Notion, or, at all events, without
having some idea of it, it is not possible to understand
anything about the Essence of God as representing Spirit
in general. What has been said, however, will get its
direct application in that part of our treatment of the
subject which immediately follows.
EIGHTH LECTURE
IN the preceding lecture the speculative fundamental
characteristics connected with the nature of the Notion,
and its development into the manifoldness of specific
qualities and definite forms, have been indicated. If we
look once more at the special problem we are dealing
with, we find that there, too, we are at once met by a
multiplicity. We find that there are several proofs of
the existence of God. There is an external empirical
multiplicity or difference, which presents itself, first of
all, as something which has had an historical origin, and
which has nothing to do with the differences which follow
from the development of the Notion, and which we take,
accordingly, in the form in which we directly come upon
it. We may, however, have a feeling of distrust in re-
ference to that multiplicity if we happen to reflect that
here we have not to do with a finite object, and remember
that our study of an infinite object must be philosophical,
and that we are not to deal with it and expend labour
upon it in a haphazard and external fashion. An his-
torical fact, nay even a mathematical figure, contains a
number of references within it, and relations to what is
outside of it, in accordance with which a conception is
formed of it, and from which we reason syllogistically to
the principal relation upon which they themselves depend,
or to another specific quality which is of importance here
and which is closely connected with them. It is said
that some twenty proofs of the Pythagorean problem
have been discovered. The more important an historical
fact is, the more points of connection it presents with the
circumstances of the time and with other historical events,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 213
so that in showing the necessity for accepting the fact
as true we may start from any one of these points. The
direct testimonies may also be very many in number, and
each testimony in so far as it is not otherwise self-con-
tradictory has in this sphere the force of a proof. If in
the case of a mathematical proposition one single example
is held to be sufficient, it is principally in connection
with historical subjects and juridical cases that a multi-
plicity of proofs must be held to strengthen the force of
the proof itself. In the region of experience or pheno-
mena, the object, as being an empirical and individual
thing, has the quality of contingency, and thus the parti-
cularity of the knowledge we have of it gives the object
the same mere appearance of Being. It is its connection
with other facts which gives the object its necessary
character, and each of these again belongs in itself to
this contingent sphere. Here it is the extension and
repetition of such connection which gives to objectivity
the kind of universality which is possible in this region.
The verification of a fact or a perception by means of the
mere number of the observations taken, relieves the sub-
jectivity of perception from the reproach of being an
illusion, a deception, or any one of those forms of error
which it may -by way of objection be declared to be.
In dealing with God since we presuppose the existence
of an absolutely general idea of Him, it is found, on the
one hand, that He infinitely transcends that region in
which all objects whatsoever stand in a connected rela-
tion with one another ; and that, on the other hand, since
God exists only for the inner element of Man's nature in
general, we directly meet in this sphere with the con-
tingency of thought, conception, and imagination, in the
most varied forms and with what is expressly allowed
to be contingency, namely, that of sensations, emotions,
and such like. We thus get an infinite number of
starting-points from which it is possible to advance to
God, and from which we must necessarily advance, and
214 THE PHILOSOPHY -OF RELIGION
hence the infinite number of such essential transitions
which must have the force of proofs. So, too, the veri-
fication and confirmation of conviction by means of the
repetition of the experiences gained of the way to truth,
must appear to be necessary in order to counteract the
infinite possibility of deception and error which, on the
other hand, lurks in the way to truth. The individual's
trust and the intensity of his belief in God are strength-
ened by the repetition of the essential elevation of his
spirit to God, and by the experience and knowledge he
gains of God's wisdom and providence as shown in
countless objects, events, arid occurrences. In proportion
to the inexhaustible number of the relations in which
things stand to the one object is the inexhaustible need
felt by Man as he enters more and more deeply into the
infinitely manifold finitude of his outward surroundings
and his inner states, to continuously repeat his experience
of God, that is, to bring before his eyes by new proofs
the fact of God's working in the world.
When we are in presence of this species of proof we
at once feel that it belongs to a different sphere from that
of the scientific proof. The empirical life of the indi-
vidual, composed as it is of the most varied changes of
mood and of conditions of feeling consequent on its
entrance into different external states, takes occasion both
from these states and when it is in them to multiply
the result it has arrived at that there is a God, and seeks
more and more anew to make this belief its own, and
to make it a living belief for itself as being an individual
existence subject to change. The scientific field, how-
ever, is the sphere of thought. Here the " many times "
of the repetition, and the " at all times " which really
represents the result, are united together in what is "once."
We have to deal with the one thought-determination,
which, being one, comprises in itself all those special forms
of the empirical life split up as it is into the infinite
particularities of existence.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 215
But these different spheres are different only as regards
form ; the matter of them is the same. Thought only
brings the manifold content into a simple shape. It
epitomises it without depriving it of its value or of any-
thing that is essential to it. Its peculiar work rather is
to bring this essential element into prominence. But
here, too, we get various different determinations. First
of all, the thought-determination is seen to be related
to the starting-point from which Spirit rises from the
finite up to God. Even if it reduces the innumerable
characteristics to a few categories, these categories are
still several in number. The finite, which has been called
in a general way the starting-point, has various charac-
teristics, and these consequently are the source of the
different metaphysical proofs of the existence of God,
that is to say, the proofs belonging to the sphere of
thought only. In accordance with the historical form
of the proofs, as we have to deal with them, the cate-
gories of the finite in which the starting-points get their
definite character are, first, the contingency of earthly
things, and next, the- teleological relation which they have
in themselves and to one another. But besides this
finite beginning, finite so far as the content is concerned,
there is yet another starting-point, namely, the Notion
of God, which so far as its content is concerned is infinite
and something that ought to be, and the only finite
element in which is that it can be something "subjective,
an element of which it has to be divested. We may
without prejudice admit a variety of starting-points.
This does not in itself in any way conflict with the
demand which we considered ourselves justified in making
that the true proof should be one only ; in so far as this
proof is known by thought to represent the inner element
of thought, thought can also show that it represents
one and the same path, although starting from different
points. Similarly the result is one and the same, namely,
the Being of God. This, however, is a kind of indeter-
2l6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
inmate Universal. A difference, however, emerges here
to which we must give somewhat closer attention. It
is intimately connected with what we have called the
beginnings or starting-points. These differ according to
their starting-points, each of which has a definite content ;
they are definite categories ; the act whereby the spirit
rises from them to God is in itself the necessary course
of thought, which, in accordance with an expression
commonly used, is called a syllogistic argument. This
has necessarily a result, arid this result is defined in
accordance with the definite character which attaches to
the starting-point, for it follows only from this. Thus
it conies about that the different proofs of the existence
of God result in giving different characteristics or aspects
of God. This is opposed to what is considered most
probable, and to the opinion that in the proofs of the
existence of God the interest centres in the fact of
existence only, and that this one abstract characteristic
or determination ought to represent the common result
of all the different proofs. The attempt to get out of
them determinations of the content is rendered unneces-
sary by the fact that the whole content is found ready
to hand in the ordinary idea of God, and this idea thus
presupposed, whether in a more definite or in a vaguer
form, or in accordance with the ordinary procedure of
Metaphysics above referred to, is definitely laid down
beforehand, and made to represent the so-called Notion
of God. The reflection that the characteristics of the
content result from the transitions which take place in
the course of reasoning, is not expressly made here, and
least of all in connection with the proof which descends
to the particular after having started from what had
been previously determined, namely, the notion or con-
ception of God, and which is expressly intended merely
to satisfy the demand that the abstract characteristic of
Being should be attached to that conception.
But it is self-evident that the different premises, and
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 217
the variety of syllogisms which are constructed by means
of these, will also yield several results differing in content.
If, accordingly, the starting-points seem to permit us to
take the fact of their being distinct from one another as
implying a relation of equality or indifference between
them, this indifference is of a limited character in view
of the results which a multiplicity of characteristics of
the conception of God yields ; and indeed the primary
question regarding their mutual relations crops up of itself
in this connection, since God is one. The relation most
readily thought of here is that according to which God is
defined as being in His several characteristics one subject
consisting of several predicates, as, for instance, when we
are in the habit of speaking not only of finite objects
which are described by a variety of predicates, but also
when we attribute to God a variety of attributes, and
speak of Him as being all-powerful, all-wise, as righteous-
ness, goodness, and so forth. The Orientals speak of God
as the many-named, or rather as the infinite-all-named,
and imagine that the demand to declare what He is can
be exhausted only by the inexhaustible statement of His
names, that is, of His characteristics or specific qualities.
We have already said of the infinite number of starting-
points that they are comprised by means of thought in
simple categories, and so here the necessity is still greater
for reducing the multiplicity of attributes to a smaller
number, or rather to one notion, all the more that God is
one notion which has in it several inseparable notions ;
and while we allow with regard to finite objects that each
in itself is certainly only one subject, an individual, that
is, something indivisible, a notion or conception, we still
regard this unity as being in itself manifold, made up of
many things external to one another and separable, a
unity which is in conflict with itself by the very fact of
its existence. The finitude of living beings consists in
this, that in them body and soul are separable, and, still
more, that the members, nerves, muscles, and so on, the
21 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
colouring matter, oil, sweat, &c., &c., are also separable ; in
fact, that what we regard as predicates existing in an actual
subject or individual, such as colour, smell, taste, and so
on, can separate from each other as independent materials,
and that it belongs to the very nature of the unity that
it should thus break up into parts. Spirit reveals its
finitude in its variety, and in general in the want of
correspondence between its Being and its notion. It
becomes manifest that the intelligence does not ade-
quately correspond to the truth, the will to the Good,
the Moral, and the Eight, the imagination to the under-
standing, and both these to the reason, and so on, and,
besides, that the sense -consciousness with which the
whole of existence is always kept supplied, or at any
rate nearly so, consists of a quantity of momentary, tran-
sitory, and so far untrue elements. This very thorough
separability and separateness of the activities, tendencies,
aims, and actions of Spirit, which we meet with in em-
pirical reality, may in some degree serve as an excuse for
conceiving of the Idea of Spirit as something which breaks
up into faculties, capacities, activities, and the like ; for
it is as an individual form of existence, a definite single
being, that it is this particular finite existence which is
thus found in a separate form of existence external to
itself. But it is God only who is this particular One,
and only as He is this One is He God ; thus subjec-
tive reality is inseparable from the Idea, and conse-
quently cannot be separated in itself. It is here that
we see the variety, the separation, the multiplicity of the
predicates which are knit into a unity by the subject
only, but which in themselves would be in a condition
of difference which would result in their coming into
opposition and consequently into antagonism with each
other, and which would show in the most decided way
that they were something untrue, and that multiplicity of
characteristics was an unsuitable category.
The next shape taken by the reduction of the several
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 219
characteristics of God resulting from the several proofs,
to the one notion or conception which is to be conceived
of as being one in itself, is the ordinary one, according to
which they are to be carried back to a higher unity, as it
is called, i.e., a more abstract unity, and, since the unity
of God is the highest of all, to what is consequently the
most abstract form of unity. The most abstract unity,
however, is unity itself, and from this it would result
that the Idea of God means simply that God is unity —
and to express this in terms implying a subject, or at least
something which has Being — that He is the One in fact,
a description, however, which implies that He is One only
as against many, so that the One in Himself might still
also be a predicate of the many, and therefore be unity in
Himself, the One Substance rather, or, if you like, Being.
But such an abstract form of determination would simply
bring us back to this, that what would result from the
proof of the existence of God would be simply the Being
of God in an abstract sense, or, what comes to the same
thing, that God Himself would simply be the abstract One
(neuter) or Being, the empty Essence of the Understand-
ing, over against which would be placed the concrete idea
of God, which cannot find satisfaction in any such abstract
characterisation. But not only is the ordinary idea not
satisfied with this abstraction, the Notion looked at in its
general aspect is by its very nature concrete itself, and
what appears outwardly as difference and multiplicity of
characteristics is simply the development of its moments,
which all the while remains within itself. It is therefore
the inner necessity of reason which shows itself active in
thinking Spirit, and produces in it this multiplicity of
characteristics ; only, since this thought has not yet got
a grasp of the nature of the Notion itself, nor conse-
quently of the nature of its relation and the necessity
of the connection, what are virtually stages in develop-
ment appear to be simply an accidental multiplicity, the
various elements of which follow on one another and are
220 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
outside of one another, just as this thought also, moving
within the circle occupied by each one of these character-
istics, so conceives of the nature of the transition which
is called Proof, that the characteristics, while connected
with each other, still remain outside of each other, and
mediate with each other merely as independent. It does
not recognise that mediation with self is the true and final
relation in any such process. And it will become evident
that this is the formal defect in these proofs.
NINTH LECTUEE
IF we look at the difference which exists between the proofs
of the existence of God with which we are dealing, as it
actually presents itself, we come upon a distinction which
is of an essential kind. One set of the proofs goes from
the Being to the thought of God, that is, to put it more
definitely, from determinate Being to true Being as repre-
senting the Being of God ; the other set proceeds from the
thought of God, from truth in itself, to the Being of this
truth. This distinction, although it is brought forward as
one which merely happens to exist in this form, and is of
a contingent character, is based on a necessary principle
which requires to be taken notice of. We have before us
two characteristics — the thought of God and the Being of
<3od. We may start from the one or from the other in-
differently in following out the course of reasoning which
is supposed to result in their union. Where it is thus
a question merely of possible choice, it appears to be a
matter of indifference from which we start ; and further,
too, if the one leads to their being brought into connection,
the other appears to be superfluous.
But what thus at first appears to be an indifferent
duality and an external possibility has a connection in
the Notion, so that neither are the two ways of arriving
at the truth indifferent to one another, nor is the difference
between them merely of an external character, nor is one
of them superfluous. This necessity is not of the nature
of an accessory circumstance. It is closely connected with
the deepest part of our subject, and chiefly with the logical
nature of the Notion. So far as the Notion is concerned,
the two paths are not merely different in a general way,
222 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
but are one-sided, both in reference to the subjective eleva-
tion of the spirit to God, and also in reference to the nature
of God Himself. We wish to exhibit this one-sidedness in
its more concrete form in reference to our subject. We
have before us, to begin with, merely the abstract categories
of Being and Notion, the contrast between them and their
mode of relationship. It will be shown at the same time
how these abstractions and their relations to one another
constitute and determine the basis of what is most concrete.
That I may be able to put this thought in a more
definite form, I may, by way of anticipation, refer to a
further distinction, according to which there are three
fundamental modes in which the connection of the two
sides or characteristics appears. The first represents the
passing over of the one characteristic into its Other ; the
second, their relativity, or the appearance of the one im-
plicitly or actually in the Being of the Other ; the third
mode, again, is that of the Notion or the Idea, according
to which the characteristic preserves itself in its Other in
such a way that this unity, which is itself implicitly the
original essence of the two, is considered as their subjec-
tive unity. Thus neither of them is one-sided, and they
both together constitute the appearance of their unity,
which is, to begin with, merely their substance, and
thus eternally results from them as being the imma-
nent appearance of totality, and is distinguished from
them for itself as their unity, as this eternally unfolds
itself in the form of their outward appearance.
The two one-sided ways of elevating the spirit to God
thus indicated, accordingly directly exhibit their one-
sidedness in a double form. The relations which spring
from this call for mention. What has in general to be
effected is that in the characteristic of the one side,
namely, Being, the other characteristic, namely, the Notion,
should appear, and, conversely, that in this latter the first-
mentioned should be exhibited. Each determines itself
to its Other, gives itself the characteristic of its Other in
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 223
and out of itself. If, accordingly, only the one side were
to determine itself so as to be the other, this determina-
tion would, on the one hand, be merely a passing over, in
which the first would lose itself, or, on the other hand,
a manifestation of itself, outside of itself, in which each
would certainly preserve its independent existence, but
would not return into itself, would not be that unity
for itself. If we give to the Notion the concrete signifi-
cation of God, and to Being the concrete signification of
Nature, and conceived of the self-determination of God
in the form of Nature, as found only in the first of the
connections indicated, this would be the process whereby
God becomes Nature. But if, according to the second of
the connections, Nature is to be taken merely as a mani-
festation of God, then she, as something in course of
transition, would represent the unity inherent in this only
for a third thing, only for us, and this would not be unity
which is actually present in-and-for-itself, the true unity,
determined beforehand. When we put this thought in
more concrete forms, and conceive of God as the Idea
existing for itself from which we start, and think of Being
as also the totality of Being, as Nature, then the advance
from the Idea to Nature takes (i) the form simply of a
passing over into Nature, in which the Idea is lost .and
disappears. (2) In order to bring out more clearly the
meaning of this transition, we may say that this would be
merely an act of remembrance on our part that the simple
result had issued from an Other which had, however, dis-
appeared. So far, again, as the outward form is concerned,
it would be simply we who had brought the semblance or
appearance into relation with its Essence and referred it
back to this. Or, looking at the question from a broader
standpoint, we may say that God had merely created
Nature, not a finite spirit which returns from Nature
back to Him ; that He had an unfruitful love of the world
as of something which was the mere semblance or show
of Himself, and which as such remained an Other in
22* THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
relation to Him which did not reflect Him, and through
which He did not shine as through Himself. And what
is the third thing supposed to be ; what are we supposed
to be who have brought this show or semblance into rela-
tion with its Essence, and referred it back to its central
point, and have been the means whereby the Essence first
manifested itself and appeared in itself ? What would this
third thing be ? What would we be ? We would repre-
sent a knowledge whose existence was presupposed in an
absolute way, in fact an independent act of a formal
universality which embraced everything in itself, and in
which that necessarily existing unity which is in-and-for-
itself would itself be included as a mere phenomenon or
semblance without objectivity.
If we form a more definite conception of the relation
which is set forth in this determination, then it will be seen
that the elevation to God of determinate Being, of Nature,
and of natural Being in general, and, along with this, of our
consciousness, the active form of- this elevation itself, is
simply religion or piety which rises to God in a subjective
way only, either simply in the shape of an act of transition
whereby we disappear in God, or by setting ourselves
over against Him as a semblance or illusion. If the finite
were thus to disappear in Him, He would be merely the
absolute substance, from which nothing proceeds, and into
which nothing returns to itself, and even to form ideas of
or to think of the absolute substance would be already
too much, something which would itself have to disappear.
If, however, the relation of reflection is still preserved, the
elevation of the pious mind to God, in the sense that
religion as such, and consequently the subjective for itself,
continues to represent what has Being and is independent,
then what is primarily independent or self-existent, and
the elevation to which constitutes religion, is something
produced by religion, something conceived of, postulated,
thought or believed, an appearance or semblance merely,
not anything truly independent which starts from itself.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 225
It is substance as an idea merely, which does not decide
for itself, and which consequently is not the activity
which as activity is found only in the subjective elevation
as such. It would not in this case be known and recog-
nised as true that God is the Spirit who Himself arouses
in men that desire to rise to Him, that religious feeling
in which the elevation begins.
If from this one-sideduess there results a broader idea
and a further development of what does not, to begin
with, get beyond something which has the character of a
reflex semblance, and if we thus reach its emancipation,
in which it, as being independent and active, would in its
turn be defined as not-semblance, then we would attribute
to this independent existence merely a relative, and con-
sequently a half connection with its other side, which
contained in it itself a non-communicating and incommu-
nicable kernel which had nothing to do with the Other.
We would be dealing merely with the superficial form, in
which the two sides were apparently related to each other,
and which would not imply a relation springing from their
essence and established by their essence. Both sides conse-
quently would be wanting in the true, total return of Spirit
into itself, and Spirit would thus not search into the deep-
things of the Godhead. But this return into itself and
this searching into the Other are essentially eoincident ;.
for mere immediacy, substantial Being, does- not imply
anything deep. It is the real return into self which
alone makes the depths of God, and it is just the act off
searching into the Essence which is return into self.
We may stop here with this preliminary reference to-
the more concrete sense of the difference indicated,. and»
which we discovered by means of reflection. What had
to be called attention to was that the difference is not a
superfluous multiplicity ; further, that the division spring-
ing from it, and which was, to begin with, of a formal and
external character, contains two characteristics — Nature,
natural things, and the progress of consciousness to God
VOL. III. P
226 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and from Him back to Being, both of which equally and
necessarily belong to one conception, and this quite as
much in the course of the subjective procedure of know-
ledge as when they have an absolutely objective concrete
sense, and, regarded each for itself, present a one-sided-
ness of a most important kind. So far as knowledge is
concerned, their integration is found in the totality which
the Notion in general represents, and, more strictly speak-
ing, in what was said about it, namely, that its unity as a
unity of the two moments is a result representing the most
absolute basis and result of the two moments. Without,
however, presupposing this totality and its necessity, it
will follow from the result of the one movement — and
since we are beginning we can begin only in a one-sided
way from the one — that by its own dialectic nature it
forces itself to go over into the other, and passes from
itself over into this complete integration. The objective
signification of what is, to begin with, a merely subjective
conclusion will, however, at once make it evident that the
inadequate, finite form of that proof is done away with.
Its finitude consists, above all, in this one-sidedness which
attaches to its indifference and its separation from the con-
tent. "When this one-sideduess has been done away with
and absorbed, it comes to have the content also in itself
in its true form. The process of elevation to God is in
itself the abolition of the one-sidedness of subjectivity in
general, and, above all, of knowledge.
To the distinction which, regarded from the formal side,
appears as a difference in the kinds of the proofs of the
existence of God, there has yet to be added the fact that
if we look at the proof from the one side according to
which we pass from the Being of God to the conception
of God, it presents itself under two forms.
The first proof starts from the Being which as some-
thing contingent does not support itself, and from this
reasons to a true necessary Being in-and-for-itself — this
is the proof ex contingentia mundi.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OP GOD 227
The other proof starts from Being in so far as it has
a definite character determined in accordance with rela-
tions implying an end, and reasons to a wise author of
this Being — this is the Teleological Proof of the existence
of God.
We have still to deal with the other side, according
to which the notion or conception of God is made the
starting-point, and from which we reason to its Being —
the Ontological Proof. As this is the plan we mean to
follow out, there are thus three proofs which we have to
consider ; and also, as being of no less importance, we have
to consider the criticism which has been given of them,
and owing to which they have been discarded and for-
gotten.
TENTH LECTURE
THE proofs we have to deal with, regarded in their fii^st
aspect, presuppose the world in general, and, above all, its
contingency. The starting-point is constituted by em-
pirical things, and by the Whole composed of these things,
namely, the world. The Whole is certainly superior to
its parts, the Whole, that is to say defined as the unity
which embraces and gives their character to all the parts,
as, for instance, even when we speak of the Whole of a
house, and still more in the case of that Whole which is
a self-existent unity, as the soul is in reference to the
living body. By the term world, however, we understand
the aggregate of material things, the collection merely of
that infinite number of existing things which are actually
visible, and each of which is, to begin with, conceived of
as existing for itself. The world embraces men equally
with natural things. When the world is thus taken as
an aggregate, and even as an aggregate merely of natural
things, it is not conceived of as Nature, by which we under-
stand something which is in itself a systematic Whole, a
system of arrangements and gradations, and particularly of
laws. The term world as thus understood expresses the
aggregate merely, and suggests that it is based simply on
the existing mass of things, and has thus no superiority,
no qualitative superiority at least, over material things.
So far as we are concerned, these things further deter-
mine themselves in a variety of ways, and chiefly as limited
Being, finitude, contingency, and so on. This is the kind
of starting-point from which the spirit raises itself to God.
It adjudges limited, finite or contingent Being to be untrue
Being, above and beyond which true Being exists. It
228
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 229
escapes into the region of another, unlimited Being, which
represents the Essence as opposed to that unessential,
external Being. The world of finitude, of things tem-
poral, of change, of transitoriness, is not the true form of
existence, but the Infinite, Eternal, and Unchangeable.
And even if what we have called limitless Being, the
Infinite, Eternal, and Unchangeable, does not succeed in
expressing the absolute fulness of meaning contained in
the word God, still God is limitless Being, He is infinite,
eternal, and unchangeable, and thus the spirit rises at least
to those divine predicates or to those fundamental qualities
of His nature which, though abstract, are yet universal,
or at least to that universal region, to the pure sether in
which God dwells.
This elevation of the soul to God is, speaking generally,
that fact in the history of the human spirit which we call
religion, but religion in a general sense, that is, in a purely
abstract sense, and thus this elevation is the general, but
merely the general, basis of religion.
The principle of immediate knowledge does not get
beyond this elevation as a fact. It appeals to it, and rests
in it as a fact, and asserts that it represents that universal
fact in men, and even in all men, which is called the inner
revelation of God in the human spirit, or reason. We
have already sufficiently examined this principle, and I
accordingly refer to it once more only in so far as we here
confine our attention to the fact in question. This very
fact, the act of elevation to God namely, is as such rather
something which is directly of the nature of mediation.
It has its beginning and starting-point in finite, contingent
existence, in material things, and represents an advance
from these to something else. It is consequently mediated
by that beginning, and is an elevation to what is infinite
and in itself necessary, only inasmuch as it does not stop
short at that beginning which is here alone the Immediate
(and this an Immediate which afterwards exhibits a merely
relative character), but rises to the Infinite by the mediate
230 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
step of the abandonment and renunciation of such a stand-
point. This elevation which is represented by conscious-
ness, is consequently in itself mediated knowledge.
With regard to the point from which this elevation
starts, we may here further remark that the content is
not of a sensuous kind, not an empirical concrete content
composed of sensation or perception, nor a concrete content
of imagination — the truth rather being that the abstract
thought-determinations implied in the ideas of the fini-
tude and contingency of the world form the starting-
point. The goal at which the elevation arrives is of a
similar kind, namely, the infinitude or absolute necessity
of God, conceived of not as having a more developed and
richer determination, but as being wholly within the
limits of these general categories. With regard to this
aspect of the question it is necessary to point out that the
universality of the fact of this elevation is false so far as
its form is concerned. For instance, it can be maintained
that even amongst the Greeks the thought of infinity,
of inherently existing necessity as representing the ulti-
mate principle of all things, was the possession of the
philosophers only. Material things did not appear in this
general way to the popular conception in the abstract form
of material things and as contingent and finite things, but
rather in their empirical and concrete shape. So in the
same way God was not conceived of under the category of
the Infinite, the Eternal, the inherently Necessary, but, on
the contrary, in accordance with the definite shapes created
by the imagination. Still less is it the case that those
nations who occupied a lower stage of culture put their
conceptions in any such actually universal forms. These
general forms of thought do certainly pass through men's
minds, as we say, because men are thinking beings, and
when they have received a fixed form in language they
are still further developed into the conscious thought upon
which the proof proper is based, but even in that case
they take, to begin with, the form of characteristics of
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 231
concrete objects ; they don't require to get a fixed place
in consciousness as independent in their own right. It
was to the culture of our time that these categories of
thought first became familiar, and they are now universal,
or at least universally diffused. But those very people
who have shared in this culture, and no less those who
have been referred to as unpractised in the independent
exercise of thought based on general conceptions, have
not reached this idea in any immediate way, but, on the
contrary, by following the varied course of thought, and by
the study of the sense in which words are used. People
have essentially learned to think, and have given currency
to their thoughts. The culture which is capable of abstract
conception is something which has been reached through
mediation of an infinitely manifold character. The one
fact in this fact of the elevation of Man to God is that
it is a mediation.
It is this circumstance, namely, that the elevation of the
spirit to God has mediation in itself, which invites to proof,
that is, to the explication of the separate moments of this
process of the spirit, and to their explication in the form of
thought. It is the spirit in its most inward character, that
is, in its thought, which produces this elevation, which in its
turn represents the course followed by the thought-deter-
minations or characteristic qualities of thought. What is
intended to be effected by this process of proof is that this
activity of thought should be brought into consciousness,
that consciousness should recognise it as representing those
moments of thought in a connected form. Against this
unfolding of these moments which shows itself in the
region of mediation through thought, faith, which wishes
to continue to be immediate certainty, protests, and so, too,
does the criticism of the Understanding, which is at home
in the intricacies of that mediation, and is at home in the
latter in order that it may introduce confusion into the
elevation itself. So far as faith is concerned, we may say
that however many faults Understanding may find with
232 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
these proofs, and whatever defective points there may be in
their manner of unfolding the moments of the elevation of
the spirit from the accidental and temporal to the infinite
and eternal, the human heart will not allow itself to be
deprived of this elevation. In so far as the human heart
has been checked in this matter of elevation to God by
the Understanding, faith has, on the one hand, appealed to
it to hold fast by this elevation, and not to trouble itself
with the fault-finding of the Understanding ; but it has, on
the other hand, told itself not to trouble about proof at
all, in order that it may reach what is the surest standing
ground, and in the interest of its own simplicity it has
ranged itself on the side of the critical Understanding in
direct opposition to proof. Faith will not allow itself to
be robbed of its right of rising to God, that is, of its witness
to the truth, because this is inherently necessary, and is
more than any single chance fact connected with Spirit.
There are facts, inner experiences in Spirit, and still more
are there in the individual spirits — for Spirit does not
exist as an abstraction, but in the form of many spirits —
facts of an infinitely varied sort, and sometimes of the most
opposite and depraved character. In order that this fact
may be rightly conceived of as a fact of Spirit as such, and
not merely as a fact belonging to the various ephemeral
contingent spirits, it is requisite to conceive of it in its
necessary character. It is this necessary character which
alone vouches for its truth in this contingent and arbitrary
sphere. The sphere to which this higher fact belongs is,
further, essentially the sphere of abstraction. Not only
is it very difficult to have a clear and definite conscious-
ness of what abstraction is and what is the nature of its
inner connection, but this power of abstraction is itself
the real danger, and this is a danger which is unavoidable
when abstraction has once appeared, when the believing
human spirit has once tasted of the Tree of Knowledge,
and thought. has begun to spring up within it in the free
and independent form which peculiarly belongs to it.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 233
If, accordingly, we look more narrowly at the inner
course followed by Spirit in thought and its moments, it
will be seen, as has been already observed, that the first
starting-point represents a category of thought, namely,
that of the contingency of natural things. The first form
of the elevation of the spirit to God is represented histori-
cally by the so-called Cosmological Proof of the existence
of God. It has also been pointed out that on the definite-
ness of the starting-point depends also the definiteness of
the goal which we wish to reach. Natural things might
be defined in another way, and in that case the result or
the truth would also be differently defined. We might
have differences which would appear unimportant to very
imperfectly developed thought, but which from that stand-
point of thought which we at present occupy would be seen
to be the very thing with which we were really concerned
and which has to be reckoned with. If things were thus
defined in a general way as existing, it might be shown that
the truth of existence as determinate Being, was Being itself,
indeterminate, limitless Being. God would thus be defined
as Being — the most abstract of all definitions, and the one
with which, as is well known, the Eleatics started. We
recall this abstraction most vividly in connection with the
distinction already made between thought in its inner and
implicit form and the bringing forward of thoughts into
consciousness. Who is there who does not use the word
Being ? (The weather is fine. Where are you ? and so on,
ad infinitum.) And who, in forming conceptions, does not
make use of this pure category of thought, though it is
concealed in the concrete content (the weather, and so
on, ad infinitum), of which consciousness in forming any
such conceptions is composed, and of which alone, therefore,
it has any knowledge ? There is an infinite difference be-
tween the possession and employment of the category of
thought called Being in this way, and its employment by
the Eleatics, who gave it a fixed meaning in itself, and
conceived of it as the ultimate principle, as the Absolute,
234 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
along with God at least, or apart from any God at all.
Further, when things are defined as finite, Spirit has risen
from them to what is infinite ; and when they are defined
at the same time as real Being, then Spirit has risen to
the Infinite as representing what is ideal or ideal Being.
Or if they are expressly defined as having Being in a
merely immediate way, then Spirit rises from this pure
immediacy, which is a mere semblance of Being, to the
Essence, and regards this as representing the ground or
basis of Being. It may again rise from them as repre-
senting parts, to God as representing the Whole ; or from
them as external and selfless things, to God as representing
the force behind them ; or from them as effects, to their
cause. All these characteristics are applied to things by
thought, and in the same way the categories of Being, the
Infinite, the Ideal, Essence and Ground, the Whole, Force,
Cause, are used to describe God. It is implied that they
may be employed to describe Him, yet still as suggesting
that though they may be validly applied to Him, and
though God is really Being, the Infinite, Essence, the
Whole, Force, and so on, they do not, all the same, exhaust
His nature, which is deeper and richer than anything such
determinations can express. The advance from any such
determination of existence taken as a starting-point and
as representing the finite in general, to its final determina-
tion, that is, to the Infinite in thought, deserves the name
Proof exactly in the same way as those proofs to which
the name has been formally given. In this way the
number of proofs goes far beyond that of those already
mentioned. From what standpoint are we to regard this
further increase in the number of the proofs which have
thus grown up in what is perhaps for us an unpleasant
way ? We cannot exactly reject this multiplicity of argu-
ments. On the contrary, when we have once placed our-
selves at the standpoint of those mediations of thought
which are recognised as proofs, we find we have to explain
why in thus adducing them we have confined, and can
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 235
confine, ourselves just to the number mentioned, and to
the categories contained in them. In reference to this
new and further extended variety of proofs, we have to
think principally of what was said in connection with
those which appeared at an earlier stage and in a more
limited shape. This multiplicity of starting-points which
thus presents itself is nothing else than that large number
of categories which naturally belong to the logical treat-
ment of the subject. We have merely to indicate the
manner in which they point to this latter. They show
themselves to be nothing but the series of the continuous
determinations which belong to the Notion, and not to any
one notion, but to the Notion in itself. They represent
the development of the Notion till it reaches externali-
sation, the condition in which its elements are mutually
exclusive, though it has really gone deeper into itself.
The one side of this continuous advance is represented
by the finite definiteness of a form of the Notion ; the
other, by its most obvious truth, which is in its turn
simply the truth in a more concrete and deeper form than
that which preceded it. The highest stage in one sphere
is at the same time the beginning of a higher stage. It
is logic which unfolds in its necessity this advance in the
determination of the Notion. Each stage through which
it passes so far involves the elevation of a category of
finitude into its infinitude, and it thus likewise involves
from its starting-point onwards a metaphysical concep-
tion of God, and, since this elevation is conceived of in
its necessity, a proof of His Being. Thus also the tran-
sition from the one stage to the higher stage presents
itself as a necessary advance in more concrete and deeper
determination, and not only as a series of random con-
ceptions, and so as an advance to perfectly concrete truth,
to the full and perfect manifestation of the Notion, to the
equating or identification of these its manifestations with
itself. Logic is, so far, metaphysical theology, which treats
of the evolution of the Idea of God in the aether of pure
236 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
thought, and thus concerns itself peculiarly with this Idea,
which is perfectly independent in-and-for-itself.
Such detailed treatment is not the object of these lec-
tures. We wish to confine ourselves here to the his-
torical discussion of those characteristics of the Notion
the rising from which to the characteristics of the Notion
which are its truth, and which may be held to be the
characteristics of the Notion of God, is the point to be
considered. The reason of the general incompleteness
which marks that method of taking up the characteristics
of the Notion can only be found in the defective ideas
prevalent with regard to the nature of the characteristics
of the Notion itself, and of their mutual connection, as
well as of the nature of the act of rising from them as
finite to the Infinite. The more immediate reason why
the characteristic of the contingency of the world and that
of the absolutely necessary Essence which corresponds to
it appear as the starting-point and as the result of the
proof respectively — and this reason is at the same time
a relative justification of the preference given to them —
is to be looked for in the fact that the category of the
relation between contingency and necessity is that in
which all the relations of the finitude and the infinitude
of Being are resumed and comprised. The most concrete
determination of the finitude of Being is contingency, and
in the same way the infinitude of Being in its most com-
pletely determined form is necessity. Being in its own
essentiality is reality, and reality is in itself the general
relation between contingency and necessity which finds
its complete determination in absolute necessity. Fini-
tude, by being taken up into this thought-determination,
has the advantage, so to speak, of being so far prepared
by this means as to point in itself to the transition to its
truth or necessity. The term contingency, or accident,
already suggests a kind of existence whose special character
it is to pass away.
Necessity itself, however, has its truth in freedom; with
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 237
it we enter into a new sphere, into the region of the Notion
itself. This latter accordingly affords another relation for
the determination of elevation to God and for the course
it follows, a different determination both of the starting-
point and the result, and, first of all, the determination
of what is conformable to an end, and that of the End.
This accordingly becomes the category for a further proof
of the existence of God. But the Notion is not some-
thing merely submerged in objectivity, as it is when re-
garded as an end, in which case it is merely the deter-
mination of things ; but, on the contrary, it is for itself,
and exists independently of objectivity. Eegarded in
this light, it is itself the starting-point, and its transition
has a determination of its own, which has been already
referred to. The fact, therefore, that the first Proof, the
Cosmological Proof, adopts the category of the relation of
contingency and absolute necessity, finds, as has been re-
marked, its relative justification in this, that this relation
is the most individual, most concrete, and, in fact, the
ultimate characteristic of reality as such, and accordingly
represents and comprises in itself the truth of the more
abstract categories of Being taken collectively. The move-
ment of this relation likewise includes the movement of
the earlier, more abstract characteristics of finitude to the
still more abstract characteristics of infinitude; or rather,
it is, in a logically abstract sense, the movement, or pro-
cedure of the proof, that is, it is the form of syllogistic
reasoning, in all cases only one and the same, which is
represented in it.1
As is well known, the effect of the criticism directed by
Kant against the metaphysical proofs of the existence of
God has been that these arguments have been abandoned,
and that they are no longer mentioned in any scientific
treatise on the subject ; in fact, one is almost ashamed to
1 Lecture X. ends here, and what follows is a fragment found amongst
Hegel's papers, and inserted at this point by the German editor.
238 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
adduce them at all. It is allowed, however, that they
may be used in a popular way, and these helps to truth
are universally employed in connection with the instruc-
tion of youth, and the edification of those who are grown
up. So, too, that eloquence which has for its principal
aim to warm the heart and elevate the feelings necessarily
takes and uses them as the inner fundamental and con-
necting principles of the ideas with which it deals. With
regard to the so-called Cosmological Proof, Kant (" Critique
of Pure lieasou," 2nd edition, p. 643) makes the general
remark that if we presuppose the existence of anything,
we cannot avoid what follows from this, namely, that
something or other exists in a necessary way, and that
this is an absolutely natural conclusion ; and he goes on
further to remark, at p. 651, with regard to the Physico-
theological Proof, that "it ought always to be mentioned
with respect, since it is the oldest, the clearest, and the
one most in harmony with ordinary human reason." He
declares that " it would not only be a comfortless task, but
an absolutely useless one, to attempt to detract in any way
from the authority of this proof." He holds, further, that
" reason can never be so far repressed by any doubts sug-
gested by subtle abstract speculation as to be unable to
extricate herself from any such burrowing indecision as
from a dream, by the mere glance which she directs to
the wonders of Nature and the majesty of the universe,
in order thus to go from one form of greatness to another
until the highest of all is reached, and to rise from the
conditioned to the condition, until she arrives at the
supreme and unconditioned Author of all."
If, then, the proof first adduced expresses an unavoid-
able conclusion from which it is impossible to escape, and
if it would be absolutely useless to seek to detract from
the authority of the second proof, and if reason can never
be so far repressed as to renounce this method of proof
and not to rise through it to the unconditioned Author
of all, it must certainly appear strange that we should
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 239
evade the demand referred to, and if all the while reason
be held to be so entirely repressed that it no longer at-
taches any weight to this proof. But just as it may
appear to be a sin against the good society of the philo-
sophers of our time to continue to mention those proofs,
it equally appears that the philosophy of Kant, and Kant's
refutations of those proofs, are something which we have
long ago done with, and which is therefore not to be men-
tioned any more.
The fact, however, is that it is Kant's criticism alone
which has done away with these proofs in a scientific way,
and which has itself become the source of the other and
shorter method of rejecting them, that method, namely,
which makes feeling alone the judge of truth, and as-
serts not only that thought is superfluous, but that it
is damnable. In so far, then, as we are concerned in
getting to know the scientific reasons for which these
proofs have lost their authority, it is Kant's criticism,
alone with which we are called to deal. It is, however,
to be noticed, further, that the ordinary proofs which
Kant subjects to criticism, and in particular the Cosmo-
logical and Physico-theological Proofs, whose method we
are here considering, contain characteristics of a moie
concrete kind than the abstract merely qualitative char-
acteristics of finitude and infinitude. Thus the Cosmo-
logical Proof contains the characteristics of contingent
existence and of absolutely necessary Essence. It has
also been observed that even when the antitheses are
expressed by the terms conditioned and unconditioned, or
by accident and substance, they still necessarily have here
this merely qualitative meaning. Here, accordingly, the
really essential point to be dealt with is the formal pro-
cedure of the mediation connected with the proof; and,
besides, the content and the dialectic nature of the char-
acteristics themselves are not dealt with in the meta-
physical syllogisms referred to, nor in Kant's criticism
either. It is, however, just the mediation of this very
240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
dialectic element which it is necessary to carry through
and pass judgment upon. For the rest, the particular
mode in which the mediation in those metaphysical lines
of argument, as well as that belonging to Kant's estimate
of them, is to be conceived of, is, as a whole, the same;
and this is true of all the separate proofs of the existence
of God, that is, of all those belonging to the class which
starts from some given form of existence. And if we
here look more closely at the nature of this syllogism of
the Understanding, we shall have also settled its character
so far as the other proofs are concerned, and in dealing witli
them we shall have to direct our attention merely to the
content of the characteristics in its more definite form.
The consideration of Kant's criticism of the Cosmological
Proof comes to be all the more interesting from the fact
that, according to Kant, this proof has concealed in it " a
whole nest of dialectic assumptions, which, nevertheless,
transcendental criticism is able to lay bare and destroy."
I shall first restate this proof in the form in which it is
usually expressed, which is the one employed by Kant,
and which runs thus : If anything exists — not merely
exists, but exists a continyentia mundi, is defined as con-
tingent— then some absolutely necessary Essence must
exist as well. Now I myself at least exist, and there-
fore an absolutely rational Essence exists. Kant remarks,
first of all, that the minor term contains something derived
from experience, and that the major term concludes from
experience in general that something necessary exists ;
that consequently the proof is not carried through in an
absolutely & priori way, a remark which connects itself
with what was mentioned before as to the general nature
of this style of argument, which takes up merely one
aspect of the total true mediation.
The next remark has reference to a point of supreme
importance in connection with this style of argument,
and which Kant expresses in the following form. The
necessary Essence can be characterised as necessary only
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 241
in one single mode, that is, in respect of all possible
opposing predicates only by means of one of these, and
consequently there can be only one single conception of
any such thing, namely, that of the most real Essence —
a conception which confessedly forms the subject of the
Ontological Proof, to be dealt with much later on.
It is against this latter more comprehensive character-
istic of necessary Essence that Kant first of all directs
his criticism, and which he describes as a mere refinement
of reasoning. The empirical ground of proof above
mentioned cannot tell us what are the attributes of this
necessary Essence. To reach these, reason has absolutely
to part company with experience, and to seek in pure
conceptions what kind of attributes or qualities an,
absolutely necessary Essence must possess, and what
thing amongst all possible things has the requisite quali-
fications which should belong to an absolute necessity.
We might attribute to the age the many marks of want
of intellectual training which characterise these expres-
sions, and be willing to admit that anything like this is
not to be found in the scientific and philosophical modes
of statement current in our day. At all events, God
would not in these days be any longer qualified as a
thing, nor would we try to seek amongst all possible
things some one thing which should suit the conception
of God. We speak indeed of the qualities or attributes of
this or that man, or of Peruvian bark, and such like ; but
in philosophical statements we do not speak of attributes
in reference to God as a thing. Only we all the more
frequently hear conceptions spoken of simply as abstract
specific forms of thought, so that it is no longer necessary
to indicate what we mean when we ask information regard-
ing the notion or conception of anything, or when, in fact,
we wish to form a conception of any object. It has,
however, quite become a generally accepted principle, or
rather it has come to form part of the belief of this
age, that reason should be reproached with putting its
VOL. III. Q
242 THE .PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
investigations in the form of pure conceptions, and even
that this should be reckoned a crime ; in other words, it
is blamed for showing itself active in a way different from
that of sense-perception, or from that followed by ima-
gination and poetry. In the case of Kant we see, at
any rate, in his treatment of the subject, the definite pre-
suppositions from which he starts, and the logical result
of the reasoning process he follows, so that any opinion
arrived at is expressly reached and proved by means of
principles, and it is held that any view must be deduced
from principles, and be, in fact, of a philosophical kind.
In our day, on the contrary, if we go along the highway
of knowledge, we meet with the oracular utterances of
feeling, and the assertions of the individual person who
has the pretension to speak in the name of all men, and
as a consequence of this pretends that he has also a right
.to impose his assertions upon everybody. There cannot
possibly be any kind of precision in the characteristics
which spring from such sources of knowledge, nor in the
form in which they are expressed, nor can they lay claim
to be logical or to be based on principles or grounds.
That part of Kant's criticism referred to suggests the
definite thought, first of all, that the proof we are dealing
with leads us merely to the idea of a necessary Essence,
but that any such characteristic is different from the
conception of God, that is, from the characteristic of the
most real Essence, and that this latter must be deduced
by reason from the former by means of conceptions pure
and simple. It will at once be seen that if this proof
does not bring us any further than to the idea of an
absolutely necessary Essence, the only objection which
could be urged against it would be, that the idea of God
which is limited to what is implied in this characteristic
is at any rate not such a profound idea as we, whose con-
ception of God is more comprehensive, wish for. It is
quite possible that individuals and nations belonging to
an earlier age, or who, while belonging to our age, aie
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 243
living outside the pale of Christianity and of our civilisa-
tion, might have no more profound idea of God than this.
For all such, this proof would consequently be sufficient
enough. We may, in any case, allow that God and God
only is the absolutely necessary Essence, even if this char-
acteristic does not exhaust the Christian idea, which, as
a matter of fact, includes in it something more profound
than the metaphysical characteristic of so-called natural
theology — something more profound, too, than what is
found in the conception of God which belongs to im-
mediate knowledge and faith. It is itself questionable
if immediate knowledge can even say this much of God,
that He is the absolutely necessary Essence ; at any rate,
if one person can know this much of God immediately,
another may equally well not know so much of Him
immediately in the absence of any right on the part of
any one to expect more of him, for a right implies reasons
and proofs, that is, mediations of knowledge, and media-
tions are excluded from and forbidden to immediate
knowledge of this kind.
But if the development of what is contained in the
characteristic of absolutely necessary Essence gives us
still further characteristics as duly following from it,
what objection can there be to accepting these, and to
being convinced of their validity ? The ground of proof
may be empirical ; but if the proof is in itself a properly
deduced consequence, and if the existence of a necessary
Essence is once for all established by this consequence,
reason starting from this basis pursues its investigations
by the aid of what are purely conceptions ; but this can
be reckoned an unjustifiable act only when the employ-
ment of reason in general is considered wrong, and, as a
matter of fact, Kant carries the degradation of reason
as far as those do who limit all truth to immediate
knowledge.
However, the characteristic of the so-called most real
Essence is easily deducible from the characteristic of the
244 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
absolutely necessary Essence, or even from the charac-
teristic of the Infinite, beyond which we have not gone,
for all and every limitation contains a reference to an
Other, and is consequently opposed to the characteristic
of the Absolutely-necessary and Infinite.
The real illusion or fallacy in the mode of inference
•which is supposed to belong to this proof, is sought for
by Kant in the proposition that every purely necessary
Essence is at the same time the most real Essence, and he
holds that this proposition is the nervus prdbandi of the
Cosmological Proof. He seeks, however, to expose the
fallacy by pointing out that, since a most real Essence is
not one whit different from any other Essence, the pro-
position permits of being simply inverted, that is, any —
and by this is meant the most real — Essence is absolutely
necessary, or, in other words, the most real Essence which
as such gets its determinate nature by means of the
Notion, must also contain within it the characteristic of
absolute necessity. This, however, is just the principle
and method of the Ontological Proof of the existence of
God, which consists in this, that it starts from the notion
or conception, and passes by means of the conception to
existence. The Cosmological Proof uses the Ontological
as a prop, since it promises to conduct us by a new foot-
path, and yet after a short detour brings us back to the
old one, the existence of which it refused to admit, and
which we abandoned for its sake.
It will be seen that the objection does not touch the
Cosmological Proof, either in so far as this latter merely
attains by itself to the characteristic of something abso-
lutely necessary, or in so far as it advances from this by
way of development to the further characteristic of what
is most real. So far as this connection between the two
characteristics in question is concerned, it being the point
against which Kant particularly directs his objections,
we can see that it is quite in accordance with the nature
of proof that the transition from one already established
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 245
characteristic to a second, or from a proposition already
proved to another, should permit of being clearly ex-
hibited ; but we can see, too, that reasoned knowledge
cannot go back in the same way from the second to
the first, and cannot deduce the second from the first.
Euclid first demonstrated the proposition of the known
relation between the sides of a right-angled triangle by
starting from this definite quality of the triangle, and
deducing the relationship of the sides from it. Then the
converse proposition was also demonstrated, and in this
case he started from the fact of this relation, and deduced
from it the right-angled character of the triangle, the
sides of which had that relation to one another, and yet
this was done in such a way that the demonstration of
this second proposition presupposed and made use of the
first. In another instance this demonstration of the
converse proposition is given apagogically by presuppos-
ing the first. Thus the proposition, that if in a rectilineal
figure the sum of the angles is equal to two right angles,
the figure is a triangle, can be easily proved to follow
apagogically from the proposition previously demonstrated
that in a triangle the three angles together make two
right angles. When it is shown that a predicate belongs
to an object, we must go further if we are to show that
such a predicate belongs to it exclusively, and that it is
not merely one of the characteristics of the object which
may belong to others as well, but that it is involved in
the definition of the object. This proof might be stated
in various ways, and is not compelled exactly to follow
one single path, namely, that which starts from the con-
ception of the second characteristic. Besides, in dealing
with the connection between the so-called most real
Essence and the absolutely necessary Essence, it is only
one aspect of this latter that we have to take directly into
account, and we have nothing at all to do with that
aspect in reference to which Kant brings forward the
difficulty discovered by him in the Ontological Proof.
246 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The characteristic of absolutely necessary Essence in-
volves the necessity partly of its Being, partly of the
characteristics of its content. If it be asked what is
implied in the further predicate, the all-embracing, un-
limited reality, the reply is that this question has no
reference to Being as such, but to what is to be further
distinguished as the characteristic of the content. In the
Cosmological Proof, Being has already a definite existence
of its own, and the question as to how we pass from
absolute necessity to the All-Reality, and back from the
latter to the former, has reference to this content only,
and not to Being. Kant finds the defect of the Onto-
logical Proof in the fact that in connection with its
fundamental characteristic, the All of realities, Being is
likewise conceived of as a reality. In the Cosmological
Proof, however, we have already this Being elsewhere.
Inasmuch as it adds the characteristic of All-Reality
to what is for it absolutely necessary, it does not at all
require that Being should be characterised as reality, and
that it should be comprised in that All-Reality.
Kant in his criticism begins by taking the advance of
the characteristic of the Absolutely-necessary to unlimited
reality only in this sense, since, as was previously indi-
cated, for him the point of this advance is the discovery
of the attributes possessed by the absolutely necessary
Essence, as the Cosmological Proof in itself has made
only one step in advance, namely, to the existence of an
absolutely necessary Essence in general, but cannot tell
us what kind of attributes this Essence possesses. We
must therefore hold that Kant is in error in asserting
that the Cosmological Proof rests on the Ontological, and
we must regard it as a mistake even to maintain that
it requires this latter to complete it, that is, in regard
to what it has in general to accomplish. That more,
however, has to be accomplished than it accomplishes, is
a matter for further consideration, and this further step
is undoubtedly taken in the moment contained in the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 247
Ontological Proof. But it is not the need of thus going
further, upon which Kant grounds his objection to this
proof. On the contrary, his argument is conducted from
points of view which lie wholly within the sphere of this
proof, and which do not touch it.
But the objection referred to is not the only one which
Kant brings forward against the line of argument fol-
lowed by the Cosmological Proof. He goes on (p. 637)
to expose the "further assumptions," a "whole nest" of
which, he declares, is concealed in it.
It contains, above all, the transcendental principle
according to which we reason from what is contingent to
a cause. This principle, however, applies in the world
of sense only, and has no meaning whatever outside of
it. For the purely intellectual conception of the con-
tingent cannot possibly produce a synthetic proposition
such as that of causality, a proposition which has a mean-
ing and a use merely in the world of sense, but which is
supposed to help us to get beyond the world of sense.
What is maintained here, on the one hand, is the well-
known doctrine, which is Kant's main doctrine, of the
inadmissibility of getting beyond sense by means of
thought, and of the limitation of the use and meaning
of the categories of thought to the world of sense. The
elucidation of this doctrine does not come within the
scope of our present treatment of the subject. What has
to be said on this point may be summed up in the
following question : If thought cannot pass beyond the
world of sense, would it not be necessary, on the other
hand, to show first of all how it is conceivable that
thought can enter into the world of sense ? The other
assertion is that the intellectual conception of the con-
tingent cannot form the basis of a synthetic proposition
such as that of causality. As a matter of fact, it is by
means of this intellectual category of contingency that
the temporal world as present to perception is conceived
of; and by employing this very category which is an
248 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
intellectual one, thought has already passed beyond the
world of sense, and transferred itself to another sphere,
without having found it necessary to endeavour to pass
beyond the world of sense by using first of all the cate-
gory of causality. Then, again, this intellectual concep-
tion of the contingent is supposed to be incapable of
producing a synthetic proposition such as is involved in
the idea of causality. As a matter of fact, however, it
has to be shown that the finite passes through itself,
through what it is meant to be, through its own content,
to its Other, to the Infinite itself ; and this is what forms
the basis of a synthetic proposition according to Kant's
use of the term. The nature of the contingent is of a
similar kind. It is not necessary to take the category
of causality as referring to the Other into which con-
tingency passes over; on the contrary, this Other is, to
begin with, the absolute necessity, and is consequently
Substance also. The relation of substantiality, however,
is itself one of those synthetic relations which Kant refers
to as the categories, and this just means that " the purely
.intellectual characteristic of the contingent" — for the
categories are essentially the characteristic qualities of
thought — gives rise to the synthetic principle of sub-
stantiality, so that if we posit contingency we posit sub-
stantiality as well. This principle which expresses an
intellectual relation, and is a category, is certainly not em-
ployed here in an element which is heterogeneous, namely,
in the world of sense, but, on the contrary, in the intel-
lectual world, which is its natural home. If it had no
defect otherwise, it might, in fact, be applied with absolute
justice in that sphere in which we are concerned with
God, who can be conceived of only in thought and in
Spirit, and this in opposition to its employment in the
sensuous element, which is foreign to it.
The second fundamental fallacy to which Kant directs
attention (p. 637) is that contained in arguing from the
impossibility of there being an infinite series of successive
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 249
given causes in the world of sense, to the existence of a first
cause. We are not justified in arguing thus on the prin-
ciples which guide the use of reason even in experience
itself, and still less can we extend this fundamental
principle beyond experience. It is quite true we cannot
within the world of sense and experience reason to the
existence of a first cause, for in this world as a finite
world there can be only conditioned causes. But just
because of this, reason is not only justified in passing
into the intelligible sphere, but is forced to do it ; or
rather, as a matter of fact, it is only in this sphere that
reason is at home. It does not pass beyond the world
of sense, but because it has this idea of a first cause it
simply finds itself in another region, and we can look for
a meaning in reason only in so far as it and its idea are
thought of as being independent of the world of sense, and
as having an independent standing in-and-for-themselves.
The third charge brought by Kant against reason in
connection with this proof is that it finds what is a false
self-satisfaction, inasmuch as in the matter of the com-
pletion of the series of causes it finally casts aside a con-
dition of any kind, while, as a matter of fact, there can
be no necessity apart from a condition ; and he objects,
again, that the fact that we cannot conceive of anything
further is held to be a completion of the conception.
Now it is certain that if we are dealing with an uncon-
ditioned necessity, with an absolutely necessary Essence,
we can reach it only in so far as it is conceived of as
unconditioned, that is, in so far as the characteristic
quality of having conditions has been done away with.
But, adds Kant, anything necessary cannot exist apart
from conditions. A necessity of this sort which rests on
conditions, that is, on conditions external to it, is a merely
external, conditioned necessity ; while an unconditioned
absolute necessity is simply one which contains its con-
ditions within itself, if we must speak of conditions in
connection with it. The difficulty here is just the truly
250 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
dialectic relation above referred to according to which
the condition, or whatever other definition may be given
of contingent existence or the finite, is something whose
very nature it is to rise to the unconditioned, to the in-
finite, and thus in what is conditioned to do away with
what conditions, and in the act of mediating to do away
with the mediation. Kant, however, did not penetrate
beyond the relations of the Understanding to the concep-
tion of this infinite negativity. Continuing this argument,
he says (p. 641), we cannot avoid having the thought,
and yet we cannot entertain it, that a Being whom we con-
ceive of as the Highest should, as it were, say to Himself :
I am from eternity to eternity, besides me there is nothing,
unless what exists by my will; but whence then am
I ? Here everything sinks under us, and floats without
support or foothold in the presence merely of speculative
reason, while it costs the latter nothing to allow the
greatest as well as the smallest perfection to go. But
there is one thing which speculative reason must above
all else " allow to go," and that is the putting of such a
question as, Whence am I ? into the mouth of the abso-
lutely necessary and unconditioned. As if that outside
of which nothing exists unless through its will, that
which is simply infinite, could look beyond itself for an
other than itself, and ask about something beyond itself.
In bringing forward these objections, Kant, in short,
gives vent to the view which he had, to begin with, in
common with Jacobi, and which afterwards came to be
the regular beaten track of argument, the view, namely,
that where we do not have the fact of being conditioned
along with what conditions, it is impossible to form con-
ceptions at all — in other words, that where the rational
begins, reason ends.
The fourth error to which Kant draws attention is
connected with the ostensible confusion between the
logical possibility of the conception of all reality and the
transcendental characteristics, which latter will be further
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 251
dealt with when we come to consider Kant's criticism
of the Ontological Proof.
To this criticism. Kant adds (p. 642) the "discovery" and
" explanation " — made in his peculiar style — of the dia-
lectic illusion which exists in all transcendental proofs of
the existence of a necessary Essence, an explanation which
contains nothing new ; and then we have in Kant's usual
fashion an incessant repetition of what is always one and
the same assurance, namely, that we cannot think the
Thing-in-itself.
He calls the Cosmological Proof, as he does the Onto-
logical, a transcendental proof, because it is independent of
empirical principles ; that is to say, it is supposed to be
established, not by reasoning from any particular quality
of experience whatsoever, but from pure principles of
reason, and even abandons that method of deduction
according to which existence is given through empirical
consciousness, in order to base itself on what are simply
pure conceptions. What better method indeed could
philosophical proof adopt than that of basing itself only
on pure conceptions ? Kant, on the contrary, in speaking,
thus, intends to say the very worst he possibly can of
this proof. So far, however, as the dialectic illusion is
concerned, the discovery of which is here made by Kant,
we find it to consist in the fact that while I must indeed
allow that existence in general has a necessary element
in it, no single thing can, on the other hand, be thought
of as necessary in itself, and that I can never complete
the act of going back to the conditions of existence with-
out assuming the existence of something necessary while
I can at the same time never start from this.
It must in justice be allowed that this remark con-
tains the essential moment on which the whole question
turns. What is necessary in itself must show that it
has its beginning in itself, and must be conceived of in
such a way as to allow of its being proved that its begin-
ning is in itself. This requirement is indeed the only
252 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
interesting point, and we must assume that it lay at the
bottom of what was previously referred to, namely, the
trouble Kant took to prove that the Cosmological Proof
rests on the Ontological. The sole question is as to
how we can begin to show that anything starts from
itself, or rather how we can combine the two ideas that
the Infinite starts from an Other, and yet in doing this
starts equally from itself.
As regards the so-called explanation and solution, so
to speak, of this illusion, it will be seen to be of the same
character as the solution which he has given of what he
calls the antinomies of reason. If I must think (p. 644
of a certain necessary element as belonging to existing
things in general, and yet am not warranted in think-
ing that anything is necessary in itself, the unavoidable
conclusion is that necessity and contingency cannot apply
to, or have any connection with, the things themselves,
because otherwise we would be landed in a contradiction.
Here we have that tenderness towards things which will
not permit any contradiction to be attached to them,
although even the most superficial experience, equally
with experience of the most thorough kind, everywhere
shows that these things are full of contradictions. Kant
then goes on to say that neither of these two funda-
mental principles, of contingency and necessity, is objec-
tive ; but that they can in any case be only subjective
principles of reason, implying, on the one hand, that we
cannot stop short unless with an explanation completed
in an a priori way, while, on the other hand, any such
complete explanation is not to be looked for, that is, not
in the empirical sphere. Thus the contradiction is pre-
served and is left wholly unsolved, while it is at the
same time transferred from things to reason. If the
circumstance that the contradiction such as it is here
held to be, and such as it actually is, is not directly
solved, implies a defect, then the defect would as a
matter of fact have to be transferred to the so-called
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 253
things — which are partly merely empirical and finite,
but are also partly that Thing-in-itself which is incapable
of manifesting itself — rather than to reason, which, even
as understood by Kant, is the faculty which deals with
ideas, with the Unconditioned and the Infinite. But in
truth reason can in any case bear the weight of the con-
tradiction, and can certainly solve it too ; and things, at
all events, know how to bear it, or rather, we should say,
they are only contradiction in the form of existence ; and
this is true of that Kantian schema of the Thing-in-it-
self quite as much as of empirical things, and only in so
far as they are rational can they solve it directly within
themselves.
In Kant's criticism of the Cosmological Proof those
moments are at least discussed on which the point at
issue really turns. We have noted two circumstances
connected with this criticism : first, that the Cosmological
Argument starts from Being as a presupposition, and
from this goes on to the content, to the conception of
God ; and second, that Kant finds fault with the line of
argument on the ground that it rests on the Ontological
Proof, i.e., on the Proof in which the conception is pre-
supposed, and in which we advance from this conception
to Being. Since, according to the standpoint we at pre-
sent occupy in conducting our investigation, the concep-
tion of God has no further determinate quality than that
of the Infinite, it follows that what we are concerned
with is, speaking generally, the Being of the Infinite.
In accordance with the distinction previously referred to,
in the one instance it is Being from which we start, and
which has to get a determinate character as the Infinite ;
and in the other it is the Infinite from which we start, and
which has to get a determinate character as having Being.
Further, in the Cosmological Proof finite Being appears
as a starting-point adopted empirically. The Proof
essentially sets out from experience, as Kant says (p.
633), in order to lay a really firm foundation for itself.
254 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The relation here implied ought more strictly, however,
to be referred back to the form of the judgment in
general. In every judgment the subject is an idea
which has been presupposed, and which is defined in the
predicate, that is, an idea which is denned or determined
in a general way by thought, which means, again, that
the determinations or specific qualities of the content
of the subject have to be indicated, even if, as in the
case of the material predicates, red, hard, and so on,
this general mode of determination, which is, so to speak,
the share thought has in the matter, is really nothing
more than the empty form of universality. Thus, when
it is said that God is infinite, eternal, and so on, God is,
to begin with, as a subject simply something hypothetical,
existing in idea, and it is only in the predicate that it is
first asserted what He is. So far as the subject is con-
cerned, we do not know what He is, that is, what content
He has, or what is the determinate character of the con-
tent, as otherwise it would be superfluous to have the
copula "is" and to attach the predicate to it. Then further,
since the subject represents the hypothetical element
which exists in idea, this presupposition can be taken as
signifying what has Being, and as implying that the sub-
ject is, or, on the other hand, that it is at first only an idea,
that instead of being posited by sense-intuition, or sense-
perception, it is posited in the sphere of ideas by imagi-
nation, by conception, by reason, and that it, in fact, gets
such content as it has in the sphere of general ideas.
If we express these two moments in accordance with
this more definite form, we shall at once get a more
definite idea of the demands which are made upon them.
Those moments give rise to the two following propositions —
Being defined, to begin with, as finite,
is infinite ; and
The Infinite is.
For, so far as the first proposition is concerned, it is
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 25
evident that it is Being properly so called which is presup-
posed as a fixed subject, and that it is what must in any
view of it remain, that is, it is what must have the predi-
cate of the Infinite attached to it. Being in so far as it is,
to begin with, characterised as finite, and because the finite
and the Infinite are simultaneously conceived of as subjects,
represents what is common to both. The real point is
not that a transition is made from Being to the Infinite
as representing something different from Being, but, on
the contrary, that we pass from the finite to the Infinite,
and that in this transition Being remains unaltered. It
is consequently shown here to be the permanent subject
whose first characteristic, namely, finitude, is translated
into infinitude. It is almost superfluous to remark that
since Being is conceived of as subject and finitude as
simply one characteristic, and, in fact, as the subsequent
predicate shows, as a purely transitory characteristic,
when we are dealing with the proposition taken by itself
alone : Being is infinite, or is to be characterised as in-
finite, we must by the term Being understand Being as
such, and not empirical Being, not the moral finite world.
This first proposition is accordingly the proposition of
the Cosmological Argument, Being is the subject, and
this presupposition whether it is taken as given or de-
duced, it does not matter how, is in reference to the act
of proof as mediation through grounds or reasons in
general, the immediate in general. This consciousness
that the subject represents what is presupposed in general,
is what is alone to be regarded as the important thing
in connection with knowledge reached by demonstration.
The predicate of the proposition is the content which
must be proved to belong to the subject. Here it is the
Infinite, which has consequently to be shown to be the
predicate of Being and of its content, and as reached by
means of mediation.
The second proposition : the Infinite is, has the more
definitely determinate content as its subject, and here it
256 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
is Being which has to show itself to be what is mediated.
It is this proposition which forms the real point of in-
terest in the Ontological Proof, and has to appear as
the result. So far as the demands of the kind of proof
sought by the Understanding, and of the mere knowledge
of the Understanding, are concerned, the proof of this
second proposition as connected with the first proposition
of the Cosmological Argument may be dispensed with ;
but it is certainly demanded by the requirements of
reason in its higher form, though this higher requirement
of reason appears in Kant's criticism disguised, so to
speak, as a mere piece of chicanery, which has been
deduced from some more remote consequence.
The fact, however, that these two propositions are
necessary rests on the nature of the Notion, in so far as
this latter is conceived of in accordance with its true
nature, that is, in a speculative way. Here, however, it
is presupposed that this knowledge of the Notion has been
got from logic, just as it is presupposed in the same way
that logic tells us that a true proof is rendered impossible
by the very nature of such propositions as the two referred
to. This may, however, be briefly indicated here as well,
in accordance with the explanation which has been given
regarding the peculiar nature of these judgments, and it
is all the more fitting to make this plain at this point,
since the current principle of so-called immediate know-
ledge recognises and takes into consideration just this
very proof of the Understanding and no other, a proof
which is inadmissible in philosophy. What has to be
demonstrated is a proposition, a judgment, in fact, with a
subject and predicate. "We cannot, to begin with, find
any fault with the demand here implied, and it looks as
if the whole point turned on the nature of the act of
proof. But the very fact that it is a judgment which has
to be proved at once renders any true philosophical proof
impossible. For it is the subject which is presupposed,
and consequently becomes the standard for the predicate
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 257
the truth of which has to be proved ; and accordingly the
essential criterion so far as the proposition is concerned,
is merely whether the predicate is adequate to the sub-
ject or not, and idea or ordinary thought, on which the
presupposition is based, is taken as deciding the truth.
But the main and only concern of knowledge, the claims
of which have not been satisfied, and which have not even
been taken into account, is just to find out whether this
very presupposition contained in the subject, and conse-
quently the further specification which it gets through the
predicate, is the totality of the proposition and is true.
This is something which reason forces us to, working
from within outward, unconsciously as it were. From what
has been already adduced, it is evident that an attempt
has been made to find what are called several proofs of
the existence of God : the one set of which is based on one
of the propositions above indicated, that, namely, in which
Being is the subject and constitutes the presupposition,
and in which the Infinite is a characteristic posited in it
by means of mediation ; and the other set of which has for
its basis the reverse proposition, by means of which the
first of the propositions loses its one-sidedness. Here the
defective element, namely, the fact that Being is presup-
posed, is cancelled, and conversely it is now Being which
has to be posited as mediated.
What has to be accomplished by the proof has accord-
ingly been stated in a complete enough way, but still the
nature of the proof itself as such has been in consequence
not touched upon. For each of the propositions has been
stated separately, the proof of it accordingly starts from
the presupposition which the subject contains, and which
has each time to be shown to be necessary through the
other, and not as immediately necessary. Either proposi-
tion presupposes the other, and no true beginning can be
found for them. For this very reason it appears at first
to be a matter of indifference where a beginning is made.
Only the starting-point is not a matter of indifference, and
VOL. III. R
258 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
the whole point just is to find out why it is not. The
question is not as to whether or not we are to begin with
one or other of the presuppositions, that is, with the imme-
diate characteristic, the ordinary idea ; but rather, what we
have got to see is that no beginning can be made with any
such presupposition, that is, that it cannot be regarded and
treated as forming the basis, the permanent foundation of
the proof.
For the statement that the presuppositions belonging to
each of the two propositions — of which the one is proved
by the other — have to be represented as mediated, when
taken in its more obvious sense, deprives them of the
essential meaning which belongs to them as immediate
characteristics. For the fact that they are posited as
mediated implies that their essential character consists in
their being transitory rather than permanent subjects. In
this way, however, the whole nature of the proof is altered,
for it stood in need of having the subject as a fixed basis
and standard. If it starts from something which has a
transitory character, it loses all support, and cannot, in
fact, have any existence at all. If we consider the form
of the judgment more closely, it will be seen that what
has just been explained is involved in the form itself, and,
in fact, the judgment is what it is just owing to its form.
It has, that is, for its subject something immediate, some-
thing which has Being in general, while as its predicate,
which is meant to express what the subject is, it has
something universal, namely, thought. The judgment
consequently itself signifies that what has Being is not
a something having Being, but is a thought.
This will at once become clearer from the example with
which we are dealing, and which will better help us to un-
derstand, however, why we are limited to what the example
directly contains, namely, the first of the two propositions,
in which the Infinite is posited as what has been mediated.
The express consideration of the other, in which Being
appears as a result, will be taken up in a different place.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 259
The major proposition of the Cosmological Proof in the
more abstract form in which we took it, contains what is
the essential element of the connection of the finite and
the Infinite, the thought, namely, that the latter is got by
way of hypothesis out of the former. The proposition,
" If the finite exists, the Infinite exists also," put in a more
definite form is primarily the following : " The Being of
the finite is not only its Being, but is also the Being of
the Infinite." We have thus reduced it to its simplest
form, and have left out of account those developments
which might be added to it by means of the still further
specified forms of reflection which belong to the Infinite
as having its Being conditioned by the finite, or to the
Infinite as being presupposed through the finite, or to the
relation of causality between finite and Infinite. All these
relations are contained in that one simple form. If, in
accordance with the definition previously given, we speak
of Being in more definite terms as the subject of the judg-
ment, the proposition will run thus : " Being is to be
defined not as finite only but also as infinite." The real
point is the demonstration of this connection. This, as
was shown above, springs from the conception of the
finite, and this speculative way of dealing with the nature
of the finite, with the mediation out of which the Infinite
proceeds, is the pivot round which the whole question,
namely, as to the knowledge of God and the philosophical
understanding of Him, turns. The essential point, how-
ever, in this mediation is, that the Being of the finite is
not the affirmative, but that, on the contrary, the Infinite
is posited and mediated by the abrogation of this Being
of the finite.
The essential and formal defect in the Cosmological
Proof consists in the fact that finite Being is not only
taken directly as the beginning and starting-point, but is
regarded as something true, something affirmative, with an
existence of its own. All those forms of reflection referred
to, such as the presupposed, the conditioned, causality,
260 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
have this in common, that what forms the presupposition,
the condition, the effect, are taken as affirmative, and the
connection is not conceived of as a transition, which it
essentially is. What the study of the finite from a specu-
lative point of view really yields, is not merely the thought,
that if the finite exists, the Infinite exists too, not that
Being is to be defined as not merely finite, but that it is
further to be defined as infinite. If the finite were this
affirmative, the major proposition would be the proposi-
tion— finite Being as finite is infinite, for it would be its
permanent finitude which the Infinite included in itself.
Those characteristics such as presupposition, condition,
causality, when taken together, give a still greater stability
to the affirmative show or appearance of the Being of the
finite, and are for this very reason only finite, that is,
untrue relations, relations of what is untrue. To get to
know that this is their nature is what alone constitutes the
logical interest attaching to them, though . their dialectic
in accordance with their special characteristics takes in
each case a special form, which is, however, based on the
general dialectic of the finite already referred to. The
proposition which ought to constitute the major proposi-
tion of the syllogism must accordingly take the following
form rather : the Being of the finite is not its own
Being, but is, on the contrary, the Being of its Other,
namely, the Infinite. Or to put it otherwise, Being which
is characterised as finite possesses this characteristic only
in the sense that it cannot exist independently in relation
to the Infinite, but is, on the contrary, ideal merely, a
moment of the Infinite. Consequently the minor proposi-
tion : the finite is — disappears in any affirmative sense, and
if we may still say it exists, we mean that its existence
is merely an appearance or phenomenal existence. It is
just the fact that the finite world is merely a manifesta-
tion or appearance which constitutes the absolute power
of the Infinite.
The form taken by the syllogism of the Understanding
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 261
has no place for the dialectic character which thus marks
the finite, nor has it any way of expressing it. It is not
in a position to express the rational element in it; and
since religious elevation is the rational element itself, it
cannot find satisfaction in that form of the Understanding,
for there is more in it than this form can express. It is
accordingly in itself of the greatest importance that Kant
should have deprived the so-called proofs of the existence
of God of the regard they enjoyed, even though he had
done no more than create a prejudice against them by
showing their insufficiency. Only, his criticism of these
proofs is insufficient in itself; and besides, he failed to
recognise the deeper basis upon which these proofs rest,
and so was unable to do justice to their true elements.
It was he who at the same time began the complete
maiming of reason, which has since his day been content
to be nothing more than the source of purely immediate
knowledge.
So far we have been dealing with the elucidation
of the conception which constitutes the logical element
in the first characteristic of religion, and have been re-
garding it, on the one hand, from the side from which it
was viewed in metaphysics in its earlier phase ; while, on
the other hand, we have been looking at the outward
form in which it was put. But this is not sufficient if
we are to get a real knowledge of the speculative concep-
tion of this characteristic. Still, one part of this know-
ledge has already been indicated, that, namely, which
has reference to the passing over of finite Being into
infinite Being, and we have now to indicate briefly the
other part, the detailed elucidation of which will be de-
ferred till we come to deal with another form of religion
to be taken up subsequently. This is just what appeared
previously in the form taken by the proposition : the
Infinite is, and in which consequently Being is define^
in general as what is mediated. The proof has to de-
monstrate this mediation. It already follows from the
262 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
foregoing remarks that the two propositions cannot be
separated from each other. The very fact that the form
of the syllogism belonging to the Understanding is
abandoned so far as the one is concerned, implies that
the separation of the two has been abandoned also. The
moment which has still to be dealt with is accordingly
already contained in the given development of the dia-
lectic of the finite.
If, however, in showing how the finite passes over into
the Infinite, we have made it appear as if the finite were
taken as the starting-point for the Infinite, so, too, the
other proposition, which is merely the converse proposi-
tion or transition, seems to be necessarily defined as a
passing over from the Infinite to the finite, or, in other
words, has to take on the form of the proposition : " The
Infinite is finite." In this equation the proposition : the
Infinite is, would not contain the entire characteristic
which has to be dealt with here. This difference dis-
appears, however, when we consider that Being, since it
is the Immediate, is directly differentiated from the
characteristic of the Infinite, and is, as a direct conse-
quence of this, characterised simply as finite. The logical
nature which thus belongs to Being or immediacy in
general is, however, presupposed as given by logic. This
characteristic of the finitude of Being, however, comes
directly into view in the connection in which Being here
stands. For the Infinite, in resolving to become Being,
determines itself to what is other than itself; but then the
Other of the Infinite is just the finite.
If, further, as was previously indicated, the subject
appears in the judgment as something presupposed, what
has Being in fact, while the predicate is something uni-
versal, namely, thought, then in the proposition, " The In-
finite is," a proposition which is at the same time a
judgment, the determination seems rather to be reversed,
since the predicate expressly involves Being, while the
subject, the Infinite namely, exists in thought only,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 263
though certainly in objective thought. Still we might
remember the common idea that Being itself is only a
thought, chiefly in so far as it is regarded in this abstract
and logical way, and all the more if the Infinite, too,
is only a thought, for in this case its predicate also
could not possibly be anything else but a subjective
thought. In any case, the predicate regarded from the
point of view of its form in the judgment is the Universal
and is thought, while considered according to its content
or determinateness it is Being, and taken in a more
definite sense it is immediate and also finite or particular
Being. If, however, it is meant by this, that Being, be-
cause it has been thought, is therefore no longer Being as
such, then this is simply an absurd idealism which main-
tains that if anything is thought it therefore ceases to be,
or even that what is cannot be thought, and that therefore
only nothing is thinkable. Still the idealism which enters
into that aspect of the entire conception or notion to be
considered here will be discussed later on when we enter
on the explanation already indicated. The point, how-
ever, to which attention should really be directed is, that
it is just the judgment indicated which, owing to the
antithesis of its content and its form, contains in it that
counter-stroke which expresses the nature of the absolute
union in one of the two previously separated sides, and
which is the nature of the Notion itself.
Put shortly, what we have so far learned regarding the
Infinite is, that it is the affirmation of the self-annulling
finite, the negation of the negation, what is mediated, but
mediated by the annulling of the mediation. This already
means that the Infinite is simple reference to self, that
abstract equality with self which is called Being. Or, it
is the self-annulling mediation, while the Immediate is
just the mediation absorbed and annulled, in other words,
that into which the self-annulling mediation passes, that
which it becomes by annulling itself.
It is just in consequence of this that this affirmation,
264 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
this thing which is equal to itself in one, is thus immedi-
ate and equal to itself only when it is simply the negation
of the negation, that is, it itself contains the negation, the
finite, but as an appearance or semblance which annuls
itself and is preserved in something higher. Or, since the
immediacy which it comes to be by this act — that abstract
equality with itself into which it passes over and which
is Being — is only the moment of the Infinite conceived
of in a one-sided way, and the affirmative as representing
it appears only as this entire process, and is therefore
finite, it follows that the Infinite, in determining itself in
the form of Being, determines itself as finitude. But
finitude and this immediate Being are consequently just
the negation which negates itself. This apparent end,
the passing of the living dialectic into the dead repose of
the result, is itself only the beginning again of this living
dialectic.
This is the Notion, the logical and rational element
in the first abstract characteristic of God and religion.
The side represented by the latter is expressed by that
moment of the Notion which starts from immediate Being,
and which is absorbed in and taken up into the Infinite.
The objective side, however, as such is contained in the
self-unfolding of the Infinite into Being and finitude,
which, just because of this, is merely momentary and
transitory — transitory merely, in virtue of the infinitude
whose manifestation it merely is, and which represents
the force in it. The so-called Cosmological Proof is of
use solely in connection with the effort to bring into
consciousness what the inner life, the pure rational
element of the inner movement, really is, and which,
regarded in its subjective aspect, is called religious eleva-
tion. If this movement, when it appears in that form of
the Understanding in which we have seen it, is not con-
ceived of and understood as it is in-and-for-itself, still
the substantial element which forms its basis does not lose
anything in consequence. It is this substantial element
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 265
which penetrates the imperfection of the form and exer-
cises its power ; or rather, we might say, it is itself the real
and substantial force. The religious elevation of the soul
to God consequently recognises itself in that expression of
the truth, imperfect as it is, and is aware of its inner and
true meaning, and so protects itself against the syllogism
of the Understanding and its methods which stunt this
true meaning. That is why, as Kant says (in the place
already referred to, p. 632), "this method of proof un-
doubtedly most readily carries persuasion with it, not only
for the ordinary understanding, but for the speculative
understanding too ; and it obviously contains, too, the
main lines on which all the proofs of natural theology are
based, and which have at all times been followed, and
will be still further followed, however much people may
try to trick them out and conceal them under all sorts
of fancy embellishments ; " and, I add, it is possible by
following the Understanding entirely to miss the mean-
ing of the substantial element contained in these great
fundamental lines of argument, and to imagine they have
been formally refuted by the critical understanding, or, it
may be, in virtue of the want of understanding as well
as the want of reason characteristic of so-called imme-
diate knowledge, politely to throw these arguments on
one side unrefuted or to ignore them.
ELEVENTH LECTURE
HAVING given this explanation regarding the general
scope of the characteristics of the content with which we
are dealing, we shall now consider the course followed by
the act of elevation first mentioned, in that particular
form in which it is at present before us. This course
consists simply in reasoning from the contingency of the
world to an absolutely necessary Essence belonging to it.
If we look at this syllogism as expressed in a formal
way and at its particular elements, we find that it runs
thus : The contingent does not rest upon itself, but,
speaking generally, rests upon the presupposition of some-
thing which is in itself absolutely necessary, and which
we call its essence, ground, or cause. But the world is
contingent, the single things in it are contingent, and it
as representing the whole is the aggregate of these ; there-
fore the world presupposes the existence of something
absolutely necessary in itself.
The determination from which this conclusion starts
is the contingency of material things. If we take these
things according as we find them in sensation and in
ordinary thought, and if we compare the various processes
which go on in the human mind, then we have a right
to assert it to be a fact of experience that material things
taken by themselves are regarded as contingent. Indi-
vidual things do not come out of themselves, and do not
pass away of themselves ; being contingent, they are
destined to drop away, and this is not something which
happens to them in an accidental way merely, but is
what constitutes their nature. Even if the course they
follow is one which develops within themselves and is
366
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 267
guided by rule and law, still it goes on till it reaches
what is their end, or rather, it does nothing but lead up
to their end ; and so, too, their existence is interfered
with in all kinds of ways by other things, and is brought
to an end by external causes. If they are regarded as
conditioned, then we can see that their conditions are
things which exist independently outside of them, and
which may correspond to them or not, and by which they
are temporarily supported, or, it may be, are not. To
begin with, they are seen to be co-ordinated in space with-
out being ranged together in accordance with any other
relation naturally belonging to them. The most hetero-
geneous elements are found side by side, and they can be
separated without any kind of derangement being caused
in the existence either of the one thing or the other. In
the same way they succeed one another outwardly in
time. They are, in fact, finite ; and however indepen-
dent they may seem, they are essentially devoid of inde-
pendence, owing to the limits attaching to their finitude.
They are ; they are in a real sense, but their reality has
the value of something which is merely a possibility ; they
are, and can therefore equally well either be or not be.
Their existence reveals the presence not only of con-
nections between conditions, that is, the points of depen-
dence owing to which they come to be characterised as
contingent, but also the connections of cause and effect,
the regular rules which govern the course they follow
both inwardly and outwardly — laws, in fact. These
elements of dependence, this conformity to law, raises
them above the category of contingency into the region
of necessity, and thus necessity is found within that
sphere which we thought of as occupied by what was
contingent. Contingency claims things in virtue of their
isolation, and therefore they may either exist or not exist ;
but then, as governed by law, they are the opposite of
what is contingent, they are not isolated, but are quali-
fied, limited, related, in fact, to one another. They do
268 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
not, however, fare any the better because of the presence
of this antithesis in their nature. Their isolation gives
them a semblance of independence ; but the connection
in which they stand with other things — with each other,
that is — directly expresses the fact that these single
things are not independent, shows, that they are con-
ditioned and are affected by other things, and are, in
fact, necessarily conditioned by other things, and not by
themselves. These necessary elements, these laws, would
themselves consequently constitute the independent ele-
ment. Anything which exists essentially in connection
with something else has its essential character and sta-
bility not in itself, but in this connection. It is the
connection upon which these are dependent. But these
connections, when defined as causes and effects, the con-
dition and the fact of being conditioned, and so on,
have themselves a limited character, and are themselves
contingent in relation to each other in the sense that
any one of them may equally well exist or not exist, and
may just as easily be disturbed by circumstances — that is,
be interfered with by things which are themselves contin-
gent, and have their active working and value destroyed,
as the separate things over which they have no advantage
in the matter of contingency. Those connections, on the
other hand, to which necessity must be attributed, those
laws, are not in any sense what we call things, but are
rather abstractions. If the connection of necessity thus
manifests itself in the region of contingent things in
laws, and chiefly in the relations of cause and effect, this
necessity itself takes the form of something conditioned,
or limited — appears, in fact, as an outward necessity. It
is itself relegated to the class of categories applying to
things, both in virtue of their isolation, that is, their
externality, and conversely in virtue of their being con-
ditioned, of their limitation and dependence. In the
connection expressed by causes and effects we get not
only the satisfaction which is wanting in the empty un-
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 269
related isolation of things, which are just for this reason
called contingent ; but the indefinite abstraction which
attaches to the expression " things," the element of vari-
ableness in them, disappears in this relation of necessity
in which things become causes, original facts, substances
that are active and indeterminate. But in the connec-
tions which hold good in this sphere the causes are
themselves finite ; beginning as causes, their Being is
isolated, and therefore contingent; or it is not isolated,
and in that case they are effects, and are consequently
not independent, but posited through an Other. The
various series of causes and effects are partly contingent
relatively to each other, and are partly themselves con-
tinued into the so-called Infinite, and thus contain in
their content nothing but those situations and forms of
existence of which each is finite in itself; and what ought
to give stability to the connection of the series, the In-
finite namely, is not only something above and beyond
this world, but is a mere negative, the very meaning of
which is relative merely, and is conditioned by what is
to be negated by it, and is consequently for this very
reason not negated.
Spirit, however, raises itself above this crowd of things
contingent, above the merely outward and relative neces-
sity involved in them, above the Infinite, which is a mere
negative, and reaches a necessity which does not any
longer go Ueyond itself, but is in-and-for-itself, included
within itself, and is determined as complete in itself,
while all other determinations are posited by it and are
dependent upon it.
These may be in the form of ideas of an accidental
or of a more concentrated kind, the essential moments of
thought belonging to the inner life of the human spirit,
to the reason which does not fully attain in a methodical
and formal way the consciousness of its inner process,
and still less gets so far as to be able to investigate those
thought-determinations through which it passes, or the
270 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
connections they involve. We have now got to see, how-
ever, if thought, which in the process of reasoning pro-
ceeds in a formal and methodical way, rightly conceives of
and expresses the course followed in the elevation of the
soul to God, which, so far, we have assumed to be a fact,
and which we have been accustomed to deal with only
in connection with the few fundamental characteristics
belonging to it. Conversely, again, we have to find out
whether those thoughts and the connection between them
can be shown to be justified, and have their reality proved,
by an examination of the thoughts in themselves, for it is
only in this way that the elevation of the soul to God
really ceases to be a supposition, and that the unstable
element in any right conception of it disappears. "We
must, however, decline to enter upon this examination
here, seeing that if it were demanded on its own account
we should have to go on to the ultimate analysis of
thought. It has to be carried out in a thorough way in
logic, the science of thought; for I identify logic with
metaphysic, since the latter, too, is really nothing but an
attempt to deal with some concrete content, such as God,
the world, the soul, but in such a way that these objects
have to be conceived of as noumena, that is, we have to
deal with the element of thought in them. At this point
it will be preferable to take up the logical results merely,
rather than the formal development. An investigation of
the proofs of the existence of God cannot be undertaken
independently at all, if it is required to have philosophical
and scientific completeness. Science is the developed con-
nection of the Idea in its totality. In so far as any indi-
vidual object is lifted out of that totality, which must be
the goal of the scientific development of the Idea, as
representing the only method of exhibiting its truth, limits
must be set to the investigation undertaken, and these it
must presuppose to be definitely fixed, as is the case in
other instances of scientific inquiry. Still the investigation
may come to have an appearance of independence, owing
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 271
to the fact that the unexplained presuppositions, which
are what constitutes the limits of what is dealt with, and
which analysis reaches in the course of its progress, are
in themselves in harmony with consciousness. Every
work contains such ultimate ideas, or fundamental prin-
ciples, upon which either consciously or unconsciously the
content is based. There is in it a circumscribed horizon
of thoughts which are no further analysed, the horizon of
which rests upon the culture it may be of a period, of a
nation, or of some scientific circle, and beyond which
there is no need to go. In fact it would be prejudicial
to what is called popular comprehension to attempt to
extend this horizon beyond the limits of ordinary ideas
by analysing these, and so to make it include speculative
or philosophical conceptions.
Still, since the subject of these lectures belongs in
itself essentially to the domain of philosophy, we cannot
dispense with abstract conceptions. We have, however,
already mentioned those which belong to this first
standpoint, and we have only to range them together
in a definite way in order to reach the speculative
element ; for, speaking generally, to deal with anything
in a speculative or philosophical way simply means to
bring into connection the thoughts which we already
have.
The thoughts, therefore, which have been already in-
dicated, consist, first of all, of the following main charac-
teristics : a thing, a law, &c., is contingent in virtue of
its isolation ; the fact of its existence or non-existence
does not bring about any derangement or alteration so
far as other things are concerned. Then the fact that it
is quite as little kept in existence by them, and that
any stability it gets owing to them is wholly insufficient,
gives them that very insufficient semblance of indepen-
dence which is just what constitutes their contingency.
The idea of necessity as applied to any existing thing, on
the other hand, requires that it should stand in some
272 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
connection with other things, so that regarded in any
of its aspects it is seen to be completely determined
by other existing things, in the form of conditions or
causes, and cannot be separated from them or come into
being of itself, nor can there be any condition, cause, or
fact of connection by means of which it can be so sepa-
rated, nor any such instance of connection as can con-
tradict the other which qualifies the thing. In accordance
with this description we place the contingency of a thing
in its isolation, in the want of perfect connection with
other things. This is the first point.
Conversely, again, since an existing thing thus stands
in a relation of perfect connection, it is in all its aspects
conditioned and dependent, is in fact perfectly wanting
in independence. It is, on the other hand, in necessity
alone that we find the independence of a thing. "What
is necessary must be. This fact that it must be, ex-
presses its independence by suggesting that what is
necessary is, because it is. This is the other point.
We thus see that the necessity of anything requires
two sorts of opposed characteristics : on the one hand, its
independence, in which, however, it is isolated, and which
makes its existence or non-existence a matter of indif-
ference; and, on the other, its being based upon and
contained in a complete relation to everything else
whereby it is surrounded, and by the connection in-
volved in which, it is kept in existence ; this means that
it is not independent. The necessary element is a recog-
nised fact quite as much as the contingent element.
Eegarded from the point of view of the first of these
ideas, everything exists in an orderly connection. The
contingent is separated from the necessary, and points
beyond it to a necessary something, which, however,
when we look at it more closely, is itself included in
contingency, just because, being posited by another, it is
dependent. When, however, it is taken out of any such
connection it is isolated, and is consequently directly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 273
contingent. The distinctions drawn are accordingly
merely imaginary.
Since it is not our intention to examine further the
nature of these thoughts, and since we wish in the mean-
time to leave the antithesis of necessity and contingency
out of account, we shall confine ourselves to what is
suggested by the idea we have given of them, namely,
that neither of the determinations is sufficient to express
necessity, but that for this both are required — indepen-
dence, so that the necessary may not be mediated by an
Other ; and also the mediation of this independence in
connection with the Other. They thus contradict each
other, but since they both belong 'to the one necessity
they must not contradict each other in the unity in
which they are joined together in it. Our view of the
matter renders it necessary that the thoughts which are
united in this necessity should be brought into connec-
tion in our minds. In this unity the mediation with an
Other will thus itself partake of independence, and this,
as a reference to self, will have the mediation with an
Other within itself. In this determination, however, both
can be united only in such a way that the mediation with
an Other is at the same time a mediation with self,
that is, their union must imply that the mediation with
an Other abolishes itself, and becomes a mediation with
self. Thus the unity with self is not a unity which is
abstract identity, such as \ve saw in the form of the
isolation in which the thing is related only to itself,
and in which its contingency lies. The one-sidedness,
on account of which alone it is in contradiction with the
equally one-sided mediation by an Other, is done away
with, and these untruths have thus disappeared. The
unity thus characterised is the true unity, and when truly
known is the speculative or philosophical unity. Neces-
sity as thus denned, since it unites in itself these opposite
characteristics, is seen to be something more than a simple
idea or a simple determinateness ; and further, the dis-
VOL. in. s
274 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
appearance of the opposite characteristics in something
higher is not merely our act, or a matter with which
we only have to do, in the sense that we only bring it
about, but expresses the very nature and action of these
characteristics themselves, since they are united in one
characteristic. So, too, these two moments of necessity,
namely, that its mediation with an Other is in itself, and
that it does away with this mediation and posits itself by
its own act because of this very unity, are not separate
acts. In the mediation with an Other it relates itself to
itself, that is, the Other through which it mediates itself
with itself is itself. Thus as an Other it is negated ; it
is itself the Other, but only momentarily — momentarily
without, however, introducing the quality of time into
the notion, a quality which first appears when the notion
comes to have a definite existence. This Other-Being or
otherness is essentially something which disappears in
something higher, and it is in determinate existence also
that it appears as a real Other. But the absolute neces-
sity is the necessity which is adequate to its notion or
conception.
TWELFTH LECTURE
IN the previous Lecture the notion or conception of
absolute necessity was explained — of absolute necessity, I
repeat. Very often absolute means nothing more than
abstract, and very frequently, too, it is imagined that
when the word absolute is used everything is said that
is necessary, and that no further definition can or ought
to be given. As a matter of fact it is just with this defi-
nition that we are chiefly concerned. Absolute necessity
is abstract, the abstract pure and simple, inasmuch as
it depends on itself and does not subsist in or from or
through an Other. But we have seen that it is not only
adequate to its notion or conception, whatever that notion
be, so that \ve were able to compare this notion and
its external existence ; but that it represents this Very
adequacy itself. Thus what might be taken as the
external aspect is contained in itself, so that this very
fact that it depends on itself, this identity or reference
to self which constitutes the isolation of things in virtue
of which they are contingent, is a form of independence
which again is really a want of independence. Possibi-
lity is an abstraction of the same kind. A thing is possible
if it does not contradict itself, that is, it is what is merely
identical with itself, something in which there is no kind
of identity with an Other, while, on the other hand, it has
not its Other within itself. Contingency and possibility
differ only in this, that the contingent has in addition a
definite existence. The possible has only the possibility
of existence. But the contingent itself has an existence
which has absolutely no value beyond being a possibility;
it is, but quite as much it is not. In the case of con-
276 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
tingency, the nature of determinate Being or existence
belonging to it is, as has been already remarked, so far
evident that it is seen at the same time to have the
character of something which is virtually a nullity, and
consequently the transition to its Other, to the Necessary,
is already expressed in that existence itself. It is an
instance of the same thing as we have in abstract identity,
which is a simple reference to self ; it is known as a pos-
sibility, and being a possibility it is recognised that it
is not yet anything. The fact that something is possible
does not really imply anything. Identity is characterised
as sterility, and that is what it really is.
What is wanting in this characteristic finds its comple-
ment, as we have seen, in the characteristic whicll is its
antithesis. Necessity is not abstract, but truly absolute,
solely in virtue of the fact that it contains the connection
with an Other in itself, that it is self-differentiation, but
a differentiation which has disappeared in something
higher and is ideal. It consequently contains what
belongs to necessity in general, but it is distinguished
from this latter as being external and finite, and as
involving a connection having reference to something
else which remains Being and has the value of Being,
and so is merely dependence. It goes by the name of
necessity too, inasmuch as mediation is in general es-
sential to necessity. The connection of its Other with
something else, which is what constitutes it, does not get
support from the ends for which it exists. Absolute
necessity, on the other hand, transforms any such relation
to an Other into a relation to itself, and consequently
produces what is really inner harmony with itself.
Spirit rises above contingency and external necessity,
just because these thoughts are in themselves insufficient
and unsatisfying. It finds satisfaction in the thought of
absolute necessity, because this latter represents some-
thing at peace with itself. Its result as result, however,
is — it is so, it is simply necessary. Thus all aspiration,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 277
all effort, all longing after an Other, have passed away,
for in it the Other has disappeared, there is no finitude
in it, it is absolutely complete in itself, it is infinite and
present in itself, there is nothing outside of it. It has in
it no limit, for its nature is to be with itself, or at home
with itself. It is not the act of rising to this necessity
on the part of Spirit which in itself produces satisfaction.
The satisfaction has reference to the goal Spirit tries to
reach, and the satisfaction is in proportion to its ability
to reach this goal.
If we pause for a moment to consider this subjective
satisfaction, we find that it reminds us of what the Greeks
found in the idea of subjection to necessity. That Man
should yield to inevitable destiny was the advice of the
wise, and this was in particular the truth expressed by
the tragic chorus, and we admire the repose of their
heroes and the calmness with which they freely and
undauntedly accept the lot which destiny has assigned
to them. This necessity, and the aims of their own wills
which are annihilated by it, the compulsory force of this
destiny and freedom, appear as the opposing elements,
and seem to leave no room for reconciliation nor for any
kind of satisfaction. In fact the play of this antique
necessity is shrouded in a sadness which is neither
driven away by defiance nor disfigured by any feeling of
bitterness, and all lamentation is rather suppressed by
silence than stilled by the healing of the wounded heart.
The element of satisfaction found by Spirit in the thought
of necessity is to be sought for in this alone, that Spirit
simply abides by that abstract result of necessity ex-
pressed in the words, " it is so," a result brought about
by Spirit within itself. In this pure is there is no
longer any content ; all ends, all interests, all wishes,
even the concrete feeling of life itself, have disappeared
and vanished in it. Spirit produces this abstract result
in itself just because it has given up this particular con-
tent of its will, the very substance of its life, and has
278 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
renounced everything. It thus transforms into freedom
the compulsion exercised upon it by fatality. For this
force or compulsion can lay hold of it only by seizing on
those sides of its nature which in its concrete existence
have an inner and an outer determinate Being. As
connected with external existence, Man is under the
influence of external force in the shape of other men, of
circumstances, and so on ; but external existence has its
roots in what is inward, in his impulses, interests, and
aims ; they are the bonds, morally justifiable and morally
ordained, or, it may be, not justifiable, which bring him
into subjection to force. But the roots belong to his inner
life, they are his ; he can tear them out of his heart ;
his will, his freedom represent that power of abstraction
from everything whereby the heart can make itself the
grave of the heart. When the heart thus inwardly re-
nounces itself, it leaves to force nothing upon which it
can lay hold. What is crushed by force is a form of
existence which is devoid of heart, an externality in
which force can no longer affect Man : he is outside of
the sphere in which force can strike.
It has been previously remarked that the result, it is
so, is the result of the necessity, to which Man clings ; and
he abides by it as a result, that is, in the sense that it is
he who produces this abstract Being. This is the other
moment of necessity, mediation through the negation of
otherness. This Other is the determinate in general, which
we have seen in the form of inner existence, the giving
up of concrete aims and interests ; for they are not only
the ties which bind Man to externality, and consequently
bring him into subjection to it, but they themselves
represent the particular element, and are external to
what is most inward, the self-thinking pure universality,
the pure relation of freedom to itself. It is the strength
of this freedom that it can in this abstract way comprise
within itself and put within itself that particular ele-
ment which is outside of itself, and can thus make it
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 279
into something external in which it can no longer be
disturbed. The reason why we men are unhappy, or
unsatisfied, or simply fretful, is because of the division
within us, that is, because of the contradiction represented
by the fact that these impulses, aims, and interests, or
simply these demands, wishes, and reflections are in us,
and that at the same time our existence has in it what is
the Other, the antithesis of these. This disunion or un-
rest in us can be removed in a twofold manner. On the
one hand, our outward existence, our condition, the cir-
cumstances which affect us and in which our interests
in general are involved, may be brought into harmony
with the roots of their interests in ourselves, a harmony
which is experienced in the form of happiness and satis-
faction. On the other hand, in the event of there being
a disunion between the two, and consequently in the
event of unhappiness, instead of satisfaction there is a
natural repose of the heart, or, where the injury goes
deeper and affects an energetic will and its just claims,
the heroic strength of the will produces at the same time
a contentment by taking kindly to the actual state of
things and by submitting to what actually is, and this is
a yielding in which the mind does not in a one-sided way
let go its hold on what is external, circumstances, or the
actual condition of things, because they have been over-
come and are overpowered, but which gives up by an
act of its own will its inner determinateness and allows
it to go. This freedom of abstraction is not without an
element of pain ; but the pain is brought down to the level
of natural pain, and has not in it the pain of penitence,
the pain attaching to the rebellious sense of wrong-doing,
just as it has no consolation or hope. But then it is not
in need of consolation, for consolation presupposes a claim
which is still maintained and asserted and does not in one
way really satisfy, while looked at in another way, it seeks
a compensation, and in the act of hoping, a desire for
something has been kept in reserve.
280 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
But it is just here that we find that moment of sad-
ness already referred to, and which diffuses itself over
this act, whereby necessity is transfigured and becomes
freedom. The freedom here is the result of mediation
through the negation of things finite. As abstract Being,
the satisfaction gained is empty reference to self, the inner
unsubstantial solitude of self-consciousness.
This defect lies in the determinate character of the
result as well as of the starting-point. It is the same
in both of these, that is to say, it is just the indeter-
minateness of Being. The same defect which has been
noted as present in the form taken by the process of
necessity, as this process exists in the region of the
volition of subjective Spirit, will be found, too, in the
process when it is an objective content for the thinking
consciousness. The defect, however, does not lie in the
nature of the process itself ; and we have now to consider
that process in the theoretical form, which is the point
we have specially to deal with.
THIRTEENTH LECTURE
THE general form of the process has been already
referred to as consisting of a mediation with self which
contains the moment of mediation in such a way that
the Other is posited as something negated or ideal. This
process has likewise been described, so far as its more
definite moments are concerned, as it presents itself in
the form of Man's elevation to God by the path of re-
ligion. We have now to compare the explanation given
of the act whereby Spirit raises itself to God with that to
be found in the formal expression which is called a proof.
The difference between them seems slight, but it is
important, and supplies the reason why proof of this
kind has been represented as inadequate and has gene-
rally been abandoned. Because what is material is
contingent, therefore there exists an absolutely necessary
Essence ; this is the simple fashion in which the connec-
tion of ideas is put. Since mention is here made of an
Essence, and since we have spoken only of absolute
necessity, this necessity may certainly be hypostatised
in this way ; but the Essence is still indeterminate, and
is not a subject or anything living, and still less is it
Spirit. We shall, however, afterwards discuss the Essence
as such in so far as it contains a determinate quality
which has any interest in the- present connection.
What is of primary importance is the relation indi-
cated in the proposition : because the One, the contingent,
exists, is, therefore the Other, the Absolutely-necessary, is,
or exists. Here there are two forms of Being in connec-
tion, one form of Being connected with another form of
Being, a connection which we have seen in the shape of
282 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
external necessity. It is, however, this very external
necessity which is recognised to be a form of dependence
in which the result depends on the starting-point, but
which, in fact, by sinking to a state of contingency, is
recognised to be unsatisfying. It is against it, accord-
ingly, that the protests have been directed which have
been advanced against this method of proof.
It contains, that is to say, the relation according to
which the one characteristic, that of absolutely necessary
Being, is mediated by the Other, by means of the charac-
teristic of contingent Being, whereby the former is put
in a dependent relation, in the relation, in fact, of what
is conditioned to its condition. This was the main ob-
jection which, speaking generally, Jacobi brought against
the knowledge of God, namely, that to know or to com-
prehend means merely " to deduce anything from its
more immediate causes, or to look at its immediate con-
ditions as a series " (Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza,
p. 419); "to comprehend the Unconditioned therefore
means to make it into something conditioned or to make
it an effect." The latter category, however, according to
which the Absolutely-necessary is taken as an effect, can
be at once discounted, since the relation it implies is in
too direct contradiction to the characteristic with which
we are dealing, namely, the Absolutely-necessary. The
relation of the condition, which is also that of the ground,
is, however, of a more outward character, and can more
easily find favour. In any case it is present in the
proposition : because the contingent exists, therefore the
Absolutely-necessary exists.
While it must be granted that this defect exists, it
is, on the other hand, to be observed that no objective
significance is given to a relation like this implying
conditionateness and dependence. This relation is present
only in an absolutely subjective sense. The proposition
does not state, and is not meant to state, that the Abso-
lutely-necessary has conditions, and is in fact conditioned
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 283
by the contingent world — quite the contrary. The entire
development of the connection is seen only in the act
of proof. It is only our knowledge of the Absolutely-
necessary which is conditioned by that starting-point.
The Absolutely-necessary does not exist in virtue of the
fact that it raises itself out of the world of contingency,
and requires this world as its starting-point and presup-
position, in order that by starting from it it may thus
first reach its Being. It cannot be the Absolutely-
necessary, it cannot be God who has to be thought of
thus as something mediated by an Other, as something
dependent and conditioned. It is the content of the
proof itself which corrects the defect which is visible
only in its form. We are thus in presence of a distinc-
tion and a difference between the form and the nature of
the content, and the form is more certainly seen to con-
tain the defective element, from the very fact that the
content is the Absolutely-necessary. This content is not
itself devoid of form, as was evident from the nature of
its determination. Its own form as being the form of
the True is itself true, and the form which differs from
it is for that reason the Untrue.
If we take what we have in general designated Form,
in its more concrete signification, namely, as knowledge,
we find ourselves amongst the well-known and favourite
categories of finite knowledge, which as being subjective
is defined generally as finite, while the course followed by
the movement of knowledge belonging to it is defined as
a finite act. Here accordingly the same element of in-
adequacy appears only in another shape. Knowledge is
a finite act, and any such act cannot involve the com-
prehension of the Absolutely-necessary, of the Infinite.
Knowledge demands, in short, that it should have the
content in itself and should follow it. The knowledge
which has an absolutely necessary, infinite content must
itself be absolutely necessary and infinite. We thus find
ourselves in the best position for wrestling once more
284 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
with the antithesis whose affirmative and subsidiary help
given by what was more of the nature of immediate
knowledge, faith, feeling, and such like, we dealt with
in the first Lectures. We must for the present leave the
Form in this shape alone, but later on we shall have
some reflections to make on the categories belonging to
it. We have in the meantime to deal with the Form in
the more definite 'shape in which it appears in the proof
which forms the subject of discussion.
If we call to mind the formal syllogism previously
dealt with, it will be seen that one part of the first
proposition, the major proposition that is, runs thus — If
the contingent exists ; and this is expressed in a more
direct way in the other proposition — There is a contingent
world. While in the former of these propositions the
characteristic of contingency is posited essentially in its
connection with the Absolutely-necessary, it is neverthe-
less stated to be at the same time something contingent
which has Being. It is in the second proposition, or in
this characteristic of the existent as it appears in the
first, that the defect lies, and this in fact means that it
is directly self-contradictory, and shows itself to be in its
very nature an untrue one-sidedness. The contingent, the
finite is expressed in terms of what has Being ; but it is,
on the contrary, characteristic of the finite that it should
have an end and drop away, that it should be a kind of
Being which has the value of what is merely a possibility
and which may either be or not be.
This fundamental error is found in the form of the
connection, which is that of an ordinary syllogism. A
syllogism of this kind has a permanent immediate element
in its premisses, it is based on presuppositions which are
stated to be not only what is primary, but to be the per-
manent primary existent element with which the Other
is in general so closely connected as some kind of con-
sequence, something conditioned, and so on, that the two
characteristics thus linked together constitute a relation
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 285
which is external and finite, in which each of the two
sides is in a relation of reference to the other. It con-
stitutes one of the characteristics of these two sides, but
it has at the same time a substantial existence of its
own outside of the relation between them. The charac-
teristic which the two different elements taken together
constitute, and which is in itself simply one, is the
Absolutely-necessary. Its name at once declares it to
be the Only-one, what truly is, the only reality. "We
have seen how its notion is the mediation which returns
into itself, the mediation which is merely a mediation
with itself by means of the Other which is distinguished
from it, and which is taken up into the One, the Abso-
lutely-necessary, negated as something having Being, and
preserved merely as something ideal. Outside of this
absolute, inherent unity, however, the two sides of the
relation are in this kind of syllogism kept also externally
apart from each other as things which have Being; the
contingent is. This proposition is inherently self-contra-
dictory, and is likewise in contradiction with the result,
the absolute necessity, which is not merely placed on one
side, but, on the contrary, is the whole of Being.
If therefore we begin with the contingent, we must
not set out from it as if it were something which is to
remain fixed in such a way that it continues to be in the
further development of the argument something which
has Being. This is its one-sided determinateness. On
the contrary, it is to be posited with its completely de-
terminate character, which implies that non-Being may
quite as well be attributed to it, and that it consequently
enters into the result as something which passes away.
Not because the contingent is, but, on the contrary,
because it is non-Being, merely phenomenal, because its
Being is not true reality, the absolute necessity is. This
latter is its Being and Truth.
This moment of the Negative is not found in the form
taken by the syllogism of the Understanding, and this is
286 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
why it is defective when it appears in this region which
is that of the living reason of Spirit, in the region, that
is, in which absolute necessity itself is considered as the
true result, as something which does indeed mediate itself
through an Other, but mediates itself with itself by ab-
sorbing this Other. Thus the course followed by that
knowledge of necessity is different from the process which
necessity is. Such a course is therefore not to be con-
sidered as simply necessary true movement, but rather
as finite activity. It is not infinite knowledge, it has
not the infinite for its content and for the basis of its
activity, for the infinite appears only as this mediation
with self through the negation of the negative.
The defect which has been pointed out as existing in
this form of the process of reasoning, means, as has been
indicated, that the elevation of Spirit to God has not
been correctly explained in that proof of the existence
of God which it constitutes. If we compare the two we
see that this act of elevation is undoubtedly also an act
whereby Spirit goes beyond worldly existence, as well as
beyond what is merely temporal, changeable, and transi-
tory. The world-element, it is true, is declared to be
actual existence, and we start from it ; but since, as was
remarked, it is defined as the temporal, the contingent,
the changeable and transitory, its Being is not satisfying
for truth, it is not the truly affirmative, it is defined as
what annuls and negates itself. It does not persistently
retain its characteristic, to be ; on the contrary, a Being
is attributed to it which has no more value than non-
Being whose characteristic contains in itself its non-
Being, its Other, and consequently its contradiction, its
disintegration and dissolution. But even if it seem to
be the case, or may even actually be the case, that so far
as faith is concerned this contingent Being as something
present to consciousness remains standing on one side
confronting the other side, the Eternal, the Necessary
in-and-for-itself, in the form of a world above which is
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 287
heaven, still the real point is not the fact that a double
world has been actually conceived of, but the value
which is to be attached to such a conception. This
value is expressed when it is said that the one world is
the world of appearance or illusion, and the other the
world of truth. When the former is abandoned, and we
pass over to the other only in the sense that the world
of appearance still remains present here, the connection
between them as it presents itself to the religious man
does not mean that that world is anything more than
merely the point of departure, or that it is permanently
fixed as a ground or basis to which Being, or the power
of acting as a basis or condition, could be attributed.
Satisfaction, everything in the way of a foundation or
first principle is, on the contrary, found to exist in the
eternal world as something which is independent in-and-
for-itself. As opposed to this, in the form taken by the
syllogism, the Being of both is expressed in a similar
way — both in the one proposition of the connection : If
a contingent world exists, an Absolutely-necessary exists
too ; as also in the other in which it is stated as a pre-
supposition that a contingent world does exist ; and
further, in the third and concluding proposition : There-
fore an Absolutely-necessary exists.
A few remarks may be further added regarding these
propositions thus definitely expressed. And first of all
in connection with the last of them, the way in which
the two contrasted characteristics are linked together,
must at once strike us : Therefore the Absolutely-neces-
sary exists. Therefore expresses mediation through an
Other, and yet it is immediacy, and directly absorbs the
former of these characteristics, which, as has been indi-
cated, is just what supplies the reason why such know-
ledge regarding whatever is its object is declared to be
inadmissible. The abolition of mediation through an
Other exists, however, potentially only. The syllogism,
on the other hand, as exhibited in detail, gives full
288 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
expression to this. Truth is a force of such a character
that it is present even in what is false, and it only
requires correct observation and attention in order to
discover the True in the False itself, or rather actually
to see it there. The True is here mediation with self by
the negation of the Other and of the mediation through
the Other. The negation, both of mediation through an
Other, as well as of the abstract immediacy which is
devoid of mediation, is present in the " therefore " above
referred to.
Further, if the one proposition is : The contingent is,
and the other : The necessary in-and-for-itself is, this
essentially suggests that the Being of the contingent has
an absolutely different value from necessary Being in-and-
for-itself. Still Being is what is common to both, and it
is the one characteristic in both propositions. In accord-
ance with this the transition does not take the form of a
passing from one form of Being to another, but from one
characteristic of thought to another. Being purifies itself
from the predicate of contingency, which is inadequate
to express its nature. Being is simple self-identity or
equality with self. Contingency, on the other hand, is
Being which is absolutely unlike itself, which contradicts
itself, and it is only in the Absolutely-necessary that it is
once more restored to this condition of self-identity. It
is accordingly here that the course thus followed by the
act of elevation to God, or this aspect of the act of proof,
differs more definitely from the others referred to, in this,
namely, that in the former of the two methods of procedure
the characteristic which has to be proved, or is supposed
to result from the proof, is not Being. Being is rather
what the two aspects have permanently in common and
which is continued from the one into the other. In the
other method of procedure, on the contrary, the transition
has to be made from the notion or conception of God to
His Being. This transition seems more difficult than
that from a determinateness of content in general, what
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 289
we are accustomed to call a notion or conception, to
another conception, and to what is more homogeneous,
therefore, than the transition from the notion to Being is
apt to appear.
The idea which lies at the basis of this is that Being
is not itself a conception or thought. The proper place
to consider it, in this antithesis in which it is exhibited
as independent and isolated, will be when we come to
deal with the proof referred to. Here, however, we have
not, to begin with, to take it abstractly and independently.
The fact that it is the element common to the two charac-
teristics, the contingent and the Absolutely-necessary, sug-
gests a comparison and an external separation between
it and them, while at first it is in inseparable union with
each, with contingent Being and absolutely necessary
Being. In this way we shall once more take up the
form of the proof already referred to, and bring out still
more definitely the difference in the contradiction which
it undergoes, regarded from the two opposite sides, the
philosophical side, and that of the abstract understanding.
The proposition indicated expresses the following con-
nection—
Because contingent Being exists, therefore absolutely
necessary Being exists.
If we take this connection in its simple sense without
characterising it more definitely by means of the category
of a ground, or reason, or the like, its meaning is merely
this —
Contingent Being is at the same time the Being of an
Other, that of the absolutely necessary Being.
This phrase " at the same time " seems to imply a con-
tradiction, over against which the two contrasted proposi-
tions are placed as solutions, of which the one is —
The Being of the contingent is not its own Being, but
merely the Being of an Other, and in a definite sense it is
the Being of its own Other, the Absolutely-necessary. And
the other —
VOL. in. T
290 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The Being of the contingent is merely its own Being,
and is not the Being of an Other, of the Absolutely-
necessary.
It has been shown that the first of these propositions
has the true meaning, which was also the meaning
expressed by the idea contained in the transition. We
shall take up further on the speculative or philosophical
connection which is itself immanent in those determina-
tions of thought which constitute contingency.
The other proposition, however, is the proposition of
the Understanding in which thinkers of modern times
have so firmly intrenched themselves. What can be
more reasonable than to hold that anything, any form
of existence, and so, too, the contingent, since it is, is its
own Being, is in fact just the definite Being which it is,
and not rather an other kind of Being ! The contingent
is in this way retained on its own account separately
from the Absolutely-necessary.
It is still easier to employ the characteristics finite
and Infinite in order to express these two characteristics
above mentioned, and thus to take the finite for itself, as
isolated from its other, the Infinite. There is therefore,
it is said, no bridge, no passage from finite Being to infinite
Being. The finite is related only to itself, and not to its
Other. The distinction which was made between know-
ledge as form and knowledge as content, is an empty one.
This very difference between the two was rightly made
the basis of syllogisms, syllogisms which start with the
hypothesis that knowledge is finite, and for this reason
conclude that this knowledge cannot know the Infinite
because it has not the power of comprehending it. Con-
versely it is concluded that if knowledge did compre-
hend the Infinite it would necessarily be infinite itself;
but it is admittedly not infinite, therefore it has not the
power of knowing the Infinite. Its action is defined just
as its content is. Finite knowledge and infinite know-
ledge yield the same kind of relation as is yielded by the
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 291
finite and the Infinite in general. The only difference is
that infinite knowledge is in a relation of stronger repul-
sion towards its opposite than the naked Infinite, and
points more directly to the separation of the two sides
of the antithesis, so that one only remains, namely, finite
knowledge. In this way all relation based on mediation
disappears, every kind of relation, that is, in which the
finite and the Infinite as such, and so, too, the contingent
and the Absolutely-necessary, might have stood to each
other. The form of finite and Infinite is the one which
has come to be most in vogue in connection with this
way of looking at the question. That form is more ab-
stract, and accordingly seems more comprehensive, than
the first-mentioned.
The finite in general and finite knowledge have thus
necessity directly ascribed to them over and above con-
tingency. This necessity takes the form of continuous
advance in the series of causes and effects, conditions and
things conditioned, and was formerly described as external
necessity, and was included in the finite as forming a
part of it. It can be understood, indeed, only in refer-
ence to knowledge, but when included in the finite it is
put in contrast with the Infinite without risk of the mis-
apprehension which might arise through the employment
of the category of the Absolutely-necessary.
If, accordingly, we keep to this expression, then the
relation of finitude and infinitude at which we stop short
will be that of their absence of relation, their absence of
reference. We have reached the position that the finite
as a whole and finite knowledge are incapable of grasping
the Infinite in general, as well as the Infinite in the form
it takes as absolute necessity, and also of comprehending
the Infinite by the aid of the conceptions of contingency
and finitude from which finite knowledge starts. Finite
knowledge is accordingly finite just because it is based
on finite conceptions ; and the finite, including also finite
knowledge, stands in relation to itself only, does not go
292 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
beyond itself, because it is its own Being, and not in any
sense the Being of an Other, and, least of all, the Being
of its own Other. This is the proposition upon which so
much reliance is placed. It supplies no way of passing
from the finite to the Infinite, nor from the contingent to
the Absolutely-necessary, nor from effects to an absolutely
first non-finite cause. A gulf is simply fixed between
them.
FOURTEENTH LECTURE
THIS dogmatic view of the absolute separation between the
finite and the Infinite has to do with Logic. It involves
an opinion regarding the nature of the conceptions of the
finite and the Infinite which is treated of in Logic. Here
\ve shall confine ourselves chiefly to those characteristics
which we have partly dealt with in the preceding Lectures,
but which are also found in our own consciousness. The
characteristics which belong to the nature of the concep-
tions themselves, and which have been exhibited in the
Logic in their own pure determinateness and in that of
their connection, must show themselves and be present
in our ordinary consciousness as well.
When, therefore, it is said that the Being of the finite
is only its own Being, and is in no sense the Being of an
Other, it is thereby declared that there is no possible way
of passing from, the finite to the Infinite, and therefore
no mediation between them, neither in themselves nor in
and for knowledge, so that, although the finite is mediated
through the Infinite, still the converse is not true, which
is just the real point of interest. Appeal is thus already
made to the fact that the Spirit of Man rises out of the
contingent, the temporal, the finite, to God as representing
the Absolutely-necessary, the Eternal, the Infinite, to the
fact that the so-called gulf does not exist for Spirit, and
that it really accomplishes the transition, and that the
heart of Man, spite of the Understanding which asserts
the existence of this absolute separation, will not admit
that there is any such gulf, but, on the contrary, actually
makes the transition from the finite to the Infinite in the
act of rising to God.
293
294 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
The ready reply to this, however, is that if you grant
the fact of this rising to God, there is certainly an act of
transition on the part of Spirit, but not of Spirit in itself,
not a transition in the conceptions, or indeed in any
sense of the conceptions themselves ; and the reason of
this just is that in the conception as here understood,
the Being of the finite is its own Being and not the
Being of an Other. When we thus regard finite Being
as standing in relation to itself only, it is merely for itself,
and is not Being for an Other. It is consequently taken
out of the region of change, is unchangeable and absolute.
This is how the matter stands with these so-called con-
ceptions. Those, however, who assert the impossibility
of any such transition will not admit that the finite is
absolute, unchangeable, imperishable, and eternal. If
the error involved in taking the finite as absolute were
merely an error of the Schools, an illogical result the
blame of which is to be put on the Understanding ; if it
were to be regarded, in fact, as belonging to those abstrac-
tions of an extreme kind with which we have got to do
here, then we might very well ask if an error of this sort
really mattered much since we might certainly regard
these abstractions as of no account compared with the
fulness of spiritual life found in religion, which, more-
over, constitutes the great and really living interest of
Spirit. But that it is exclusively the finite which con-
stitutes the true interest amongst these so-called great
and living interests, is only too evident from the atten-
tion paid to religion itself, in connection with which, and as
a consequence of the fundamental principle referred to an
amount of study has been bestowed on the history of the
finite materials of the subject, on the history of external
events and opinions far beyond that given to the infinite
element, which has been confessedly reduced to a minimum.
It is by the employment of thoughts and of these abstract
categories of finite and Infinite that the renunciation of
the knowledge of truth is supposed to be justified, and
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 295
as a matter of fact it is in the region of pure thought
that all these interests of Spirit have free play, in order
that they may there have their real nature decided, for
thoughts constitute the really inner substantiality of the
concrete reality of Spirit.
But suppose we leave this conception of the Under-
standing, and its assertion that the Being of the finite is
only its own Being, and not the Being of an Other, not
transition itself, and take up the further idea which
emphasises the element of knowledge. If it is agreed
that Spirit does actually make this transition, then the
fact of this transition is not a fact of knowledge, but of
Spirit in general, and in a definite sense of faith. It has
been sufficiently proved that this act of elevation to God,
whether seen in feeling or in faith, or however you choose
to define the mode of its spiritual existence, takes place
in the inmost part of Spirit, in the region of thought.
Religion as representing what concerns the innermost
part of Man's nature has its centre and the root of its
movement in thought. God in His Essence is thought,
the act of thought itself, just as the ordinary representa-
tion of Him and the shape given to Him in the mind,
as well as the form and mode in which religion ap-
pears, are defined as feeling, intuition, faith, and so on.
Knowledge, however, does nothing beyond bringing this
inward element into consciousness on its own account,
beyond forming a conception of that pulsation cf
thought in terms of thought. In this, knowledge may
appear one-sided, and it may appear all the more as if
feeling, intuition, and faith essentially belonged to religion,
and were more closely connected with God than His
thinking notion and His notion as expressed in thought ;
but this inner element is present here, and thought just
consists in getting a knowledge of it, and rational know-
ledge in general just means that we know a thing in its
essential determinateness.
To have rational knowledge or cognition, to compre-
296 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
hend or grasp in thought, are terms which, like
" immediate " and " faith," belong to present-day cul-
ture. They have the authority of a preconceived idea
which has a twofold character. On the one hand, there
is the fact that they are absolutely familiar, and are con-
sequently final categories regarding whose signification
and verification there is no need to inquire further. On
the other hand, there is the fact that the inability of
reason to comprehend and know the True and the Infinite
is something settled quite as much as their general mean-
ing is. The words, to know or cognise, to comprehend
or grasp in thought, have the value of a magical formula.
It never occurs to those under the influence of this pre-
conceived idea to ask what the expressions to know, to
grasp in thought, mean, or to get a clear idea of them,
and yet that would be the sole and only point of im-
portance if we were to say something that was really
pertinent regarding the main question. In any such
investigation it would be evident of itself that knowledge
merely expresses the fact of the transition which Spirit
itself makes, and in so far as knowledge is true know-
ledge or comprehension it is a consciousness of the neces-
sity which is contained in the transition itself, and is
nothing save the act of forming a conception of this
characteristic which is immanent and present in it.
But if, so far as the fact of the transition from the
finite to the Infinite is concerned, it is replied that this
transition takes place in the spirit, or in faith, feeling,
and the like, such an answer would not be the whole
answer, which rather essentially takes the following form.
Religious belief, or feeling, inner revelation, means that
we have an immediate knowledge of God which is not
reached by mediation. It means that the transition does
not consist of an essential connection between the two
sides, but is made in the form of a leap from one to the
other. What we would call a transition is broken up
in this way into two separate acts which are outwardly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 297
opposed, and follow each other in succession of time only,
and are related to each other by being compared or re-
called. The finite and the Infinite simply keep in this
condition of separation, and this being presupposed,
Spirit occupies itself with the finite in a particular way ;
and in occupying itself with the Infinite in the way of
feeling, faith, knowledge, it performs a separate, immedi-
ate and simple action — not an act of transition. Just as
the finite and the Infinite are without relation to each
other, so, too, the acts of Spirit by which it fills itself
with these characteristics, and fills itself either with the
one or the other, have no relation to each other. Even
if they happen to exist contemporaneously, so that the
finite is found in consciousness along with the Infinite,
they are merely mixed together. They are two inde-
pendent forms of activity which do not enter into any
relation of mediation with each other.
The repetition which is involved in this conception of
the ordinary division of the finite and the Infinite has
already been referred to — that separation by which the
finite is put on one side in an independent form, and the
Infinite on the other in contrast with it, while the former
is not the less asserted in this way to be absolute. This
is the dualism which, put in a more definite form, is
Manicheism. But even those who maintain the existence
of such a relation will not admit that the finite is abso-
lute, and yet they cannot escape the conclusion which
does not merely flow from the statement referred to, but
is just this very statement itself, that the finite has no
connection with the Infinite, that there is no possible
way of passing from the one to the other, but that the
one is absolutely distinct from the other. But even if
a relation is conceived of as actually existing, it is, owing
to the admitted incompatibility between them, a relation
of a merely negative kind. The Infinite is thought of as
the True and the only Affirmative, that is, the abstract
Affirmative, so that its relation to the finite is that of a
298 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
force in which the finite is annihilated. The finite, in
order to be, must keep out of the way of the Infinite,
must flee from it. If it comes into contact with it, it
can only perish. As regards the subjective existence of
these characteristics with which we are dealing, as repre-
sented, namely, by finite and infinite knowledge, we find
that the one side, that of infinitude, is the immediate
knowledge of Man by God. The entire other side, again,
is Man in general ; it is he who is the finite about which
we are chiefly concerned, and it is just this knowledge of
God on his part, whether it is called immediate or not,
which is his Being, his finite knowledge, and the transi-
tion from it to the Infinite. If, accordingly, the manner
in which Spirit deals with the finite, and that in which
it deals with the Infinite, are supposed to represent two
different forms of activity, then the latter form of activity
as representing the elevation of Spirit to God would not
be the immanent transition referred to ; and when Spirit
occupied itself with the finite it would in turn do this in
an absolute way, and be entirely confined to the finite
as such. This point would allow of being dealt with at
great length, but it may be sufficient here to remember
that, although the finite is the object and the end dealt
with by this side, it can occupy itself with it in a true
way, whether in the form of cognition, knowledge, opinion,
or in a practical and moral fashion, only in so far as the
finite is not taken for itself, but is known, recognised,
and its existence affirmed in connection with the relation
in which it stands to the Infinite, to the Infinite in it, in
so far, in fact, as it is an object and an end in connection
with this latter category. It is well enough known what
place is given to the religious element both in the case
of individuals and even in religions themselves, and how
this religious element in the form of devotion, contrition
of heart and spirit, and the giving of offerings, comes to
be regarded as a matter apart with which we can occupy
ourselves and then have done with ; while the secular life,
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 299
the sphere of finitude, exists alongside of it, and gives itself
up to the pursuit of its own ends, and is left to its own
interests without any influence being exercised upon it by
the Infinite, the Eternal, and the True — that is, without
there being any passing over into the Infinite within the
sphere of the finite, without the finite coming to truth
and morality by the mediation of the Infinite, and so,
too, without the Infinite being brought into the region of
present reality through the mediation of the finite. We
do not require here to enter upon the consideration of
the lame conclusion that the one who has knowledge,
namely, Man, must be absolute in order to comprehend
the Absolute, because the same thing applies to faith or
immediate knowledge as being also an inner act of com-
prehension, if not of the absolute Spirit of God, at all
events of the Infinite. If this knowledge is so afraid of
the concrete element in its object, then this object must
at least have some meaning for it. It is really the non-
concrete which has few characteristics or none at all,
that is the abstract, the negative, what is least of all,
the Infinite in short.
But then it is just by means of this miserable abstrac-
tion of the Infinite that ordinary thought repels the
attempt to comprehend the Infinite, and for the simple
reason that the present and actual Man, the human
spirit, human reason, is definitely opposed to the Infinite
in the form of a fixed abstraction of the finite. Ordinary
thought would more readily allow that the human spirit,
thought, or reason, can comprehend the Absolutely-neces-
sary, for this latter is thus directly declared and stated
to be the negative as opposed to its Other, namely, the
contingent, which has on its part a necessity too, external
necessity that is. "What accordingly can be clearer than
that Man, who moreover is, that is to say, is something
positive or affirmative, cannot comprehend his negative ?
And conversely, is it not still more clear that since his
Being, his affirmation, is finitude, and therefore negation,
3co THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
it cannot comprehend infinitude, which, as opposed to
finitude, is equally negation but in the reverse way, since
it is Being, affirmation in contrast with the characteristic
attached to finitude ? What then can be clearer than
that finitude comes to Man from both sides ? He can
comprehend a few feet of space, yet outside of this
volume there lies the infinitude of space. He possesses
a span of infinite time, which in the same way shrinks
up into a moment as compared with this infinite time,
just as his volume of space shrinks up into a point. But
considered apart from this outward finitude which charac-
terises him in contrast with those infinite externalities,
he is intelligence, is able to perceive, to form ideas, to
know, to have cognition of things. The object on which
he exercises his intelligence is the world, this aggregate
of infinite particular things. How small is the number
of these known by individual men — it is not Man who
knows but the individual — as compared with the infinite
mass which actually exists. In order clearly to realise
the paltry nature of human knowledge, we have only to
remember a fact which cannot be denied, and which we
are accustomed to describe as divine Omniscience, and to
put it in the fashion in which it is expressed by the
organist in L , in a funeral sermon reported in " The
Courses of Life on Ascending Lines " (Part II., Supple-
ment B.) — to mention once more a work marked by
humour of the highest kind : " Neighbour Brise was
speaking to me yesterday about the greatness of the
good God, and the idea came into my head that the
good God knew how to name every sparrow, every
goldfinch, every wren, every mite, every midge, just as
you call the people in the village, Schmied's Gregory,
Briefen's Peter, Heifried's Hans. Just think how the
good God can call to every one of these midges which
are so like each other that you would swear they were
all sisters and brothers — just think of it!" But as
compared with practical finitude the theoretical element
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 301
at least appears great and wide ; and yet how thoroughly
we realise what human limitation is, when these aims,
and plans, and wishes, and all that so long as it is in the
mind has no limits, are brought into contact with the
reality for which they are intended. All that wide
extent of practical imagination, all that endeavour, that
aspiration, reveals its narrowness by the very fact that it
is only endeavour, only aspiration. It is this finitude
with which the attempt to form a conception of the In-
finite, to comprehend it, is confronted. The critical Under-
standing which holds by this principle, supposed to be so
convincing, has really not got beyond the stage of culture
occupied by that organist in L , has in fact not even
attained to it. The organist used the pictorial idea
referred to in the simplicity of his heart, in order to
bring the idea of the greatness of God's love before a
peasant community. The critical Understanding, on the
other hand, employs finite things in order to bring objec-
tion against God's love and God's greatness, that is to say,
against God's presence in the human spirit. This Under-
standing keeps firmly in its mind the midge of fmitude,
that proposition already considered — the finite is, a pro-
position the falseness of which is directly evident, for
the finite is something the essential character and nature
of which consist just in this that it passes away, that it
is not, so that it is impossible to think of the finite or
form an idea of it apart from the determination of Not-
Being, which is involved in the thought of what is
transient. Who has got the length of saying, the finite
passes away ? If the idea of Now is inserted between
the finite and its passing away, and if in this way a kind
of permanence is supposed to be given to Being — "the
finite passes away, but it is now " — then this Now itself
is something which not only passes away, but has itself
actually passed away, since it is. The very fact that I
have this consciousness of the Now, and have put it into
words, shows that it is no longer Now, but something
302 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
different. It lasts, it is true, but not as this particular
Now, and Now can only mean this actual Now, in this par-
ticular moment, something without length, a mere point.
It continues, in fact, only as being the negation of this
particular Now, as the negation of the finite, and conse-
quently as the Infinite, the Universal. The Universal
is already infinite. That respect for the Infinite which
keeps the Understanding from finding the Infinite in
every Universal ought to be called a silly respect. The
Infinite is lofty and majestic, but to place its grandeur
and majesty in that countless swarm of midges, and to
find the infinitude of knowledge in the knowledge of
those countless midges, that is, of the individual midges,
is a proof of the impotence, not of faith, of Spirit, or of
reason, but of the Understanding to conceive of the finite
as a nullity, and of its Being as something which has
equally the value and signification which belong to Not-
Being.
Spirit is immortal ; it is eternal ; and it is immortal
and eternal in virtue of the fact that it is infinite, that it
has no such spatial finitude as we associate with the body
when we speak of it being five feet in height, two feet in
breadth and thickness, that it is not the Now of time,
that the content of its knowledge does not consist of
these countless midges, that its volition and freedom have
not to do with the infinite mass of existing obstacles, nor
of the aims and activities which such resisting obstacles
and hindrances have to encounter. The infinitude of Spirit
is its inwardness, in an abstract sense its pure inwardness,
and this is its thought, and this abstract thought is a real,
present infinitude, while its concrete inwardness consists
in the fact that this thought is Spirit.
Thus, after starting with the absolute separation of
the two sides, we have come back to their connection, and
it makes no difference whether this connection is repre-
sented as existing in the subjective or objective sphere.
The only question is as to whether it has been correctly
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 303
conceived of. In so far as it is represented as merely
subjective, as a proof only for us, it is of course granted
that it is not objective and has not been correctly con-
ceived of in-and-for-itself. But, then, what is incorrect
in it is not to be looked for in the fact that there is no such
connection at all, that is to say, that there is no such
thing as the elevation of Spirit to God.
The real point, therefore, would be the consideration
of this connection in its determinateness. The considera-
tion of it in this way is a matter at once of the deepest
and most elevated kind, and just because of this it is the
most difficult of tasks. You cannot carry it on by means
of finite categories ; that is, the modes of thought which
we employ in ordinary life and in dealing with contingent
things, as well as those we are accustomed to in the
sciences, don't suffice for it. The latter have their founda-
tion, their logic, in connections which belong to what is
finite, sucli as cause and effect ; their laws, their descriptive
terms, their modes of arguing, are purely relations belong-
ing to what is conditioned, and which lose their significance
in the heights where the Infinite is. They must indeed
be employed, but at the same time they have always to
be referred back to their proper sphere and have their
meaning rectified. The fact of the fellowship of God
and Man with each other involves a fellowship of Spirit
with Spirit. It involves the most important questions.
It is a fellowship, and this very circumstance involves
the difficulty of at once maintaining the fact of difference
and of defining it in such a way as to preserve the fact
of fellowship. That Man knows God implies, in accord-
ance with the essential idea of communion or fellowship,
that there is a community of knowledge ; that is to say,
Man knows God only in so far as God Himself knows
Himself in Man. This knowledge is God's self-conscious-
ness, but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on
the part of Man, and this knowledge of God by Man is a
knowledge of Man by God. The Spirit of Man, whereby
304 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
he knows God, is simply the Spirit of God Himself. It
is at this stage that the questions regarding the freedom
of Man, the union of his individual consciousness and
knowledge with the knowledge which brings him into
fellowship with God, and the knowledge of God in him,
come to be discussed. This wealth of relationship which
exists between the human spirit and God is not, how-
ever, our subject. We have to take up this relationship
only in its most abstract aspect, that is to say, in the form
of the connection of the finite with the Infinite. However
strong the contrast between the poverty of this connection
and the wealth of the content referred to may seem, still
the logical relation is at the same time also the basis of
the movement of that fulness of content.
FIFTEENTH LECTURE
THE connection between these forms of thought referred
to which constitutes the entire content of the Proof
under discussion, has already been examined in the fore-
going Lectures. That this connection does not correspond
to the results supposed to be reached in the Proof, is a
point to be thoroughly discussed afterwards. The pecu-
liarly speculative aspect of the connection, however, still
remains to be considered, and we have here to indicate,
without entering upon this logical examination in detail,
what characteristic of this connection has reference to
this speculative aspect. The moment to which attention
has mainly to be directed in reference to this connection,
is the fact that it is a transition, that is to say, the point of
departure has here the characteristic quality of something
negative, has the character of contingent Being, of what
is a phenomenon or an appearance only, which has its
truth in the Absolutely-necessary, in the truly affirmative
element in this latter. As regards, first of all, the former
of these characteristics, the negative moment namely,
if we are to get a philosophical grasp of it, all that is
necessary is that it be not taken as representing mere
Nothing. It does riot exist in any such abstract form,
but, on the contrary, is merely a moment in the contin-
gency of the world. There ought accordingly to be no
difficulty in not taking the negative as abstract Nothing.
The popular idea of contingency, limitation, finitude, phe-
nomenon, involves the idea of definite Being, of definite
existence, but at the same time it substantially involves
negation. Ordinary thought is more concrete and true
than the Understanding which abstracts, and which when
VOL. in. 3°5 u
3o6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
it hears of a negative too easily makes Nothing out
of it, pure Nothing, Nothing as such, and gives up all
thought of its being in any way connected with existence
in so far as existence is defined as contingent, pheno-
menal, and so on. Keflective analysis points to the two
moments which exist in a content of this kind — namely,
an affirmative, definite Being, existence as one particular
form of Being ; but a moment also which involves the
quality of finality, mortality, limits, and so on, in the
form of negation. Thought, if it is to form a conception
of the contingent, cannot allow these moments to be
separated into a Nothing for itself and a Being for itself.
For they do not exist in this form in the contingent;
on the contrary, it comprises both in itself. They are
therefore not to be taken as existing each by itself in
connection with one another, nor is the contingent to be
taken just as it is, as representing the connection between
them. This then is the speculative determination. It
remains true to the content of ordinary thought or con-
ception, while, on the contrary, this content escapes
abstract thought which asserts the independence of the
two moments. It has resolved into its parts the contin-
gent, which is the object of the Understanding.
The contingent accordingly, as thus defined, represents
what is a contradiction in itself. What thus resolves
itself becomes in consequence just exactly what it be-
came in the hands of the Understanding. But resolu-
tion is of two sorts. The resolution effected by the.
Understanding results simply in the disappearance of the
object, of the concrete union ; while in the other kind of
resolution the object is preserved. Still this preservation
does not help it much, or not at all, for in being thus
preserved it is defined as a contradiction, and contradic-
tion dissolves itself ; what contradicts itself is Nothing.
However correct this may be, it is at the same time
incorrect. Contradiction and Nothing are at all events
distinct from one another. Contradiction is concrete, it
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 307
at least has a content, it at least contains things which
contradict themselves ; it at least gives expression to them,
it declares what it is a contradiction of: Nothing, on the
contrary, does not express anything at all, it is devoid of
content, it is the absolutely empty. This concrete quality
of the one and the absolutely abstract quality of the other
constitute a very important difference. Further, Nothing
is in no sense contradiction. Nothing does not contra-
dict itself, it is identical with itself; it accordingly fulfils
perfectly the conditions of the logical proposition that a
thing should not contradict itself — or if this proposition is
expressed thus, Nothing ought to contradict itself, this is
an ought which has no result, for Nothing does not do what
it ought, that is, it does not contradict itself. If, how-
ever, it is put in the way of a thesis thus — Nothing
which exists contradicts itself, then it is plainly correct,
for the subject of this proposition is a Nothing which at
the same time is, but Nothing itself as such is merely
simple, the one characteristic which is equivalent to
itself, which does not contradict itself.
Thus, the cancelling or solution of the contradiction
in Nothing, as given by the Understanding, moves in
vacua, or, more accurately, in contradiction itself, which
in virtue of a solution of this kind declares itself in fact
to be still in existence, to be unsolved. The reason why
the contradiction is still uncancelled is just that the
content, the contingent, is first posited only in its nega-
tion in itself, and not yet in the affirmation which must
be contained in this cancelling since it is not abstract
Nothing. Even the contingent is certainly, to begin with,
as it presents itself to the ordinary thought, an affirma-
tive. It represents definite Being, existence ; it is the
world, affirmation, Reality, or however you like to term it,
and it is this enough and to spare ; but as such it is not
yet posited in its solution, not given in the explication
of its content and substance, and it is just this content
which is meant to lead to its truth, namely, the Abso-
308 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
lutely-necessary. It is the contingent itself in which, as
was said, the finitude, the limitation of the world has
been indicated in order that it may itself directly point
to its solution, that is, in accordance with the negative
side already indicated. And further, the analysis or
resolution of this contingent which is posited as already
resolved in the contradiction, is seen to be the affirma-
tive which is contained in it. This resolution has been
already referred to. It was got and adopted from the
idea formed by the human mind as representing the
transition of Spirit from the contingent to the Absolutely-
necessary, which in accordance with this would itself be
this very affirmative, the resolution of that first and
merely negative resolution. So, too, to indicate the
speculative element in this final and most inner point
would simply mean to put in a completely connected
form the thoughts which are already contained in the
conception we are dealing with, namely, in that first
resolution. The Understanding which conceived of it
merely as contradiction which resolves itself into No-
thing, takes up only one of the two moments contained
in it, and leaves the other alone.
As a matter of fact the concrete result in its unfolded
shape, that is, its speculative form, has been already
brought under our notice, and that long ago, namely, in
the definition which was given of absolute necessity. In
that connection, however, an external kind of reflection
and style of argument was employed in reference to the
moments which belong to this necessity or from which
it results. What we have got to do here is merely to
call attention to those moments which are found in what
we have seen to be the contradiction which is the resolu-
tion of the contingent. In absolute necessity what we
found first of all was the moment of mediation, and, to
begin with, of mediation through an Other. The analysis
of the contingent directly shows that the moments of this
mediation are Being in general, or material existence, and
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 309
the negation of this, whereby it is degraded to the state
of something which has a semblance of Being, something
which is virtually a nullity. Each moment is not isolated
and taken by itself, but is thought of as attaching to the
one characteristic, namely, to the contingent, and as exist-
ing purely in relation to the Other, as having any mean-
ing only in this relation. This one characteristic, which
holds them together, is what mediates them. In it, it is
true, the one exists by means of the other ; but then each
can exist for itself outside of their connection, and each
ought, in fact, to exist for itself, Being for itself and
negation for itself. If, however, we call the former
Being as it appears in the more concrete shape in which
we have it here, namely, as material existence, we practi-
cally grant that this material existence is not for itself, is
not absolute or eternal, but is, on the contrary, virtually
a nullity which has indeed a Being, but not an inde-
pendent Being, a Being-for-self, for it is just this Being
possessed by it which is characterised as something con-
tingent. Since, accordingly, in the case of contingency
each of the two characteristics exists only in relation to
the other, this mediation between them appears to be
contingent itself, to be merely isolated, and to be found
only in this particular place. The unsatisfactory thing
is that the characteristics can be taken for themselves,
that is to say, as they themselves are as such, and as
related only to themselves, and therefore immediately and
thus as not mediated in themselves. Mediation is conse-
quently something which happens to them in a merely
outward way, and is itself contingent ; that is, the pecu-
liar inner necessity of contingency is not demonstrated.
This reflection consequently leads up to the necessity
of the starting-point in itself which we took as something
given, as a starting-point in fact. It leads up not to the
transition from the contingent to the necessary, but to
the transition which is implicitly contained in the con-
tingent itself, to the transition from one of each of the
3io THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
moments which constitute the contingent, to its Other.
This would bring us back to the analysis of the first ab-
stract, logical moments, and it is sufficient here to regard
contingency as the act of transition in itself, as its can-
celling of itself or annulling of itself, as this is ordinarily
conceived of.
In the resolution of contingency just described, there
is at the same time indicated the second moment, that
of absolute necessity, that is, the moment of mediation
with self. The moments of contingency are, to begin
with, in a relation of antithesis to each other, and each is
posited as mediated by its antithesis or Other. In the
unity of the two, however, each is something negated,
and their difference is consequently done away with, and
although we still speak of one of the two, it is no longer
related to something different from it, but to itself; we
have thus mediation with self.
The speculative way of looking at this accordingly
implies that the contingent is known in itself in so far
as it is resolved into its parts, and this resolution at first
takes the form of an external analysis of this character-
istic. It is, however, not merely this, but is really the
resolution of that characteristic in itself. The contingent
is by its very nature that which resolves itself, disinte-
grates itself, it is transition in itself. But, in the second
place, this resolution is not the abstraction of Nothing, but
is rather affirmation within the resolution, that affirmation
which we call absolute necessity. It is thus that we
form a philosophical conception of this transition. The
result is shown to be immanent in the contingent, i.e., it
is the very nature of the contingent to revert back to its
truth, and the elevation of our spirit to God — in so far as
we have provisionally no further definition of God than
the description of Him as Absolute Being, or because we
for the present rest satisfied with it — is the course of
development followed by this movement of the Thing or
true fact. It is this Thin" or true fact in-and-for-itself
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 311
which is the impelling power in us, and which gives the
impulse to this movement.
It has been already remarked that for the consciousness
to which the determinations of thought do not present
themselves in this pure speculative form, and conse-
quently not in their self-solution and self- movement, but
which represents them to itself by general ideas, the
transition is rendered more easy by the fact that the
thing from which we start, namely, the contingent,
already means something which resolves itself, which
passes over into its Other. In this way the connec-
tion between that from which the start is made and the
point ultimately reached, is made absolutely clear. This
starting-point is consequently the one which is most
advantageous for consciousness, and the one which is
most in accordance with an end. It is the instinct of
thought which implicitly makes this transition, which
is the essential fact or Thing, but at the same time this
instinct brings it into consciousness in the form of a
determination of thought, of such a kind that it appears
easy for it to represent it as a general idea merely, that
is, in the form of abstract identity. When the world, in
fact, is defined as the contingent, this means that refer-
ence is made to its Not- Being, while it is hinted that its
truth is its Other or antithesis.
The transition is rendered intelligible by the fact that
it is not only implicitly contained in the starting-point,
but that this latter directly suggests the transition, that
is, this characteristic is also posited and is therefore in
it. In this way its determinate existence is something
given for consciousness, which makes use of ordinary
ideas just in so far as it has to do with immediate
existence, which is here a determination or quality of
thought. Equally intelligible is the result, the Abso-
lutely-necessary ; it contains mediation, and it is just
this understanding of the connection in general which
passes for being the easiest possible, a connection which
312 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
in a finite way is taken as the connection of the one with
an Other, but which, on the other hand, carries its correc-
tive with it in so far as this connection issues in an
insufficient end. A connection of this kind, owing to
the fact that the law which governs it constantly requires
that it should repeat itself in the matter which composes
it, always lead up to an Other, that is, to a negative,
while the affirmative which reappears in this act of
development is simply something which issues from it-
self, and thus the one as well as the Other finds no rest,
and no satisfaction. The Absolutely-necessary, again,
since regarded from one point of view it itself produces
that connection, is something which can also break off the
connection, bring back into itself this going out of itself
and secure the final result. The Absolutely-necessary is,
because it is; thus that Other and the act of going out
towards that Other are set aside, and by this unconscious
inconsequence satisfaction is secured.
SIXTEENTH LECTURE
THE foregoing Lectures have dealt with the dialectical
element, with the absolute fluidity, of the characteristics
that enter into the movement which represents this first
form of the elevation of the spirit to God. We have
now further to deal with the result in itself as defined
in accordance with the standpoint adopted.
This result is the absolutely necessary Essence. The
meaning of a result is known to consist simply in this,
that in it the determination of the mediation, and conse-
quently of the result, has been absorbed in something
higher. The mediation was the self-annulling of the
mediation. Essence means what is as yet absolutely
abstract self- identity ; it is not subject, and still less is it
Spirit. The entire determination is found in absolute
necessity, which in its character as Being is at the same
time what has immediate Being, and which, as a matter
of fact, implicitly determines itself as subject, but at first
in the purely superficial form of something having Being,
in the form of the Absolutely-necessary.
The fact that this determination is not adequate to
express our idea of God is a defect which we may in the
meantime leave alone, inasmuch as it has been already
indicated that the other proofs bring with them further
and more concrete determinations. There are, however,
religious and philosophical systems whose defectiveness
consists just in this, that they have not got beyond the
characteristic of absolute necessity. The consideration
of the more concrete forms in which this principle has
embodied itself in religion, belongs to the philosophy of
religion and to the history of religion. Regarding the
313
3U THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
subject in this aspect, it may here be merely remarked that
in general those religions which have this determinateness
as their basis have, so far as the inner logical development
of concrete Spirit is concerned, richer and more varied
elements than any which the abstract principle at first
brings with it. In the sphere of phenomena and in con-
sciousness the other moments of the Idea in its full and
completed form, are superadded in a way which is inconsis-
tent with that abstract principle. It is, however, essential
to find out whether these additions in the way of definite
form belong merely to imagination, and whether the con-
crete in its inner nature does not get beyond that abstrac-
tion— so that, as in the Oriental and particularly in the
Indian mythology, the infinite realm of divine persons
who are brought in not only as forces in general, but as
self-conscious, willing figures, continues to be devoid of
Spirit — or whether, on the other hand, spite of that one
necessity, the higher spiritual principle emerges in these
persons, and whether, in consequence, spiritual freedom
comes to view in their worshippers. Thus in the religion
of the Greeks we see absolute necessity in the form of
Fate occupying the place of what is supreme and ultimate,
and it is only in subordination to this necessity that we
have the joyous company of the concrete and living Gods.
These are also conceived of as spiritual and conscious,
and in the above-mentioned and in other mythologies are
multiplied so as to make a still larger crowd of heroes,
nymphs of the sea, of the rivers, and so on, muses, fauns,
&c., and are connected with the ordinary external life of
the world and its contingent things, partly as chorus and
accompaniment in the form of a further particularisation
of one of the divine supreme deities, partly as figures of
minor importance. Here necessity constitutes the abstract
force which is above all the particular spiritual, moral,
and natural forces. These latter, however, partly possess
the character of non-spiritual, merely natural force, which
remains completely under the power of necessity, while
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 315
their personalities are merely personifications ; and yet,
although they may not exactly deserve to be called persons,
they also partly contain the higher characteristic of sub-
jective inherent freedom. In this way they occupy a
position above that of their mistress, namely, necessity,
to which only the limited element in this deeper prin-
ciple is subordinate, a principle which has elsewhere to
await its purification from this finitude in the region of
which it at first appears, and has to manifest itself inde-
pendently in its infinite freedom.
The logical working out of the category of absolute
necessity is to be looked for in systems which start from
abstract thoughts. This application in detail of the
category has reference to the relation between this prin-
ciple and the rnanifoldness of the natural and spiritual
world. If absolute necessity thus forms the basis as
representing what is alone true and truly real, in what
relation do material things stand to it? These things
are not only natural things, but also include Spirit, the
spiritual individuality with all its conceptions, interests,
and aims. This relation has, however, been already de-
fined in connection with the principle referred to. They
are contingent things. Further, they are distinct from
absolute necessity itself ; but they have no independent
Being as against it, and neither has it, consequently, as
against them. There is only one Being, and this belongs
to necessity, and things by their very nature form part
of it. What we have defined as absolute necessity has
to be more definitely hypostatised in the form of universal
Being or Substance, while, in its character as a result, it
is a self-mediated unity in virtue of the abrogation of
mediation. It is thus simple Being, and is what alone
represents the subsisting element of things. When our
attention was previously called to necessity in the form
of Greek Fate, it was thought of as characterless or inde-
terminate force ; but Being itself has already come down
from the abstraction referred to, to the level of the things
316 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
above which it ought to be. Still, if Essence or Sub-
stance itself were merely an abstraction, things would
have an independent existence of concrete individuality
outside of it. It must at the same time be characterised
as the force of these things, the negative principle which
makes its validity felt in them, and by means of which
they represent what is perishing and transitory and has
merely a phenomenal existence. We have seen how this
negative element represents the peculiar nature of con-
tingent things. They have thus this force within them-
selves, and do not represent manifestation in general, but
the manifestation of necessity. This necessity contains
things, or rather it contains them in their stage of media-
tion. It is not, however, mediated by something other
than itself, but it is the direct mediation of itself with
itself. It is the variable element or alternation of its
absolute unity whereby it determines itself as mediation,
that is, as external necessity, a relation of an Other to
an Other, that is, whereby it spreads itself out into in-
finite multiplicity, into. the absolutely conditioned world,
but in such a way that it degrades external mediation,
the contingent world to the condition of a world of
appearance, and in this uunity comes into harmony with
itself, posits itself as equal to itself, and does this in the
world as representing its force. Everything is thus in-
cluded in it, and it is immediately present in everything.
It is the Being, as it also is the changeable and variable
element of the world.
The determination of necessity as unfolded in the
philosophical conception of it, is, speaking generally, the
standpoint which we are in the habit of calling Panthe-
ism, and sometimes in a more developed and definite form,
sometimes in a more superficial form, it is what expresses
the relation indicated. The very fact of the interest
which this name has again awakened in modern times,
and still more the interest of the principle itself, render
it necessary that we should direct our attention to it.
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 317
The misunderstanding which prevails with regard to
Pantheism ought not to be allowed to pass without being
mentioned and corrected ; and after that we shall have
to consider in this connection the place of the principle
in the higher totality, in the true Idea of God. Since at
a previous stage the consideration of the religious form
taken by the principle was dispensed with, we may, by
way of bringing a picture of it before the mind, take the
Hindu religion as representing Pantheism in its most
developed form. With this development there is bound
up at the same time the fact that the absolute Substance,
the sole and only One, is represented in the form of
thought as distinguished from the accidental world, as
existing. Religion in itself essentially involves the re-
lation of Man to God, and still less when it appears in
the form of Pantheism does it leave the one Essence in
that condition of objectivity in which metaphysic imagines
it has left it as an object while preserving its special
character. We have to call attention first of all to the
remarkable character of this attempt to bring Substance
under the conditions of subjectivity. Self-conscious
thought does not only make that abstraction of Substance,
but is the very act of abstraction itself. It is just that
simple unity as existing for itself which is called Sub-
stance. This thought is thus conceived of as the force
which creates and preserves the world, and which also
alters and changes its existence as this appears in parti-
cular forms. This thought is termed Brahma. It exists
as the natural self-consciousness of the Brahmans, and as
the self-consciousness of others who put under restraint
and kill their consciousness in its manifold forms, their
sensations, their material and spiritual interests, and all
the active life connected with them, and reduce it to the
perfect simplicity and emptiness of that substantial unity.
Thus this thought, this abstraction of men in themselves,
is held to be the force of the world. The universal force
takes particular forms in gods, who are nevertheless
318 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
transitory and temporary ; or, what conies to the same
thing, all life, whether in the form of spiritual or natural
individuality, is torn away from the fiuitude of its per-
fectly conditioned connection — all understanding in this
latter being destroyed — and is elevated into the form of
divine existence.
As we were reminded, the principle of individualisation
appears in this Pantheism in its several religious shapes,
in a form inconsistent with the force of substantial unity.
Individuality, it is true, does not exactly get the length
of being personality, but the force unfolds itself in a
sufficiently wild way as an illogical transition into its
opposite. We find ourselves in a region of unbridled
madness in which the present in its most ordinary form
is directly elevated to the rank of something divine, and
Substance is conceived of as existing in finite shapes,
while the shapes assumed have a volatile character and
directly melt away.
The Oriental theory of the universe is in general re-
presented by this idea of sublimity which puts all indi-
vidualisation into special shapes, and infinitely extends
all particular forms of existence and particular interests.
It beholds the One in all things, and consequently clothes
this purely abstract One in all the glory and splendour
of the natural and spiritual universe. The souls of the
Eastern Poets dive into this ocean and drown in it all
the necessities, the aims, the cares of this petty circum-
scribed life, and revel in the enjoyment of this freedom,
upon which they lavish by way of ornament and adorn-
ment all the beauty of the world.
It will be already clear from this picture, and this is
a point upon which I have elsewhere explained my
views, that the expression Pantheism, or rather the
German expression in which it appears in a somewhat
transposed form, that God is the One and All, or every-
thing— TO cv /cat Trai/ — leads to the false idea that in
pantheistic religion or in philosophy, everything (Alles),
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 319
that is. every existing thing in its finitude and par-
ticularity, is held to be possessed of Being as God or as
a god, and that the finite is deified as having Being.
It could only be a narrow and ordinary or rather a
scholastic kind of mind which would expect this to be
the case, and which, being perfectly unconcerned about
what actually is, sticks to one category, and to the cate-
gory, in fact, of finite particularisation, and accordingly
conceives of the manifoldness which it finds mentioned,
as a permanent, existing, substantial particularisation.
There can be no mistake but that the essential and
Christian definition of freedom or individuality, which as
free is infinite in itself and is personality, has misled the
Understanding into conceiving of the particularisation of
finitude under the category of an existing unchangeable
atom, and into overlooking the moment of the negative
which is involved in force and in the general system to
which it belongs. It imagines Pantheism as saying that
all, that is, all things in their existing isolation, are God,
since it takes the irav in this definite category as referring
to all and every individual thing. Such an absurd idea
has never come into anybody's head outside of the ranks
of these opponents of Pantheism. This latter represents
a view which is, on the contrary, quite the opposite of
that which they associate with it. The finite, the con-
tingent is not something which subsists for itself. In
the affirmative sense it is only a manifestation, a revela-
tion of the One, only an appearance of it which is itself
merely contingency. The fact is that it is the negative
aspect, the disappearance in the one force, the ideality
of what has Being as a momentary standpoint in the
force, which is the predominant aspect. In opposition to
this the Understanding holds that these things exist for
themselves and have their essence in themselves, and are
thus in and in accordance with this finite essentiality,
supposed to be divine or even to be God. They cannot
free themselves from the absoluteness of their finitude,
320 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
and this finitude is not thought of as something which
disappears and is absorbed in this unity with the Divine,
but is still preserved by them in it as existing. On the
other hand, since the finite is, as they say, robbed of its
infinitude by Pantheism, the finite has in consequence
no longer any Being at all.
It is preferable to use the expression, " the philosophical
systems of substantiality," and not to speak of systems of
Pantheism, because of the false idea associated with this
term. We may take the Eleatic system in general as
representing these in ancient times, and the Spinozistic
as their modern representative. These systems of sub-
stantiality are, as we have seen, more logical than the
religions corresponding to them, since they keep within
the sphere of metaphysical abstraction. The one aspect
of the defect which attaches to them is represented by the
one-sidedness referred to as existing in the idea formed
by the Understanding of the course taken by the spirit's
elevation to God. That is to say, they start from actual
existence, treat it as a nullity, and recognise the Absolute
One as the truth of this existence. They start with a
presupposition, they negate it in the absolute unity, but
they don't get out of this unity back to the presupposi-
tion. They don't think of the world, which is con-
sidered to be merely comprised within an abstraction of
contingency, of the many and so on, as produced out of
Substance. Everything passes into this unity as into a
kind of eternal night, while this unity is not characterised
as a principle which moves itself to its manifestation, or
produces it, " as the unmoved which moves," according
to the profound expression of Aristotle.
(a.) In these systems the Absolute, or God, is defined
as the One, Being, the Being in all existence, the absolute
Substance, the Essence which is necessary not through
an Other, but in-and-for-itself, the Causa Sui, the cause
of itself, and consequently its own effect, that is, the
mediation which cancels itself. The unity implied in
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 321
this latter characteristic belongs to an infinitely deeper
and more developed form of thought than the abstract
unity of Being, or the One. This conception has been
sufficiently explained. Causa Sui is a very striking
expression for that unity, and we may accordingly give
some further attention to its elucidation. The relation
of cause and effect belongs to the moment of mediation
through an Other already referred to, and which we saw
in necessity, and is its definite form. Anything is com-
pletely mediated by an Other in so far as this Other is
its cause. This is the original thing or fact as absolutely
immediate and independent ; the effect, on the other
hand, is what is posited merely, dependent, and so forth.
In the antithesis of Being and Nothing, One and Many,
and so on, the characteristics are found existing in such
a way as to imply that they are matched with each
other in their relation, and yet that they have, as un-
related, a valid independent existence besides. The
Positive, the Whole, and so on, is, it is true, related to
the Negative, to the parts, and this relation forms part
of its essential meaning ; but the Positive as well as the
Negative, the Whole, the parts, and so on, have in ad-
dition an independent existence outside of this relation.
But cause and effect have a meaning simply and solely
in virtue of their relation. The meaning of the cause
does not extend beyond the fact that it has an effect.
The stone which falls has the effect of producing an
impression on the object upon which it falls. Looked
at apart from this effect which it has as a heavy body,
it is physically separate and distinct from other equally
heavy bodies. Or, to put it otherwise, since it is a
cause while it continues to produce this impression, if
we, for example, imagine its effect to be transitory, then
when it strikes against another body it ceases so far to
be a cause, and outside of this relation it is just a stone,
which it was before. This idea haunts the popular mind
chiefly in so far as it characterises the thing as the
VOL. III. X
322 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
original fact and as continuing to exist outside of that
effect it produces. Apart from that effect which it has
produced, the stone is undoubtedly a stone, only it is
not a cause. It is a cause only in connection with its
effect, or, to introduce the note of time, during its effect.
Cause and effect are thus, speaking generally, insepa-
rable. Each has meaning and existence only in so far
as it stands in this relation to the other, and yet they
are supposed to be absolutely different. We cling with
equal firmness to the idea that the cause is not the effect
and the effect is not the cause, and the Understanding
holds obstinately to this fact of the independent being
of these two categories and of the absence of relation
between them.
When, however, we have come to see that the cause is
inseparable from the effect, and that it has any meaning
only as being in the latter, then it follows that the cause
itself is mediated by the effect ; it is only in and through
the effect that it is cause. This, however, means nothing
more than that the cause is the cause of itself, and not
of an Other. For this which is supposed to be an Other
is of such a kind that the cause is first a cause in it, and
therefore in it simply reaches itself, and in it affects
only itself.
Jacobi has some reflections on this Spinozistic category,
the Causa Sui (" Letters on the Doctrine of Spinoza," 2nd
ed., p. 416), and I refer to his criticisms upon it just be-
cause they afford us an example of how Jacobi, the pio-
neer of the party of immediate knowledge or faith, who
is so much given to rejecting the Understanding in his
consideration of thought, does not get beyond the mere
Understanding. I pass over what he says in the passage
referred to regarding the distinction between the category
of ground and consequence, and that of cause and effect,
and the fact that in his later controversial essays he
imagines he has found in this difference a true description
and definition of the nature of God. I merely indicate
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 323
the more immediate conclusion referred to by him, namely,
that from the interchange of the two " it may be success-
fully inferred that things can originate without originating,
and alter without undergoing alteration, and can be before
and after each other without being before and after."
Such conclusions are too absurd to require any further
comment. The contradiction to which the Understand-
ing reduces a principle is an ultimate one ; it is simply
the limit of the horizon of thought beyond which it is
not possible to go, but in presence of which we must turn
back. We have, however, seen how the solution of this
contradiction is reached, and we shall apply it to the
contradiction in the form in which it here appears and is
here stated, or rather we shall simply briefly indicate
the estimate to be formed of the above assertion. The
conclusion referred to, that things may originate without
originating, and alter without undergoing alteration, is
manifestly absurd. We can see that it expresses the
idea of self-mediation through an Other, of mediation as
self-annulling mediation, but likewise that this mediation
is directly abandoned. The abstract expression, Things,
does its part in bringing the finite before the mind. The
finite is a form of limited Being to which only one of
two opposite qualities attaches, and which does not re-
main with itself in the Other, but simply perishes. But
then the Infinite is this mediation with self through the
Other, and without repeating the exposition of this con-
ception, we may take an example from the sphere of
natural things without going at all to that of spiritual
existence, namely, life as a whole. What is well known
to us as its self-preservation is " successfully" expressed
in terms of thought as the infinite relation in virtue of
which the living individual of whose process of self-
preservation we alone speak here, without paying atten-
tion to its other characteristics, continually produces itself
in its existence. This existence is not identical Bein«,
O'
Being in a state of repose, but, on the contrary, represents
3^4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
origination, alteration, mediation with an Other, though
it is a mediation which returns to itself. The living
force of what has life consists iu making life originate,
and the living already is ; and so we may indeed say —
though it is certainly a bold expression — that such and
such a thing originates without originating. It under-
goes alteration ; every pulsation is an alteration not only
in all the pulse-veins, but in all the parts of its entire
constitution. In all this change it remains the same
individual, and it remains such only in so far as it is
this inherently self-altering active force. We may thus
say of it that it alters without undergoing alteration,
and finally — though we cannot certainly say that of the
things — that it previously exists without existing pre-
viously, just as we have seen with regard to the cause
that it exists previously, is the original cause, while at
the same time previously, before its effect, it is not a
cause, and so on. It is, however, tedious, and would
even be an endless task to follow up and arrange the
expressions in which the Understanding presents its finite
categories and seeks to give them the character of some-
thing permanent.
This annihilation of the category of causality as used
by the Understanding takes place in connection with
the conception which is expressed by the term Causa Sui.
Jacobi, without recognising in it this negation of the
finite relation, the speculative element, that is, despatches
it simply in a psychological, or, if you like, in a prag-
matical fashion. He declares that "it is difficult to
conclude from the apodictic proposition, everything must
have a cause, that it is possible everything may not
have a cause. Therefore it is that the Causa Sui has
been invented." It is certainly difficult for the Under-
standing not only to have to abandon its apodictic pro-
position, but to have to assume another possibility
which, moreover, has a wrong look in connection with
the expression referred to. But it is not hard for
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 325
reason, which, on the contrary, in its character as the
free, and especially as the religious human spirit, abandons
such a finite relation as this of mediation with an Other,
and knows how to solve in thought the contradiction
which comes to consciousness in thought.
Dialectic development, such as has been here given,
does not, however, belong to the systems of simple sub-
stantiality, to pantheistic systems. They do not get
beyond Being or Substance, a form which we shall take
up later on. This category, taken in itself, is the basis
of all religions and philosophies. In all these God is
Absolute Being, an Essence, which exists absolutely in-
and-for-itself, and does not exist through an Other, but
represents independence pure and simple.
(b.) Categories like these, which are of so abstract a
character, do not apply very widely, and are very
unsatisfactory. Aristotle ("Metaphysics," i. 5) says of
Xenophanes, that " he was the first to unify (ev/cra?),
he did not advance anything of a definite nature, and so
gazing into the whole Heavens — into space (ins Blaue),
as we say — said, the One is God." The Eleatics, who
followed him, showed more definitely that the many and
the characteristics which rest on multiplicity lead to
contradiction and resolve themselves into nothing ; and
Spinoza, in particular, showed that all that is finite dis-
appears in the unity of Substance, and thus there is no
longer left any further, concrete, fruitful determination
for this Substance itself. Development has to do only
with the form of the starting-points which finds itself
in presence of subjective reflection, and with that of its
dialectic, by means of which it brings back into that
universality the particular and finite, which appear in
an independent way. It is true that in Parmenides this
One is defined as thought, or that which thinks, what has
Being ; and so, too, in Spinoza, Substance is defined as
the unity of Being (of extension) and thought. Only,
one cannot therefore say that this Being or Substance is
326 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
hereby posited as something which thinks, that is, as
activity which determines itself in itself. On the con-
trary, the unity of Being and thought continues to be
conceived of as the One, the Unmoved, the Stolid.
There is an outward distinction into attributes and
modes, movement and will, a distinction effected by
the Understanding. The One is not unfolded as self-
developing necessity, not, in accordance with what is
indicated by its notion, as the process which mediates
the necessity with itself and within itself. If the prin-
ciple of movement is here wanting, it is certainly found
in more concrete principles in the flux of Heraclitus, in
number too, and so on ; but, on the one hand, the unity
of Being, the divine self-equality, is not preserved, and,
on the other, a principle of this kind stands in exactly
the same relation to the ordinary existing world as the
Being, the One, or the Substance referred to.
(c.) Besides this One there is, however, the actual con-
tingent world, Being with the quality of the Negative,
the realm of limitations and things finite, and in this
connection it makes no difference whether this realm is
conceived of as a realm of external existence, of sem-
blance or illusion, or, according to the definition of
superficial Idealism, as a merely subjective world, a
world of consciousness. This manifoldness with its
infinite developments is, to begin with, separated from
that Substance, and we have to find out in what relation
it stands to this One. On the one hand, this definite
existence of the world is merely taken for granted.
Spinoza, whose system is the most fully developed, starts
from definitions, that is, from the actual characteristics of
thought and of ordinary ideas in general. The starting-
points of consciousness are presupposed. On the other
hand, the Understanding forms this accidental world into
a system in accordance with the relations or categories of
external necessity. Parmenides gives the beginnings of
a system of the phenomenal world at the head of which
PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 327
the goddess Necessity is placed. Spinoza did not con-
struct any philosophy of Nature, but treated of the other
part of concrete philosophy, namely, a system of ethics.
This system of ethics was from one point of view to be
logically connected with the principle of absolute Sub-
stance, at least in a general way, because Man's highest
characteristic, his tendency to seek after God, is the pure
love of God, according to Spinoza's expression, siib specie
(cterni. Only, the principles which underlie his philo-
sophical treatment of the subject, the content, the start-
ing-points, have no connection with the Substance itself.
All systematic detailed treatment of the phenomenal
world, however logical it may be in itself, when it fol-
lows the ordinary procedure, and starts with what is
perceived by the senses, becomes an ordinary science in
which what is recognised as the Absolute itself, the One,
Substance, is riot supposed to be living, is not the moving
principle, the method, for it is devoid of definite char-
acter. There is nothing left of it for the phenomenal
world, unless that this natural and spiritual world in
general is wholly abstract, is a phenomenal world, a
world of appearance, or else that the Being of the world
in its affirmative form is Being, the One, Substance, while
the particularisation in virtue of which Being is a world,
evolution, emanation, is a falling of Substance out of itself
into finitude, which is an absolutely inconceivable mode
of existence. It is further implied that in Substance itself
there is no principle involving the characteristic of being
creative ; and thirdly, that it is likewise abstract force, the
positing of finitude as something negative, the disappear-
ance of the finite.
(Concluded igth August 1829.)
AMPLIFICATION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL PEOOF
IN THE LECTUEES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
KELIGION DELIVEEED IN THE SUMMEE OF
1831.
KANT has criticised this proof too, as well as the other
proofs of the existence of God, and it was chiefly owing
to him that they were discredited, so that it is now
scarcely considered worth while to look at them closely.
And yet Kant says of this proof that it deserves to be
always regarded with respect. When, however, he adds
that the teleological proof is the oldest, he is wrong. The
first determination of God is that of force or power, and
the next in order is that of wisdom. This is the proof
we meet with first amongst the Greeks also, and it is
stated by Socrates (Xenophon, Memor., at the end of Book
First). Socrates takes conformity to an end, especially in
the form of the Good, as his fundamental principle. The
reason why he is in prison, he declares, is that the Athe-
nians consider it to be good. This proof accordingly
coincides historically with the development of freedom.
We have already considered the transition from the
religion of power to the religion of spirituality in general.
We have already had in the intermediate stages also the
very same mediation which we recognise as present in
the religion of beauty, but broken up and as yet devoid
of any spiritual character. But since with that transi-
tion to the religion of spirituality there is added another
and essential determination, we have first to bring out its
meaning in an abstract way, and direct attention to it.
328
AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF 329
Here we have the determination of freedom as such, of
an activity as freedom, a working in accordance with
freedom, no longer an unhindered working in accordance
with power, but a working in accordance with ends.
Freedom is self-determination, and what is active has
self-determination implicitly as its end in so far as it
spontaneously determines itself within itself. Power is
simply the act of self -projection, and implies that there
is an unreconciled element in what is projected ; and
though this is implicitly an image or picture of the
power, still it is not expressly felt in consciousness that
what creates simply preserves and produces itself in its
creation in suchwise that the characteristics of the
Divine itself appear in the creature. God is here con-
ceived of as possessed of the characteristic of wisdom, of
activity in accordance with an end. Power is good and
righteous, but action in accordance with an end is what
first constitutes this characteristic of rationality, according
to which nothing comes out of the act but what had been
already previously determined upon, that is, this identity
of the creating power with itself.
The difference which exists among the proofs of the
existence of God consists simply in the difference of
their determination. There is in them a mediation, a
starting-point, and a point at which we arrive. In the
Teleological and Physico-theological Proofs both points
possess in common the characteristic of conformity to an
end. We start from a form of Being which is actually
characterised as in conformity with an end, and what is
thereby mediated is the idea of God as positing and
working out an end. Being, considered as the immediate
from which we start in the Cosmological Proof, is, to
begin with, a manifold, contingent Being. In accordance
with this, God is defined as necessity which has Being
in-and-for-itself, uhe force or power which is above the
contingent. The higher determination accordingly is,
that conformity to an end is present in Being. The
330 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
rational element already finds expression in the end in
the form of a free self-determination and carrying out
of this content, so that this content which at first in its
character as an end is inward, is realised, and the reality
corresponds to the notion or end.
A thing is good in so far as it fulfils its destiny or end,
and this means that the reality is adequate to the notion
or destined character. In the world we perceive a harmo-
nious working of external things, of things which exist
in a relation of indifference to each other, which come
into existence accidentally so far as other things are con-
cerned, and have no essential reference to one another.
Still, although things thus exist apart from each other,
there is evidence of a unity in virtue of which there is
an absolute conformity amongst them. Kant states this
in a detailed way, as follows. The present world reveals
to us an inexhaustible scene of manifold life, of order,
conformity to ends, and so on. This determination in
accordance with an end is seen specially in what has
life, both as it is in itself and in its relation to things
outside of it. Man, the animal, is something inherently
manifold, has certain members, entrails, &c., and although
these appear to exist alongside of each other, still the
general determination in accordance with an end is present
through them all and maintains them. The one exists
only through the other and for the other, and all the
members and component parts of men are simply means
for the self-preservation of the individual which is here
the end. Man, all that has life in fact, has many needs :
air, nourishment, light, &c., are necessary for his suste-
nance. All this actually exists on its own account, and
the capacity of making it minister to an end is external
to it. Animals, flesh, air, and so on, which are required
by Man, do not in themselves declare that they are ends,
and yet the one is simply a means for the other. There
is here an inner connection which is necessary, but which
does not exist as such. This inner connection is not
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 331
made by the objects themselves, but is produced by some-
thing else, as these things themselves are. The conformity
to an end does not produce itself spontaneously ; the
active working in accordance with an end is outside of
the things, and this harmony which implicitly exists and
posits itself, is the force which presides over these objects,
which destines them to stand to each other in the relation
of things whose existence is determined by an end. The
world is thus no longer an aggregate of contingent things,
but a collection of relations in conformity with an end,
which, however, attach themselves to things from without.
This relation of ends must have a cause, a cause full of
power and wisdom.
This activity in accordance with an end, this cause, is
God.
Kant remarks that this proof is the clearest of all, and
can be understood by the ordinary man. It is owing to it
that Nature first acquires an interest ; it gives life to the
knowledge of Nature, just as it has its origin in Nature.
This is in a general form the Teleological Proof.
Kant's criticism is accordingly as follows. This proof,
he says, is defective above all, because it takes into con-
sideration merely the form of things. Reference to an
end applies only to the determination of form. Each
thing preserves itself, and is therefore not merely a
means for others, but is an end itself. The quality in
virtue of which a thing can be a means has reference to
its form merely, and not to its matter. The conclusion,
therefore, does not carry us further than the fact, that
there is a forming cause ; but we do not prove by this
that matter also has been produced by it. The proof,
says Kant, does not therefore adequately express the idea
of God as the creator of matter and not merely of form.
Form contains the characteristics which are mutually
related ; but matter is to be thought of as without form,
and consequently as without relation. This proof there-
fore stops short at a demiurge, a constructor of matter,
332 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
and does not get the length of a creator. So far as this
criticism is concerned, we may undoubtedly say that all
relation is form, and this implies that form is separated
from matter. We can see that God's activity would in
this way be a finite one. When we produce anything
technical we must take the material for it from the out-
side. Activity is thus limited and finite. Matter is
thus thought of as permanently existing for itself, as
eternal. That, in virtue of which things are brought into
connection with each other, represents the qualities, the
form, not the permanent existence of things as such.
The subsistence or permanent existence of things is their
matter. It is, to begin with, undoubtedly correct that
the relations of tilings are included within their form ;
but the question is, Is this distinction, this separation
between form and matter admissible, and can we thus
put each specially by itself ? It has been shown, on
the contrary, in the Logic (Encydop. Phil., § 129), that
formless matter is a nonentity, a pure abstraction of
the Understanding, which we may certainly construct,
but which ought not to be given out to be anything true.
The matter which is opposed to God as something un-
alterable is simply a product of reflection, or, to put it
otherwise, this identity of formlessness, this continuous
unity of matter is itself one of the specific qualities of
form. We must therefore recognise the truth that
matter which is thus placed on one side by itself, belongs
itself to the other side, to form. But then the form is
also identical with itself, relates itself to itself, and in
virtue of this has just the very quality which is distin-
guished from it as matter. The activity of God Himself,
His simple unity with Himself, the form, is matter. This
remaining equal to self, this subsistence is present in, the
form in such a way that the latter relates itself to itself,
and that is its subsistence, which is just what matter is.
Thus the one does not exist apart from the other ; on the
contrary, they are both the same.
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 333
Kant goes on to say, further, that the syllogism starts
from the fact of the order and conformity to an end
observable in the world. We find there arrangements
in accordance with an end. It is this reference of things
to an end, not found in the things themselves, which
accordingly serves for the starting-point. We have in
this way a third thing, a cause, posited. From the fact
of arrangement in accordance with an end, we reason to
the existence of its author, who has established the teleo-
logy of the relations. We cannot therefore infer the
existence of anything more than what, so far as content
is concerned, is actually given in presently existing things,
and is in conformity with the starting- point. The teleo-
logical arrangement strikes us as wonderfully grand, as
one of supreme excellence and wisdom ; but a wisdom
which is very great and worthy of admiration is not yet
absolute wisdom. It is an extraordinary power which
is recognised as present here, but it is not yet Almighty
Power. This, says Kant, is a leap which we are not justi-
fied in taking, and so we take refuge in the Ontological
Proof, and this starts from the conception of the most real
Essence. The mere sense-perception, however, from which
we start in the Teleological Proof, does not bring us so
far as this totality. It must certainly be granted that
the starting-point has a smaller content than what we
arrive at. In the world there is merely relative and not
absolute wisdom. We must look at this more closely.
We have here a syllogism. We reason from the one to
the other. We start with the peculiar constitution of the
world, and from this go on to conclude the existence of
an active force, of something that binds together things
which exist apart from each other ; this represents their
inner nature, their potentiality, and is not present in
them in an immediate way. The form of the reasoning
process here produces the false impression that God has
a basis from which we start. God appears as something
conditioned. The arrangement of things in accordance
334 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
with an end is the condition, and the existence of God
is apparently asserted to be something mediated or con-
ditioned. This is an objection upon which Jacobi laid
special stress. We try, he says, to reach the uncon-
ditioned through the conditions. But, as we have already
seen, this merely seems to be the case, and this false
impression disappears of itself when we reach the real
meaning of the result. So far as this meaning is con-
cerned, it will be allowed that the process is merely the
course followed by subjective knowledge. This mediation
does not attach to God Himself. He is certainly the
Unconditioned, infinite activity which determines itself in
accordance with ends, and which has arranged the world
on a teleological plan. We do not imagine, when we
speak of that process of knowledge, that these conditions
from which we start precede that infinite activity. On
the contrary, this represents the process of subjective
knowledge only, and the result we reach is that it is God
who has established these teleological arrangements, and
that therefore they represent something established in
the first instance by Him, and are not to be regarded as
something fundamental. The ground or principle from
which we start disappears in what is characterised as the
true principle. This is the meaning of the conclusion,
that what conditions is itself in turn explained to be the
conditioned. The result declares that to posit as the
foundation what is itself conditioned would be to intro-
duce a defective element. This procedure accordingly,
both actually and as regards its end, is not merely sub-
jective, not something which goes on merely in thought; on
the contrary, this defective side is itself removed by means
of the result. The objective thus asserts its presence in
this form of knowledge. There is not only an affirmative
transition here, but there is also a negative moment in
it, which is not, however, posited in the form of the
syllogism. There is therefore a mediation which is the
negation of the first immediacy. The course followed by
7^ LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 335
Spirit is, it is true, a transition to the activity which is
in-and-for-itself and posits ends, but, it is involved in
the course thus followed, that the actual existence of this
teleological arrangement is not held to represent Being iii-
and-for-itself. This is found only in reason, the activity
of eternal reason. That other Being is not true Being,
but only an appearance or semblance of this activity.
In dealing with the determination of ends, we must
further distinguish between Form and Content. If we
consider form pure and simple, we have Being in accord-
ance with an end which is finite, and, so far as form is
concerned, its finitude consists in the fact that the end
and means, or the material in which the end is realised,
are different. This is finitude. "We thus use a certain
material in order to carry out our ends, since the activity
and the material are different. The finitude of form is
what constitutes the finitude of Being in accordance with
an end. The truth of this relation, however, is not any-
thing of this kind. On the contrary, the truth is in the
teleological activity which is means and matter in itself, a
teleological activity which accomplishes its ends through
itself. This is what is meant by the infinite activity
of the end. The end accomplishes itself, realises itself
through its own activity, and thus comes into harmony
with itself in the process of realising itself. The finitude
of the end consists, as we saw, in the separableness of
means and material. Viewed thus, the end represents
what is as yet a technical mode of action. The truth of
the determination of the end consists in the fact that the
end has within itself its means, as also the material in
which it realises itself. Eegarded in this aspect, the end
is true so far as the form is concerned, for objective truth
consists simply in the correspondence between the notion
and reality. The end is true only when what uses the
means, and the means, as well as the reality, are identical
with the end. The end thus presents itself as something
which possesses reality in itself, and is not something
336 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
subjective, one-sided, the moments of which exist outside
of it. This is the truth of the end, while the teleological
relation seen in finitude represents, on the contrary, some-
thing untrue. It is necessary to remark here that teleo-
logical activity as representing a relation thus defined in
accordance with its truth, exists in the form of something
higher, which is, however, at the same time present, and
which we can certainly speak of as the Infinite, since
it is a teleological activity which has both material
and means in itself. Regarded from another point of
view, however, it is finite as well. Teleological deter-
mination in this its true form, which is the form we
require it to have, is found actually existing, though
only in one of its aspects, in what has life, in what
is organic. Life as the subject is the soul. This latter
is the end, that is, it posits itself, realises itself, and
thus the product is the same as the thing that produces.
What has life is, however, an organism ; the organs are
the means. The living soul has a body in itself, and it
is only in union with this that it constitutes a whole,
something real. The organs are the means of life, and
these very means, the organs themselves, are also the ele-
ment in which life realises and maintains itself, they are
material also. This is self-preservation. What has life
preserves itself ; it is beginning and end ; the product is
at the same time what begins. The living as such is
constantly in a state of activity. The feeling of need is
the beginning of activity, and impels to the satisfaction
of the need, and this satisfaction, again, is the beginning
of a new need. The living exists only in so far as it
is constantly a product. This gives us the truth of the
end so far as form is concerned. The organs of the
living being are means, but they are equally the end ; in
exercising their activity they produce themselves only.
Each organ maintains the other, and in this way maintains
itself. This activity constitutes an end, a soul, which is
present in every point of the organism. Every part of
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 337
the body experiences sensation ; the sonl is in it. Here
we have teleological activity in its true form. But the
living subject is also something thoroughly finite. The
teleological activity presents here the character of some-
thing which is formally true, but which is not complete.
The living being produces itself ; it has the material of
production in itself. Each organ excretes animal lymph
which is made use of by other organs in order to repro-
duce themselves. The living being has the material in
itself, only this is merely an abstract process. Finitude
shows itself in this, that while the organs draw their
nourishment from themselves they employ material for
this taken from the outside. Everything organic is re-
lated to inorganic Nature, which has a definite indepen-
dent existence. Regarded in one aspect, the organism is
infinite since it represents a circle of pure return into
self ; but it is at the same time in a state of tension rela-
tively to external inorganic Nature, and has its needs.
Here the means come from the outside. Man requires
air, light, water ; he also feeds on other living things, on
animals which he in this way reduces to the state of in-
organic Nature, to means. It is this relation particularly
which leads to the idea of a higher unity representing
that harmony in which the means correspond to the end.
This harmony is not found in the subject itself, and yet
it has in it the harmony which constitutes organic life,
as we have seen. The whole construction of the organs,
of the nerve and blood system, of the entrails, lungs,
liver, stomach, and so on, presents a remarkable agree-
ment. But does not this harmony itself demand some-
thing else outside of the subject ? We may let this
question alone at present; for if we get a grip of the
notion of organism such as has been given, then this
development of teleological determination is itself a neces-
sary consequence of the living nature of the subject in
general. If we do not get a grip of that notion, then
the living being will not be the concrete unity referred
VOL. nr. y
333 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
to. In order to understand what life is, recourse is
accordingly had to external mechanical modes of con-
ception as illustrated by the action of the blood, and to
chemical conceptions as seen in analysis of foods. It is
not, however, possible by such processes to discover what
life itself is. It is necessary to suppose the existence of
some third thing which has brought these processes into
existence. As a matter of fact, however, it is just the
subject which is this unity, this harmony of the organism.
Still this unity involves the relation of the living subject
to external Nature, which is thought of as having a merely
indifferent and accidental connection with the subject.
The conditions involved in this relation do not form
the sole basis of the development of what has life ; still,
if the living being did not find these conditions ready to
hand, it could not possibly exist. The observation of
this fact directly produces the feeling that there must
exist something higher which has introduced this har-
mony. It at once awakens sympathetic attention and
admiration in men. Every animal has its own narrow
range of means of sustenance, and indeed many animals
are limited to a single source of sustenance, human
nature having in this respect also the most general
character. This fact accordingly, that there exists for
every animal this outward particular condition, rouses in
Man that feeling of astonishment which passes over into
a sense of exalted reverence for that third something
which has brought about this unity. This represents
Man's elevation to the thought of that higher existence
which produces the conditions necessary for the accom-
plishment of its end. The subject secures its own pre-
servation, and the act whereby it does this is, further,
in all living things an unconscious one, is what in
animals we term instinct. The one gets its means of
sustenance by force, the other produces it with the help
of art. This it is which we term the wisdom of God in
Nature, in which we meet with that infinitely manifold
/Ar LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 339
arrangement in respect of the various activities and
conditions necessary to the existence of all particular
things. When we consider all those particular forms in
which the living being shows its activity, we find that
they are contingent, so to speak ; that they have not
been produced by the subject itself, and necessitate the
existence of a cause outside of them. The fact of life
merely involves self-preservation in general ; but living
beings differ from one another in an infinite variety of
ways, and this variety is the work of something other
than themselves. The question is simply this, How does
inorganic Nature pass over into organic Nature, and how
is it possible for it to serve as a means for what is
organic ? We are here met by a peculiar conception of
the way in which these two come together. Animals
are inorganic as contrasted with men, and plants are
inorganic as contrasted with animals. But Nature, which
is in itself inorganic, as represented, for instance, by the
sun, the moon, and in general by what appears in the
form of means and material, is in the first instance
immediate, and exists previous to the organic. Eegarded
in this way, the relation is one in which the inorganic
is independent, while, on the other hand, the organic is
what is dependent. The former, the so-called immediate,
is the unconditioned. Inorganic Nature appears complete
in itself; plants, animals, men, approach it in the first
instance from the outside. The earth might have con-
tinued to exist without vegetation, the vegetable kingdom
without animals, the animal kingdom without men.
These various forms of existence thus seem to be inde-
pendent and to be there for themselves. We are in the
habit of referring to this as a matter of experience. Thus
there are mountains without any vegetation, without
animals and men. The moon has no atmosphere, there
does not go on in it any meteorological process such as
supplies the conditions necessary for vegetation. It thus
exists without having any vegetative nature, and so on.
340 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
Inorganic existence of this kind appears as independent,
and Man is related to it in an external way. The idea
thus arises that Nature is in itself a producing force
which creates blindly, and out of which vegetation comes.
From this latter in turn comes what is auimal, and then
finally Man possessed of conscious thought. We can
undoubtedly assert that Nature produces stages of which
the one is always the condition of that which follows.
But then, since organic life and Man thus appear on the
scene in an accidental way, the question arises whether
or not Man will get what is necessary. According to
the idea referred to, this is equally a matter of chance,
since here there is no unity having a valid existence on
its own account. Aristotle gave expression to the same
idea. Nature is constantly producing living things,
and the point is whether or not these will be able to
exist Whether or not any of the things thus produced
will be able to maintain itself, is a pure matter of
accident. Nature has already made an endless number
of attempts, and has produced a host of monstrosities ;
myriads of beings of various forms have issued from her
which were not, however, able to continue in existence,
and besides, she did not concern herself at all with the
disappearance of such forms of life. By way of proving
this assertion, people are in the habit of directing atten-
tion specially to the remains of monsters which are stil.l
to be found here and there. These species disappeared,
it is asserted, because the conditions necessary to their
existence had ceased. Eegarded in this fashion, the
harmony which exists between the organic and the in-
organic is held to be accidental. There is here no
necessity to begin and ask about a unity. The presence
of design is itself affirmed to be accidental. Now, here
is what is really involved in this conception. What,
speaking generally, we call inorganic Nature as such is
thought of as having an independent existence, while the
organic is attached to it in an external fashion, so that
341
it is a mere matter of chance whether or not the organic
finds the conditions of existence in what confronts it.
So far as the form of what essentially constitutes the
conception is concerned, we have to remark that in-
organic Nature is what comes first, is what is immediate.
It was in harmony with the childlike ideas of the Mosaic
age that the heavens and the earth, light, and so on,
should have been thought of as created first, while the
organic appeared later in point of time. The question
is this : Is that the true definition or essential nature
of the notion of the inorganic, and do living things and
Man represent what is dependent ? Philosophy, on the
other hand, explains the truth involved in the defini-
tion of the notion ; and apart from this, Man is certain
that he is related to the rest of Nature as an end, and
that Nature is meant to be a means so far as he is con-
cerned, and that this represents the relation in which
the inorganic in general stands to the organic. The
organic is in its formal aspect, and by its very nature,
something which exists in accordance with an end. It
is means and end, and is therefore something infinite in
itself. It is an end which returns back into itself ; and
even regarded as something dependent on what is outside
of it, it has the character of an end, and consequently it
represents what is truly first in comparison with what
has been termed the immediate, in comparison, that is,
with Nature. This immediacy is merely one-sided de-
termination, and ought to be brought down to the level
of something that is merely posited. This is the true
relation. Man is not an accident added on to what is
first ; but, on the contrary, the organic is itself what is
first. The inorganic has in it merely the semblance of
Being. This relation is logically developed in Science
itself.
This relation, however, still involves an element of
separation, as seen in the fact that the organic, regarded
from one side, is related outwardly to inorganic Nature,
342 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
which is not posited as existing in the organic itself.
The living being develops out of the germ, and the
development is the action of the limbs, the internal
organs, and so on ; the soul is the unity which brings
this about. The truth, however, of organic and inorganic
Nature here also is simply the essential relation between
the two, their unity and inseparability. This unity is a
third something which is neither the one nor the other.
It is not found in immediate existence. The absolute
determination which brings both, the organic as well as
the inorganic, into unity, namely, the subject, is the
organic ; while the other appears as object, but changes
itself into the predicate of the organic, into something
which is held to belong to it. This is the reciprocal
element in this relation. Both are put into one, and in
this one each is something dependent and conditioned.
We might call this third something, the thought to which
consciousness raises itself, God, using the word in a
general sense. It falls, however, very far short of the
Notion of God. Taken in this sense, it represents the
activity of production, which is a judgment whereby both
sides are produced together. In the one Notion they
harmonise and exist for one another. The thought to
which we rise, namely, that the truth of the relation of
ends is this third something, is thus absolutely correct,
taking that third thing in the sense in which it has just
been defined. Taken thus, however, it is defined in a
formal way, and the definition rests, in fact, on something
whose truth it is. It is itself living activity ; but this
is not yet Spirit, rational action. The correspondence
between the Notion as representing the organic, and
reality as representing the inorganic, simply expresses
the essence of life itself. It is involved in a more
definite form in what the ancients called the vou?. The
world is a harmonious whole, an organic life which is
determined in accordance with ends. It was this which
the ancients held to be vov$} and, taken in a more ex-
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 343
tended signification, this life was also called the world-
soul, the \dyos. All that is posited here is simply the
fact of life, and it is not implied that the world-soul
is distinguished as Spirit from this active life belonging
to it. The soul is simply the living element in the
organic ; it is not something apart from the body, some-
thing material, but is rather the life-force which pene-
trates the body. Plato accordingly called God an
immortal £o>oi/, that is, an eternally living being. He
did not get beyond the category of life. When we
grasp the fact of life in its true- nature, it is seen to be
one principle, one organic life of the universe, one living
system. All that is, simply constitutes the organs of
the one subject. The planets which revolve round the
sun are simply the giant members of this one system.
Eegarded in this fashion, the universe is not an aggregate
of many accidents existing in a relation of indifference,
but is a system endowed with life. With this thought
we have not, however, yet reached the essential charac-
teristic of Spirit.
We have considered the formal aspect of the relation
of ends. The other aspect is that of the content. The
question here may take any of the following forms :
What are the essential characteristics of the end, or
what is the content of the end which is being realised,
or how are these ends constituted in respect of what
is called wisdom ? So far as the content is concerned,
the starting-point is the same as that of experience.
We start, that is, from immediate Being. The study of
ends in the form in which we actually meet with them,
has, when pursued from this side, contributed more than
anything else to the neglect of the teleological proof, so
much so indeed that this latter has come to be regarded
with disdain. We are in the habit of speaking of the
wise arrangements of Nature. The various and manifold
kinds of animals are, as regards the real nature of the
life they have, finite. The external means necessary for
344 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
this life actually exist ; life in its various forms is the
end. If accordingly we ask what the substance of this
end is, it is seen to be nothing else save the preservation
of these insects, of these animals, &c. We may indeed
find pleasure in contemplating their life ; but the neces-
sity of their nature and destiny is of an absolutely in-
significant kind, or, to put it otherwise, is an absolutely
insignificant conception. When we say, God has made
things thus, we are making a pious observation, we are
rising to God ; but when we think of God we have the
idea of an absolute, infinite end, and these petty ends
present a sharp contrast to what we recognise as His
actual nature. If we now consider what goes on in
higher spheres of existence, and look at human ends,
which we may regard as relatively the highest of all, we
see that they are for the most part frustrated and dis-
appear, leaving no permanent result. In Nature millions
of seeds perish just when they begin to exist, and without
ever being able to develop the life-force in them. The
life of the largest portion of living things is based on the
destruction of other living things ; and the same holds
good of higher ends. If we traverse the domain of
morality, and go on even to its highest stage, namely,
civil life, and then consider whether the ends here are
realised or not, we shall find, indeed, that much is attained,
but that still more is rendered abortive, and destroyed by
the passions and wickedness of men ; and this is true of
the greatest and most exalted ends. We see the earth
covered with ruins, with remains of the splendid edifices
and works left by the finest nations whose ends we re-
cognise as having a substantial value. Great natural
objects and human works do indeed endure and defy
time, but all that splendid national life has irrecoverably
perished. We thus see how, on the one hand, petty,
subordinate, even despicable designs are fulfilled; and,
on the other, how those which are recognised as having
substantial value are frustrated. We are here certainly
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 345
forced to rise to the thought of a higher determination
and a higher end, when we thus lament the misfortune
which has befallen so much that is of high value, and
mourn its disappearance. We must regard all those ends,
however much they interest us, as finite and subordinate,
and ascribe to their finitude the destruction which over-
takes them. But this universal end is not discoverable
in experience, and thus the general character of the tran-
sition is altered, for the transition means that we start
from something given, that we reason syllogistically from
what we find in experience. But then what we find
present in experience is characterised by limitation. The
supreme end is the Good, the general final-end of the
world. Eeason has to regard this end as the absolute
final-end of the world, and must look upon it as being
based purely on the essential nature of reason, beyond
which Spirit cannot go. Reason in the form of thought
is, however, recognised as being the source of this end.
The next step accordingly is that this end should show
that it is accomplished in the world. But the Good is
what has a determinate character in-and-for-itself by
means of reason ; and to this, Nature stands opposed,
partly as physical Nature which follows its own course
and its own laws, and partly as the natural element in
Man, his particular ends which are opposed to the Good.
If we go by what our senses show us, we find much that
is good in the world, but also an infinite quantity of evil,
and we would just have to reckon up the amount of evil,
and the amount of good which does not attain realisation,
in order to discover which preponderates. The Good,
however, is something absolutely substantial ; it belongs
to the very essence of its nature that it should be realised.
But it is something which merely ought to be real, for it
cannot reveal itself in experience. It stops short with
being something which ought to exist, something which
is a postulate. But since the Good has not itself the
power thus to realise itself, it is necessary to postulate a
346 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
third thing through which the final-end of the world will
be realised. This is an absolute postulate. Moral good
belongs essentially to Man ; but since his power is finite,
and since the realisation of the Good in him is limited
owing to the natural element attaching to him, since, in
fact, he is himself the enemy of the Good, it is not within
his power to realise it. The existence of God is here con-
ceived of simply as a postulate, as something that should
be, and which should have for Man subjective certainty,
because the Good represents what is ultimate in his
reason. But this certainty is merely subjective ; it re-
mains merely a belief, an ideal, and it cannot be shown
that it actually exists. Aye, if the Good is to be really
moral and present, then we should have to go the length
of requiring and presupposing the perpetual existence of
the discord, for moral Good can only exist and can only
~be in so far as it is in conflict with evil. It would thus
be necessary to postulate the perpetual existence of the
enemy, of what is opposed to the Good. If, then, we
turn to the content, we find it to be limited ; and if we
go on to the supreme end, we find ourselves in another
region, where we start from what is inward, not from
what is actually present and supplied by experience. If,
on the other hand, we start from experience, the Good,
the final-end is something subjective merely, and in this
case the contradiction between Man's finite life and the
Good would have to exist always.
AMPLIFICATION OF THE TELEOLOGICAL AND ON-
TOLOGICAL PROOFS GIVEN IN THE LECTURES
ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION FOR THE
YEAR 1827.
AMONGST the proofs of the existence of God, the Cosmo-
logical occupies the first place. Only in it is the affir-
mative, absolute Being, the Infinite, defined not merely
as infinite in general, but, in contrast to the characteristic
of contingency, as absolutely necessary. The True is the
absolutely necessary Essence, and not merely Being or
Essence.
This category already involves other characteristics.
In fact, these proofs might be multiplied by dozens ;
each stage of the logical Idea may contribute its quota.
The characteristic of absolute necessity is involved in
the course of thought described.
The absolutely necessary Essence, taken in a general,
abstract sense, is Being not as immediate, but as reflected
into itself. We have defined Essence as the non-finite,
the negation of that negative we term the finite. That
to which we make the transition is thus not abstract
Being, barren Being, but Being which is the negation of
the negation.
It involves in it the element of difference, the differ-
ence which carries itself back into simplicity. In this
Infinite, this absolute Being or Essence, there is thus
involved the determination of difference, negation of the
negation, but difference as it relates itself to itself. But
determination of this kind is what we call self-determina-
347
338 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
to. In order to understand what life is, recourse is
accordingly had to external mechanical modes of con-
ception as illustrated by the action of the blood, and to
chemical conceptions as seen in analysis of foods. It is
not, however, possible by such processes to discover what
life itself is. It is necessary to suppose the existence of
some third thing which has brought these processes into
existence. As a matter of fact, however, it is just the
subject which is this unity, this harmony of the organism.
Still this unity involves the relation of the living subject
to external Nature, which is thought of as having a merely
indifferent and accidental connection with the subject.
The conditions involved in this relation do not form
the sole basis of the development of what has life ; still,
if the living being did not find these conditions ready to
hand, it could not possibly exist. The observation of
this fact directly produces the feeling that there must
exist something higher which has introduced this har-
mony. It at once awakens sympathetic attention and
admiration in men. Every animal has its own narrow
range of means of sustenance, and indeed many animals
are limited to a single source of sustenance, human
nature having in this respect also the most general
character. This fact accordingly, that there exists for
every animal this outward particular condition, rouses in
Man that feeling of astonishment which passes over into
a sense of exalted reverence for that third something
which has brought about this unity. This represents
Man's elevation to the thought of that higher existence
which produces the conditions necessary for the accom-
plishment of its end. The subject secures its own pre-
servation, and the act whereby it does this is, further,
in all living things an unconscious one, is what in
animals we term instinct. The one gets its means of
sustenance by force, the other produces it with the help
of art. This it is which we term the wisdom of God in
Nature, in which we meet with that infinitely manifold
/Ar LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 339
arrangement in respect of the various activities and
conditions necessary to the existence of all particular
things. When we consider all those particular forms in
which the living being shows its activity, we find that
they are contingent, so to speak ; that they have not
been produced by the subject itself, and necessitate the
existence of a cause outside of them. The fact of life
merely involves self-preservation in general ; but living
beings differ from one another in an infinite variety of
ways, and this variety is the work of something other
than themselves. The question is simply this, How does
inorganic Nature pass over into organic Nature, and how
is it possible for it to serve as a means for what is
organic ? We are here met by a peculiar conception of
the way in which these two come together. Animals
are inorganic as contrasted with men, and plants are
inorganic as contrasted with animals. But Nature, which
is in itself inorganic, as represented, for instance, by the
sun, the moon, and in general by what appears in the
form of means and material, is in the first instance
immediate, and exists previous to the organic. Eegarded
in this way, the relation is one in which the inorganic
is independent, while, on the other hand, the organic is
what is dependent. The former, the so-called immediate,
is the unconditioned. Inorganic Nature appears complete
in itself; plants, animals, men, approach it in the first
instance from the outside. The earth might have con-
tinued to exist without vegetation, the vegetable kingdom
without animals, the animal kingdom without men.
These various forms of existence thus seem to be inde-
pendent and to be there for themselves. We are in the
habit of referring to this as a matter of experience. Thus
there are mountains without any vegetation, without
animals and men. The moon has no atmosphere, there
does not go on in it any meteorological process such as
supplies the conditions necessary for vegetation. It thus
exists without having any vegetative nature, and so on.
350 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
means produces the end, and the end the means. The
world is living, it contains the movement of life and
the realm of living things. What has not life — inorganic
Nature, the sun, the stars — stands in an essential and
direct relation to what has life, and to Man in so far
as he in a measure belongs to living Nature, and partly
because he sets particular ends before himself. This
finite conformity to an end is found in Man.
That is the characteristic note of life in general, and
at the same time of life as it actually is, life as seen
in the world. This, it is true, is life in itself, inner
conformity to an end ; but it means that each kind or
species of life represents a very narrow sphere, and has
a very limited nature.
The real advance accordingly is from this finite mode
of life to absolute, universal conformity to an end, to
the thought that this world is a /coV/xo?, a system, in
which everything has an essential relation to everything
else, and nothing is isolated ; something which is regularly
arranged in itself, in which everything has its place, is
closely connected with the whole, subsists through the
whole, and thus takes an active part in the production,
in the life of the whole.
The main point -thus is that a transition is made from
finite life to one universal life, to one end which is
articulated into particular ends, in such a way that in
this particularisation things are in a condition of harmony
and of reciprocal essential relation.
God is defined, to begin with, as the absolutely necessary
Essence ; but this definition, as Kant has already observed,
falls very far short of expressing the conception of God.
God alone is the absolute necessity, but this definition
does not exhaust the conception of God ; the definition
in which He is described as the universal life-force, the
one universal life, is both higher and deeper.
Since life is essentially subjectivity, something living,
this universal life is subjective, the vov$, a soul. Thus
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 351
the idea of the soul is involved in the universal life,
the characteristic of the one all -disposing, all -ruling,
organising vovs.
As regards the formal element here, we have to note
the very same thing as we found in connection with the
previous proofs. We have here once more the transition
of the Understanding ; because there are arrangements,
ends of a like kind, there is a wisdom which disposes
and orders everything. But the act of rising to this
thought involves at the same time the negative moment,
which is the main point, namely, that this life, these
ends as they actually are, and as existing in their im-
mediate finite form, do not represent what is true. On
the contrary, it is this one life movement, this one vov?,
which is what is true.
There are not two things ; there is indeed a starting-
point, but the mediation is of such a character that in
the transition what is the first does not continue to be
the basis, the condition. On the contrary, its untruth,
its negation, is involved in this transition ; the negation
of the negative, finite element in it, the negation of the
particularity of life. This negative is negated, and in
this act of elevation, finite particularity disappears. As
representing truth, the object of consciousness is the
system of one life movement, the vov$ of one life move-
ment, the soul, the Universal Soul.
Here it happens again that this definition : God is the
one universal active force of life, the soul which pro-
duces, posits, organises a /coV/xoy, is a conception which
does not yet suffice to express the conception of God.
It is essentially involved in the conception of God that
He is Spirit.
We have still to consider the third, essential and
absolute form from this point of view. In the transi-
tion just referred to, the content was life, the finite life
movement, immediate life which actually exists. Here
in the third form the content which forms the basis is
332 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
Spirit. Put in the form of a syllogism, it runs thus :
Because finite minds exist or are, — and it is Being
which here constitutes the starting-point, — therefore the
absolute Mind or Spirit exists or is.
But this " because," this merely affirmative relation,
is defective in this respect, that the finite minds would
require to be thought of as the basis, and God would be
a consequence of the existence of finite minds. The
true form is : There are finite minds, but the finite has
no truth, the truth of the finite spirit is the absolute
Spirit.
The finitude of finite minds is no true Being; it is by
its very nature dialectic, which implies that it abrogates
itself, negates itself, and the negation of this finitude is
affirmation as infinitude, as something universal in-and-
for-itself. This is the highest form of the transition ;
for the transition is here Spirit itself.
There are in this connection two characteristics, Being
and God. In so far as we start from Being, this latter,
looked at as it first shows itself, is directly finite. Since
these characteristics exist, we could equally as well begin
from God and go on to Being, though, when we say we
could, we must remember that we cannot speak of what
we can do in connection with the conception of God,
because He is absolute necessity.
This starting-point when it thus appears in finite form
does not yet involve Being; for a God who is not, is
something finite, and is not truly God. The finitude of
this relation consists in the fact that it is subjective, that
it is this general conception in fact. God has existence,
but He has only this purely finite existence in our idea
of Him.
This is one-sided ; we have introduced into this content,
namely, God, the taint of that one-sidedness, that finitude,
which is termed the idea of God. The main point is
that the idea should get rid of this defect whereby it
is something merely represented in the mind, something
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 353
subjective, and that this content should have attached to
it the determination of Being.
We have to consider this second mediation as it
appears in this finite form, or form of the Understanding,
in the shape of the Ontological Proof. This proof starts
from the Notion or conception of God, and goes from this
to Being. We do not find this transition amongst the
ancients, for instance in Greek philosophy, nor was it
made in the Christian Church till after a long time. It
was one of the great scholastic philosophers, Anselm,
Archbishop of Canterbury, that profound, philosophical
thinker, who first grasped this idea.
We have the idea of God ; but He is not merely an
idea, He is. How are we to make this transition ?
How are we to get to see that God is not merely some-
thing subjective in us ? How is this determination of
Being to be mediated with God ?
The Kantian criticism was directed against this so-
called Ontological Proof too, and with triumphant success,
so to speak, in its day. It is still held at the present
day that these proofs have been refuted as being worth-
less efforts on the part of the Understanding. We have,
however, already recognised the fact that the act where-
by these higher thoughts are here reached is the act of
Spirit, the act peculiarly belonging to thinking Spirit,
which Man will not renounce the right to exercise ; and
so, too, this proof is an act of the same sort.
The ancients did not know of this transition ; for, in
order to arrive at it, it is necessary that Spirit should go
down into itself as deeply as possible. Spirit, when once
it has arrived at its highest form of freedom, namely,
subjectivity, first conceives this thought of God as sub-
jective, and reaches first this antithesis of subjectivity
and objectivity.
Anselm expressed the nature of this transition in the
following fashion. The idea of God is that He is ab-
solutely perfect. If accordingly we think of God only
VOL. III. Z
354 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
as idea, then we find that what is merely subjective, and
merely represented in the form of an idea, is defective,
and not perfect ; for that is the more perfect which is
not merely represented as an idea, but also is, really is.
Therefore, since God is what is most perfect, He is not
idea merely, but, on the contrary, He is possessed of
actuality or reality.
The later, broader, and more rational form which re-
presents the development of this thought of Anselin
asserts that the conception or Notion of God implies
that He is the Substance of all realities, the most real
Essence. But Being also is reality, therefore Being
belongs to Him.
It has been urged against this that Being is no reality,
that it does not belong to the reality of a notion. Eeality
in a notion or conception implies determinate content in
a notion, but Being adds nothing to the notion or to the
content of the notion. Kant has put it in the following
plausible form : I form an idea of a hundred thalers ;
but the notion or conception, the determinateness of the
content is the same whether I form an idea of them, or
whether I actually possess them.
As against the first proposition that Being ought to
follow from the Notion in general, it has been urged
that Notion and Being are different from each other :
the Notion thus exists for itself, while Being is different.
Being must come to the Notion from the outside, from
elsewhere. Being is not involved in the Notion. This
can be put in a very plausible way by the aid of the
hundred thalers.
In ordinary life an idea of a hundred thalers is called
a notion or conception. That is not a notion at all in
which you may have any kind of determination of
content. It is certainly true that Being may not belong
to an abstract sense-idea such as blue, or to any deter-
minateness of the Understanding which happens to be in
my mind; but then this ought not to be called a notion.
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 355
The Notion, and still more the absolute Notion, the
Notion in-and-for-itself, the Notion of God, is to be taken
for itself, and this Notion contains Being as a determinate
characteristic. Being is a form of the determinateness
of the Notion. This may easily be shown to be the case
in two ways.
First of all, the Notion is essentially the Universal
which determines itself, which particularises itself ; it
is what has the active power of differentiation, of par-
ticularising and determining itself, of positing a finitude,
and of negating this its own finitude, and of being through
the negation of this finitude identical with itself.
This is the Notion in general. This is just what the
Notion of God, the absolute Notion, God, really is. God
as Spirit or as love means that God particularises Him-
self, begets the Son, creates the world, an Other of
Himself, and possesses Himself, is identical with Himself,
in this Other.
In the Notion in general, and still more in the Idea,
what, in fact, we see is, that through the negation of the
particularisation, the positing of which is at the same
time the work of the activity which He Himself is, He
is identical with Himself, relates Himself to Himself.
The primary question is, What is Being ? what is this
attribute, this determinateness, namely, reality ? Being is
nothing but the unutterable, the inconceivable ; it is not
that concrete something which the Notion is, but merely
the abstraction of reference to self. We may say, it is
immediacy, Being is the Immediate in general, and con-
versely the Immediate is Being, it is in relation to itself,
that is, the mediation is negated.
This determination, namely, reference to self, or im-
mediacy, accordingly directly exists for itself in the
Notion in general, and it is involved in the absolute
Notion, in the Notion of God, that He is reference to
self. This abstract reference to self is directly found in
the Notion itself.
356 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
The Notion is what has life, what is self-mediating ;
and so Being, too, is one of its characteristics. Being
is different from the Notion to this extent, that Being
is not the entire Notion, but is only one of its char-
acteristics, merely that simple aspect of the Notion in
virtue of which it is at home with itself, is self-identity.
Being is the determination which is found in the
Notion as something different from the Notion, because
the Notion is the whole of which Being is only one
determination. The other point is that the Notion con-
tains this determination in itself, this latter is one of
its determinations ; but Being is also different from the
Notion, because the Notion is the totality. In so far as
they aie different, mediation forms a necessary element
in their union.
They are not immediately identical ; all immediacy is
true and real only in so far as it is mediation within
self, and conversely all mediation, in so far as it is
immediacy in itself, has reference to self. The Notion
is different from Being, and the peculiar quality of
the difference lies in this that the Notion absorbs and
abolishes it.
The Notion is the totality, represented by the move-
ment, the process, whereby it makes itself objective. The
Notion as such, as distinct from Being, is something
purely subjective, and that implies a defect. The Notion,
however, is all that is deepest and highest. The very
idea of the Notion implies that it has to do away with
•this defect of subjectivity, with this distinction between
itself and Being, and has to objectify itself. It is itself
the act of producing itself as something which has Being,
as something objective.
Whenever we think of the Notion, we must give up
the idea that it is something which we only possess, and
construct within ourselves. The Notion is the Soul, the
final-end of an object, of what has life ; what we call
Soul is the Notion, and in Spirit, in consciousness, the
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 357
Notion as such attains to existence as a free Notion
existing in its subjectivity as distinct from its reality
as such.
The sun, the animal is the Notion merely, but has
not the Notion ; for them the Notion has not become
objective. It is in consciousness and not in the sun
that \ve find that division which is called I, the existing
Notion, the Notion in its subjective reality, and I, this
Notion, arn the subjective.
No man, however, is content with his mere self-hood.
The Ego is active, and this activity shows itself in ob-
jectifying self, in giving to it reality, definite existence.
In its more extended and concrete signification, this
activity of the Notion is impulse. All sense of satisfac-
tion arises through this process whereby subjectivity is
done away with, and what is inward and subjective is
posited as at the same time outward, objective, and real,
that process by which the unity of the merely subjective
and merely objective is brought about, and the two are
stripped of their one-sidedness.
There is nothing so well illustrated by all that goes
on in the world as the abolition of the antithesis of
subjective and objective, whereby the unity of the two
is effected.
The thought of Anselm, therefore, so far as its content
is concerned, is the truer and more necessary thought ;
but the form of the proof deduced from it is certainly
defective in the same way as the modes of mediation
previously referred to. This unity of Notion and Being
is hypothetical, and its defect consists just in the very
fact of its being hypothetical.
What is presupposed is that the pure Notion, the
Notion in-and-for-itself, the Notion of God, is, involves
Being also.
If we compare this content with faith or immediate
knowledge, we shall find that the content is the same as
that of Anselm's presupposition.
358 AMPLIFICATION OF TELEOLOGICAL PROOF
When the matter is regarded from this standpoint of
immediate knowledge, what is said is this. It is a fact
of consciousness that I have the idea of God, and along
with this idea, Being must be given, so that Being is
bound up with the content of the idea. If it is said
that we believe it, that we know it immediately, then
the unity of the idea and Being is expressed in the
form of the presupposition just exactly as it is in
Anselm's argument, and we have not got one bit further.
This is the presupposition we everywhere meet with in
Spinoza too. He defines the Absolute Cause, Substance,
as that which cannot be thought of as not existing, the
conception of which involves existence ; that is, the idea
of God is directly bound up with Being.
This inseparableness of Notion and Being is found in
an absolute form only in the case of God. The finitude
of things consists in the fact that the Notion, and the
determinate form of the Notion, and the Being of the
Notion, are essentially different. The finite is what does
not correspond to its notion or rather to the Notion.
We have the notion of Soul ; the reality, the Being is
represented by the corporeal form. Man is mortal ; we
express this truth also by saying, Soul and body can part.
There we have the fact of separation, but in the pure
Notion we have the inseparableness referred to.
When we say that every impulse is an example of
the Notion which realises itself, we are saying what is
formally correct ; the impulse which has received satisfac-
tion is undoubtedly infinite so far as the form is con-
cerned. But the impulse has a content, and so far as
the determinate character of its content is concerned, it is
finite and limited ; in this respect it does not correspond
to the Notion, to the pure Notion.
This is the explanation of what is involved in the
standpoint of the knowledge of the Notion. What was
considered last was the knowledge of God, the certainty
of the existence of God in general. The essential thought
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 359
in this connection is the following. When we have
knowledge of an object, the object is before us ; we are
directly related to it. But this immediacy involves media-
tion, what was called the act of rising to God, the fact
that the human spirit comes to consider the finite as
non-existent.
By means of this negation Man's spirit raises itself to
God, brings itself into harmony with God. The con-
clusion : I know that God is, is the simple relation which
has originated in this negation.
AMPLIFICATION OF THE ONTOLOGICAL PKOOF
IN THE LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RELIGION FOR THE YEAR 1831.
IN the sphere of revealed religion what we have first
to consider is the abstract Notion or conception of God.
This free, pure revealed Notion is what forms the hasis.
The manifestation of the Notion, its Being for an Other,
is its existence, and the region in which this existence
shows itself is the finite spirit. This is the second point
— finite Spirit and finite consciousness are concrete. The
chief thing in this religion is to attain to a knowledge of
the process whereby God manifests Himself in the finite
spirit, and is identical with Himself in it. The third point
is the identity of the Notion and existence. Identity here
is, strictly speaking, an awkward expression, for what we
have in God is essentially life.
In the forms hitherto treated of we advanced from
what was lower to what was higher, and took as the
starting-point one definite form of existence regarded in
its different aspects. Being was first taken in its most
comprehensive aspect as contingent Being, in the Cosmo-
logical Proof. The truth of contingent Being is Being
necessary in-and-for-itself. Existence was then further
conceived of as involving relations of ends, and this
supplied us with the Teleological Proof. Here there is
an advance, a beginning from existence as actually given
and present. These proofs consequently form part of
the finite determination of God. The Notion of God is
that of something boundless, not boundless in the bad
sense, but rather as representing what has at the same
3&>
AMPLIFICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF 361
time the most determinate character possible, pure self-
•determination. These first proofs belong to the domain
of finite connection, of finite determination, since we start
with what is given. Here, on the other hand, the start-
ing-point is the free, pure Notion, and it is accordingly at
this stage that we meet with the Ontological Proof of
the existence of God. It constitutes the abstract meta-
physical basis of this stage. It was first discovered in
Christendom by Anselm of Canterbury. It was then
further developed by all the later philosophers, by
Descartes, Leibnitz, and Wolff, yet always along with
the other proofs, though it alone is the true one. The
Ontological Proof starts from the Notion. The Notion is
considered to be something subjective, and is defined as
something opposed to the object and to reality. Here it
constitutes the starting-point, and what we have got to
do is to show that Being, too, belongs to this Notion.
The exact method of procedure is as follows. The
Notion of God is first of all described, and it is shown
that He cannot be conceived of unless as including
Being in Himself. In so far as Being is separated from
the Notion, God exists in a merely subjective way in
our thought. As thus subjective He is imperfect, and
imperfection belongs only to finite Spirit. It has to be
shown that it is not only our notion which exists, but
that He exists independent of our thinking. Anselm
states the proof in the following simple form : God is
what is most perfect, beyond which nothing can be
thought of as existing ; if God is merely an idea, then
He is not what is most perfect. This, however, is in
contradiction with the first statement; for we consider
that as perfect which is not merely an idea, but which is
also possessed of Being. If God is merely subjective, we
could bring forward something higher which would be
possessed of Being as well. This is further developed as
follows. We begin with what is most perfect, and this
is defined as the most real Essence, as the Substance
362 AMPLIFICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
of all realities. This has been termed possibility. The
Notion as subjective, since it is distinguished from Being,
is merely what is possible, or at all events it ought
to be what is possible. According to the old Logic,
possibility exists only where it can be shown that no
contradiction exists. Realities are, in accordance with
this idea, to be considered as existing in God only in
their affirmative aspect, as limitless, and in such a way
that negation is supposed to be eliminated. But it is
easy to prove that in this case all that is left is the
abstraction of something which is one with itself. For
when we speak of realities we mean to imply that they
represent different characteristics, such as wisdom, right-
eousness, almighty power, omniscience. These character-
istics are attributes which may easily be shown to be in
contradiction with each other. Goodness is not right-
eousness; absolute power is in contradiction with wisdom;
for this latter presupposes final-ends. Power, on the
other hand, means the limitlessness of negation and
production. If, as is demanded, the Notion is not to
contradict itself, all determinateness must be dropped,
for every judgment or difference advances to the state
of opposition. God is the Substance of all realities, it is
said, and since one of these is Being, Being is conse-
quently united with the Notion. This proof maintained
itself until recent times, and we find it worked out par-
ticularly in Mendelssohn's " Morning Hours." Spinoza
defines the Notion or conception of God by saying that it
is that which cannot be conceived of apart from Being.
The finite is something whose existence does not corre-
spond to the Notion. The species is realised in existing
individuals, but these are transitory ; the species is the
Universal for itself. In the case of the finite, existence
does not correspond to the Notion. On the other hand,
in the case of the Infinite, which is determined within
itself, the reality must correspond to the Notion ; this is
the Idea, the unity of subject and object. Kant criticised
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 363
this proof, and the objections he urged against it were as
follows. If God is defined as the Substance of all reali-
ties, then Being does not belong to Him, for Being is no
reality. It makes no difference to the Notion or concep-
tion whether it exists or does not exist, it remains the
same. Already in Anselm's day this objection was urged
by a monk who said, " The fact of my forming an idea of
anything does not therefore imply that the thing exists."
Kant maintains that a hundred thalers really remain the
same whether I merely form an idea of them or actually
possess them ; consequently Being is not a reality, or real
predicate, since nothing is added by it to the Notion. Ifc
may be granted that Being is not any determinate con-
tent ; all the same, nothing certainly should be added to
the Notion. (We may remark in passing that to speak
of every wretched form of existence as a notion is to go
on quite wrong lines.) On the contrary, it should be rid
of the defect attaching to it in that it is merely some-
thing subjective, and is not the Idea. The Notion which
is only something subjective, and is divorced from Being,
is a nullity. In the form of the proof as given by
Anselm, the infinitude consists in the very fact that it
is not one-sided, something purely subjective to which
Being does not attach. The Understanding keeps Being
and the Notion strictly apart, and considers each as self-
identical. But even according to the ordinary idea the
Notion apart from Being is considered one-sided and un-
true, and so, too, Being in which there is no Notion is
looked on as notionless Being, Being which is inconceiv-
able. This antithesis which is found in finitude cannot
have any place in connection with the Infinite or God.
But it is the following circumstance which makes the
proof unsatisfactory. That most perfect and most real
existence is in fact a presupposition measured by which
Being for itself and the Notion for itself are one-sided.
Descartes and Spinoza defined God as the cause of Him-
self. Notion and existence form an identity ; in other
364 AMPLIFICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
words, God as Notion cannot be conceived of without
Being. What is unsatisfactory in this view is that we
have here a presupposition, and this means that the
Notion measured by this standard of hypothetical neces-
sity must be something subjective.
The finite and subjective, however, is not finite only
as measured by the standard supplied by that presuppo-
sition. It is finite in itself, and is consequently the anti-
thesis of itself. It is the unsolved contradiction. Being
is supposed to be distinct from the Notion. We may
imagine we can regard this latter as strictly subjective,
as finite ; but the essential characteristic of Being is in
the Notion itself. This finitude of subjectivity is done
away with in the Notion itself, and the unity of Being
and the Notion is not a presupposition relatively to the
latter, and by which it is measured. Being in its imme-
diacy is contingent, and we have seen that its truth is
necessity. The Notion necessarily involves Being, and
this is simple reference to self, the absence of mediation.
If we consider the Notion, we find it to be that in which
all difference is absorbed, and in which all determinations
are merely ideal. This ideality is mediation or difference,
which has been absorbed and removed, perfect clearness,
pure transparency, being at home with self. The free-
dom of the Notion is just absolute reference to self,
identity which is also immediacy, unity without media-
tion. The Notion thus has Being in itself potentially.
Its very meaning is that it does away with its one-sided -
ness. The idea that Being can be separated from the
Notion is a mere fancy. When Kant says that it is
impossible to extract reality from the Notion, he is think-
ing of the Notion as something finite. But the finite is
just what annuls itself ; and if we were to think of the
Notion in this way as divorced from Being, we should
just have that very reference to self which Being essen-
tially is.
The Notion, however, has not Being in itself potentially
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 365
only. It is not seen to be there merely 'by us ; but, on
the contrary, the Notion is actual Being, Being for itself
also. It abolishes its subjectivity, and objectifies itself.
Man realises his ends ; that is, what was, to begin with,
merely ideal loses its one-sidedness, and is consequently
made into something which has Being. The Notion
shows itself eternally in that activity whereby Being is
posited as identical with itself. In perception, feeling,
&c., we have outward objects before us; but we take
them up into ourselves, and thus the objects are ideal in
us. The Notion is thus the continuous act whereby it
abolishes its difference. When we regard closely the
nature of the Notion, we see that this identity with Being
is no longer a presupposition, but a result. The course
of procedure is as follows : the Notion makes itself ob-
jective, turns itself into leality, and is thus the truth,
the unity of subject and object. God is an immortal
living Being, says Plato, whose body and soul are united
in one. Those who separate the two sides do not get
beyond what is finite and untrue.
The standpoint which we here occupy is the Christian
one. "We have here the Notion of God in its entire
freedom. This Notion is identical with Being. Being
is the poorest of all abstractions ; but the Notion is not
so poor as not to contain this determination in it. We
have not to deal with Being in the poverty of abstraction,
in immediacy in its bad form, but with Being as the
Being of God, as absolutely concrete Being, distinguished
from God. The consciousness of finite Spirit is concrete
Being, the material for the realisation of the Notion of
God. Here it is not a question of any addition of Being
to the Notion, or merely of a unity of the Notion and
Being — such expressions are awkward and misleading.
The unity is rather to be conceived of as an absolute
process, as the living movement of God, and this means
that the two sides are distinguished from each other,
while the process is thought of as that absolute, con-
366 AMPLIFICATION OF ONTOLOGICAL PROOF
tinuous act of eternal self-production. Here we have
the concrete and popular idea of God as Spirit. The
Notion of Spirit is the Notion which has Being in-
and-for-itself, that is to say, knowledge. This infinite
Notion is negative reference to self. When thus posited
it is judgment, the act of distinguishing, self-differentia-
tion. But what is thus differentiated, and which at first
appears as something outward, devoid of Spirit, outside
of God, is really identical with the Notion. The develop-
ment of this Idea is the absolute truth. In the Christian
religion it is known that God has revealed Himself, and
it is the very nature of God to reveal Himself, and to
reveal is to differentiate. What is revealed is just that
God is the revealed God.
Religion must be something for all men ; for those
who have so purified their thought that they know what
exists in the pure element of thought, and who have
arrived at a philosophical knowledge of what God is, as
well as for such as have not got beyond feeling and
ordinary ideas.
Man is not merely pure thought. On the contrary,
thought manifests itself as perception or picture-thought,
or in the form of ordinary ideas. The absolute truth
which is revealed to Man must therefore exist for him
as a being who forms general ideas and sensuous images,
who has feelings and sensations. This is the mark by
which religion in general is distinguished from philosophy.
Philosophy thinks what otherwise exists only for the
ordinary idea and sensuous perception. Man who thus
forms general ideas, is in his character as Man a think-
ing being also, and the substance of religion comes to
him as a being who thinks. It is only a thinking being
that can have a religion, and to think is also to form
ideas, though the former act alone is the free form of
truth. The Understanding thinks too, but it does not
get beyond identity; for it the Notion is Notion, and
Being is Being. These two one-sided categories always
IN LECTURES ON PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 367
keep this one-sided form, so fur as it is concerned. In
their true nature, on the other hand, these finite forms
are no longer held to be inherently identical on the
ground that they are, but rather they are considered to
be merely moments of a totality.
Those who find fault with philosophy for thinking reli-
gion, for stating religion in terms of thought, don't know
what they want. Hatred and vanity here come directly
into play under the outward guise of humility. True
humility consists in having the spirit absorbed in the
truth, in losing ourselves in what is most inward, in having
within us the object, and the object only. Thus any-
thing subjective which may still be present in feeling,
disappears. We have to consider the Idea from the
purely speculative point of view, and to justify its claims
as against the Understanding, and against it as being
hostile to all content of religion whatsoever. This con-
tent is called a mystery, because it is something hidden
from the Understanding ; for the latter does not get the
length of the process which this unity is, and thus it is
that everything speculative, everything philosophical, is
for the Understanding a mystery.
INDEX
ABSOLUTE, the, i, 24, 66 : as the
One and as Power, ii. 140
Absolute religion, the, ii. 327 ; a
positive religion, 336 ; a religion
of freedom, 347
Adonis, myth of, ii. 85
Anaxagoras, ii. 55
Animals, worship of, i. 307 ; in
Egypt, ii. 94, 112
Aiiselm, i. 21 ; ii. 353; Hi. 159,
353. 36i
Antigone, the, 11. 264
Apologetics criticised, i. 152
Aristotle quoted, iii. 12, 29, 193,
320, 325. 349, 357, 361
Art, its origin and nature, i. 139;
Egyptian, ii. 114 ff. ; is religious,
114 ; in Greek religion, 273
Atonement, the, iii. 94
Authority, in religion, i. 224 ; in
Christian Church, iii. 125
BEAUTY, re'igion of, ii. 224
Being, denned, i. 122 ; ii. 350 ; and
God, iii. 203 ; as Nature, 223 ;
various meanings of, 233
Being and Notion, ii. 350 ; iii. 355
Bible, the, in Protestant Church,
i. 27 ; iii. 8l ; basis of Christian
doctrine, ii. 341 ; its sublimity,
ii. 1 88
Bb'hine, on the Trinity, ii. 32 ; on
Only- begotten, 37
Brahma, ii. II, 26 ; as thought, 31 ;
has no temple. 42
Brahmans, the, ii. 38
Buddha, ii. 50
Buddhism, ii. 48 ; compared with
Lamaism, 58
CATHOLIC religion, the, i. 254 ; iii.
103
Cat<>, i. 326
368
Causa Sui, iii. 320
Causes, general and special, i. 14 ;
cause and effect, ii. 291 ; iii. 321
Cavazzi on the Singhilli, i. 312
Charles X., ministry of, i. 257
China, the religion of, i. 335 ; a
moral religion, 340
Christ, history of, not myth. i. 146 ;
for the Church, iii. 113; not
merely a man, i. 226; the God-
Man, iii. 76, 89 ; Son of God
and Son of Man, 85, 121 ; and
Socrates, 77, 86, 144 ; teaching
of, 78, 82. 85 ; death of, 86, 87.
92, 97, 98 ; resurrection of, 91 ;
ascension of, 91, note; died for
all, 95 ; and the Idea, 113 ; mira-
cles of, 1 16; and His Apostles,
179
Christian religion, the, begins in
dualism, i. 17 ; commands us to
know God, 37 ; iii. 193 ; the re-
vealed religion, i. 84 ; the perfect
religion, ii. 330 ; polemical, as
kingdom of God, iii. 79 ; the
religion of Spirit, 107 ; truth of,
1 10 ; contrasted with Moham-
medan, 143
Church, Christian, the, its origin,
iii. 97, loo, 123 ; doctrine of, 124
Cicero, on the gods, ii. 309 ; on
Roman religion, 311
Confucius, i. 346
Cosmological Proof, ii. 144 ; iii.
238 ff. ; essential defect in, 259
Creation, conception of, ii. 155, 178 ;
iii. I
Creed, the, i. 27 ; creeds, iii. 126
Cross, the, ii. 255 ; its meaning,
iii. 89
DEAD, reverence for, i. 311 ; care
of, in Egypt, ii. 1 10
INDEX
369
Death, conception of, in Egyptian
religion, ii. 97
Descartes on God, iii. 363
Development in the finite religions,
i. 79
Devil, the, in Milton, iii. 49
Divine and human, severance of,
i. 239 ; union of, ii. 349 ; iii. 72,
129
Dogmas, considered of no moment,
i. 39 ; studied historically, 41 ;
ii. 345 ; in Christian Church, iii.
126
Dualism in Jewish religion, ii. 199
ECKHARDT quoted, i. 218
Egypt, religion of, ii. 101
Eleatics, the, i. 98 ; iii. 320, 325
Elevation to God, iii. 229
End, idea of, ii. 150, 289 ff.
England under the Stuarts, i. 249
" Enlightenment," defined, i. 29,
219; iii. 139; and philosophy,
148
Esquimaux, their religion, i. 294
Evil, i. 72; in the Bible, 133; in
Persian religion, ii. 73 ; in
Egyptian religion, 103 ; in Jew-
ish, 218 ; as reflection, iii. 53 ;
as opposed to good, 60 ; in Chris-
tianity, 129
Exegesis, its limits, i. 27 ; ii. 342
FAITH, a form of knowledge, i.
117; in relation to knowledge,
iii. 174 ff. ; as understood by
Reformers, i. 150; what it is,
21 1 ; iii. 114; breach between,
and thought, i. 226 ; iii. 161 ;
explains death of Christ, 87 ; and
miracles, 119; as Christian, 157
Fall, the, i. 271, 276 ; ii. 200, 218 ;
»»• 53
Fate, idea of, in Greek religion, ii.
169, 239, 261, 321 ; iii. 314
Father, kingdom of the, iii. 4 ; and
Son, 12, 37
Feeling, reliyious, i. 119, 125 ; iii.
1 80 ; has twofold character, i.
129; content of bad or good,
130; iii. 182; not a basis for
God, i. 137; and philosophy,
149 ; life of, iii. 184
Fetish worship, i. 309
Fichte, i. 228 ; iii. 68
Finite, the, and Infinite, i. 185, 200 ;
relation to the Infinite, iii. 293 ff.
VOL. III.
Foe, religion of, ii. 49
France under Robespierre, i. 257
Freedom, human, i. 227 ; of Spirit,
ii. 226 ; Greek idea of, 259
French, the, and the Catholic re-
ligion, i. 254
GOD, v. the Absolute, i. 24 j a
Trinity, 30 ; a living God, 33 ;
knowledge of, 36, 45, 191 ; iii.
190 ; not merely in feeling, i. 51 ;
defined, 90, 92 ; ii. 55, 126, 327,
348 ; the most universal person-
ality, i, 121 ; personality in, ii.
56 ; existence of, i. 167 ; iii.
155 ff. ; ex consensu gentium, 197 ;
as the One, ii. 135 ; attributes of
180; iii. 205, 217; Jewish, ii.
210; exists for Spirit, iii. 8; as
love, IO ; not defined by predi-
cates, 13 ; becomes man, 75 >
" God is dead," 91 ; as Creator,
176 ; i. 198 ; not jealous, iii. 193 ;
the Notion, 208 ; fellowship of,
with man, 303
Goethe, on classic art, ii. 253 ; on
design, iii. 349
Goodness, innate, criticised, i. 180,
192
Greek religion, a religion of
humanity, ii. 257 ; joyous, 261 ;
gods of, 230, 244 ; not symbolical,
285 ; compared with Roman, 300
HEAVEN, in Chinese religion, i. 337
Herodotus, on the Greek gods, i.
223 ; ii. 249 ; referred to, i. 295 ;
on immortality of soul, ii.
1 02 ; on Egyptian gods, 103,
III
Hesiod, on Chaos, ii. 229
Hindus, cosmogony of, ii. 17 ; re-
ligion of pantheistic, iii. 317
Homer, i. 315 ; ii. 262, 269
IDEA, the, defined, i. 21 ; ii. 329,
349 ; as divine self-revelation,
iii. 4; the speculative, 17
Idea, or ordinary thought, defined,
i. 143 ; dialectic of, 157
Idols and God, iii. 199
Immortality, of the soul : idea of,
necessarily connected with that
of God, i. 79, 314 ; and trans-
migration, ii. 63 ; Herodotus on,
IO2, I IO ; not in Jewish religion,
213; in Greek religion, 260 ;
2 A
370
INDEX
definite doctrine in Christian re-
ligion, iii. 105 ; immortality of
Spirit, iii. 57, 302
Incarnation, the, i. 7° > idea of,
pervades every religion, 77 ; its
importance, 151 ;. iii. 73
Incarnations, Indian, ii. 23
India, religion of, ii. I ff.
Indian literature, i. 285
Infinite and finite, i. 184, 325 ; iii.
259, 293. 299
Innocence, the state of, i. 272 ;
not the true state of Man, 279
JACOBI, quoted on faith, i. 118
Pantheism in system of, 333 ;
and Kant, iii. 250 ; on the know-
ledge of God, 282 ; on the Causa
Sui, 322
Jesus : was He the Son of God ?
iii. in ; belief in, 120
Jews, as chosen people, ii. 209
Job, Book of, ii. 193
KANT, his Critique of Pure Reason,
i. 55, 250 ; his moral standpoint,
228 ; on Teleological Proof, ii.
1 59 ; iii. 328 ; on Ontological
Proof, ii. 353 ; iii. 363 ; on Cos-
mological Proof, 238 ff. ; quoted,
68
Kingdom of God, the, iii. 78, 85,
135, 149 ; and Roman Empire,
90
Knowledge, denned, i. 119; iii.
162, 296 ; in relation to religion,
295 ; immediate knowledge, i. 42,
162
LAMAS, the, ii. 57
Life defined, iii. 336
Light, religion of, ii. 70
Love, God as, iii. 10 ; as understood
by Christ, 83 ; of Spiritual Com-
munity, 1 06
MAGIC, religion of, i. 290 ; prayer
as, 293
Man, and God, i. 228 ; his freedom,
244 ; ii. 223 ; as essential end,
165 ; in religion of sublimity,
191 ; and animals, 252 ; his real
nature, iii. 45 ; and Nature, 340 ;
knows God, 303 ; and religion, 366
Manicheism, iii. 297
Manu, code of, ii. 17
Marriage v. celibacy, i. 25 1
Mendelssohn on the Christian re-
ligion, i. 220 ; iii. 362
Middle Ages, i. 21, 101, 280, 285 ;
theology of, iii. 158
Miracles, as basis of faith, i. 218;
ii. 338 ; none amongst Hindus,
92 ; in Jewish religion, 187 ; re-
jected by Christ as criterion of
truth, i. 219; ii. 339; iii. 116;
how to be understood, 1 18; Spirit
the true miracle, 119
Mithras- worship, ii. 8 1
Mohammedan religion, ii. 198, 212,
297 ; contrasted with Christian,
iii. 143
Mongols, the, i. 296
Mysteries, Greek and Christian, ii.
283
Mystery, religion of, ii. 85
NATURE, design in, 1.12; not wor-
shipped in any religion, 8l ; and
Spirit, 108, 208 ; iii. 210 ; reli-
gion of, i. 270 ; in Jewish reli-
gion, ii. 184 ; in relation to Man,
iii. 42 ; organic and inorganic,
339 ; waste in, 344
Necessity, its various forms, ii. 141 ;
idea of, amongst the Greeks, iii.
^277, 314
Nemesis, ii. 240
Notion, the, what it is, i. 275; de-
fined, ii. 348 ; iii. 208 ; and
Being, 15, 222, 354; refuge of
religion, 147
OBSERVATION, standpoint of, criti-
cised, i. 176
(Edipus Coloneus, ii. 266, 288
One, conception of the, ii. 135
Ontological Proof, ii. 352 ; iii. 347 ff.,
360 ff.
Oracles, Greek, ii. 278
Osiris, in Egyptian religion, ii. 101 ;
identified with Nile, 107, 285
PANTHEISM, misunderstood, i. 96 ;
iii. 319; philosophy not, i. 214-
217 ; criticised, 333 ; ambiguity
of term, ii. 54 ; in Hindu reli-
gion, iii. 317
Paradise, i. 273, 279
ParmenSdes, i. 333 ; ii. 135 ; iii.
325, 326
Parsis, religion of the, ii. 77
Penitence, Christian and Hindu, ii.
37 ; denned, iii. 129
INDEX
Perception, i. 139
Phantasy, religion of, ii. I
Philosophy, does not produce reli-
gion, i. 4 ; antagonism of theology
to, 31 ; ii. 343 ; and Christian
doctrine, i. 38 ; and immediate
knowledge, 42; not Spinozism,
93 ; and religion, iii. 148, 157,
367 ; orthodox par excellence, ii.
345
Philosophy of Religion, i. 23 ; rela-
tion to philosophy, 23 ; to posi-
tive religion, 27 ; not opposed to
doctrine of Church, 32 ; re-estab-
lishes dogma, 37 ; its adversaries
shown up, 56 ; is the unfolding
of what God is, go ; a xmity, 100
Phcenix, the, ii. 84
Pietism, iii. 141
Plato, quoted, i. 165 ; on the Infinite,
200 ; Republic of, 255 ; on Trinity,
iii. 29 ; on God, 193, 343
Power, conception of, ii. 128, 132 ;
as wise, 154 ; as self -determining,
225
Prometheus, ii. 236
Proof, Physico-theological, ii. 156 ;
nature of, iii. 165
1 'roofs of existence of God, repre-
sent knowledge of God, i. 167 ;
iii. 155 ff., 226 S.
Property, idea of, ii. 214
Protestant Church and doctrine, iii.
159
Protestant States, i. 249
Protestantism, i. 252
Protestants, present day, i. 217 ;
view of priests and laymen, 249 ;
and the Bible, iii. 8 1
RACINE criticised, ii. 265
Reason, human and divine, i. 33 ;
and faith, 49 ; iii. 160 ; how can it
be examined ? i. 53 ; true home of
religion, 204 ; and dogma, iii. 159
Reconciliation, in Christian religion,
i. 17 ; ii. 347 ; iii. 124 ; in Greek,
ii. 286 ; denned, iii. 67 ; accom-
plished, 109, 129; in the world,
136
Reformation, the, i. 47
Religion, defined, i. I, 106, 206; ii.
327 ; iii. 229 ; and knowledge, i.
5, 15 ; and philosophy, 18 ; iii.
148, 366 ; consciousness of ab-
solute truth, i. 22 ; highest sphere
of consciousness, 54 ; conception
of, 60, 89 ; and secular life, 70 ;
revealed, 83 ; ii. 328 ; imposes
absolute obligation, i. 103 ; use
of figures in, 145 ; can it be
taught ? 149 ; the knowledge of
God, 167 ; in relation to autho-
rity, 224 ; to "the State, 246 ; ob-
jective, 262 ; as self-consciousness,
ii. 164 ; as national, 208 ; con-
trasted with religiousness, 330 ;
must exist in feeling, iii. 181 ;
for all men, 366 ; different re-
ligions moments of Notion, i. 79
Renunciation, its true meaning, i.
245
Revealed religion, ii. 328 ; the re-
ligion of Spirit, 335
Revolution, French, i. 256
Roman religion, ii. 298 ; self-seeking,
304; superstitious, 311 ; transi-
tion to Christian, 317; Roman
plays, 314
SACRAMENT, of the Supper, iii. 132 ;
of Baptism, 127
Sacrifice, its nature, i. 234 ; in
Jewish religion, ii. 218 ; in Greek,
268 ; of Christ, iii. 95
Schelling, his idea of God, ii. 53
Sin, original, i. 158
Socrates, ii. 286 ; compared with
Chr'st, iii. 77, 86 ; on Teleo-
logical Proof, 328
Son, kingdom of, iii. 5, 33; Son of
God not the world, 39
Sphinx, the, ii. 119, 122
Spinoza, on substance, i. 334 ; iii.
325, 327 ; philosophy of, ii. 55 ;
on God, 357 ; iii. 362
Spinozism, i. 92, 97, 98 ; said to
confuse good and evil, 99 ; sub-
stance in, 333 ; defect in, iii. 320
Spirit, the witness of, i. 43 ; ii.
339 ; essentially manifestation, i.
46; self-producing, 75; contrasted
with Nature, 108 ; is knowledge
of itself, 206 ; is eternal and im-
mortal, iii. 57, 302 ; the kingdom
of, IOI ; the true miracle, 119;
the Holy Spirit, 97, 107, 108,
Iio; attests Christ's mission, 113
Spiritual Community, the, iii. 100 ;
a communion of saints, 107
State, the, and religion, i. 70, 102,
246, 251 ; final stage of Spirit,
113; as end, ii. 296 ; realisation
of Divine, iii. 138
372
INDEX
Stoicism, iii. 63
Sublimity, religion of, ii. 170 ; God
in, 172
Substance, idea of, in religions, 5.
318; Oriental conception of, ii.
53 ; in Spinoza, iii. 325
Syrian religion, the, ii. 82
TELEOLOGY, ii. 148
Teleological Proof, ii. 157 ; iii.
328 ff., 347 ff.
Theologians, despise doctrine, i. 39 ;
criticised, 217 ; ii. 345
Theology, of reason, its nature, i.
28 ; contrasted with philosophy
of religion, 31 ; and the Bible, ii.
343
Thought, defined, i. 94 ; God exists
in, 132; contrasted with idea,
144 ff . ; eternal Idea present in,
iii. 7 ; and faith, 161
Trinity, dogma of the, i. 3 } ; mis-
understood, 159; expresses a
childlike relation, iii. 25 ; as a
speculative conception, 29 ; the
Indian, ii. 14; the Holy, iii. II ;
the Christian, 99
Truth v. certainty, iii. 178
Understanding, the, hates philo-
sophy, i. 32 ; religion of, ii. 288 ;
God a mystery to, iii. 17; and
reason, 22 ; and faith, 231 ; ami
proofs of existence of God, 265 ;
and God, 301 ; and contradiction,
306 ; religion a mystery for, 367
Universal, the, defined, i. 122
Utility, religion of, ii. 288 ; is the
Roman religion, 298
VEDAS, the, reading of, ii. 18
Voltaire on faith, i. 219
Vorstellung, or idea, defined, i. 143
WILL, the, iii. 50
"Word," the, ii. 17 ; iii. 31
Worship, its nature, i. 65, 67, 210 ;
special forms of, 229 ; as propitia-
tion, 240
ZOROASTER, ii. 77
THE END
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